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THE

HEGELIAN SYSTEM.

VOL. II.

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THE

SECRET OF HEGEL:

BEING

THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM

IN

ORIGIN, PRINCIPLE, FORM, AND MATTER.

BY

JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING.

'Μάντιν, ἣ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ——
—— Οὗτοι γὰρ κλητοί γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.'

'The Hidden Secret of the Universe is powerless to resist the might of thought; it must unclose itself before it, revealing to sight and bringing to enjoyment its riches and its depths.' HEGEL.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN, ROBERTS, & GREEN.
1865.

ERRATA,

Vol. II.—Pages 208, 216, in the phrase *after-process* strike out the hyphen.

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THE

SECRET OF HEGEL.

III.

THE SECTION, *QUALITY*, AS TRANSLATED IN II., HERE COMMENTED AND INTERPRETED.

DEFINITENESS (QUALITY).

THE language just encountered must appear very strange to the uninitiated English reader, and, perhaps, he may be inclined to attribute the circumstance to imperfection of translation. Let him be assured, however, that in German, and to the German student who approaches Hegel for the first time, the strangeness of the initiatory reception is hardly less repulsive than it has just proved to himself. There is no valid reason for despair, then, as regards intelligence here, because it is a *translation* that is before one, and not the *original*. To due endeavour, the Hegelian thought will gather round these English terms quite as perfectly, or nearly so, as round their German equivalents. Comment nevertheless is wanted, and will facilitate progress.

Bestimmen and its immediate derivatives constitute much the largest portion of the speech of Hegel. The reader, indeed, feels for long that with *Bestimmung* and *Bestimmung* he is *bestimmt* into *Unbestimmtheit*; and

even finds himself, perhaps, actually cursing this said *Bestimmung* of Hegel as heartily as ever Aristotle cursed the Idea of Plato. *Stimme* means *voice*, and the action of *Bestimmen* is to supply voice to what previously had none. As already said, then, Hegel's *Bestimmung* is a sort of naming of Adam: it is a process of Logical Determination—a process in which concrete determinateness, or determinate concretion, grows and grows in organised complexity up from absolute abstract indeterminateness or from absolutely indeterminate abstraction to a consummate Absolute. To Hegel what is, is Thought; and the *life* of Thought can only be Logical Determination, or the distinguishing (*differentia*ting) of indefinite abstraction (the *beginning* of Thought) into ultimate concrete definiteness (the *end* of Thought) by means of the operation of the faculties of Thought (Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason), to the resolution of the *Begriff* (the *An sich*, the indefinite *Universal*) through the *Ur-theil* (the *Für sich*, the separation into *Particulars*, into *Many*, as against *One*), and the production of the *Schluss* (the concrete *Singular*,) which is the All of Thought, Thought elevated into its ultimate and complete concretion as the absolute Subject (which again is the ultimate *An und für sich*).—This is a very complete expression for the industry of Hegel.—*Bestimmen*, then, is to develop in abstract Thought all its own constitutive, consecutive, and co-articulated members, or elements, or principles. *Bestimmen* attaches or develops a *Bestimmung*, and produces *Bestimmtheit*. *Bestimmen* is to *be-voice*, to *vocify*, *voculate*, render *articulate*, to *define*, *determine*, or *distinguish into the implied constitutive variety*: even *to accentuate* will be seen to involve the same function; or we may say *modulate*, then

modify—that is, *dis-cern* into *modi*—the native constituent modi. *Bestimmen* is the reverse of generalisation; instead of evolving a *summum genus*, it *involves* a *species infima*, or rather an *individuum*—not indeed *infimum*, but *summum*. Generalisation throws out *differentiæ*, *Bestimmung* (specification, singularisation) adds them. The one abstracts from *difference* and holds by *identity*; the other abstracts from *identity* and holds by *difference*. *Bestimmen*, then, is to produce, not Logical Extension, but Logical Comprehension (*Inhalt*), Logical Determination; it adds differentiæ or significates; it means to specify, to differentiate, to distinguish, to qualify, characterise, &c., or more generally, just to define or determine. *Bestimmtheit* has the sense in it of the past participle: it is a *differentiatum*, *specificatum*, *qualificatum*—just a Determinate, a Definite in general, or the quality of determinateness and definiteness; hence the meanings attached by Hegel himself to it of Form, Product, &c., and of Element when that word signifies, not a constitut*ing*, but a constitut*ed* element. *Bestimmung* may refer to the process as a whole, but it generally applies to a resultant member of this process: it is what corresponds to a predicate; it is a significate, a specificate, a differentia, &c.; it is a property, a peculiarity, a speciality, a particularity, a quality; it is a principle, a sign, an exponent, a constituent, and, in that sense, an element also. It may be translated character, characteristic, article, member, modus, determination, definition, trait, feature, *dodge*—even *wrinkle*, if you like. Then looking to the *use* of the *trait*, the senses *vocation*, *destination*, &c. are brought in. *Qualification* is another very useful word for it, and so likewise are *function*, *factor*, *term*, *expression*, *value*. *Bestimmtheit*, then, here

(in the text before us), is just definiteness, tangibleness, recognisableness—and that is always due to Quality.

Being, *Seyn*,—to understand this word, abstract from all particular Being, and think of Being in general, or of the absolute generality of Being. There must be no sense of personality attached to it, as is so common in England; nor, indeed, any sense of anything. The *common* element in the whole infinite chaos of all and everything that *is*, is Being. *Seyn*, in Germany, often in Hegel himself, means the abstraction of *sensuous Isness*: but here it is more general than that; it is the quality of *Isness*, *pur et simple*; it brings with it a sense at once of comprehensive universality and of ultimate principle. Carlyle ('Frederick the Great,' vol. iii. p. 408) says, '"Without Being," as my friend Oliver was wont to say, "Well-being" is not possible."' Cromwell had soldiers and other *concrete materiel* in his eye, when he said *Being* here; still put as Being, these are abstractly put. In like manner, we have here just to put, not soldiers, &c. only, but *all that is*, abstractly as Being. It refers, in fact, to the absolutely abstract, to the absolutely generalised thought of Being. In short, Being as Being must be seen to be a solid simple without inside or outside, centre or sides: it is just to be taken *an ihm selber*, absolutely abstractly; it is just the unit into which all variety, being reflected, has disappeared: it is the *an sich* of such variety.

The meaning of *Immediate*, *Unmittelbar*, will be got by practice: it just means *directly present*. Anything seen, felt, &c. is immediate. Being, then, is just what is indefinitely immediate to us. It (the term immediate) is derived from the Logical use of it as in *Immediate Inferences*, i.e. inferences without *intermediate* proposition. *Essentity* or *Essence*, *Wesen*, is inner or true, or

noumenal Being as opposed to outer, apparent, sensuous, or phenomenal Being. It is the *principle* of what *is* or *shows*. It may be translated also *Inbeing*, or *Principial Being*. By practice, however, the Hegelian *Wesen* will attach itself even to *Essence*, once the thought is seen. It is evident that, the thought of pure or abstract *Seyn* being realised, there is no call for any reference to the thought of *Wesen*. Absolutely abstract Being seems self-substantial, and awakens no question of a *whence* or *what*; it is thus free from any determination which it might receive by being related to Essence: in this absolute generalisation, indeed, *Seyn* and *Wesen* have coalesced and become indistinguishable. But it is as opposed to *Wesen* that *Seyn* acquires the sensuous shade already spoken of. In that contraposition, *Seyn* is phenomenal show; it is the *Seyn* of *Wesen*, and so outer, and very outer—a palpable *crust*, as it were, which very tangibly *is*. As yet, as we have said, our *Seyn* is the abstraction *from* all that is, and so the common element *of* all that is. It is to be said and seen, also, that the two shades of *Seyn* tend to run together, for, after all, each at last only implies *immediacy* to consciousness.

In itself (*An sich*), italicised, means *in itself* as virtually, impliciter, or potentially *in itself*: it is the δύναμις of Aristotle. At the end of the first paragraph, we have also an 'in its own self' which is not italicised: this is a translation of the peculiarly Hegelian German, *an ihm selber*,—an innovation on his own tongue to which Hegel was compelled in order to distinguish another and current shade of meaning which might confuse the sense he wished to attach to *an sich*. *An ihm selber*, in fact, implies, not the mere *latent* potentiality of *an sich*, but a certain *overt* potentiality, a

certain manifestation, a certain actuality, a certain assonance to the Aristotelian ἐντελέχεια. Hegel intimates that *an sich*, with the accent not on *sich*, but on *an*, may be viewed as equivalent to *an ihm*. But *an sich*, on the whole, in the passage referred to, has taken on a shade of meaning quite peculiar to the place. In this latter case what is *an ihm* is to be regarded as Seyn-für-Anderes, and so *outwardly an ihm* (*in it*). Hegel illustrates the meaning here by the common expressions, *there is nothing in him* or *in it*, or *there is something in that*, and seems to see implied in these a certain parallelism or identity between what is latent *in itself*, and what is overt *in it*. The addition of the *selbst* or *selber* introduces another shade, and renders the task of a translation still more difficult; for in English *an ihm selber* is *in itself* quite as much as *an sich*. To separate the words, as in the first German phrase, and say *in it self*, would be hardly allowable. Perhaps the plan actually adopted is as good as any: that is, to italicise *in itself* when it stands for *an sich*, and to leave it without such distinction, or write it, as here, 'in its own self' (also without italics), when it represents *an ihm selbst* or *selber*. What is intended to be conveyed by the text *Seyn an ihm selber*, Being in its own self, is not hard to make out: it just means Being as (when abstractly thought) it is there before us overtly in its own self, and without reference to another or any other. *An sich*, then, implies potential latency; *An ihm selber*, irrespective selfness, or irrespective, self-dependent overtness; and *An ihm*, such overtness connected with and equivalent to such latency. Again, these terms will occur in Hegel, not always in their technical senses, but sometimes with various shades, and very much as they occur in other writers. It must

be confessed, indeed, that it is these little phrases which constitute the torment of everyone who attempts to translate Hegel. *An*, for example, in the phrase *an ihm*, is often best rendered by the preposition *by*. *An*, in fact, is not always coincident with the English *in*. *An* denotes proximity, and is often best translated by *at* or *by*: nay, in all of the three phrases above, the substitution of *at* or *by* for *in* will help to illustrate the contained meaning. Consider the phrase 'Das Seyn scheint am Wesen,' which we may translate, the Phenomenon shows *in* the Noumenon; would not the sense seem to be more accurately conveyed by, the Phenomenon shows *by* the Noumenon, or even by, the Phenomenon shows *at* the Noumenon? When *an* refers to overtness or manifestation, then, we may translate it *by*.

There-being or *Here-being* is the translation of *Daseyn*, and is an unfortunate necessity. *Existence* might have answered here; but Existence, being reserved by Hegel to name a much later finding, is taken out of our hands. What a German means by *Daseyn* is, this mortal sojourn, this sublunary life, this being here below; and what Hegel means by it, is the scientific abstract thought implied in such phrases. It is thus mortal *state*, or the quality of sublunariness; it is existential definiteness, or definite existentiality, and implies reference thus to another or others. It is determinate Being, — Here-being, There-being, Now-being, or, best perhaps, *So*-being or *That*-being; it is the quasi-permament moment of Being that manifests itself between *Coming to be* and *Ceasing to be*; it is the *to-be* (Seyn) common to both phrases: and this constitutes the perfectly correct abstract description, or thought (the notion), of every single Daseyn or

Here-being, or So-being, and consequently of Daseyn, Here-being, So-being, as such.

Being-for-self is the literal rendering of *Fürsichseyn*; which, indeed, cannot be translated otherwise. It means the reference of all the constituents of an individuality, of a personality, of a self, to the punctual unity of that individuality, or personality, or self: it is the focus in the draught of the whole huge whirlpool,—that whereby its Many are One. *For*, however, does not completely render *Für*. The German, when much intruded on, exclaims, 'One can never be *Für sich* here!' Vowels also are described as letters which *für sich* sound, consonants not so. *Für sich*, then, is the Latin *per se* and a little more: it expresses not only independence of others, but occupation for oneself. Were a Voter, when asked, 'Whom are you for?' to reply, 'For myself,' he would convey the German *für mich*. That is *für sich* which is on its own account. By *Fürsichseyn*, *Being-for-self*, then, we are to understand a being *by* one's own self and *for* one's own self.

Generally, in reading Hegel, let us bear both the current and the etymological meanings in mind. That *finite* is literally *ended* or *limited*, *infinite unended* or *unlimited*, must not be lost sight of, for example. Finally, I will just add this, that almost all the technical terms of Hegel appear in Kant also, especially in his 'Logic,' where much light is thrown upon them as used, not by the latter only, but by the former likewise.

CHAPTER I.

BEING.

A. *Pure Being.*—B. *Nothing.*—C. *Becoming:* 1. *Unity of Being and Nothing.*

The explanation of *terms* which we have just given seems sufficient for the above sections also; and we may now apply ourselves to some interpretation of the particular *matter*, confining our attention for the present to what of text precedes Remark 1. We shall rely upon the reader perusing and re-perusing, and making himself thoroughly familiar with all he finds written in the paragraphs indicated.

All that they present has remained hitherto a universal stumbling-block, and a matter of hissing, we may say at once, to the whole world. Probably, indeed, no student has ever entered here without finding himself spell-bound and bewildered, spell-bound and bewildered at once, spell-bound and bewildered — if he has had the pertinacity to keep at them and hold by them — perhaps for years. When the bewilderment yields, however, he will find himself, it is most likely, we shall say, putting some such questions as the following: — 1. What has led Hegel to begin thus? 2. What does he mean by these very strange, novel, and apparently senseless statements? 3. What can be intended by these seemingly silly and absurd transitions of Being into Nothing, and again of both into Becoming? 4. What does the whole thing amount

to; or what is the value of the whole business? These questions being satisfactorily answered, perhaps Hegel will at last be found accessible.

1. *What has led Hegel to begin thus?*—To this question, the answer is brief and certain: Hegel was led to begin as he did in consequence of a profound consideration of all that was implied in the Categories, and other relative portions of the philosophy, of Kant. But in order to awaken intelligence and carry conviction here, it is obviously incumbent upon us to do what we can to reproduce the probable course of Hegel's thinking when engaged in the consideration alluded to. No doubt, for a full explanation, there is necessary such preliminary exposition of the industry of Kant as has been spoken of as likely to follow the present work; but, pending such exposition, we hope still to be able to describe at present Hegel's operations, so far as Kant is concerned, not unintelligibly.

The speculations peculiar to Hume generally, and more especially those which bear on Causality, constitute the *Grundlage*, the *fundamen*, the mother-matter of the products of Kant. Now in this relation (of Causality) there are two terms or factors, the one antecedent and the other consequent; the former the cause, and the latter the effect. But if we take any cause by itself and examine it *à priori*, we shall not find any hint in it of its corresponding effect: let us consider it ever so long, it remains self-identical only, and any mean of transition to another — to aught else — is undiscoverable. But again, we are no wiser, should we investigate the matter *à posteriori*: that the effect follows the cause, we see; but *why* it follows— the reason of the following — the precise mean of the

nexus — the exact and single copula — this we see not at all. The source of the nexus being thus undiscoverable, then, whether *à priori* or *à posteriori*, it is evident that causality is on the same level as what are called *Matters of Fact*, and that it cannot pretend to the same authority as what again are called *Relations of Ideas*. Did it belong to these latter — examples of which are the axioms and other determinations of Mathematic—it would be both *necessary* and *intelligibly* necessary; but as it belongs only to the former class, the weight of its testimony—its validity — can amount to probability only. That a straight line is the shortest possible from any *here* to any *there*, I *see* to be universally and necessarily true—from Relations of Ideas; but that wood burns and ice melts, I see to be true only as — Matters of Fact, which *are* so, but *might*, so far as any reason for the state of the fact is concerned, be otherwise: they are, in truth, just matters of fact, and relations of ideas do not exist in them. Matters of Fact, then, are probable; but Relations of Ideas are apodictic, at once necessary and universal. Causality now belonging to the former, it is evident that the nexus between the fire and the burning of wood (say) is but of a probable nature. The fire burns the wood, I perceive; but it might not: the affair concerns contingent matter only, and no examination of the relation, either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, can detect any reason of necessity. Causality, then, as presenting itself always in matters of fact, and as exhibiting neither *à priori* nor *à posteriori* any relation of ideas, cannot claim any authority of necessity. Why, then, when I see a cause, do I always anticipate the effect; and why, when I see an effect, do I always refer to a cause? Shut out, for an answer here, from

the relations of ideas, and restricted to matters of fact, I can find, after the longest and best consideration, no ground for my anticipation but *custom*, *habit*, or the *association* (on what is called the law of the Association of Ideas) of things *in expectation* which I have found once or oftener *associated in fact*; for so habitual becomes the association, that even *once* may be found at times to suffice.—Thus far Hume.

But now Kant—who has been much struck by the curious new truths so ingeniously signalised by Hume, and who will look into the matter and not shut his eyes, nor exclaim (as simply Reid did, in the panic of an alarmed, though very worthy and intelligent, divine), 'God has just put all that in our souls, so be off with your sceptical perplexings and perplexities'—(Neither will he pragmatically assert, like Brown, Causality is a relation of an *invariable* antecedent and an *invariable* consequent, and absurdly think that by the *use* and not the *explanation* of this term *invariable* (which is the whole problem) he has satisfactorily settled all!)—now Kant, who is neither a Reid nor a Brown, but a man as able as Hume himself, steps in and says, this nexus suggested by you (Hume) between a cause and its effect, is of a subjective nature only; that is, it is a nexus in me, and not in them (the cause and the effect); but such nexus is inadequate to the facts. That this *unsupported paper* falls to the *ground*—the reason of that is not in me surely, but in the objects themselves; and the reason of my expectation to find the same connexion of events (as between *unsupported paper* and *the ground*) is not due to something I find in myself, but to something I find in them. I cannot intercalate any custom or habit of my own as the reason of that connexion. True, as you say, neither *à priori*

nor *à posteriori* can I detect the *objective* copula; and true it is also that we have before us only contingent matter or Matters of Fact: nevertheless, the nexus is such that mere custom is inadequate to explain it. The nexus is such, indeed, that (as Brown might say, and did say as against Hume, though merely assertively and so that, for ultimate answer, he simply settled down at last in Reid's answer, to which one would have thought from all his fighting he was diametrically opposed—'the will of the Divine Being') it introduces an element of *invariability*, and custom evidently cannot reach as far as that; so that the question remains, why are the objects invariably connected in our expectation—why, in short, is the relation of causality as necessary and as universal in its validity as any axiom of Mathematic, as any one of those very Relations of Ideas from which it has but this moment been expressly excluded? *Every change* (*effect*) *has its cause*: this is a truth of no probable nature; we say, we see that cork floats, but it might not; but we cannot say we see that change has its cause, but it might not: on the contrary, we feel, we know, that change *must*—and *always*—have its cause. Now, the source of this Necessity and Universality—that is the question, and lie where it may, it very plainly cannot be an effect of any mere subjective condition of ourselves, of any mere anticipation through habit.* Hume certainly has shut us out—though very oddly he himself (in custom) had recourse to such—from all *à posteriori* sources; for

* It is sufficiently curious to perceive that Brown, when he said '*invariable connexion is Causality, and we know all the cases of such connexion by the will of the Divine Being*,' fancied himself to be saying something against Reid, or something for or against Hume—or just fancied himself to be philosophising indeed!

whatever is known *à posteriori*, or by experience, is but a Matter of Fact, and therefore probable only, or contingent only. But, if the source cannot be *à posteriori*, *it must be à priori*. Hume, to be sure, talks of an *à priori* consideration in this very reference (Causality); but there must be another and truer *à priori* than the *à priori* of Hume. Now, first of all, what is it that we name the *à posteriori?* That is *à posteriori*, the knowledge of which is due to experience alone; and the organ of experience is perception, sensation, inner or outer; inner for affections from within, and outer for affections from without. But Locke traces all our knowledge to affection either of outer or of inner sense, therefore all our knowledge must be *à posteriori*. But this is manifestly erroneous; for in that case, there could be no apodictic, no necessary and universal knowledge at all: but there is such knowledge—universally admitted, too—in what are called relations of ideas; and Causality seems itself—though with a difference—another instance of the same kind. This latter knowledge, then, (the apodictic,) cannot be *à posteriori*, and, consequently, it must be *à priori*. But besides sensuous affection, we possess only intellectual function: if the former be the source and seat of the *à posteriori*, then, the latter may be the source and seat of the *à priori*. But that being so, the necessity of Causality must still have its seat in the mind, in us; or, in other words, its source must be subjective—and we have just declared a subjective source impossible! Again, we have just said also that Causality concerns contingent matter: change itself is only known *à posteriori* or by experience! Here seem great difficulties. How can what is only *à posteriori* obey what can only be *à priori?* And how can an *à priori* or necessary truth have a sub-

jective source, or belong to the mind only? As has been seen already also and just said, this necessity of Causality is not the only truth that cannot be *à posteriori*; we are led to enlarge the problem to the admission of the whole sphere named *Relations of Ideas*. Relations of Ideas! The phrase belongs to Hume himself, and he admits the necessity involved: did Hume, then, never ask whence are they? and did he unthinkingly fancy that, though Ideas themselves—as but derivative from Matters of Fact—were contingent and probable, the Relations that subsisted among them might be apodictic and necessary? Had Hume stumbled on such considerations as these, he would have been led into a new inquiry; he would have been forced to abandon his theory of all our knowledge being limited to Impressions of Sense and resultant Ideas of Reflection; he would have been forced to see that, as there are apodictic truths, there must be a source of knowlege *à priori* as well as *à posteriori*, and that all our Ideas are not necessarily copies of our Impressions. Stimulated by the example of Causality, too, he might have been led to see that the element of necessity did not restrict itself to Relations of Ideas only, but associated itself with contingent matter, with Matters of Fact as well; and might have asked, therefore, are there not, besides Causality, other such examples of an apodictic force in *à posteriori* or contingent matter?—what is the whole sphere of necessary knowledge, as well pure as mixed?—and what is the peculiar source of all such knowledge? In this way, he might have been led to perceive that apodictic matter, impossibly *à posteriori*, must be *à priori*, and an *à priori* which had attained new reaches. He had talked, for example, of examining a cause *à priori* in search of

its effect, as has been already remarked: but, after all, this *à priori* is *à priori* only as regards the effect; after all, any knowledge gained by the examination would be of an *à posteriori* nature. The true *à priori*, then, must be anterior, not to this and that experience, but to all experience; it must concern a knowledge that is not empirical, that reaches us not from elsewhere through a channel of sense. Plainly, then, it must be an element confined to the mind itself; and plainly also, lie where it may, it must lie elsewhere than in sensation. Now, it is this *elsewhere than in sensation* that gives the cue and clue to the possibility of an element of necessity *subjective* as *in us*, but of an *objective* VALIDITY and of an *objective* RÔLE. Sensation being excluded, there remains for us the understanding only; and it is not so difficult to surmise that principles of the understanding—a faculty that concerns insight, discernment, evidence—may bring with them their own authority. The contributions of sensation, for example, are wholly subjective in this sense, that they are mine only, or yours only, or his only—that they are incapable of communication, and, consequently, incapable likewise of comparison. An odour, a savour, a touch, a sound, a colour, affects me, affects you, affects him; but the affection of each is peculiar and proper to himself; we cannot show each other our affections; that is, they are incommunicable and incapable of comparison. But it is different with the contributions of understanding: these bring their own evidence; this evidence is the same to all of us; it can be universally communicated, and universally compared. Now, a validity of this nature may be correctly named *objective*, for *it is independent of every subject.* An objective *rôle*, again, implies that the possessor of such rôle presents itself

with and *in* objects. *A priori* principles, then, will be principles peculiar to the understanding only; *subjective* in that they have their source *in the mind, in us*, but *objective* in that they possess *a universal and necessary validity independent of every subject*; and *objective*, perhaps, also in this, that though subjective *in origin*, they present themselves *with* and *in* objects *in every event of actual experience*. In this manner, we can see the possibility of an apodictic element both pure and mixed. In fact, we see that the whole business was opened, when we opposed sensuous affection to intellectual function, and assigned the *à posteriori* to the one and the *à priori* to the other. This very sentence, indeed, is *the* key to German Philosophy; it is a single general expression for the operations as well of Hegel as of Kant. German Philosophy, as we all know, begins with the question: How are Synthetic Judgments *à priori* possible? Now to this question, the answer of Kant—and the answer is his system—is, Intellectual Function with the *à priori* sensuous forms, or sensuous *species*—Space and Time; while the answer of Hegel—implying in his case a system also—is, Intellectual Function alone.*

But to apply this to Causality—how find in the mind a principle correspondent to something so very outward and *à posteriori*, and yet so apodictic and

* The antithesis of *matters of fact* and *relations of ideas* is virtually identical with that of *sensuous affection* and *intellectual function*. Unnamed, it underlies the whole thing. Hume shut himself out from relations of ideas by erroneously seeing (in Causality, &c.) matters of fact only. Kant was driven by the *evidence* for peculiar *validity* of causality to what was *in effect* relations of ideas. Hegel, *in effect*, has only cleared relations of ideas into their *system*—that crystal skeleton which, the whole *truth* of the concrete, of sensuous affection, of matters of fact, underlies and supports the same. Of this, so to speak, invisible skeleton Causality is but one of the bones.

necessary? Now the intellect, or the understanding, is just Judgment; and Judgment has functions, of which functions the various classes of propositions (which are but decisions or judgments of Judgment) are the correspondent Acts. Now the hypothetical class of propositions points to a function of Judgment which we may name Reason and Consequent. Evidently at once here is a function of Judgment, the sequence of the elements of which is exactly analogous to the sequence of the elements of Causality. The state of the case is not yet free from great difficulty, however. Assuming the function of Reason and Consequent to be the mental archetype of Causality, how are we to connect it with contingent matter, and reduce it into a relation which—*within* us as Reason and Consequent—comes to us actually from *without* in the shape of innumerable real causes and innumerable real effects? This very important portion—so suggestive as it proved to Hegel—of Kant's industry is wholly unknown in England, and seems to have been universally neglected (unless by Hegel) in Germany. If the reader will take the trouble to turn up the works of Sir William Hamilton, he will find Kant's theory relegated to that class which names Causality only a special and peculiar mental principle, and nothing more. Of the deduction of the principle—and in a System of such—from the very structure of the mind itself, and of the laborious succession of links whereby it is demonstrated to add itself *to* outward facts and come back to us *with* the same, there is not one word in Hamilton. He knows only that Kant opines Causality to be *a peculiar mental principle!* In short, no *Ahnung*, not even a *boding* of the true state of the case, seems ever to have dawned on this great German scholar, who knew the

Germans just so well and intimately that he annihilated them all! It is amusing to observe the self-assured Sir William fooling himself to the top of his bent with his sharp distinctions and well-poised divisions about Kant violating the law of parsimony, postulating a new and express principle, while *he*, for his own vast part, on the contrary, &c. &c. ! ! ! Hamilton, however, introduces into his own theory (!) a certain relativity of time; and relativity of time—but with something of a claim to coherency and sense, the while—belongs to the theory of Kant also.—Now, one can believe that Hamilton was at least an ardent manipulator of the *leaves* of books.

Time it was that became in the hands of Kant the medium of effecting the reduction in question, or that connexion between the inner and the outer which was manifestly so necessary. It will not be required of us at present, however, to track the probable heuristic course of Kant any further in this direction. Suffice it to say, that the desire to incorporate an inner law with outer bodies—especially in such a reference as Causality—necessarily led Kant to a consideration of Space and Time. The result of this consideration was, that space and time, though *perceptive* objects and so far *sensuous*, were *à priori* and so far intellectual, so far appertinent to the mind itself. In this way, there was *à priori* or native to the mind, not only function, but affection: both being side by side in the mind, then, function had affection in its clutch, or Unity had a Many on which it might exercise its energy. A *schema*, an *à priori schema* was thus formed, into which matter from without—that is, empirical or *à posteriori* matter—had to fit itself—to the eventual production of

the formed, of the rational, of the ruled and regulated —universal context of Experience.

Indeed, thought Kant, how can it be otherwise? The *à posteriori* is but affection: we are, of course, acted on from without, but we know only the resultant affections set up. These are within us: they have no system in themselves, they are wholly contingent: this system which they so much require, they can only obtain within us, and the understanding alone is what is adequate to the want. In the end, the affections of sense were found to be construed *into* the formed universe, *through* the *à priori* perceptive spectra, Space and Time, and *under* the synthetic energy of the various functions of Apperception. Lastly, the various syntheses of these functions were named Categories.—Causality, then, is but a function of Apperception, externalised into, and coming back to us from, or with, actual outer objects, through the media, sensuous but *à priori*, or *à priori* but sensuous, of Space and Time. Now, observe what the world has become! It is now wholly in us; but we to it are quite formal: we are but the subjectivity that actualises it, as it were, into life; *it* is function and affection—*it* is the *matter* within us: abstracting from ourselves then, that matter of function and affection remains, and the world is this: There are intellectual syntheses (categories), there are Space and Time, there are Empirical Affections. But, narrowly looked at—and this is a consequence of Kant's own industry, though it never occurred to Kant—empirical affections, as well as Space and Time, are but externalisations of the categories, are but outwardly what the categories are inwardly. The categories, then, are truly *what is*; the categories are the true essence of the universe: in the categories we have to look for the ultimate prin-

ciples, and the ultimate principle of everything that is. This is what occurred to Hegel; and it is here that he receives the torch from the hands of Kant, and proceeds to carry it further. *Intellectual Function* is the secret, then: almost it would seem as if the work of Kant and Hegel were but a new analysis of the human mind, a new statement of its constituent elements, an identification of this mind and these elements with, an enlargement of this mind and these elements to, the mind and elements of God—and all so that creation should be seen to be but the *other* of this mind and these elements—to be but the external counterpart of these, its internal archetype and archetypes. Now this is probably the shortest and clearest general view we have yet attained to; but we cannot stop here—the uninitiated reader must be carried more deeply into the details still, before he can be dismissed as competently informed. Nevertheless, it will always be of use to bear in mind that the ultimate proposition of Hegel seems to be this: To know all the Functions which Affections obey, and to demonstrate the presence of the former everywhere in the latter, would be at once to know the Absolute, and to complete Philosophy.

Let us look well at these categories, then, says Hegel, and consider them in their own absolute truth. First of all, then, there are the four capital Titles, as Kant names them, Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. Now, of these the first three are evidently objective and material, while the last is only subjective and formal: the first three concern the constitution and construction of objects themselves, the last only their relation to us. But to the development of the absolute world, we abstract from ourselves, and it would seem, therefore, as if we must abstract also from this modality

of Kant. Things exist in Quantity, Quality, and Relation; and this division seems complete in itself. As for Subjectivity—and it is subjectivity that modality involves—it is a sphere apart; Subjectivity, in short, implies Things and something more. Things have their own laws; but Subjectivity appears in an element which, while implying laws of its own, involves subjection to those of things also. Subjectivity, then, appears a higher stage, and it seems necessary to complete things or objectivity first.

The first glance of Hegel, then, eliminates for the nonce modality, and we have to see him now employed on Quantity, Quality, and Relation. Now, are these the most universal of all objective categories, and are they complete? Again, this being so, are they deducible the one from the other, and all from a common principle which is obviously the *First* and the *Fundament*? The categories being the Absolute, being truly *What is*, it is evident that their completion—and in a system—would constitute, at last, Philosophy. They cannot, then, be left standing as we receive them from Kant. Notwithstanding that Kant derives them from the functions of Judgment, actual analysis fails; they have not in him the *architectonic* oneness and fulness which he himself desiderates, but rather that *rhapsodic* appearance of undeducedness and incompleteness which he himself abhors. They look meagre, disconnected, arbitrary: we instinctively refuse to accept them as the inner and genetic archetypes of all that is. We must be better satisfied in their regard: they must be larger and fuller somehow: we must trace them both up to their necessary source, and down into all the ramifications of their completed system. In this way, we shall have the crystal of the universe, the diamond net into which

the whole is wrought, God and the thoughts of God before the birth of time or a single finite intelligence, or even entity. Idealism thus would be finished and complete. Thought would constitute the universe: the universe would simply be thought, thought in its two reciprocal sides, thought inner and thought outer. The proper name for Philosophy in this case would be Logic; for, indeed, the all of things would simply be reduced to Logic. Nay, Logic would be the Absolute —Logic would supplant and replace Theology itself. The chaos of this universe, in fact, that stands before ordinary intelligence, would shapingly collapse into the law and order and unity of a single life—a life which we should understand—a life which each of us should participate—*modally*. The Substance, Attribute, and Modus of Spinoza would thus be realised, would thus have flesh on their bones, and be alive and actual. These are grand thoughts, suggestive of a close at last to the inquest of man: we must complete them: we must take up the lead that Kant has given us: we must strike boldly through the gate which he—led up to it by Hume—has been the first to open to us! Let us look well to what he has done, then; let us follow all his steps; above all, let us look again into all the materials he has collected as categories. What we have to do is to complete their Many, and to find their One: what we have to do is to demonstrate the All, and in co-articulation with the *Principium*—with that which is *first* and *one* and *inderivative*!

As regards their One, that in Kant is Apperception, Judgment; but Judgment is only a single moment of Logic: there remain two others—Simple Apprehension and Reason. The last, certainly, Kant has drawn into consideration, but perhaps imperfectly; and, as regards

the second (the first in the rubric), he has not thought of it at all. But, if Logic is to be considered the principle of the whole—(and why should not Logic constitute the principle of the whole?—what God has created must be but an emanation of his own thought, of his own nature; and do we not know that man, so far as he is a Spirit, is created in the likeness of God?—why, then, should not Logic, which is the crystal of man's thought, be the crystal also of God's thought, and the crystal as well of God's universe—of that universe which, as God's universe, must be but the *re*alisation, the other side, of God's thought?)—if Logic, then, is to be the principle of the whole, we must be serious with Logic, and take it together in all its parts. Simple Apprehension, then, is a moment no more to be omitted than any of the rest.

But, possessing the light of system and unity which Kant's demand for an architectonic principle has kindled in us, we cannot be content with Logic itself in these mere chapters and headings, in this mere side-by-side of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason: they, too, must be organically fused into a concrete unit, which unit were evidently the ultimate or basal unit, the absolutely primordial cell—in other words, the Absolute itself. But is this possible?—can we view these as but elements of a single pulse, moments of a single movement? Yet, again, what we are contemplating is a principle too subjective for our objects as yet, and we seem to be tending too much to the standpoint of Kant. Kant held by Appereeption and a subjective idealism: Kant postulated an elsewhere which, received into our organs, only so and so affected us, only so and so appeared to us in consequence of the constitution peculiar, not to it (the elsewhere, the thing-in-

itself), but to them (the organs). In this way, knowledge could only be phenomenal and provisional. But it is not so that we would view the problem: we eliminate subjectivity in the first instance; we stretch out the threads of the categories as the primordial and essential filaments; on these we lay the particularised universe of things;—and then we say, Behold the world, Behold *what is*! With such design before us, then, we cannot *begin* with Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason: these, as named, concern subjectivity; and even if they are the ultimate moments of the All, we must have them in another form before we can lay them down as objective categories of foundation and support. We can talk of Quantity, Quality, and Relation, for these are objective, and all things submit to their forms. But the moments of Logic in the form of the moments of Logic are too subjective to serve a similar purpose: in such form, they seem alien to things. The moments of Logic in such form, then, will not answer *as a beginning*, however much they may constitute the true rhythm of all things. In other words, the Logical movement is the ultimate principle—but we do not find it *in the beginning* in that form; it has a preliminary path to describe before reaching the same.—But let us look again at the categories as we find them in Kant.

Well, we look at them—and it is to be seen, without difficulty, that they are but results of generalisation. The question occurs, then, has this process reached completion, or is it susceptible of being carried further? Again, in the latter event, might not, in ultimate generalisation, a category be anticipated which should be the category of categories, or the Notion of Notions; for Kant himself calls the categories Notions,

Stammbegriffe, root-notions. The notion of notions!—well, but we have just seen that the logical movement must be the fundamental principle; if, in another way, therefore, a notion of notions is to emerge with a claim to the like authority and place, the two results must coincide and be identical. In other words, this ultimate generalisation, this last abstraction, which is the notion of notions, will constitute the first form of the logical pulse—and, in general, just the beginning that we want. This logical pulse, too, being coincident with the ultimate category or notion of notions, is capable of being regarded as κατ' ἐξοχήν *the* Notion.

But the categories are, so to speak, *concrete* abstractions: they possess a filling, contents, matter, an implement, a complement, an ingest, an intent, a tenor, a purport, an import (Inhalt): Quantity possesses universality, particularity, singularity; Quality, affirmation, negation, limit; Relation, substance, causality, reciprocity. The ultimate Category, or the Notion, then, being also a *concrete* abstraction like the rest, will possess a filling of its own; and this filling or matter must be the universal of all these fillings or matters. Each of these matters, again, must be but *a* particular of it (the matter of the Notion), as universal. They, then, thus particulars of the same universal, must be mutually related and affiliated as congruent differences of the same identity.—But in this last phrase we have a hint given us as to how we should regard the matter of *the* Notion. These words *identity* and *difference* can be used in description of the first two moments of the matter of *all* the Titles. Under Quantity, *Universality*, not only in its notion, but in its very name, points to unity or *identity*; while *Particularity*, again, is but *difference*—the *particulars* are

but the *differences* of the *universal*, the *species* but the differences of the *genus*. Under Quality, *Affirmation* is plainly *identity*—but the identity, so to speak, of common concurrence; and as plainly *Negation* is *difference*, for it implies a No to a Yes, or difference is at *twain*, and two contain difference. Under Relation, *Substance* is but the supporting *identity* of the All of things, while *Causality* is but the *difference* in this identity — implying, as it does always, the first and the second, the one and the other. The fourth Title of Kant we have eliminated for the present as it refers to subjectivity: nevertheless, the fourth title is equally illustrative of the same facts—Nay, in the *Titles* themselves, let alone their *moments*, cannot a like relation be detected? Is not the Quality of anything just its own identity?—and is not Quantity just anything's own difference? Increase or decrease of Quantity (within limits) does not alter Quality (you and I would be much the same were we some pounds heavier: the cabbage is its own identity (and this lies in its quality), but its growth from day to day (Quantity) constitutes its difference). — And this is a lesson to us — Kant is wrong to place Quantity before Quality — now that attention is called to this, we seem to see, just in a general way indeed, that Quality ought to precede Quantity: Quality is indeed the inner reality or identity, while Quantity is but the the outer difference. — In *identity* and *difference*, then, we seem to have obtained wider universals for the two first moments of all the Kantian triads. But they are *triads*; what, then, of a third moment in this our own new triad?—may we hope to find a similar wider universal for it also? Now this will not be difficult, if we observe in each triad the relation which the third term or moment

bears to the first and second. The third moment, in fact, always seems to participate in both of those which precede;—we can see it, in a manner, to conjoin and sum these. The singular, for example, contains in it both the universal and the particular; limitation implies both affirmation and negation; while, in the last place, reciprocity or community seems to contain in its one virtue both that of substantiality and that of causality. But these triads of Kant have been derived from certain Logical triads which also manifest the same property. To convince himself of this, let the reader but glance at the Table in Kant that sums the various judgments: Disjunctive, for example, does it not involve a virtue at once Categoric and Hypothetic? Nay, does not the third Title, Relation, (we have eliminated the fourth,) manifest itself as but, in a manner, a uniting medium of both Quantity and Quality—though, to be sure, it is *a* relation—*proportion* of *quantity*, with *quality* as a result — rather than Relation in general, which accurately accomplishes this? (By the bye, let us not forget this exact new third just discovered for Quantity and Quality—Proportion, Measure, *Maass*!)

But if the third moment is always related to the first and second, they, too, probably will be mutually related?—It really *is* so. This, indeed, we have already said: in every case, it is the relation of identity and difference. On looking quite close, indeed, the second moment (difference) is seen to be just the opposite, the contrary, the negative of the first (identity). Negation is the opposite of affirmation; particularity is the opposite of universality; and the same relation does in fact obtain between substantiality and causality, for the latter involves reference to dependence or derivation, and that is the opposite of substan-

tiality. Nay, looking to the Titles themselves, there is virtually the same relation between Quality and Quantity; for if the one is inner, the other is outer.

The three moments, then, are always interconnected, as Yes, No, and Both. This is sufficiently singular, and suggests very clearly the possibility of ranging all in a common system. The movement plainly is one of identity, opposition, and reconciliation of both in a new identity. This movement, then, name it as we may (in the terms of Aristotle as formerly, if it is thought fit), is the Notion of Notions, or *the* Notion. This movement will be the Logical movement also, then? Yes; the same relation but repeats itself in the triad Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason (Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss): Judgment always says no to the awards of Sense, and Reason reconciles them in a new and higher truth. Such is but the history of the world!—What we see, then, everywhere is but the logical movement repeating itself in a variety of forms and under a variety of names. We have certainly discovered the principle, then, and the proper pulse of this principle: but how are we to set it in action to the production of a system? The Categories have presented themselves as triads, the moments of which collapse, in the case of each triad, into a trinity (tri-unity). Now, let us but find the *first* trinity, and the sequence of trinities ought to flow of itself, according to the movement, up to the ultimate trinity, which is the consummation of the whole: in this way, the thing would be done — our aim accomplished!

The course of Hegel's thoughts and the nature of his whole industry—Dialectic and all—can now have no difficulty to any reader. A glance at the contents of the 'Logic' or 'Encyclopaedia' will — from the mere

outside — amply suffice to confirm all. Consider this one point: it occurred to ourselves, a moment ago, that it was difficult to find and name a proper third to identity and difference as identity and difference; and we were tempted to say, community or reciprocity itself. On turning to the contents of the works named (the 'Logic' and the 'Encyclopaedia'), we found Hegel had experienced the same difficulty; for in the one work, the third to identity and difference is the *Contradiction*, while in the other it is the *Ground*. This last term approaches, it will be observed, the one which had occurred to ourselves, *Community*; for the Ground is the Community of the Differences.

Hegel now, then, has *realised* Logic. He has discovered the principle of the Categories, and of their concatenation as well — a principle which is true in fact, and which is capable of being made the principle of the universe. What he has to do now, then, is to complete the categorical trinities, and, at the same time, conduct them all up to, or derive them all down from, a similar simple multiple, or multiple simple, which were the First and inderivative. But to this he possesses a clue in perceiving that the process is one of Logical Determination, where, necessarily, the First is the absolute abstraction, and the last the absolute concretion. Again, both of these will be but forms of the absolute principle, which is the Notion; and the Notion — quantitatively named, but with a qualitative force — is the reciprocal unity, or the tautological reciprocity of universality, particularity, and singularity. Here, in fact, is the type of the system itself: the absolute universal will be the first, while the absolute singular will be the Last, and the absolute particular — or the ultimate categories which

represent all the ground-thoughts descriptive and constructive of the universe — will be the Middle, or the matter comprehended between the first and last. For a First, then, Hegel sees that he must find the most abstract universal, or the most universal abstract; or that he must find that trinity which shall exhibit the Notion in its most abstract or universal form. In a word, he must find the most abstract universal identity (*the* genus), the most abstract universal difference (*the* differentia), and the most abstract universal community of identity and difference (*the* species), or however else we may name—and the names are Legion — the several constituent moments of the Notion. But Hegel has actually before him other categories and many remarks of Kant for his express guidance and direction in this whole industry. Some of these, as in relation to Something and Nothing, &c., we have seen already; and here, from the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' are a few more, which the reader will now see must have contained much matter eminently suggestive to Hegel:—

It is to be observed that the Categories, as the true Stammbegriffe (root-notions) of pure understanding, possess their equally pure derivatives, which can by no means be omitted in *a complete system of Transcendental Philosophy*, but with whose mere mention I may be content in a mere critical preliminary inquest.

Hegel, then, could see what he had to do for the construction of a system. Poor Kant, like a *hen* that had hatched *ducks*, was never done with cluck-clucks of consternation over the mad fashion in which his rash brood — Fichte and the rest — dashed into the bottomless water of speculation, — never done with cluck-clucks of consternation and of fervid warning to return to the solid land of kritical procedure, for

which he pathetically assured them their excellent 'Darstellungsgabe' (say style) could do so much. It is questionable if he could have recognised in Hegel that return to his own results which he so ardently longed for and so unwearicdly called for. It is quite certain now, however, that the whole work of Hegel was simply to furnish that 'complete system of the Transcendental Philosophy' indicated by Kant.

Let me be permitted (the veteran proceeds) to name these pure but derivative notions, the predicables of pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). If we have the original and primitive notions, the derivative and subaltern may be easily added, and the family-tree of pure understanding completely delineated. As I have here to do, not with the completion of the system, but only with that of the principles towards it, I may be allowed to postpone the addition of such a complement to another work. This object, however, may be pretty correctly reached, if any one but take in hand the ordinary ontological text-books, and set, for example, under the category of Causality, the predicables of power, action, passion, &c.; under Reciprocity, those of the present, resistance, &c.; and under Modality, origin, decease, &c. &c. The categories combined with the modi of pure sense [Time and Space], or with one another, furnish a great number of derivative *à priori* notions, &c.

Hegel was thus directly referred to the very manner in which he should set about his task; and his task was comparatively easy, for, as Kant himself points out,

The great compartments (Fächer) are once for all there—it is only necessary to fill them up; and a systematic Topik, like the present, does not readily permit us to miss the places to which each notion properly belongs, at the same time that it causes us readily to remark those which are still empty.*

* The above quotations are from the K. of P. R. § 10; those that follow, from § 11, same work.

Kant proceeds: —

As regards the Table of the Categories, some curious remarks may be made which may have, perhaps, advantageous results as respects the scientific form of all rational truths. For that this Table, in the theoretic part of philosophy, is uncommonly serviceable, nay indispensable, in order completely to project a plan towards the Whole of a Science, so far as this science is to rest on *à priori* notions, as well as mathematically to distribute the same *according to definite principles*, appears directly of itself from this, that said Table contains at full all the elementary notions of understanding, and even the form of a system of the same in the human understanding, and consequently furnishes direction and guidance to all the moments of any contemplated speculative science, and even to their order, as indeed I have already given elsewhere an example in proof (s. 'Metaphys. Anfangsgr. der Naturwissensch'). Here now are some of these remarks.

The first is: that this Table, which contains four classes of Categories, parts first of all into two Divisions, the first of which is directed to objects of Perception (pure as well as empirical); the second, again, to the Existence of these objects (whether as referred to one another or to the understanding) [Quantity 'pure,' Quality 'empirical,' Relation 'mutual reference,' Modality 'reference to the understanding'].

The first class I would name that of the *mathematical*, the second that of the *dynamical*, Categories. The first class, as is evident, has no correlates, which are found only in the second. This difference must have its reason [as Hegel has well investigated] in the nature of the understanding.

2nd Remark.—That in every case there is a like number —three—of the categories of every class, which summons to reflection [and Hegel reflected and pondered this to some effect], as all *à priori* distribution elsewhere through notions is necessarily a Dichotomy [Black or not-Black, &c.]. Moreover, that the third category in every case [Hegel is all here] arises from the union of the second with the first of its class.

Thus Allness (Totality) is nothing else than Plurality [a Many] considered as Unity; Limitation is nothing else than Reality united to Negation; Community is one Substance Causally determining another Reciprocally; lastly, Necessity is nothing else than Existence given by Possibility itself. Let it not be thought, however, that the third category is for this reason a merely derivative one, and not a root-notion of pure understanding. For the union of the first and second in order to produce the third notion demands a special act of understanding, which is not identical with that which is exerted in the case of the first and second. Thus the notion of a *Number* (which belongs to the category of Totality) is not always possible where there are the notions of Plurality and Unity (as, for example, in the conception of the Infinite); nor out of this, that I unite the notion of a *cause* and that of a *substance*, is *Influence*—that is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance—directly and without more ado to be understood. From this it is obvious that a special act of understanding is necessary to this; and so as regards the rest.

3rd Remark.—In the case of a single category, that, namely, of Community, which occurs under the third Title, is the agreement with the corresponding form in the Table of the Logical Functions (here the disjunctive judgment) not so self-evident as in that of the others.

In order to assure oneself of this agreement, it is to be observed: that in all disjunctive judgments the *sphere* (the Many of all that is contained under the judgment) is conceived as a whole distributed into parts (the subordinate notions), and, as these parts cannot be contained the one under the other, they are thought as mutually co-ordinated, not subordinated, in such wise that they act on each other, not one-sidely as in a series, but reciprocally as in an aggregate (if one member of the distribution is established, all the rest are excluded, and *vice versâ*).

Now what we have to think is a similar conjunction in a Whole of Things, where the one is not subordinated as effect to the other as cause, but co-ordinated as at the same time

and reciprocally cause in reference to the other (for example, the case of a body, the parts of which at once reciprocally attract and resist each other), which is quite another sort of conjunction than that met with in the simple relation of the cause to the effect (of reason to consequent), in which the consequent does not reciprocally in its turn determine the antecedent, and does not therefore constitute a whole with it (like the Creator with the world). The same process which understanding observes when it represents to itself the sphere of a distributed notion, it observes also when it thinks a thing as capable of distribution; and as the members of distribution in the former mutually exclude each other, and nevertheless are united together in a single sphere, so it conceives the parts of the latter as such that existence attaches to each of them as substances independently of the rest, and yet that they are united together in a single whole.

In these remarks the reader will readily observe many germs which it was the business of Hegel only to mature. That, under each class, the third category, for example, should be a concrete of the two former—this *an sich*, virtually, is the dialectic of Hegel. Once, indeed, that Hegel had observed this peculiarity, and that he had also generalised the categ*ories* into *the* categ*ory*, his system, we may say, and in all its possibilities, was fairly born. Kant observes,* 'that there are two stocks or stems of human knowledge, which arise perhaps from *a single common root*, as yet unknown to us, namely, Sense and Understanding, through the former of which objects are *given*, and through the latter *thought*.' Now, to see that this bringing together of sensation and intellect amounted to the percipient Understanding (intuitus originarius, intellectuelle Anschauung, anschauender Verstand) of Kant—to see moreover that Kant's own industry had no other tendency

* K. of P. R., Introduction, *sub finem*.

than to realise such reduction and identification,—this also may be named the beginning of Hegel; for, in a word, Hegel's system is a demonstration that Sensation and Understanding are virtually one, the former being but outwardly what the other is inwardly, and each the necessary reciprocal counterpart of the other. This, too, is evidently the effect of the speculations of Kant in reference to the Categories and the Schemata resultant from the conjunction of these with Time and Space. To co-ordinate and reduce to one, Sense and Intellect, or Sensations and Ideas (Notions), this is another of those curt statements of the whole which may conduce not only to the understanding, but to the judging, of the Hegelian system. Hegel himself has remarked, that to reproduce a system is the true way critically to judge it: he intimates even that he who faithfully reproduces a system is already beyond it. Now, no doubt, these curt statements are calculated to bring one's knowledge up to the very apex of insight; but they only mislead, deceive, ruin, when they themselves are taken as knowledge, and when it escapes notice that their function is not to constitute knowledge, but only to give focus to knowledge. A *general* statement is but gas—and of a very dangerous kind—in the mouth of him who is empty of the *particulars*. In these curt words, tending though they do to carry us beyond what they concern, there is this danger, then, to all parties in humanity; and there is yet in them another danger to a single party. To the Materialist, for example, such words as above are so glaringly absurd, and the enterprise they indicate so glaringly stupid, that he feels justified, from the mere outside, to neglect and reject all industries (as those of Kant and Hegel) which are capable of being characterised by them. It is the former danger

which is the important one, however, and the latter we may neglect, for, as the idealist views man as Spirit, the materialist views him only as Animal: however acute he (the materialist) may be, then, as regards mundane commodity, he is wholly opaque to what alone is human—Religion, Philosophy, and even Poetry—and is manifestly of no account to men who can interest themselves in such subjects as the present.

To possess a curt formula for the whole of Hegel, does not dispense us from *the labour of the particular*, then; and we have yet much of this to achieve.

It is now to be seen, nevertheless, that a complete answer to our first question as to what led Hegel to begin as he did, is rapidly rising on us. We see what was the One of his system, and how he found it; we see also what his Many are to be, and how he is to find them. Of a clue to the First of his Many, we have also some perception now, though this First itself has not yet exactly announced itself. Suppose Hegel, in quest of this First, &c., to adopt the hint of Kant and take the text-books of Ontology in his hand, or suppose him to inspect the derivative categories—all the categories, indeed,—mentioned by Kant himself,—it will not be difficult to discern how it was he was enabled to succeed. Kant expressly states as categories, Daseyn and Nichtseyn, or Being and Non-being; and he also elsewhere suggestively speculates in regard to Something and Nothing, an ultimate Abstract, &c.: it could not be difficult, then, for Hegel—with his eyes opened as they now were to the general issue, by the *re*alisation of the Logical Movement itself—to see that Seyn and Nichtseyn were categories to be ranked under Quality,—that Quality, as we have ourselves so very clearly seen, must precede Quantity, and that this very

sub-category Seyn was itself the most abstract quality conceivable. But Seyn being this abstractest notion of all, his beginning was found. Though *the* Notion constituted *the principle*, he could not make the Notion in the form of Notion the beginning. The Notion itself must have a beginning, and this beginning might be constituted by Seyn. The Notion itself in its own development must submit to the law of its own rhythm, and could not appear on the scene in any Minerva-like completeness as at once the full-formed Notion. The Notion itself must begin, and must begin by appearing under the form of *its own first moment—universality*, *identity*, or *an sich*, &c. But appearing as the absolutely first universality, or the absolutely first identity, it could only appear as *the primal indefiniteness that is*—and that is pure Being. What is—call it the world, call it God, call it the Notion—if it began, could only begin in absolute indefiniteness. In fact, it is not necessary that this indefiniteness should ever have *been*—it is enough that, if we want what we call a beginning, we must begin with indefiniteness.—What is a beginning? A beginning implies that there at once *is* and *is not*—and how can that be named otherwise than as pure Being, indefinite Being?—that what is, is—but as yet absolutely indefinitely? This is the true *Begriff* of the Vorstellung—primordial Chaos. A *fundamen*, a *fomes*, a ὕλη, a *rudimentum*, a Grundlage, a groundwork, a mother-matter, is always postulated by the Vorstellung; but this postulate translated into the language of thought proper, amounts to *the indefiniteness that is*, or pure Being.

But if pure Being be the first, according to the law of the Notion, its own opposite, or Non-being, must be the second, and the third must be a new simple that concretely contains both; or the third must be a *species*

of which the first is the *genus*, and the second the *differentia*: but this here is just *Werden*; every Becoming at once *is* and *is not*, or is at once Being and Non-being. Here, then, is the absolutely first triad, the absolutely first form of the always tri-une Notion; or here is the absolutely germinal cell: it is impossible to go further back than to the absolute indefiniteness that at once *is* and *is not*, but *becomes*. It is an error on our part to have a difficulty here, and to stultify ourselves with the Vorstellung of a Substrate, of a *Something* that was this indefiniteness. In one sense that is not requisite, as it is here Logic that we have before us —as it is here with thoughts only, and not with things, that we have to do. But if we want a Substrate, that we possess in Thought. Thought is and Thought is all that is (or the Notion), and the first form was indefiniteness, but an indefiniteness that still was. Or take it otherwise, there actually *is*, there really *is*, there can be no doubt of that; there really is this variegated universe—Jupiters, and belts of Saturn, and double stars, and the sun, and the earth; Barclay's porter, Hook's patent coffee-roaster, and what not: well, the beginning of all that—if ever there was a beginning—must have been in an *indefinite One*, the only name for which could be pure Being. Let anyone turn and twist it as he may, he will find no other issue. Hegel's beginning, then, is true, not only to the principles of Kant, not only to the requirements of Logic, or to those of this new logical Notion generalised by Hegel out of Kant, but it is true also to the nature of facts such as we see and know them.

Surely, this was an immense success for Hegel. Having *re*alised Logic, and seen it to be the essential all —having discovered the Notion itself—to have also

discovered the absolutely initial form, not only of that notion, but just of the facts around us as any peasant may see them!

Being, Non-being, Becoming! Here is the trinity as it must have been—in its beginning!

Again, from the *re*alisation of Logic, it followed that Logic would be the vital pulse in every sphere—that every sphere, in short, would be but a form, but a metaphor, but a Vorstellung of Logic: but, this being so, history itself would have to submit to the same truth, history itself would present in its process only a development of Logic. But limiting ourselves in history to the history of Logic itself, we should expect to find even this special history following the same laws. The first special logicians, then, would in this case be found historically to be engaged with Seyn, Nichtseyn, Werden, &c. On inquiry, Hegel found all this true to fact: all this is represented in the Greek thinkers that precede Socrates. Nay, all this is true up to the present instant: for *the Notion* itself only emerged *an sich* (the Moment of Simple Apprehension) in Kant, became *für sich* organised into its differences (the Moment of Ur-theil) in Fichte and Schelling, and transformed itself to *an und für sich* (the Moment of Schluss) in Hegel. This is another reason why, though the Notion was the bottom truth, no beginning could be made with it in that form: to have attempted this, would have been to stultify history. It is in history that we have series which demand beginnings; and as regards Logic, it is in history that we must find its beginning also. Thus is it that Hegel was driven to a profound study of thought as it has historically appeared, and the result of this study was to confirm him in the sequence of the logical series which he contemplated.

We may safely hold now, then, that the first question—How it was that Hegel was led to begin as he did—is fairly answered. We see at once the nature of his *one*—the nature of his *many*—the nature of his *first*—and *where* and *how* he got them.

2. *What does Hegel mean by these very strange, novel, and apparently senseless statements?*—This presents now no difficulty. So much of the answer has passed into what precedes, however, or must be reserved for what follows, that very little is left us to say under the present head.

The indefinite Immediate seems a strange phrase; but what else can be said of pure Being, but that it is the indefinite Immediate? There is an immediate to us—we *are*—there is something present to us: now, if we take no note of any particularity in this that is present to us, but generalise all particularities into their common *one*,—what we reach is indefinite, but it is still immediate. Being is not annihilated by the abstraction, there still *is*; and what is, when we absolutely abstract from all particularity, is just the indefinite Immediate. The result of such abstraction is but the void self-identical faculty; or it is just thought gone into its own indefinite blank where it will see none and have none of its own constituent distinctions. But anything like a personal reference—any thought of any individual's special faculty—destroys the abstraction. Being is just what is when everything is abstracted from—the absolute universal of *all* particulars: and Being surely is just that one thing in which all particulars concur. Whatever is, *is*, or is Being; that is, Being is common to everything. In this abstraction, it is evident that we are quite freed from any question of an inner principle whence this Being might arise.

Indefinite Being brings with it no such want; or indefinite Being, as the *materia communis*, is felt to be this principle itself. Being is just indefinitely What is; and, as we know that there is a—definitely What is,—we know that what indefinitely is, is just the *fundamen* and *tout-ensemble* of all that definitely is. All that requires to be understood in the paragraph that regards Seyn will now be perfectly intelligible. Other terms not as yet noticed, have their places elsewhere.

We may add only, that *An sich* is perhaps the best term for the initial identity, the initial indefinite potentiality, which, if a beginning is required at all, must be attached as beginning to the Notion. The Notion as indefinite identity is in the moment of Simple Apprehension; though Simple Apprehension, as form, is itself much later in the series of developments; and as indefinite identity the Notion may be correctly described as simply *an sich*, simply *in itself*, simply virtual, or potential, or impliciter. But this is just pure Seyn: pure Being is nothing more and nothing less than simply the Notion *an sich*, or, if you like, the notion *of* an sich. But, in obedience to the laws of What is, *identity* must pass into *difference*. Simple Apprehension must become Judgment, the Begriff must sunder its be-griped-ness into the *part*-ing which is the Urtheil; the *An sich* must awake into *Für sich*. Thus is it that we see how Für sich becomes applicable to the second step: Für sich refers to a certain amount of consciousness; recognition is implied; and recognition is a result of *distinction*, of *difference*.—Against this appropriation of Für sich for the second moment of the universal pulse, we know that many objections may be urged from the usage of Hegel himself. Even in the table of contents, for example, we see Fürsichseyn placed as the

resuming moment of Reason. Nor is it an affair of *place* only; for we know that Fürsichseyn denotes the collapse of *all* particularity into singularity. Neither is this the only example of a similar usage. Nevertheless, we believe that we are right in the main, and that even the exceptions will give little pause to the student who is anything *instruit*. The very chapter in Hegel which is specially entitled Fürsichseyn is devoted to the evolution of the One and the Many, with a view to the transition of Quality into Quantity.*—The third step now is readily intelligible as the stage of *an* and *für sich*.

3. *What can be intended by these seemingly silly and absurd transitions of Being into Nothing, and again of both into Becoming?*—Well now, there is, after all, no great difficulty here. Suppose we define Nothing, how otherwise can we define it than as the absence of all distinguishableness, that is, of every *discrimen* whatever? But the absence of every recognisable *discrimen* whatever is just the absence of all particularity, and the absence of all particularity is but the abstraction from all particularity—pure Being! Pure Being and pure Nothing, then, are therefore identical. Pure Seyn can be no otherwise defined than pure Nichts: Seyn like Nichts, and Nichts like Seyn—each is the absence of all distinguishableness, or of every recognisable discrimen whatever. Did

* Hegel says (Logic, vol. ii. p. 5), 'it is Being-in-and-for-itself, that is to say, it *dif-ferences* the significates which it contains *in itself*; because it is Repulsion of itself from itself, or indifference to itself, *negative* reference to itself, it sets itself opposite itself, and is infinite Being-for-self only so far as it is *unity with itself* in this its *dif-ference from itself*.' This is, beyond mistake, an identification of the Moment of Unterschied with that of Für sich. Hegel in practice is not strict, however: Fürsichseyn, even in this page, is spoken of as Totality, that is, as An-und-Fürsichseyn. However it may be, my proposition is allowable.

you take up anything, and call it pure Seyn, and yet point to a *discrimen* in it, you would only be deceiving yourself, and speaking erroneously; for in pure Seyn there can be no discrimen. Seyn must be universal, and any discrimen would at once particularise it. Thus, then, Pure Being and Pure Nothing are absolutely identical—they are absolutely indistinguishable. It is useless to say Nothing is Nothing, but Being is Something: Being is not more Something than Nothing is. We admit Nothing to exist; Nothing is an intelligible distinction; we talk of thinking Nothing and of perceiving Nothing: in other words, Nothing is the abstraction from every discrimen or particularity. But an abstraction from every discrimen, does not involve the destruction of every or any discrimen: all discrimina still exist; in Nothing we have simply withdrawn into indefiniteness. This Nothing, then, of ours still implies the formed or definite world. Precisely this is the value of Pure Being: when we have realised the notion Pure Being, we have simply retired into the abstraction from all discrimina, but these—for all our abstraction and retirement—still are. Pure Being and Pure Nothing, then, point each to the absolutely same abstraction, the absolutely same retirement. In both, in fact, Thought, for the nonce, has turned its back on all its own discrimina; for Thought is all that is, and all discrimina are but its own. In fact, both Being and Nothing are abstractions, void abstractions, and the voidest of all abstractions, for they are just the ultimate abstractions. Neither is a concrete; neither is, if we may say so, a *reale*. *What*, then, *is*—What *actu* is—in point of fact is—is neither the one nor the other; but everything that is, is a σύνολον, a composite, of both. This is remarkable—

that the formed world should hang between the hooks of two invisible abstractions, and, at the same time, that every item of the formed world should be but a σύνολον of these two invisible abstractions. We cannot handle Being here and Nothing there, as we might this stone or that wood; yet both stone and wood are composites of Being and Nothing: they both *are* and are *not*—and this in more senses than one. They *are*—that is, they participate in Being. They are distinguishable, they involve difference; difference implies negation: that is, they participate in Non-being. The stone is *not* the wood, the wood is *not* the stone: each, therefore, if it *is*, also is *not*. Again, neither the one nor the other is, any two consecutive moments, the same; each is but a Werden, but a Becoming. A day will come when both the one and the other, both this wood and that stone, will have disappeared: their existence was a process, then—every instant of their existence was a change, and it took the sum of these changes to accomplish their disappearance. All here is mortal—nothing is twice the same—no man ever passed twice through the same street. This, then, is the truth of Being and Nothing: neither *is*; what *is*, is only their union—and that is Becoming; for Becoming is Nothing passing into Being, or Being passing into Nothing. This will probably suffice to guide the student who can and will think, in the proper direction to gain his own repose as regards these seemingly silly transitions.

One word may still be added advantageously, however, in reference to the *difference* of Being and Nothing; for, absolutely identical, they are still absolutely different: in them, indeed, the two sides which obtain throughout the universe have reached their absolute and direct antithesis. In Being, Thought is,

willingly—in Nothing, Thought is, *unwillingly*—in abstraction from all particularity. Being is the *tub* that sees itself just emptied; Nothing is this same tub that would now see itself refilled. Thought is well pleased to find itself in Being; but in indefiniteness (Nothing) it is uneasy; it has a want, it craves—craves, in short, to have definiteness, particularity, difference,—craves to know and to see itself—to know and to see its own distinctions, its own discrimina: and this evolution *of* Thought's own self *to* Thought's own self, what is it but the universe? Thus is it that Thought is the pure Negativity, and *sets* its own Negative—which is the Object. Thus is it that Thought does not remain indefinite, but presses forward, according to its own rhythm, to the revelations of History and Existence. This is another curt formula for what Hegel *would*: it corresponds exactly to his phrase in regard to *Reason making itself für sich that which it is an sich.* It is well worthy of observation, too, that the second moment of the one throb, the one pulse, that which corresponds to the Ur-theil, is one of pain. The Ur-theil, which is a breaking asunder into the differences, is but as a throe of labour: the evolution of Existence is but the Absolute in travail. Daseyn is but a continual birth—and birth is pain. So it is that he errs mightily who seeks in life as life repose: life as life is monstration and probation—movement—difference; repose is reachable only in elevation over the finite particulars which emerge—or rather only in the reference of these to that Affirmation of which they are but the Negative. That there should be pain in Nothing, then, and that this pain should be the fount of movement, we can now understand. The difference between Being and Nothing, in fact, is but that Being is the *implication of*

all particularity, and Nothing the *abstraction from* all particularity. It is obvious, then, that though, so to speak, the *middle* is always the same (and the *middle* is the *matter held*, which here is in both cases *indefiniteness*, and precisely the *same* indefiniteness, for *implication of* all particularity is the same *Inhalt* as *abstraction from* all particularity), the extremes differ; or, that though Being and Nothing are statements of precisely the same thing, the one is an affirmative statement, while the other is a negative one. In fact, we can conceive both Being and Nothing as possessing two sides. There is a side in Being in which it is Nothing; and again there is a side—definite existence being always involved—where it is Being. So it is with Nothing: even as Nothing, definite existence is still involved; and so it has precisely the same two sides as Being. In short, each constitutes the middle and the extremes of which we have just spoken; and their difference lies in this—that in the one, the one extreme is accentuated, and in the other, the other.

4. *What does the whole thing amount to—or what is the value of the whole business?*—Under the three previous questions, we have already had to deal with some considerations which tend to throw light on this question also. It represents nevertheless, perhaps, the very greatest difficulty which every one feels on his first introduction to the system of Hegel. What is all this to do for me? — what is it intended to explain?—in what way is the general mystery rendered any less by it? Such questions occur to everyone. All these abstract terms are mere formalities, one feels, and one is tempted to exclaim, What influence can be allowed any such formalities in questions that concern the origin of this so solid, real, and substantial universe? It is to be said at once, that the light of the whole can never

be seen at the first step: how can one link, and that the first one, give insight into the entire reach of that which issues as an immense organic whole? Such vast consummation can never be expected to be intelligible in the beginning, in the same way as in the end. It is this consideration which seems to actuate Hegel; who, in general, vouchsafes abundantly scornful, dry, abstract allusion, but never one word of plain, straightforward, concrete explanation. Information in Hegel is, for the most part, but a disdainful abstruse *riling* of us. We, however — from what we know already of his *procédés* hitherto, and of his aims generally,— can luckily help ourselves.

We have seen, then, from accurate insight into the Categories of Kant, that the probability is, that all that is, is but a *form* of the one movement of thought, of the one logical throb, which is the Notion. This is much. The *substantiality* of the outer world ought not to be allowed to come in, as it were, as a stumbling-block here. The outer world is but outer, the inner but inner: they are equally ideal. Thought is the organic whole of its own discrimina: these are in spheres; outer and inner are two such: outer and inner, in short, exist in mutual reciprocity, and the one is no less substantial than the other, or they are consubstantial. But what do we mean by *substantiality* as we ordinarily object it? It refers to matter, to solidity, to thingity; substantiality means a basis of somewhat, &c. &c. If we will but look close, however, we shall find that all this means only individualisation or self-reference: to thought its own discrimina *are*; this is self-reference — self-reference is Being. If thought distinguishes its own discrimina from itself, and gives them self-reference, then they *are*: but

when they also *outwardly* are, then the discrimination becomes more absolute, then the distinction becomes a chasm — then the self-reference has grown substantial, and one seems to have before one only isolated, self-complete, self-substantial immediates. Not a whit on that account are they more substantial than the inner, however. Nay, the inner is their truth, the inner is the genuine substantiality; and they themselves are but transitory forms, a prey to the contingency of the Notion in externality to its own self.

The Notion, then, is the real substantiality of the Universe; and *its* first forms, however formal they may seem, are the actual First, the actual beginning. *You* think of sand, and earth, and mud, and clay; but you have no business to think of sand, and earth, and mud, and clay here. Where thought as thought is concerned, it is absurd to apply the category of *natural causality*; and with a little patience you may find sand, and earth, and mud, and clay themselves actually reduced to the Notion, and held thereof. Natural causality itself is but the Notion — the Notion, however, in a peculiar sphere: instead of the Notion, then, being submiss to Causality, it is Causality that must submit to the Notion, from which, indeed, it derives all its own virtue.

Once for all, the triad, Being, Non-being, Becoming, is the tortoise of the universe, and the elephant of the same may rest secure on it: that triad is the abstractest form, and so the most rudimentary form, of the living concrete Notion, which is the soul and centre of the All. Thought is, and we can go no further back than to, we can begin no sooner than with, its own absolutely indefinite identity, which is pure Being. But thought that *apprehends* itself as Being, *judges* itself

Nothing, and *reasons* itself into Becoming. (Reason is the Ver-nunft, from ver-nehmen = transsumere.) The earliest Begriff (Seyn) parts into the earliest Urtheil (Nichts), and resumes itself in the new one of the earliest Schluss (Werden). This will be found to be even historically correct. There is nothing unusually strange in this: consider that you yourself *are*, that existence is, and you will see a strangeness—just in this, that there should be such a state of the case at all—to be matter of fact, which is at least not in any respect less striking than that of the Hegelian procedure. To subjective thought, Being is an absolutely necessary idea; and to objective thought it is equally necessary, for before our existence could be—and our existence is—Being must have been thought. But in either case, the further process of transition to Nothing and to Becoming is also necessary. A primordial slime in a primordial Time and Space is the very anility or infantility—extremes meet—of thought: it is but the crude Vorstellung of a crude babe. Thought is the *prius* of all; and these, Being, Non-being, &c., are the absolutely necessary categories that underlie Existence.

It will be seen now, then, that the error of the reader in regard to the simple paragraphs of our text, is that he thinks too much, rather than too little. He comes to them with a mind that teems with prejudices, presuppositions, crude figurate conceptions (Vorstellungen), what are called formed opinions, and so forth; and he is not at all prepared to see the beginning taken in what seems to him so cavalier a fashion—Nothing, without more ado, set down as Being—and thus by the Jesuitical juggle of a logical presto, as it were, genesis asserted and the world begun. What is here,

however, is not genesis in that sense; what is here is abstraction, generalisation; what is here is logical; there is no attempt to create a single dust-atom. The reader, moreover, has no business to speculate, to guess and guess, to conjecture and conjecture; he has no business to sweat himself into a supposed meaning, by the earnest attempt to see through a mill-stone of his own devising: he has no business, in short, but simply to take up—what is there before him.

There is a subjective Logic in which we learn about terms, propositions, syllogisms, &c.; but there ought also to be an objective Logic in which we shall learn about the secret criteria which we apply to objects, the levers by which we grasp them, and characterise them, and make them familiar to us. For there are such criteria, there are such levers; and the truth in their regard is, that we at present know them not; that they are not the tools of us, but we rather are the tools of them. A complex or complement of some kind, for example, is brought for our examination. At first it is but an unintelligible mass; but at length we understand it. Now, to understand it, what have we done? We have simply beset it, or transfixed it, or supplied it with categories. Rather, what it was, it is no longer; what it was, has disappeared; it is now a simple system—a simple congeries of categories. The stuff has entirely vanished; the whole mass and matter has been converted into thought. What then is valuable—what then is true in the object, is these levers and criteria—not of its judgment only, but actually of its conversion and transformation. There is nothing left in it which is not thought; for the *other*, which appears, or which we opine in it, is nothing as against thought—against the thought, that is, into which it has been transformed.

Cause, effect, relation, principle, essence, true nature, quality, action, reaction, force, influence, &c. &c.— such are the secret criteria, or tools, or levers we apply. Now, just to discover and explain all these, this is the business of the Logic of Hegel; and it is thus very plain how that Logic, if a complete co-articulated system of these, must just be in simple truth the crystal of the universe. Being, Nothing, Becoming, then, are but three of these levers; and is it not a truth that we characterise, and determine, and finish off whole columns of facts with such predicates as these? But have we ever looked at these predicates themselves? have we ever inquired into their own nature, or into their relative connexion? have we ever satisfied ourselves of the conditions of their authority? The Materialist is a man that will have no nonsense, see you; he will look at facts only; even when he has stuck each fact, like a pincushion, so full of the needles and pins of his own brain that nothing but these any longer shows, he actually believes himself to be still contemplating the fact. The Materialist, in fact, is but the prey of a thousand little imps within him, whom he sees not. Unknown to himself, in truth, the Logic of Hegel is all there within his skull. The difference between him and Hegel is this: from Hegel it issues pure, and in system, and as it is; from the Materialist it issues in that miscellaneous mass or mess (Gebräu), named by Hegel *raisonnement*, blindly, irregularly, rhapsodically, not as it is, but as it is *opined* — about *causes*, and *conditions*, and *essential*, and *accidental*, &c. &c.

But the Materialist is, in this respect, no worse than the great body of mankind at present. We all fancy, Being, Nothing, One, Many, &c., so plain in their meanings, that there is no need of investigating them. Every-

body, we say, knows perfectly what *nothing* is, perfectly what it is *to be*, and perfectly what it is *to become*. Or again, we may conceive the most of us to say, if we did not know what they are, in what respect have the paragraphs of the text improved our knowledge? Are we to swallow such statements for information seriously meant? Do you really ask us to believe that Being is Nothing; or that because Being is Nothing, or Nothing Being, there is anything *Become*? Why, the singing of the tea-kettle is something infinitely more substantial, something infinitely more instructive, than any such barren nonsense of empty verbiage, call it philosophy, metaphysic, logic, or by whatever other fine name you will! Nay, why should we accompany you further? With such a foundation, what are we to expect? If, indeed, we grant you that Being is Nothing, what *can* we expect? Can such demand on our credulity be aught else than a preparation for sophistry, legerdemain, imposture, falsehood?

Such objections, in fact, at first hand, cannot be taken amiss. Hegel receives them, in general, with his peculiar and terrible sneer, and, on the whole, simply allows the System itself to answer them. For our part, we trust that a sufficient answer will be found in what precedes. One turn more, however, and we have done with Being and Nothing, and this whole matter of a beginning.

In dealing with objects, I certainly use sundry inner distinctions; objects, in fact, obey these distinctions: it were well, then, if we knew these distinctions and the system of them, if there be a system of them. In regard to every object that presents itself, we say, for example, it *is*. The pen *is*, the paper *is*, the thought *is*, the feeling *is*: now the pen is the pen, the paper is the paper,

the thought is the thought, the feeling is the feeling; but what is the *is*? By this *is*, we determine them; *they* obey *it*. It is a somewhat, therefore, and surely we may allowably spend a moment in looking at it *for itself*. In general, we look at it only for the others—the pen, the paper, &c.; but suppose we look at it now for itself. *Is*—whatever first was, that surely was the first of the first: whatever came first—fire, or earth, or water, or chaos, or thought—*is* was the first of *it*; with it *is*, *it* began, and till there *is*, there can be no beginning. Everyone will admit that What is, is. Now, let him give any meaning he likes to this *what*; let him conceive it as mind, or as matter, or as space, or as time; he will admit without difficulty that he can equally withdraw this meaning—mind, matter, space, time. Let him try, however, to withdraw the *Is*, and he will find it impossible. We withdraw mind: still there is matter, there is space, there is time. We withdraw matter; still there is space, still there is time. We withdraw space; still there is time. We withdraw time, and still *there is*. This is not meant arithmetically—that if I begin with six words, and withdraw four of them, two remain. This withdrawal is meant to be performed by the mind in earnest thought, and earnestly occupied with its thought. It is very easy not to do this, it is very easy to refuse to do this, and it is very easy to sneer rather than do this; but he who will do this—there are some few, perhaps, who cannot do this—will be obliged to admit that, let him abstract and abstract what he may, he cannot get rid of the notion, Being. It is impossible to realise to thought that there can possibly be, or that there could possibly be, an absolute void, or rather the absolute void of a void; for even a void itself would have to be withdrawn, did we desire

to effect an absolute *non-is*. *There is*, *is*, or *Isness*, is an absolutely necessary thought, then,—necessary and universal—a category—the first category.

Now, there is no wish here to go out of Logic. It is with Being, or Isness, as a thought only that we concern ourselves. And surely in signalising this abstractest of all possible thoughts—this, then, in that respect, first thought—we are not untruly, not fraudulently employed.

Well, now, this is a beginning of objective Logic; this principle of determination, Is or Being, is a thought—an absolutely necessary, universal thought—and it forms a necessary ingredient in thought, and in all characterisation by thought. Of everything in this universe we must say that it *is*: yes, but of everything in this universe we must say also that it is *not*. This *is* a penny, it is *not* a ha'penny; it *is* copper, it is *not* silver; it *is* round, it is *not* square, &c. &c. That it is *not* is as essential a principle of determination in regard to everything in this universe, as that it *is*. In our apprehension of an object, affirmation possesses not one whit more truth, not one whit more reality, not one whit more necessity, than negation. An object, to be apprehended as an object, requires to be precisely apprehended; and precision is the deed of negation. *Non-is*, then, and *is* are necessary correlatives, are necessary conjuncts, never separate, absolutely inseparable in every act of determination of any kind; and determination constitutes the nature of the operation of every function we possess—sense, understanding, imagination, &c.

Being and Nothing, then, are thus inseparably present in every concrete; and here in utter abstraction they are inseparable also: rather, here in utter

abstraction they unite and are the same. View either separately, and before your very view—even as you view—it passes into the other. Nothing will not remain nothing, it will not fix itself as Nothing, it grows of itself into *there is*. Nothing involves Being, or Nothing cannot be thought without the thought of Being. Being, again, absolutely abstract is an absolutely necessary thought; but it is characterless, it is nothing. Think abstract Nothing, it introduces Being; think Being, it introduces Nothing. But Nothing passing into Being is origination; Being passing into Nothing is decease; and both are Becoming. Becoming, then, is that in which both Being and Nothing are contained in unity. Or such is the constitution of the absolutely general thought Becoming; and there can be pointed out no single actual case of Becoming in which this constitution does not accurately display itself. These three abstract thoughts, each equally necessary and universal, are also necessarily and universally bound together, therefore. There is no finite object whatever which has not received the determination of each of these three thoughts. Every finite object whatever truly *is*, every finite object whatever truly *is not*, every finite object whatever truly *becomes*, and becomes in one or other of the modes of its double form. Nor does any object receive such determination from us; it possesses such determination in its own self; it has received such determination from God, it has been so *thought* by God, it has been created by God on and according to these thoughts, Being, Nothing, and Becoming. These thoughts are out there—without us—in the universe, and in here—within us—in the universe: they are objective thoughts in obedience to which the whole is disposed. They are necessary pressures or compres-

sures moulding the all of things. They are three of God's thoughts in the making of the universe.

There is no necessity, then, to give these thoughts the peculiar dialectic look of the peculiar abstraction of Hegel. They can be approached and examined in the same analytic way in which we approach and examine all the other denizens of the universe which may be submitted to us. Still, the more the reader thinks and the more he looks at them, the more will he find himself convinced that the brief paragraphs of the text actually contain the whole matter, and really perfectly determine it: nor are we now without the means of explaining all the Hegelian peculiarities in or with which this whole matter appears. From the light we now abundantly possess, for example, we must expect in what is named Being, just the elementary form of the Begriff, or—the Begriff *an sich*. What *is* an sich, just is—abstractly is—that and as yet no more. Now, what is it that most abstractly is, or what is it that is in the most eminent manner *an sich*? Why, simply the first thought that can arise. But in its first natural form—and we know no other first—such thought arises *on sensation*. This is in every way the first. We have no business with any world but the world we know. What is, is thought. This is the Absolute. But it is no absolute vacuum. It is an Absolute—distinguished in itself. *This we know*; and, therefore also, that the indefinite implies the definite, as the latter the former. Our field, then, is this Here of thought; in which Here Sensation is the phenomenal First—or Sensation is what is most eminently *an sich*. The Notion as in Sensation, then, is the first part of Logic, or—Simple *Apprehension—just as it has always been.*

But the first thought in sensation can abstract nothing

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but the wholly indefinite *sense* (rather than thought) of Being, Is, Am. The reflexion on which abstraction can only be that it is—as there is simply no distinction in it—the simple Nothing. But this result is the consequence of a reflexion on the first thought, Being. But such second act is not an act of sensation, of simple apprehension. It is a doubling back on such act; it is a thinking of the act of simple apprehension, a seeking to discriminate in it. But to discriminate is to distinguish *this* as against *that*,—that is, to negate, to develop differences in what was previously self-identical. This new act—reflexion—is an act of understanding, an act of judgment. The Nothing, then, is a result of judgment. In other words, the Begriff of Simple Apprehension, which was Being, has passed into the Ur-theil of Judgment, which is Nothing. And this is sufficiently curious and significant, for it is the universal formula: On the Being—the satisfaction, fullness, and faith—of Simple Apprehension, there follows always the Nothing—the dissatisfaction, the emptiness, the doubt—of Understanding (Judgment): Under the *Or-deal*, the Ur-theil, the Begriff breaks up and sunders from its substantiality—into the strife of the differences.

In these two moments, we may recognise also the Kantian elements of a *Perception*, the objectivo-subjective of Sensation, and the subjectivo-objective of a Judgment—or Affection receiving its meaning, its sense, its objectivity from Function. Only, in Hegel, the question is not of sensation as sensation, but of the thought involved. Again, Simple Apprehension is positive, while Judgment is negative. The former, too, seems passive, while the latter is active. The negative, lastly, has more relation to the subject, and has greater claim to be named the subjective moment: the first is only *an*

sich, the second is *für sich*. This, however, depends altogether on the point of view: function seems more subjective, since it is an *act*, though the result is objective evidence; but, again, affection is more subjective, as yielding only subjective evidence. There is a source of confusion indicated here, as regards the use of the word subjective, which should be borne in mind.

But neither has Nothing any distinction in it. Thought before (in presence of) Nothing can abstract from it only Being. Thus Being and Nothing are the same. Being and Nothing are inseparable: wherever there is thought, there is distinction; and wherever there is distinction, there *is* and there is *not*. And it is remarkable, that even in having recourse to Being as Being, it is only Nothing we encounter. Nothing is the fruitful womb in which all is: it is Nothing (the Negative round which we build, or on which we hang, our Positive) which is the important element, the very soul and life of what is. (Something of the necessary dialectic shows here, however.)

But this third reflexion, that Nothing is returned to Being, implies, like the former, also its own gain. Nothing gone into Being is Becoming.—It is not meant here to say that this is a theory of generation. What we have here are thoughts only. The consideration of material things does not belong to Logic as Logic. Matter as Matter is apart from Logic. What is here said is, that Being gone into Nothing, or Nothing gone into Being—a transition which here takes place—expresses in two or three words what we express also by the one word Becoming.—Again, what is the nature of this third reflexion? As the former were Simple Apprehension and Judgment, this is Reason. What were separated are here brought together in a Schluss. Judgment

stated a difference; but Reason has here reconciled identity and difference into a new identity. Reason, then, has ended in a new Begriff, in a renewed act of Simple Apprehension, on which Judgment again acting, develops the differences Origin and Decease, which Reason again reconciles into the quasi-fixed moment (between both) of Daseyn.

But we have outstripped our text, and must now return. We have now to see in the 'Remarks' what Hegel himself thinks proper to extend to us by way of explanation. Perhaps we ought to have translated, and included among these Remarks, the dissertation on 'Wherewith must the beginning, &c. be made,' which precedes the opening of the detailed Logic; but much of the matter it contains has already oozed out in another form. Besides, Hegel's explanations are seldom of any use to the uninitiated, and are calculated as much to mislead as to guide. In the dissertation in question, for example, Hegel's beginning seems to have been conditioned by wholly absolute considerations—at which we—knowing the relativity of the beginning to Kant—can only shake our heads—not, however, as doubting their truth, but as intimating only that Hegel, had he liked, might have led us to the house by a much straighter and easier path. What an incubus of labour might not Hegel have spared us, had he but let us see him starting from Kant—had he but *named* his consequent realisation of Logic into its one vital tri-une pulse! But this philosophical Wolsey could not stomach the confession of his debts. Instead of that, while the reader is constantly misled by the loudest and most unexceptive reprobation of the doctrines of Kant, the merits of the same are effectually concealed from him by the very manner in which they

are expressly mentioned. It is only after long initiation that one comes to detect twinkles of a confession in Hegel, as in that allusion 'not unrevenged,' when speaking of his predecessors (since Kant) neglecting Logic, &c. In his explanations, indeed, Hegel, is always indirect; he seeks abstract points of connexion, and avoids the concrete truth: in fact, we are rather abstrusely sneered into light than kindlily and directly led. One feels, indeed, almost savagely indignant with Hegel, when one thinks of the world of labour, of the almost superhuman labour, which the peculiarity of his statement has involved. Had he but told us, one thinks to oneself,—I was simply serious with the general scope of Kant—with his endeavour to reduce the whole human concrete under the cognitive faculties, to demonstrate objectivity to be contained in the categories, and to exhibit the world of sense as but an externalisation and *Vereinzelung* of the same: serious with these thoughts, it was not difficult to systematise and complete the categories; it was not difficult to place Nature as that same system of categories—in *outward* form; it was not difficult, in obedience to the general pulse, to set Spirit as resuming in itself both Nature and the Categories (the Logical Idea); and it was not difficult, whether by generalising the categories, or by fusing the cognitive faculties—Simple Apprehension (Sensation), Judgment, Reason—into a concrete one vitality, to find that general pulse which should be the basis and principle and motive power of the whole, and which Kant himself actually named when he said, *à priori* synthetic Judgment. Had Hegel but told us this—and why did he not tell us this?—of what advantage has his reticence been to any man—even to himself? But let us turn now to

Remark 1.

And let us, first of all, consider any technical terms that may seem in want of a word of explanation. Bëent is a translation of Seyendes, and found unavoidable. The reader will have remarked the quite Hegelian subtlety, that *opposition* implies relation, *reference*, connexion, conjunction, even in that it is opposition. Wesentlich, essentially implies always a reference to the Hegelian Wesen ; it may be translated —*as concerns the essential constitutive principle.* Substrate—the substrate here regards change ; it means the subject of the change, the something that undergoes the change. There now *is*, and again there is *not* : but there is a substrate conceived under this transition : it appears just two different states of the same something ; these states are merely held asunder in time. This conception of a substrate completely subverts the abstraction which Hegel would have us think. Synthetisch and Vorstellend, synthetically and conceptively—these words deserve particular notice. *Conceptively* relates to one of the most important points in Hegel,—to his use, that is, of the word Vorstellung, and its cognate forms. In Locke the word *Idea* is used just for *a*, or any state or fact of consciousness in general. In sensation, it is the *feeling* present in the mind which is the Idea ; in perception and imagination, the *object*—outward in the one case, inward in the other—is the idea ; then in memory, the idea is whatever is remembered, and in thought whatever is thought. Now, Vorstellung, in current German, in Kant for one, is exactly this Lockeian *Idea*. Hegel, however, opposes Vorstellung as the crude, almost sensuous, pictorial image or conception of common thought, to Begriff

as the Notion of rigorously logical, rigorously scientific thought. To Hegel the thoughts of most of us, when we say, Heaven, Hell, God, Justice, Morality, Law—even perhaps Being and Here-being—are but crude figurate conceptions, Vorstellungen, and require to be purified into Notions, Begriffe, if we would think aright our own thoughts. The Vorstellungen are but 'Metaphors' (as Hegel says),—externalisations, as it were, of the Begriffe, and to be really understood and seen into, require to have what is metaphoric, pictorial, sensuous, external—we had almost said crustaceous—stripped off them. Conception, then, is to be understood in the translations here as representing Vorstellung, and Notion Begriff. This for many reasons. Conception derivatively is certainly the Begriff—a taking together, or a being taken together; but then the Latin *Notio* has already been reserved by Kant (he uses *conceptus*, also, in his Logic), and the rest as the strict equivalent of Begriff and conception, perhaps, in general usage, is fully looser than notion. The custom of both Kant and Hegel is such that it was impossible to employ *idea* for Vorstellung. Representation were certainly a very good meaning for this last word; but it sounds as yet very uncouth when so used. In general, and where accuracy is necessary, Idea translates Idee, Notion Begriff, and Conception Vorstellung. In translating Kant, it is better to substitute for Vorstellung, the precise mental state which is referred to at the moment. In translating Hegel, we often convey Vorstellung by the phrase figurate conception, followed by representation in brackets, with a view to the gradual naturalisation of this last word. We know now what *is* Hegel's Begriff, and so are in a condition to understand what is said of a false Begriff as opposed to a true one. Our mere

subjective *thoughts*, or mere products of ordinary generalisation, are not necessarily Begriffe: these are always forms of *the* Begriff, are self-referent, and objectively true.

Synthetically contains an allusion here to an expression of Kant's (see page 327, vol. i., and, for additional illustration, pp. 340, 341, 343, of same volume) about existence adding itself synthetically *to* the notion of the hundred dollars! It is not difficult to illustrate what Hegel means by these merely *conceptive* and *synthetic* elements, in the ordinary form in which creation stands before the mind. 'God might have thrown into Space a single germ-cell from which all that we see now might have developed itself.' Observe the *synthesis* here—the mere *outward adding* of one thing to another, as a mason puts stone to stone, a joiner wood to wood, or as a gardener drops an acorn into the earth, and a whole oak rises. *God* drops the *Germ-cell* into *Space*. Each is complete by itself, and each is just mechanically, synthetically *annexed* to the other: God is added on complete at once; and so of the others,—the *germ-cell*, moreover, constituting but an outward synthesis to the *notion* in God's mind. But observe the Vorstellung, the conception, the scenic representation, the picture! Three units, out of each other, are here side by side,—God, the Germ-cell, Space: each is entire, complete, and independent in itself; there is no transition from the one to the other; each—and this is true even of the Germ-cell—has the character of *a First*. In short, all here is synthetic and conceptive: we see Space—just an absolute universal void—we see an indefinite giant suddenly show therein, or come to the edge thereof, and drop into the vacancy down, down, a germ-cell! Now this has seemed *thinking* to a writer who

believes himself in advance, and who is in advance, of most of the literary interests of the day. Yet it is to thinking precisely what the writing of the Chinese is to that of Europeans, precisely what discourse by hieroglyphics is to discourse by alphabets. The exact truth of the matter is, that a thinker of the order indicated, however worthy otherwise, is to a Hegel but a little boy as yet in his picture-books. Thinking, to be thorough, must be thought *out*. This will illustrate much. Hegel intimates, then, that creation, as usually thought, is the appearance of Something in Nothing at the will of another Something, and that this process is merely synthetic and the whole thing a picture, a Vorstellung. The point of union, he alludes to, where Being and Nothing coincide, may be named the Limit, or the Beginning, or the will in act, for each of these involves an *is* and a *non-is*.

Negation and *negative*: it is subtle perception on the part of Hegel to have discerned that wherever there is question of one and an*other*, there is negation, and that thus God's energy, even as affirmative, is negative.

Gesetzt, *posited*: this brings up probably the greatest difficulty in Hegel, viz., what he means by *ein Gesetztes*? —what by *Gesetztseyn*? As usual, we shall find the Hegelian sense to have a very strict connexion with the ordinary one. Now, what is the ordinary one? The ordinary one is to be found in the discussion of hypothetical syllogisms as contained in the common text-books of Logic. *Setzend*, in fact, is the equivalent of the Latin participle *ponens* in the phrase *modus ponens*. 'If perfect justice exists, the hardened sinner will be punished: but perfect justice does exist; therefore the hardened sinner will be punished:' this is a hypothetical syllogism in the *modus ponens*. Now, the

two parts of which the Major consists here are called the *antecedent* and the *consequent*, and in the *modus ponens* the former *ponit*, *setzt*, *sets*, *posits*, or *infers* the latter. In the example before us, the existence of perfect justice is the antecedent, and it posits the punishment of the hardened sinner, which is the consequent. If the word *posit* were a vernacular English word parallel to the German *setzen* both in its logical and in its ordinary senses, we should have no difficulty in the respective translation; but it is not so, and we are constantly in perplexity in consequence of being unable properly to render the various shades and secondary meanings which *setzen* and its derivatives acquire in the hands of Hegel. For instance, an antecedent may be considered as only *in itself* or potential, until the consequent is assigned, and *then* it is the antecedent which seems posited. Posited in this case seems to refer to *statement* or *explication*; and this sense is very common in Hegel. Here, then, *it is gesetzt* means, it is developed into its proper explication, statement, expression, enunciation, exhibition, &c. Again, a Gesetztes, as not self-referent, is but lunar, satellitic, parasitic, secondary, derivative, dependent, reflexional, posititious, &c. Then on the part of that which posits, something of arbitrary attribution may enter. Altogether, Gesetztseyn alludes to reflexion, relativity, mutual illativity, &c. Setzen has the senses, to put in the place of, to depute, and also duly to set out the members of a whole or set; and allusions to these senses also are to be found in Hegel. In short, such senses as the following will sometimes be found in place in this connexion: vicarious, representative, attributive, adjectitious, &c. &c. To eximply or eximplicate often conveys the meaning of setzen, as also the simple *assign*. See further Hegel himself on the

word at pp. 376, 377, vol. i.; see also pp. 109, 110, vol. ii. In Kant and Fichte, setzen means, to lay down as granted, to take for granted, to establish, to affirm, to assert, to assume, &c.; and this meaning is, *at bottom*, identical with the Hegelian.

Inhalt means here, *Logical comprehension*, or the complement of significates which attach to a notion: Inhalt is to Hegel the Import of something, and the import is not always mere contained matter, but implies that matter as *formed* or assimilated.

Opined, Gemeint. — *Meinung* is the δόξα of the Greeks; it implies crude, instinctive, uninvestigated, unreasoned, subjective, or personal *opinion*,—*mein*-ung, as if it were a *mine*-ing, or *my*-ing—something purely *mine* — something purely subjective and instinctive.

The Remark itself is sufficiently miscellaneous; its general object, however, is to illustrate what has just been said, and repel the most usual objection. This objection concerns the identification of Being with Nothing, and probably requires now but small notice at our hands, seeing that so much has been already done to insure a correct understanding of *what* is meant by *each* of the terms, and of *how* they are to be identified. The whole error of the objection lies in opposing to Nothing, not abstract, but concrete Being; in which case, the Nothing itself ceases to be abstract. As Nothing and Being are the same, it seems to be inferred that we say it is the same thing whether we have food or not, whether we have clothes or not, whether we have money or not, &c.: but this reasoning is very bad. Nothing when it is concreted into no-food is hunger; in the same way, as no-clothes, it is cold, and as no-money, it is poverty. Now we have been speaking of Nothing *as* Nothing, and not of hunger,

cold, and poverty. Again, we have been speaking of Being *as* Being, and not of corporeal or animal Being. When you oppose, then, these definite Nothings to this definite Being, it is absurd to suppose that the results will be identical with those which issue from the opposition of abstract Being and abstract Nothing. Nothing, when abstract Being is concerned, is the abstraction from everything definite and particular, and abstract Being itself is the same abstraction; but the nothing of light is darkness, and it cannot be said that the eye is indifferent whether it be the one or the other: definite Being is a complex of infinite *rapports*. But where is the use of your abstraction, then, may be urged in reply? Why, this ultimate generalisation Being—we are bound to make it, and it has always been considered a determination of the greatest consequence — surely, then, it is worth while pointing out that this Being is identical with the abstract Nothing, that they are both abstractions, and that their truth is Werden. These are great poles of thought, subjective and objective; and it is important to know them, as they are, and in their relations. The incidental references illustrate this: the philosophy of Parmenides, for example, was centred in the thought abstract Being, while that of Heraclitus related simply to Becoming, and we see what vast effects may be produced by the contemplation of abstract Nothing in the case of Buddhism. Being is the first abstract thought, indeed, and, with the Eleatics, we find it as such in History; for the *material principles* and the *numbers* which preceded it are not pure thoughts.

The importance of our findings, too, is well shown in the impossibility of a creation and in the Pantheism, which result from the absolute separation of Being

and Nothing exhibited in the common dictum *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* A creation is impossible without the community of Nothing and Being; and if all that is, is just Being, or if all that is, is just Substance, then there results only the abstract Pantheism of Parmenides or of Spinoza. We may remark, however, that — as used — the *dictum* is safe from the attack of Hegel; for it is nothing else but the law of causality in another form; what it means is simply the *à priori* synthetic judgment of Kant — there is no change without a cause. It is this sense which prevents the reader from agreeing with Hegel in his attack. What Hegel wishes to hold up, however, is the essential importance in this universe of the distinction, Nothing: in effect, negativity, in the sense of distinctivity, is *the* creative power; and there is nowhere anything which does not confess its influence.

The errors of Kant, too, in reference to the Ontological argument spring from bluntness to the distinctions we signalise, and thus demonstrate the value of the latter: Kant, in fact, exhibits a similar confusion of the finite and the infinite, as well as a very imperfect perception of the nature and relations of Being, Non-being, and *So*-being (Daseyn).

The objections to the relative teaching of Hegel, then, arise from the untutored attitude of common sense, which means ever the blind instinctive employment of stereotyped abstractions of one's own, whence or how derived one knows not, asks not, cares not: in the case before us, for example, common-sense insists that *its* abstraction, a *differentiated* Nothing, is *our* abstraction, reference-less Nothing. We may add, that the practical lesson is to perceive that it is our duty, in view of the infinite affirmation in which we participate,

to entertain complete tranquillity in the presence of any finite Particular that may emerge.

Remark 2.

There seems nothing very hard here ; the chief object is to point out the difficulty of giving a true expression to speculative propositions, which are always dialectic. The form of the judgment is shown to be inadequate. Identity, unity, inseparability, are all imperfect expressions of the relation that subsists between Being and Nothing. The concluding illustration in regard to light and darkness speaks for itself.

Of terms, we may notice two — Abstract and Unterschied.

Abstract is one of the commonest words in Hegel, and is often used in such a manner as perplexes : it always implies that something is viewed in its absolute self-identity, and absolutely apart from all its concrete references. As regards *Unterschied*, it is worth while observing that it means *inter-shed*, or *inter-part* : the Unterschied of Seyn and Nichts may be profitably regarded as just a sort of abstract water-shed.

Remark 3.

This is the most important of all the Remarks in this place, and the reader ought to make a point of dwelling by it long and studying it thoroughly. The rigour of thought in regard to a First, a Second, the transition between them, and the principles of progress in general, ought to improve the powers of every faculty which has been privileged to experience it. What is said in regard to crude Reflexion and the means of helping it, is also striking and suggestive. Then we are taught what a true synthesis is, and

what a false one. Again, we learn that it is the abstractions which are unreal, while their concrete union is fact. In truth, the general gist of the remark is, it is absurd to remain in abstract self-identity, and say movement, progress, is impossible to you; for synthesis must be possible, and is necessary just for this reason, that synthesis *is*—that is, there is this variegated empirical universe. — The observations in regard to *determinate nothings* are very important, as well as those that bear on the necessity of our keeping strictly to the precise stage we have reached, without applying in its description or explanation characters which belong to later stages. The incidental notice of the Parmenides of Plato is exceedingly terse, full, and satisfactory.

Hegel remarks of Plato's critique of the Eleatic One: 'It is obvious that this path (method) has a presupposition, and is an external reflexion.' A cooperative reader, and every reader should be cooperative, ought to ask himself, where is 'the presupposition?' and where is the 'external reflexion?' Again, in the first Remark, the reader ought not to leave without understanding: 'Metaphysic might tautologically maintain, that were a dust-atom destroyed, the whole universe would collapse.' Let the reader go back here, and study both for himself. The *presupposition* is, that variety is incompatible with unity: the *external reflexion* is, that the two forms are just externally counted: Hegel's universe is such, that the whole is not more each part than each part is the whole — to destroy a part and destroy the whole are thus tautological.

There is also expressed here such respect for the empirical world as helps us to see that the system of Hegel

is no chimera of abstraction, no cobweb of the brain, but that what it endeavours is just to *think* this universe, as it manifests itself around us, *into its ultimate and universal principles.*

As regards terms, we may just remark that *Beziehung* implies more than mere *reference*; it implies, as it were, *connective reference*: it is used pretty much, in fact, in its strict etymological meaning. Synthesis, as alluded to in a previous note, will be found fully explained here: the unphilosophical synthesis thinks it enough just to put together full-formed individuals from elsewhere, as God, a germ-cell, and space (say); while philosophical synthesis is *immanent*, and points to a transition of *necessity* with *concrete union* of *differents.* The allusion to 'ursprüngliche Urtheilen' leads one to think of Kant as the source of all that Hegel seems peculiarly to teach as regards the Ur-theil: at all events—leaving Apperception and the Categories out of sight — Kant's transcendental doctrine of Urtheilskraft is wholly employed on the commediation of the inner unities with the outer multiples, and contains a great variety of matter which must have proved eminently suggestive in regard to the main positions assumed by Hegel.

Remark 4.

This remark is still occupied with the Unity of Being and Nothing; but it is exceedingly terse, clear, and illustrative. The dialectic against the Beginning or Ending of the World is very happily shown to rest wholly on the separation of Being and Nothing; and the hit to ordinary understanding which believes — against this dialectic—a Beginning and Ending of the World, and yet accepts — with this dialectic — the

dividedness of Being and Nothing, is a very sore one. The mode in which *incomprehensibility* is explained to be produced is excellent, and genuinely Hegelian. The illustration afforded by Infinitesimals is also exceedingly satisfactory, as are also the definitions of Sophistry and Dialectic.—Something that *is* in its disappearance was eminently adapted to attract a Hegel, whose own *object* is always something very similar; that is, it is, like Infinitesimals, very much of a *ratio* — *the one of a double*. In fact, reciprocity very well answers to the bottom thought of Hegel, — the Notion itself is — in one way of looking — but a form of reciprocity. So we have neither Being nor Nothing, but a sort of outcome of their reciprocal reflexions, where the one is very much the other — and *in consequence of* the other. Hegel seems to contemplate the intussusception of the infinite Universe into a geometrical punctum: the world is the oscillating coloration of a partridge's eye; it is but a vibrating point — an ideal throb. The method is infinite referential inferentiality, or relative illativity of object and subject; but the object is the subject's, and the subject itself is the veritable Absolute. There is a Chinese toy or puzzle which appears as a hollow sphere with innumerable contained successively smaller spheres, movable, and successively within one another: conceive this expanded into the infinitude of space, extended into the infinitude of time, and occupied by all the interests of the universe and man, sphere under sphere, but so that all, perfectly transparent, perfectly permeable, are mutually intussuscipient, and collapse punctually into a single eye-glance;—conceive this, and you have the Vorstellung, the Figure, the Metaphor of the System of Hegel. But is not this a mere intellectual *jeu d'esprit*? Outside

effort and intentional production, in such a scheme, and with only human faculty to carry it out, *must* be expected; but this must also be said, that, in the progress of the work, there is no great interest of the world, which does not require to be touched; and this touch we find always to be that of the very master of thought, in such wise that, on the whole, at once the most penetrative and the most comprehensive wisdom is offered to us which has ever yet exhibited itself in time. Again, it is not only an *objective system* that is concerned; it is also a *subjective organon*: he, indeed, who has passed through such a *Calender* finds himself — always in the ratio of his original force, of course — a power of rare elasticity and vigour, and with a range of the most gratifying compass — a Hegel himself is keen to the last point, strong to the last weight, and wide as the universe. Lastly, if we bear in mind that Kant and Hegel have at length introduced objective principles into philosophy, and thus lifted it bodily to the platform of Science, e.g. the Categories, the Notion, &c.—one will see good reason to consider the system of Hegel (and the same may be said for that of Kant) an essential and indispensable element in the culture of all who would present themselves in the arena now-a-days, and work for the public — whether in Science or in Art, in Statecraft or the Professions, in Literature, or the mere business of the Schoolmaster.

2. *Moments of Becoming.*—3. *Sublation of Becoming.*—*Remark.*

We may spend a word, first of all, on the terms Zunächst, Unmittelbar, Daseyn, Moment, Idëel, and Grundlage. — Zunächst remains for long something troublesome to the student of Hegel. It just means,

at nearest in the direction in which you are going. If you are generalising, then it will mean the next step towards the *genus summum*; and nearer (näher) will mean, nearer to universal extension. But if, like Hegel's, your process is one of Determination, and towards ultimate Comprehension or Singularisation, then you must look on the opposite side of the line, and nearer and nearer must mean, greater and greater comprehension, or more and more complex, more and more particularised, more and more individualised. Zunächst, then, may be translated just *in the first instance*, *in the first place*, *at first hand*, *primâ facie*, *&c.*; and sometimes also, *at closest*, or *at strictest*:—*first of all* is also a convenient phrase; *shortly*, *properly*, &c., will sometimes be found to render it. *Das nähere* just means the *particulars*, the *details*, and this manifests the process to be one towards increased precision and definiteness: the *nearness* involved regards the *particular object* concerned, then.

Unmittelbar: *Direct* will be found best to translate this word in paragraph 2 of No. 2; so also at end of No. 3: as it is used in the Remark opposed to *das Aufgehobene*, one gets a vivid glance of the *direct beingness* which Immediacy amounts to.

Daseyn: an English equivalent for this word is difficult to find; but this is no reason why we should make any difficulty of the Notion. Being, Seyn, is easily understood to be Being in general, just the universal or general fact of existence, of Being at all: but Daseyn refers to a definitely-recognised Being; it is that which constitutes the recognisableness of every and any member of this actual existence. Seyn applies to the whole; it is the universal indistinguishable *mush*: but Daseyn has thrown the *checker* down, and

Seyn has become a whole of distinguishable individuals. Distinguishableness, in fact, is the quality of Daseyn; or, in truth, considering what we imply by the termination *ness*, I know not but what we might say *ness* amounts to Seyn, *ness* declares the fact that there just *is*: but then *ness*ness would denote the quality whereby a thing is, and distinguishably is. Daseyn is the *ness*-ness of anything that is; that, as it were, that I can metaphorically rub and *feel* between the thumb and finger. Now this Daseyn, Ness-ness, is accurately composed of Being and Nothing, and the latter is not one whit less essential than the former.

Grundlage is here the constitutive *One* of separable individuals; it is the base, in the sense of a chemical base that goes accurately asunder into its constituents, and eclipses these into its unity again; a mother-liquor which we can figure as this moment disappearingly sundered into its dry elements, and the next reappearingly resolving these into its liquid unity again.

Idëel and Moment we can take together, as they both refer to the one process of Aufhebung. Now that process is just what has been described as producing a Grundlage. Water is Hydrogen and Oxygen; in it they are aufgehoben, and become Idëel; *it* is *their* Grundlage, *they* are *its* Moments. In this way, one can see how Hydrogen and Oxygen are in water withdrawn, each from its own Immediacy. The *Moments* of Spirit are Nature and the Logical Idea; in it they are *Idëel* as in their Grundlage. Ὕλη and μορφὴ are aufgehoben in the ἐντελέχεια. I drop this Gold into that *Aqua Regia*, and it disappears; it is aufgehoben, but it is not destroyed—it still *idëellement* is, it is now a *moment*. In Hegel, however, the *moments* are more than synthetic Differents collapsing to a simple One;

each is very much the other, and in consequence of the other, or each, while itself reflected into the other, holds the other reflected into itself, and so is the other. The Moments in reference to the Lever are very illustrative. All through Hegel, indeed, this reciprocation or mutuation of the moments is the great fact: 'each sublates itself *in itself*, and is in itself the contrary of itself.' *Sublation*, *resolution*, *elimination*, &c. will be now intelligible as translations of Aufhebung.

If it be considered that the one moment has the nature of *Matter* in it, and the other that of *Form*, (one sees that the Aristotelian characterisation of the *Moments* is about the most general of all,) it will be easily understood that the one, as in the case of the Lever, is always relatively *Real*, and the other relatively *Ideal*.

As regards interpretation here, it is really difficult to see that any words can be used more light-giving than those of Hegel himself. In fact, nothing can surpass the accuracy of eye with which he sees, or the distinctness of lip with which he names. No doubt, what is here must appear very strange to a beginner; but, after all, it is employed on what is around us, and is an attempt to observe and (in a way) generalise ultimate facts. What we mean by Being, if we will but look closely enough, is only *indefinite immediacy*, as Nothing in the same way is *immediate indefiniteness*. Being and Nothing are thus the same; or Being has gone into Nothing, and Nothing has gone into Being. But such movement is a process, and is named Becoming. This process unites both distinctions, but so that they are alternately direct and indirect, and in such fashion that the one has concreted or thickened itself into Origin, and the other similarly into Decease: but these again, as but different directions of the same

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process, arrest themselves and sist process into *proceed* or *product*; or Being and Nothing, now Origin and Decease, as but opposing directions of *Becoming*, arrest themselves, and sist *Becoming* into *Become* — and that is Daseyn, Here-being, There-being, *So*-being.

In the directest fashion, this is just the generalisation of what is before our eyes and between our fingers: in other words, this is the *thinking* of the same; these are the *thoughts* which the commonest things involve: this, then, is Logic; why, then, should we not be content to take it thus? The generalisation of Aristotle, in regard to the abstract ultimates of ordinary reasoning, was not, we should say, one whit less strange, or one whit more satisfactory, when it emerged, than is now the generalisation of Hegel in regard to the ultimates of things. Things, in truth, have ultimate forms, as well as Thoughts, and it is good to know them all; nor is it to be supposed that less good will result from the ultimate thinking of Things than from the ultimate thinking of Thoughts. Nay, observe, in both cases, it is *ultimate thinking*; and as Thoughts and Things are all, this ultimate Thinking will not constitute only all ultimate Thinking, but it may go together systematically as a whole, and so constitute *the* ultimate and essential truth of the universe, or — Philosophy at length! Again, Hegel is no less qualified for this abstraction here, than Aristotle was for that abstraction there; and these laconic paragraphs in regard to Nothing, Being, Becoming, and their process, may at once be held up in proof thereof. In every particular, the characterisation is consummate—the identification of the distinction we use as Being with the distinction we use as Nothing, the exhibition of each as process, the pointing out that process as Be-

coming, the demonstrating Becoming to unite the distinctions at once as identical and as different in the opposing forms of Origin and Decease, and lastly, the *precipitation* of Becoming—by its own contradiction—into Become,—all is masterly, and there is present a dialectic which, as mere process, must wonderfully sharpen our wits. But it is not for a moment to be thought that it is as subjective discipline, and not as objective thinking, that this dialectic is valuable: on the contrary, the thoughts themselves must be seen to be the ultimate and essential thoughts that found, or ground, or beground the universe. Or so only can a *beginning* be thought; and so only, *therefore*, can a beginning be *constituted.*

A Beginning, in truth, or *the* Beginning, is what constitutes the bottom consideration here. To Hegel it is, no doubt, evident that it is utterly impossible to start with a single unit *and* conditions. Such a start were in its own crude presuppositions its own refutation. No material unit is competent to a material many; while to presuppose conditions for the production of this many, is just to presuppose this many itself. Before trying to find a beginning, we should have asked, what is a Beginning? What is the Category? this is the first question. It is absurd to talk of Conditions before we know what Conditions are. It is futile to explain the Beginning, unless we have first of all fairly seen into all that the Category, Beginning, implies. An Outward of any kind, for example, and a Beginning will be found absolutely incommensurable. In this way, as regards the object of our quest, we are shut in to the Inward—we are shut in to thought as thought, and the only possible conclusion is, that the thought of the beginning is just the beginning of thought. To

postulate a single substance exposed to a variety of conditions in a ready-made Time and Space, is just to take things as we see them—is just crudely to trip over crude figurate conceptions of the bottom categories, Identity and Difference, which should have been examined first. To talk of a primitive matter *and* conditions in explanation of transition, is to stultify oneself—is to begin with the very variety which requires to be explained.

Again, it seems very difficult to think of a Beginning as only inward; we cannot think an inward without an outward as substrate and basis. We cannot conceive of thought as in the first instance just in the air.

This is perfectly just. Thought is not thought just like so much water, held somewhere in the bag of the universe: Thought implies a thinking Subject. It may be that this Subject is not at first in ἐντελέχεια, or even in ἐνέργεια or μορφὴ; it may be that, at first, it is only in the stage δύναμις, or that it *is* only potentially. *Beginning*, in fact, applied to such Subject must find it only potentially there, or only as indefinite immediacy: that is, the Subject itself, in the beginning, must find itself only in indefinite immediacy. *Being* is the first dim thought, which, when sought to be looked at closer, is only *Nothing*; but from this *Nothing* there is a return again to the sense of *Being*, which now, increased by the reflexion Nothing, can be conceived very intelligibly to contain the thoughts *Becoming* and *Become*. But this *become* is so far *definite*, it *definitely is*, and it becomes the *Something* of reflexion, and so on. In short, the whole process of the Logical Idea can have the universal Subject assigned to it as substrate. The reader is likely to find all this strange; but it is not a whit more strange than that pebble from

the brook, or this pen in my hand: we cannot blink the fact that there is existence, and that man's life has been to understand it. Very truly also that pebble from the brook is not an object just because it is a material something: all that constitutes what it essentially is to me, are categories, and what it is apart from these categories is as nothing: no object, even the most material, but is in very truth a congeries of thoughts. There is no absurdity, then, in the *thought* of the beginning *as* the beginning; for we must have confidence in thoughts and know them as the only verities when opposed to things.

It is on such universal and absolute considerations, then, that Hegel would rest his beginning and all his other *procédés*; and he does not, for a moment think it necessary to allude to the manner in which he gradually worked himself into light on the stand-point and with the materials of Kant. One word in reference to that the actual and concrete origin will not be out of place, just to reassure ourselves of the mundane connexions and really external nature of Hegel's operations, however esoteric be their issue, and however absolute their truth. It is hardly necessary, probably, to remind the reader that Hegel, adopting the hint of Kant, and taking in his hands both the Ontological manuals and Kant's own materials, could hardly fail to observe that Seyn was the *genus summum*, Nichts the *differentia summa*, and Werden the *species summa*. As little reason either is there for reminder that Hegel, realising Logic, recognised in the three steps just named but three forms of the three moments of the single Logical heart-beat common to the Universe, or that, vitalising History, his attention was specially directed to that Notion of Reciprocity which connected him with Kant. Let us just point out in passing,

however, that the three numbers under Werden refer to the same considerations. Thus, No. 1 is 'the unity of Being and Nothing,' which is the Begriff, or the moment of Simple Apprehension; No. 2 is 'the moments of Becoming'—or manifestly the Ur-theil; and No. 3, the 'Sublation of Becoming,' is a movement of Schluss or an act of Reason. The reciprocity of opposing moments with mutual eclipse in a common sphere (in analogy with Kant's mode of viewing the disjunctive judgment) is also obvious. We are not for a moment to suppose, then, that the Logical series of Hegel really rests on absolute considerations, or really flows absolutely from an internal pulse: the veritably genetic considerations and pulse of Hegel are certainly, for the most part, relative and external. I know not whether the problem ever presented itself to Hegel in the brief *propos*, We have to identify Affection with Function; but what that phrase implies lies not obscurely at the centre of his whole industry. If the reader will but take the trouble to reflect on the problem as thus expressed, he will realise to himself the nature and course of the necessarily first thoughts of Hegel. His first difficulty, for example, will be the *formality* of the problem as announced, and the necessity for *matter*. What is Function—what is Affection? Thinking is function—yes—and feeling is affection; but how get them together—where shall we begin—how shall we begin? The Logical movement is function; but Simple Apprehension and the rest are quite formal—how are we to realise them? There seems no possibility of a transition from the one to the other. In the midst of such thoughts as these, it certainly would be a relief to recur to the Categories, and to observe in these a sort of middle-ground between affection and function—media,

as it were, which united both; for the Categories involve an intellectual schema, which schema, in that it possesses matter, is to a certain extent sensuous. To complete these Categories, then, from the confines of the object up to those of the subject, would seem a very hopeful portion of work towards solution of the general problem. But before the Categories presented themselves thus to Hegel, I think there is evidence that he had attempted the question from another side: to name it at once, I think the 'Phaenomenologie' proves Hegel to have been led to begin first of all with Affection, in the hope of being able to work *up* to Function. In this work, as is seen at a glance, he starts with crude *Sensation*, passes on to intelligent *Perception*, and again to *Understanding*, &c.; and the general object throughout is to resolve these forms into notions, or into forms of Reason. All is sought to be pointed out as an affair of Reflexion; ever there is Reflexion behind Reflexion. Under Perception, for example, observe how in every such act he points out a variety of moments which are necessarily notional, and not perceptional at all:—

> In that the qualities (the reference is to a thing and its qualities) are expressed in the simple oneness of the universal, they refer themselves to themselves, are indifferent to one another; each is on its own account, free from the rest. The simple, self-equal universality itself again is distinct and free from these its determinatenesses; it is pure reference of self to self, or the medium in which these determinatenesses all are, and *interpenetrate* each other therefore in it as in a *simple* unit without *touching* each other; for just through their participation in this universality, are they indifferently *per se*. This abstract universal medium, which may be named Thingness in general or the pure Essentity, is nothing else than the Here and Now (which were the results of crude Sensation) as they have exhibited themselves,

namely, as a Simple Together of Many; but the Many are in their determinateness themselves simply Universal. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time plural; it is *white* and also *sharp, cubical* also, and also of a certain *weight*, and so on. All these many qualities are in a simple Here, in which therefore they interpenetrate and pervade each other; none has another Here than the other, but each is everywhere in the same Here in which the others are; and at the same time, without being separated by separate Heres, they do not in this interpenetration affect each other: the white does not affect or alter the cubical, neither of them nor both together the sharp, and so on; but as each is itself simple reference of self to self, it lets the others alone, and refers itself to them only through the neutral or indifferent *Also*. This *Also* is therefore the pure Universal itself, or the Medium, the *Thingness* which thus holds them together.

That in this way perception is attempted to be exhibited as an affair of thought, is plain; and certainly the statement has its own subtlety of analytic and metaphysical truth: it may prove, indeed, a useful illustration of the manner of Hegel. In the celebrated Preface to this work, the industry, an example of which we have just seen, is expressly referred to :—

By this in general, that, as was expressed above, substance is in itself subject, is every object (Inhalt, literally, implex, or whole of comprehension) its own reflexion into itself. The subsisting, or the substance of a finite object, is its equality with its own self; for its inequality with itself were its dissolution. But self-equality, or equality with self, is pure Abstraction; and this is Thought. When I say *Quality*, I say the simple determinateness: by quality is one object distinguished from another, or by quality is it an object; it is for its own self, or it consists through this simplicity with itself. But by this is it essentially Thought. Herein is it understood, that das Seyn (Being) is Thought, &c. . . . . Thought is the immanent Self of the Object, &c.*

* Pref. Phaenom. pp. 41, 42; Berlin, 1841. The preceding, op. cit. p. 84.

By these quotations, it will be intelligible that Hegel in his earlier stages was employed in an endeavour to lead the notion directly into the object by an analysis of the successive phases of this latter, or of the successive faculties to which it was submitted. That is, Hegel at first sought to reduce Affection to Function by an analysis of the former. Transition from the one to the other is not in this manner perfectly satisfactory, however, and Hegel was enabled to perceive later that to complete one side first, and to allow it, when completed, just to pass over into its other in obedience to the general rhythm, would constitute, on the whole (ridiculed as it has been universally, and by Schelling particularly), a much more satisfactory Transition. In short, it occurred in time to Hegel to identify the first form of the Notion with the most abstract category, to develop category after category *risingly* towards the Notion itself, to exhibit it itself, describing its own subjective forms, passing over into the notion of the object and terminating in the Idea, and thus to complete Logic, or the whole of those inner forms which were the souls of everything without. Logic completed, or the Logical Idea appearing summed and full-formed as an organic whole, he exhibited the same as passing over, and falling asunder now into externality and particularity—as Nature. The next step was the conjunction of both into Spirit. But enough has now been said by way of reminder of the external operations of Hegel: we return now to our commentary of the text where necessary.

CHAPTER II.

THERE-BEING.

And, first of all, we have to see the moment of the Begriff, or of Simple Apprehension, in

A.

THERE-BEING AS SUCH.

The general distributions or divisions which precede 'a. There-being in general,' though to be perused, need not be allowed to arrest the reader for their full understanding, which, indeed, is impossible in the first instance. Nowhere, in truth, can any reader hope to read with the same perfect intelligence and open sense with which Hegel wrote, till after a repeated return from the united whole to the separated parts.

As moment of Simple Apprehension, with but identity before us, the identity of There-being as such, or of There-being in general, there is not much to be said here. Accordingly, what *is* said is more of the nature of general remark. The construction or constitution of every There-being is accurately named, however; and that is the main point. Everything that definitely is, is product of Becoming, and as such it is a σύνολον, a composite — but in perfect unity, singleness, and simpleness — of Being and Nothing. Now, everything that is, definitely is: we have, therefore, in the characterisations here reached,

the principles of the universal structure of the all of things. The distinction is certainly subtle and difficult to realise; still it is very certain that it is a *not* which gives the qualifying force — the edge of individuality and self-identity to Being itself. Without that *not*, Being itself indeed is *not*, or nought; for it is an absolute abstraction, and there shows not a sign in it. In the value assigned to Daseyn, then, there is more than mere thought: we cannot say, only, according to these thoughts all things are; but we can say also, according to this very constitution all things are. When the ingredients of certain medicinal juleps, &c. are sent *dry*, they are called the *species* of these medicaments. Now, similarly, we may say, that Daseyn is the universal *species* of everything that is. It is not necessary, then, that we should call up before us the idea of the originating subject in order to put ourselves at home with the meaning of Daseyn; this assignation is sufficient by itself; we see at once its truth and value as the *basal form*. Again, it is important to know that Being and Nothing are not, each apart and by itself, anywhere denizens of this universe. What is, is an inseparable *one* of both; neither Being as Being, nor Nothing as Nothing, anywhere actually is. Both are abstractions, and utterly void abstractions. It is saying very little for God, then, to say He is pure Being, or, what is the same thing, the Sum of all Realities; yet no mode of characterising God is thought— very generally, at least — more appropriate or solemn. As Hegel points out, there is the same warrant for, and the same honour in, the designation for God of *Sum of all Negations*.

The caution as regards the intercalations of Reflexion is of value in its general scope, but its particular

relevancy is not clear. Daseyn, There-being, is a simple *one*, therefore in the form of Immediacy, therefore also in the form of Being: this seems result of the objective evolution, and not of the reader's subjective reflexion. Neither is it to this that Hegel's remark applies, but to our seeing, also, that it is only *one-sidedly* in the determination of Being, and that in point of fact the other determination, Nothing, is present also. Now it is this part that has been anticipated by reflexion, and not yet expressly evolved. The first sentence of the relative paragraph exhibits a peculiar grammatical construction. Up to the semicolon there are three clauses, of which the second is separated from the first by a comma, and the third by a comma and a dash from the second: now the function of this dash is to connect the third clause (ein aufgehobenes, negativ-bestimmtes) as well to the nominative (Das Ganze) of the first clause as to that (Das Seyn) of the second. The peculiarity has been attempted to be conveyed in the translation. Such *longè-referent, multi-referent* construction is not unusual in Hegel, and brings its own difficulties. It would be hard to believe the immense length of time the present student lay without power of movement before this particular sentence: the relative page of the relative volume of Hegel, at all events, is about as brown as the opening pages of a boy's school-book. Yet the difficulty does not appear great now. At first, however, in the uncertainty of the new terms and the new notions, any such peculiarity of construction is coy of determination, and so is apt to throw us for long completely out.

As regards the terms, there is not much occasion to add any remark. For Daseyn, perhaps, There-ness, So-

ness, as well as Ness-ness, would be more eligible than There-being, &c. For setzen we have used the term evolution; but we shall have a better opportunity for the further discussion of this word. Vermittelung is an awkward term to convey in English: it is that process, mediation, or intervention of means, which brings about a result; in fact, it is always a bringing *about*. Inhalt, as usual, is a *complexus notarum*, a complement of the significates of logical comprehension.

b. *Quality.*

The difficulty here is to *conceive*—*picture*—negation as There-being, or Thereness, and Quality: it is hard to inspissate Nothing with Substance; we must fix our eye on the substantial negation in all quality as steadily as we can, however. The moment of objective reflexion must be well looked at here. The one element is distinguished from the other, and so, therefore, it is now a reflected entity, or it contains a reflexion from the other in it, at the same time that, by distinction, it is in a manner shed off or reflected on to its own self. The effect of the bestimmen of Being by Nothing may be illustrated. 'Daseyn ist *bestimmtes* Seyn:' one might almost translate this, There-being is curdled Being; or There-*ness* is curdled-*ness*. Something of a *real* negation may be so seen.—Again, throw into that clear air so much cold, and it is opacified, curdled into a cloud. In these examples, one might figure that negation had been added to the Being that was, and so this opaque, curdled, determined There-being resulted. Being, in short, is de*term*ined; there is a terminus put to it, a negation; and so it is There-being, so much there-ness.

Remark.

Reality and Negation.

This observation is full of the most excellent matter, and opens striking vistas into several very unexpected directions. This applies to the sum of all Realities, to that of all Negations—to the notions of God's Goodness, Justice, Wisdom, Power—to that of Absolute Power, &c. &c. The allusion to Böhme is very interesting; and as regards Spinoza, the critique of Hegel is always, as we shall have more occasion to see in the sequel, absolutely irresistible and masterly. There is a hint, too, very well worth observing, that though the individual belongs to other spheres than that of Seyn, he must, so far as he holds of Seyn, submit to the characterisations of Seyn. The writing here is so exoteric, that comment is unnecessary. As regards terms, I would just point out that, in the beginning of the Remark, Hegel himself sets *an sich* as equal to im Begriffe. As regards the hopelessness of solution which some may feel in regard to Goodness, Power, &c., let me suggest that *vital reciprocity* which is the root of the whole: *right* is right only because there is a *left*; *up*, up, only because there is a *down*; and each is quite as much in the other—or simply other—as it is in itself, or itself.

With a general remark or two, we shall pass on. If we suppose what Daseyn is, to have been thought before Daseyn was, we shall come to see, on due consideration, that it could not have been thought otherwise than Hegel indicates. It is to this strict thinking of Hegel that we are to refer his tendency to keep in view the etymological meaning of his terms. In fact, this alone ought to be a guarantee of his sincerity, and earnestness, and good faith with us.

He is not contented with a vague sign; he does not move in tropes; he must have a word that accurately and precisely and exactly cuts out his thought; and he never uses a word without distinctly seeing what it amounts to, or perfectly satisfying himself that it is adequate to his purpose. This, however, makes the difficulty of Hegel; because in him, if we attempt, as the sensuous modern literature has taught us, to float on with words in their ordinary and current sense, we find ourselves presently lost. It is a severe task, then, to him who would follow Hegel, to keep by the thought of Hegel, and, in spite of the cloud of current sense, recognise distinctly in each word, and even in each fraction of a word, what that precisely is which Hegel means it to convey. Take the word *endlich*, finite, for example: if we commit ourselves to the vague and phantasy-exciting signification in common use, we shall never see into the Notion; while, on the contrary, how different, how clear it becomes when we tame phantasy into thought, and correct loose opinion by etymology! That is finite which is ended or endable in space, in time, or in thought; that is infinite which is neither ended nor endable in space, in time, or in thought: rather, anything in time and space is superfluous, everything in these being limited by other, and thought with the pure forms of sense themselves is alone what is infinite. Consider Ego, for example: it is wholly infinite—unended, unendable.

It is this same close restricting of himself to reality which has procured Hegel the reproach of Haym, that perception is always behind him. The reproach is a compliment: Hegel would deal with facts of existence, and not with fictions of conception. It does not follow, indeed, that thought is less pure thought because

perception is behind it; rather, in an opposite supposition, thought would be but empty idle subjectivity: function and affection are necessary complementary reciprocals. Still the development from Seyn to Daseyn which we have witnessed, *though true to perception*, has always found its materials within its own self. (The *divisions* are, of course, from their very nature, anticipations.) What is said of a Category is always to be understood by reference to the world of facts; but this is the point which must not be overlooked, that it is also *universally* and *necessarily* true and applicable in that world. In reading Daseyn, for example, it just gains in sense and truth, the more real and energetic and entire the reference is which we make to the concrete: the thing is, that the characterisation is unexceptive. Besides, we have not to occupy ourselves with the concomitant reflexions in such manner as to hide from ourselves the progressively extricated differentiæ which are again re-incorporated to increase and progress.

The *homogeneousness* with which Being and Nothing are one in There-being is the important consideration. We have not Being here, and Nothing there: they are perfectly incorporated into a One. *Light* and *darkness* are, as it were, perfectly commingled into the resultant *colour*. Again, the *colour* is directly a *light*, as *There*-being is directly *Being*; but the other moment, darkness, Nothing, is equally there, and will manifest itself on its own side. Colour is not partly light, and partly dark; it is a uniform simple Immediate: still it is the Grundlage, the neutral base, in which light and darkness both *are* — idëellement, that is— ideally—moments, but sublated. The illustration corresponds not inexactly. The *definiteness*, then, seems

mainly due to the negative element: it is the dark gives colour and distinction in colour. Not very different is it in the case of a flavour; the peculiarity of it, the difference of it, is the *edge*, and seems apart from the *body* of the flavour: when it is all peculiarity or edge, it is thin, worthless, or passes into Nothing. (One meets characters who are all edge, distinction, emphasis, accent; they *cut*, but they do not *move*: the fair union makes the great man, as Homer, Sophocles, Epaminondas, Cervantes, &c.) Sound is much the same; it is determination by silence that produces musical notes: possibly, varying proportions of vibration and non-vibration constitute much of the difference in sounds. Colour, in like manner, may result, not, as in the coarse theory of Goethe, from a mechanical mixture of light and darkness, but from variety in the alternation of vibration and non-vibration (undulation offers no difference to make a difficulty). It is remarkable, too, that there are seven musical notes and seven colours; and if the latter be really reducible to three, is such reduction applicable to the former? Are colours but music to the eye — music but colours to the ear? Perhaps, variety in odours and flavours similarly arises, and all difference is but alternation of vibration and non-vibration. Thus, too, may neutral effects be accounted for, as the black of the union of iron and gallic acid in ink. Non-being, then, is the seat of determination, the edge of difference — how else is edge conceivable but as cessation? Edge here, too, is but another word for the smack, the pitch, the feel. In this way we can see difference in identity almost as a matter of fact. We can conceive *what is* as the one identical, infinitesimal spore whose vibration is its difference—and that is the all of thought

as exhibited. Hegel's general view must be capable of being so stated. What is the universe to him, if not the one absolute *vox* inflecting itself into its involved *voculations*? Bestimmung is but *articulation*, and the absolute Bestimmung is but the absolute articulation of the absolute *one* — and that *one* is just Thought: Thought's own native articulations constitute the All of Things.—The above remarks, it is to be understood, however, are not to be regarded *materially*, or in themselves, but only *formally* and relatively, as illustrative of the union of Being and Nothing in every There-being.

c. *Something.*

The reader ought to pay particular attention to this section, for it is the most important we have yet seen, both in itself and as illustrative of the thinking peculiar to Hegel.—We may notice, in the first place, what is spoken of as the Unterschied, the *inter-shed*, the *distinction*, the *dif-ference*, which in There-being appears as Reality and Negation. It is the same difference which was first named Being and Nothing, then Origin and Decease, and now as here. Being and Nothing collapsed, or were eclipsed, into the concrete neutral base, Becoming; There-being assumed a like relation to Origin and Decease; and now we see Something similarly to resume Reality and Negation. Thus, then, we see Logical Determination verily in process: the moments have successively *thickened* themselves, and the base (which is just also a moment) has likewise successively *thickened* itself. Now, the means productive of this *thickening* has been simply Reflexion, or indeed just—Thinking: the one moment of the single logical rhyth-

mus passes into its opposite, and with it collapses into a higher third: this is Hegel's Dialectic; but it is also Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason; or it is Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss; or, again, it is ὕλη, μορφὴ, ἐντελέχεια, An sich, für sich, &c. &c.*

What we have to see here, however, is, that *the* Difference exists, and that it is always, in whatever form, still *the* Difference,—an antithesis and at the same time synthesis of *two* such, that the *one* is only because the *other* is, and both collapse into a Third. The reader must bear in mind the *inter-shed*, then, as the primordial, but ever-present and vital, Diæresis or Diaphora of the world: Yes — No — Both!

The single pivot of this section, however, finds itself in the phrases *first and second negation*, *the negation of the negation*, *the concrete absolute negation*, *resolution of difference*, *sublation of distinction*, *the negative reference of self to self*, *the negative unity of self with self*, *the Mediation of self with self*, *Being-within-Self*, &c.; all of which just mean the same thing, and that is, the negation of the constitut*ing* Variety, or Many into the constitut*ed* Unit or One, or the absorption of the Parts into the Whole, said Whole being further regarded as simply Singular. In Something, in short, There-being just sublates its own difference, or it returns to itself from its own difference, and is thus gone into itself. If anyone will consider what a Subject is, he will readily understand this: an Ego or I is the unity of an infinitude of details, but as Ego it is wholly negative, as Ego all its details have disappeared; Ego is,

* Perhaps it is confusing to call this movement Reflexion, as Hegel reserves that term for only one of its contained moments—that of the separating and abstracting understanding or judgment: an instance of this occurs in this very paragraph, in an allusion to *unformed* Reflexion.

therefore, the negative unity of itself with itself, or the mediation of itself with itself; and thus is it the negation of the negation, for its details are in the first instance as negative to it, (the *abstract* negative is here involved, productive of variety or difference,) but *it* as return to itself is the negation of the negation, and the resumption of concrete unity. The two negatives or negations are thus, then, very clear; and Something as negation of the negation is seen to be the beginning of the Subject. The words in the text, 'There-being in general, Distinction in it, and resolution of this Distinction,' contain the whole business. In these words, too, *the moments* come completely to the surface: 'There-being in general' is the Immediacy of the Begriff, the An sich, or the moment of Simple Apprehension; 'Distinction in it' is the Mediacy of the Ur-theil, or the moment of Judgment; and 'resolution of this distinction' is, as Schluss or resuming Totality, the moment of Reason. In him who shall understand this section, the lesson of Hegel has fairly begun. Every way the thinking here is admirable: consider the pointing out, though that is an anticipation, and Something has first of all to other itself in itself,—that Something, as *in itself* Becoming, goes asunder into the concrete Werden that has Something and Other as its sides, both of which are Somethings.

The reader will get a glimpse of the negative reference to self, if he will conceive his finger running questioningly over an unknown surface, and suddenly returning from the edge of the same back, as it were, to its centre with the word *wood*, or *stone*, or *glass*, &c., as the case may be. Let him suppose himself to be blindfolded, and successive surfaces to be tenta-

tively offered to one finger, and he will find that he is in contact for some time simply with an unknown blur of difference, which blur suddenly collapses to a unity—and to a unity of self-reference — when *what* it is — and that is its notion—suddenly strikes him. Then only when it attains self-reference is the blur — Something. Hegel's Metaphysic of Something, then,— and it is perfect, for no Something in the Universe but will be found to be accurately constituted *so*.— is but a concrete act of Perception as Perception was determined by Kant. Consider what an unknown blur the *Santa Maria* must have proved to the Indians who watched with appalled astonishment those bright shapes, Columbus and the harnessed Spaniards, descending from it; and consider, again, the easy unity of self-reference in which it would have all gone together as 'ship' to the eyes of any European sailor, had any such, by shipwreck or otherwise, found himself among them! All this refers to Kant's theory of perception—a theory which, as stated at full elsewhere * in its own place, shall only be alluded to here. This theory, we may observe, Hegel has undoubtedly made his own; but we know of no evidence at present that anyone has previously recognised its presence and creative activity in him, nor, indeed, that any but Hegel has recognised it in Kant even. Now that it is pointed out, however, it is quite likely that it will be found in many words which never yielded it, and of many people who never thought of it before. In Kant's theory of Perception, then, there are three moments: there is, first, the manifold of Sense; second, the synthetic unity of the Category; and third, the Apperception of the individual subject. This, again, is but *the* Notion of

* In another work.

Hegel: the Category is the Universal; the Manifold, the Particular; and subjective Apperception, the Singular. Now, we have seen manifolds united into the self-referent Singles, wood, stone, glass, ship, &c., and it appears as if this self-reference were the result of the single Category Something. But this is not the case: in an act of Perception there are generally a vast number of Categories involved. The Indians who saw the *Santa Maria*, though they had no form 'ship' to apply, were, nevertheless, not idle with their Categories, but had soon stuck it full with many characterisations of their own. It was a *thing*, and had *qualities*; it was a *force*; perhaps it was an *animal* and had *life*: it was certainly there in Quantity and Quality; it was *Something*, it had definite Being, it involved Becoming, it implied pure Being. This is to try and convey to the reader that all perceptions — that is, just all objects — are but congeries of Categories, of Notions. Take any object you like, and throw out of it one after the other the Categories you have thought into it (Kant), or which are in it (Hegel) — then ask yourself what remains? To the common mind what remains is still the object, the wood, stone, glass, ship, in absolute, isolated, free independence, after as before. To Kant what remains is the manifold of sense — *affection* set up in us by the unknown thing in itself or things in themselves without us, disposed into the *really* internal, but *apparently* external, forms of space and time: this, then, is what remains to Kant — an *unperceived*, incoherent manifold of Affection. To Hegel, again, what remains must be otherwise characterised. For him, the Kantian Thing-in-itself, as a mere void characterless assumption, exists not. To him, again, the sensuous element, affection, as but the externalisation or mere other of the intellectual ele-

ment, function, exists only in this latter. To Hegel, consequently, withdrawal of the Categories is the total eclipse at once of an inner and an outer; or Sense, as but the reflexion of Thought, must disappear with Thought. If you discharge, indeed, all Categories from any object — a stone, say — what is there then that does remain? Can you name it? can you find in it a single character whereby you can *say* it? No; it is unsayable, an Unsagbares, a characterless void, like the Kantian Thing-in-itself! At least, it is as nothing to the other element, which has just been discharged, or at best it is only the other of that element. To Hegel, then, the object of Thought is Thought, and anything else *opined* in it is but its other as other. But Hegel is not satisfied with saying as much; he wishes to show as much, and he exhibits the *object* of Thought—just *the* object—in gradual growth from the Nothing of Pure Being up to the All and the One of the Absolute Spirit. The Logic of Hegel, then, is but the genetic exposition of the true Thing-in-itself as opposed to the inane Thing-in-itself of Kant. Nay, the reader must feel this himself now—after the Metaphysic of Something. Has not a light gone up to him thence? Has he not felt that the *solidity* of every Something was, after all, Thought? Has he not been made to see that even his ordinary perceptions imply thoughts, are impossible without thoughts, and that these thoughts constitute the all-important moments of these perceptions? Even to him, then, now, in this Logic, is it not the formation of the Thing-in-itself he sees before him? If we refer now to a passage quoted from the 'Phaenomenologie,' a little way back, we shall see how much the 'Logik' is a rise as regards the same. What was to Hegel in the one work the

vague, inarticulate, as it were dreaming, Sichselbstgleichheit, or equality with self, is here the precise, fully-developed, perfectly self-conscious negative reference to self. Kant is, in every way, the *materia* of Hegel; but if anyone will realise to himself what thinking lay in Hegel between those determinations of the 'Phaenomenologie' and these of the 'Logik,' he will get a glimpse into such profundity, accompanied by such a sense of weight, as will make his head ache and ache again. Hegel is a royal thinker, the most tenacious, the most deeply-incisive, the most long-breathed, the world has ever witnessed.

The necessity of the *one* of a notion to the *many* of sense before we can even *perceive*: this, a determination of Kant, is another way of exhibiting the germ-cell of Hegel. Hegel saw this to be necessarily, *in every case*, a negative reference to self; and he just made it his object to find *all* the *cases*, and in their sequence and system. How much, then, deep consideration of what constitutes Kant's theory of Perception, and also the Thing-in-itself, had to do with the origin of the system of Hegel, ought now to be tolerably clear, and we may conclude here with a word on two or three of the terms.

Real and *Reality* must always be understood by reference to the place in the development where the latter word emerges; indeed, this is a remark universally applicable as regards the terms of Hegel: to understand them we have just to refer to the *Moment* out of which their *Notion* rose. *Opine*, as usual, concerns crude subjective *mein*-ung, as it were the mere *mine*-ing, *my*-ing, or *me*-ing of thought. *Being-within-self*, or Insichseyn: the effect of *In* here, as contradistinguished from *An*, must be seen into; it is attempted

to be conveyed by *within*. In *Something*, indeed, a *within* begins.

'In Something Mediation with Self has reached *position*:' these last three words translate *ist gesetzt*. The meaning plainly is, that, in the one notion, the other *is explicit* or fairly overt, and expressed, that is, it is in Logical Position. This *setzen*, especially in its derivatives Gesetztseyn and Gesetztes, is always particularly troublesome to an English translator. What it means here is happily particularly plain, however.

The would-be abstract Nothing, of course, refers to the common understanding, and its 'it is the same thing, therefore, whether I have a house or nothing, a hundred dollars or nothing, &c.' This Nothing plainly *would be* abstract, or *is supposed to be* abstract; but, on the contrary, it is evidently concrete, as it refers to a concrete—house, dollars, &c.

That the most abstract determinations 'are also the most current expressions of unformed reflexion,' (and it is hoped the manner, 'the reflexion,' &c., will not prove too foreign here,) might have been suggested to Hegel by a remark of Kant's at page 280 of the Logic, in his collected works, which points out that abstract notions are 'sehr brauchbar,' very useful and useable, 'as they may be applied to many things.' Some forty-three pages further on, Hegel says the same thing again thus: 'to unformed thought, the abstractest categories, Being, There-being, Reality, Finitude, &c., are the most current.' Hegel's own thought is evidently here, even were it on occasion of Kant, which, however,—the whole matter is of little moment,—is not certain. Nevertheless, one cannot read the Logic of Kant—seemingly meagre as it is—without thinking perpetually how much this and that must have done for Hegel.

Here is a passage which well illustrates the Vorstellung of Hegel, as well as the production of a pure universal 'Logik' as parallel to a pure universal 'Grammatik:'—

Knowledge of the Universal *in abstracto* is Speculative Knowledge; Knowledge of the Universal *in concreto*, common knowledge. Philosophical knowledge is Speculative knowledge of Reason, and it begins therefore there where the common exercise of Reason commences to make attempts in the cognition of the Universal *in abstracto*.

From this determination of the difference between the common and the speculative use of Reason, we may infer what people the beginning of philosophising must date from. Of all nations the Greeks, then, first began to philosophise. For they first attempted to cultivate cognitions of Reason, not by aid of the leading-string of images, (figures, pictures,) but *in abstracto*; while other nations, on the contrary, sought to make Notions intelligible to themselves always only by means of images *in concreto*. Thus even at the present day there are nations, as the Chinese and certain Indians, who treat indeed of things which are derived solely from reason, as of God, the Immortality of the Soul, &c., but seek not, nevertheless, to explore the nature of these objects according to notions and rules *in abstracto*.*

Kant goes on to say, that what Philosophy appears among Persians and Arabians comes from Aristotle, that the Zendavesta displays no trace of the same, and that the 'gepriesene' Egyptian wisdom was, in comparison with Greek Philosophy, mere child's-play. The antithesis of the Hegelian *Conception* to the Hegelian *Notion* is precisely that of an Image *in concreto* and a Thought *in abstracto*. It is as images or pictures, one sees, that *conceptions* are just *representations* of *notions*. The hint to Hegel's whole process is also plain here. We could all, however, have seen this hint,

* Op. cit. p. 189.

but it was only a Hegel who could realise it. Here from the 'Soul's Tragedy' of that wonderfully analytic and subtle character-reproducing Poet, Browning, is a passage which may illustrate the same subject of Conceptions and Notions :—

> As when a child comes in breathlessly and relates a strange story, you try to conjecture from the very falsities in it, what the reality was,—do not conclude that he saw nothing in the sky, because he assuredly did not see a flying horse there, as he says,—so, through the contradictory expression, do you see, men should look painfully for, and trust to arrive eventually at, what you call the true principle at bottom.

This suggests another Hegelian characteristic: we, like dupes, are led daily, and blindfolded, by 'what you call the true principle at bottom,' without the slightest notion of what it is; but he, for his part, must see and know and settle it all as Wesen.

B.

FINITUDE.

The reader will find elements of difficulty here. Let him remember, first of all, the exact point of the development at which he has arrived. He has seen There-being sublate its own determinateness, distinction, or difference by reflexion into its own self as a Something. The sublation has not destroyed the difference, however, which still, as it were, remains outside the reflexion into self, and thus distinguished from the self of the Something is, in that relation, *Other*. The reader must see that the *other* is not imported from elsewhere, but that the Something *others* itself in itself. This is the first point to be observed, and it is one of the greatest importance: we must never part company

with what we have before us, and always see clearly whither we are arrived. At present we have reached Something and Other, which, as such, have, in the first instance, the air of being indifferent in regard to each other. Now, it is important to see that, each being equally a Something and only other because of the other, the element of negation is not in them themselves, but falls out or outside of both. But this involves a reflexion the one from the other, with the result that Something is *in itself* against its Being-for-Other. To understand this, we must see that we have not introduced a foreign *other*, that the *other* spoken of is the *other* which reflected itself in the Something itself, and which still is the Something, but so that the Something there is as Other, or is its own Being-as-Other. This is the true development of the notion implied in the Hegelian Seyn-für-Anderes. The reflexion by which the *negation* was identified with There-being, and restored to, or incorporated with, the *reality*—and these were the moments of There-being—gave birth to the Something, which Something again, as negative reflexion into self, involved an*other from* which the reflexion took place. But this other was still its own; and it is the peculiar constitution of every Something in this universe, that it involves, or implies, or contains its own other. There, however, in this region of other, the Something is as Being-as-other, or, as Hegel prefers it, Being-for-other. The peculiar force of the German *für*, as already seen in the illustrations relative to *für mich* and *für sich*, is here to be recalled and reconsidered. We say in English, *it passes for genuine*, it *passes for Gold*, &c.: this is the same *for* as that in the Being-for-other. *Something* in the determination so designated, is every way *other*; it is there where it

is *as* other, and there where it is in every direction *for* other.

Now this the region of otherness, is the region also of recognisableness, determinateness. And again the determinateness is the Something's own. But the Something's determinateness reflected into the Something, becomes that Something's *qualification* or precise *determination*; meaning thereby its vocation, destination, purpose, chief end, or how else you may name its one manifestible peculiar nature. Then, again, the peculiar manifest*ible* nature passes plainly into the peculiar manifest*ed* nature; and that is Beschaffenheit, or so constitutedness, which we may translate, in opposition to *qualification* (from *qualis*) by *talification* (from *talis*). Talification, then, alludes to Something being constituted such, that when involved with *Other* it asserts itself thus and thus; or *talis* (such sort) is just the answer to *qualis* (what sort).

Now this actual manifestation, identical also (as we have seen) with the potential manifestibility, must, without difficulty, be perceived to constitute, as Hegel says, the immanent and, at the same time, negated Being-for-other, or the Limit of the Something. That it is the immanent Being-for-other is plain; and that, manifesting itself only *as* or *when* involved with other, it is also *negated*, is likewise plain. Not less easy is it to see that its assertion *against* or *on* other is its Limit; or that where it at once affirmatively or immanently and negatedly or with other is, there is its Limit, or there is it in its Limit.

But just such constitution (of assertion with or against other) as characterises Limit, is what we name the immanent determination, proper nature, of any Something.

Lastly, if Limit (End) is the proper nature of Something, Something is evidently the Finite, or that which is of an *ended* nature—ended and *endable*, inasmuch as there is reference to a negating Other.

The remark that follows is prompted by this—that Hegel in the *second* chapter has passed into the moment of the Ur-theil, and he excuses the affirmative nature of the findings under the first division A—*affirmative* though the moment is *negative*—by pointing out that, if in the first instance we had a positive verdict, and the Urtheil almost in the form of the Begriff, we shall now, under the second division, find all as negative as can be wished, and the Urtheil fairly as Urtheil.

Terms here are thus explained. Bestimmung emerging from the development as the Qualification or *what sort* which it is, is accurately defined; and Beschaffenheit no less so. *Immanent* is in every English Dictionary.

a. *Something and an Other.*

This is certainly very difficult thinking; but it is at the same time, perhaps, the deepest, the most penetrating, the most comprehensive, which the modern world has ever witnessed. Under the first moment, marked 1, there are three sub-moments: Firstly, to Simple Apprehension, both (Something and Other) are Something; secondly, to Judgment, both are Other; thirdly, to Reason, the Other is the Other for itself, and just so also is it, at the same time, Something, or the Something. That both are Something, and that both are relatively Other, we may take this as quite plain, without more explanation; but the *Other* isolated and for itself is more difficult. Yet this is not so very difficult when the true point of

view is attained to. The Other belongs not to the Somethings themselves; it is quite external to them; it is something else than they, then; something independent, *sui generis*, and on its own account: it may be isolated, then, and considered for itself, and so on. Then the Other as Other must just be this externality as such of Nature: it is always to Spirit its Other, and nothing but its Other, at the same time that it is in its own nature simply the Other as such. Then this Other by self-reflexion sublates itself, and otherness remains simply a distinguishedness—a relativity, not a substantiality and positivity.—These are great thoughts: they are the truth of Idealism, or, rather, they are that idealistic Realism which is the only True, and which extends to each moment of the antithesis its own rights, in such manner that each is seen to be but the necessary complementary reciprocal of the other.

Under number 2, we are to expect a moment of *dis*tinction; and that it proves to be, for the poles of the single antithesis, which were at first Being and Nothing, are now distinguished as Being-in-self and Being-for-other. So far as words are concerned, Hegel's own seem sufficient. We may just point out in passing, that a firm view of Non-There-being may be procured by considering the constitution of There-being, in which the element of Negation, which was still, however, There-being, is what is now referred to as the Non-There-being. Again, we may remark that we have all our materials still before us, and need not move from the spot, neither to please Haym, who will have it that we do move, nor Rosenkranz, who certainly, in all conscience, moves enough, and never thinks, indeed, of staying by the spot. The phrase 'their truth is their reference,' or 'their reference is

their truth,' is understood at once when the Something is thought as othering itself in itself; for the other and the reflexion to self are very plainly mutual complements, true only in their sum. Again, it is well worthy the reader's deepest consideration, how it is that Being is just reference to self: there is a little corner in these paragraphs whence there is a good glimpse into this. Certainly, we are not limited to our own materials, but the findings will be found true for all materials: it is true, for instance, of all *Somethings*, and of all *Others*, that their truth is their reference.

Under number 3, as is natural to expect now, we shall find the moments which have been but just disjoined re-united again. There is no difficulty here, indeed, to those who have followed what precedes: the most of the space, in fact, is taken up with certain explanations. What we see first is, that the *Other* is still *in* the Something, though this latter has gone *into itself*. *Circumstance* has been chosen expressly to translate Umstand, which is here the Being-for-other. The sense of *In-itself* is made very plain here. We have spoken of it as implying latent potentiality; but this we see now is a secondary *nuance*. The In-itself is, first of all, just the counter-reflexion to Being-for-other; but then, In-itself without Being-for-other is only abstract—is only potential. The Being-for-other, in fact, as regards the constitution of any Something, is *in* the In-itself, or just is *in it*, and is truly the Something, is truly the In-itself, or is just truly *it*. This is all amply illustrated in the text;—especially striking is it that In-itself as a characterisation simply abstract is simply also external. There is no allowance to be made, then, for what we are in ourselves, unless in relation to what we are—or have manifested ourselves—for others.

The Thing-in-itself is here made plain; and the simple trick Reflexion plays itself in such distinctions is very simply and happily exposed. The true In-itself is *the Notion*, whether as Totality or individual detail: this, however, we see, requires *Setzen*, requires *position*; for the *an sich* is just at first the *abstract* Begriff. That suggests the special meaning of Gesetztseyn, which is so difficult to render in English. We are here in Seyn, Being; but Being is the reference to self, and each of its moments, therefore, will be as bëent or self-referent. A character of self-substantiality will attach to each, and movement among them will be but a passing from one to the other. But the result of self-reference is Being-in-self, or the In-itself; and so it is that Being is so much or so wholly Ansichseyn. The moments, then, here *are* rather set or posited, than that they set or posit each other; which latter movement is that peculiar to Wesen or Essence. This Hegel illustrates by examples from both spheres. If it is difficult to translate, we are not allowed, then, nevertheless, to fail to understand. Under Being, the action of Setzen is to explicate, or to make the implicit *explicit*. This is a process of evolution, expression, realisation, statement, and it is usually named *logical position*. Under Essence or Wesen, the moments of evolution become overtly reciprocal, or the one posits, sets, or stakes the other. As we have seen, right sets left, left right, &c. Anything thus set, then, is not independent and self-subsistent; it is derivative, representative, vicarious, subdititious, surrogative, pronominal; it is a reaction, a recoil, a rebound or redound, a replication, a reflexion, a reciprocation,—it is an exinvolute, an eximplicate, an occasionate. In this way, one can see the meaning of ein Gesetztes. Again, Gesetztseyn just expresses the

abstract quality of all this: it is posititiousness, adjectitiousness, ascriptitiousness, attributiveness, assertiveness, &c. &c. In short, we are to see the universal presence of reflexion and reciprocation, of relativity and correlativity, or of the *relative inference* already spoken of. No doubt, Hegel sees in Setzen, to set, or stake, or put in place of, and from this the rest derives. In reference to the Metaphysical methods that preceded his own, he has good right to say that this element of mutuation and reflexion never entered, and that the whole effort was to maintain something positive. We may fancy Hegel teasing out substantial unity into a whole world of reflexion; and then, in that case, one might say, What is, is Gesetztseyn, mere reflexion, mutuation, mutuatitiousness.

b. *Qualification, Talification, and Limit.*

We have seen the Being-for-other declared *in* the Something, *in it*, rather than in its *in-itself*. This is a dredging or deepening of abstract In-itself, into a *capability* of the Being-for-other. Or the Being-for-other being reflected into the In-itself, this In-itself is now *be-mediated* (concretely furnished) thereby. It is no longer abstract latent potentiality which is before us as the In-itself; the Being-for-other seems now reflected into its depths, and to lie within it, *mediating* it, or giving it a concrete interior. Nevertheless, the *In-itself* is still abstract in that it holds in it a mere reflexion of the Being-for-other, and is still provided with negation or with Being-for-other. But what is mirrored here is just inner qualification, inner determination proper, or peculiar inner nature. One can understand this, and how the notion of *capacity* or capa-

bility is brought about; and one can see also that this is a determinateness not only bëent, but *an sich* bëent, or bëent *in itself*. From *In-itself* to *In it*, there is a *rise* of manifestation, still the abstractness of the *In-itself* is a necessary moment; without abstractness, the *inner nature* would simply be Being-for-Other, which it is not. There is a peculiarity of grammar in the phrase 'into which it is reflected into itself:' it is Hegel's, however, and intentional.

That to which the Something is adequate, is evidently the force of *Bestimmung* here, which is thus, as it were, equal to the *Definition*, and more than the Differentia.

No. 1 further illustrates this sense of Bestimmung; and the reader has simply to see that this sense has fairly risen, as well as that nothing has been taken in from elsewhere. Well considered, what is said about 'determinateness manifoldly growing through involution with Other,' &c., does not impugn this statement: we are still in presence only of our original materials.

The next paragraph contains excellent illustration, but is difficult, and requires intimate initiation before one can find oneself at home in it.

In the first place, we must understand Reason to be Vernunft (Ver-nommenes); and that implies *what is taken together and trans*, which again is just the concrete All and the resuming One, or just the living Totality that is. In this light, then, Man is just the thinking Totality of all that is, or of the universe. This is his *Determination*, but Thought as such is his *Determinateness*; or the one is his qualification, the other his qualificatedness. Then, again, all that Man is, even what in him has not the form of thought (as the element of Nature or of Sense), is *in itself* Thought.

But Man is thought not only *in himself*, but *in him*; that is, we cannot say 'there is nothing *in him*,' but we must say there is thought *in him*: it is recognised as his manifestible peculiar nature—as his Bestimmung, and throughout his whole actuality and existence. Thought is thus *concrete*, not the abstract form as which we generally regard it, but endowed with the Inhalt and Erfüllung, the implement and complement of actual objectivity and life. Such is man's nature, life, or living purpose; but this nature is only *in itself*, it is not a completed realisation and statement, not *actu* full explication and expansion; *it*—together with this filling which is veritably in it—is in the form of *In-itself* in general—it is only an *Is-to-be*—its *filling* appears as external to it, as over-against it, as what still *is to be* brought into it. In this way, this paragraph will be found intelligible. I have attempted to help a little the last sentence in the translation. The construction of this sentence is peculiar; for the last *die* in it, referring to the Erfüllung, has awkwardly to skip clauses to make good its reference. *Implement* is used in its etymological sense for Filling, &c.

No. 2 has seven paragraphs, and we shall remark on them separately. The first is easy in itself, but is received with hesitation and suspicion by the reader. Hegel appears here to play so very clearly fast and loose just as it suits him, that the Hocus Pocus of the whole business must just be held patent. It is to be said, however, that the nature of the case really *is so*; that, for all appearances to the contrary, we have still before us the original *one* or *fundamen*, and the original *two* or *momenta*; and that it is not our *fault*, nor, indeed, *virtue*, if reflexion now on this side and

now on that, or now in this moment and now in that, should seem *double* and contradictory. This *doubleness* is in truth not ours, but that of the Thing itself, of What is. It is quite fair, then, to return to the Being-for-other, and the result of its independence now: in fact, we must see *that its independence now*, or *outside of the Determination as the Determination*, can only be what Hegel calls it—the Beschaffenheit;—for the Beschaffenheit of anything is just that Being-for-other in it which remains apart from its function proper, its defining and characterising business as such.

The next paragraph is explanatory, and its general reference outwards is perfectly allowable. It is to be seen as a result of its very Metaphysical or Logical constitution, too, that Something is a prey to influence from without: Something has negation, other, in it.

Change in Something (i.e. anything) will be found to be seated, not where the Something is *in itself*, but where it is indifferent outer other, or where it is indifferent outer Being-for-other; and that, as apart from the Determination (or Qualification) as such, is the region of what we name Talification. *Change*, too, is legitimately introduced, for change is implied in being 'a prey to influence from without.'

The fourth paragraph contains the reciprocal transition of Qualification into Talification, and of the latter into the former, and is of some length and difficulty. The burthen is this: Qualification arises from the reflexion of the Being-for-other of the Something into the In-itself of the same, and is analogous to what we name *special function*. But though the reflexion has sublated the Being-for-other, it has not cancelled it—the constitutive moments of the Something still remain other to other. But the Being-for-other that remains

outside of the Qualification (special function) is Talification—concomitant, collateral, secondary, or, as it were, contingent function. The Qualification seems indifferent, then, to the Talification; yet as regards the Something both are *in it*, or both belong to the one Determinateness of the Something, or both, then, by implication pass into one another mutually. What Something is *in itself* is also *in it*; but that implies a Being-for-other—or just another to which the qualification is open: but qualification in involution with other is talification. Or the Determinateness as such implies a negative, and thus introduces an element of otherness into the qualification which is thus again talification. These steps are certainly difficult, and the original is not easy. Perhaps it is after the words 'the connexion is more particularly this,' that the reader finds the longest pause; for the copula of thought that unites the immediately next sentence, relating to the 'qualification as such being open to the relation to other,' with the sentence which follows, bearing on the 'determinateness being at the same time moment,' is, we should say, very hard to hit. Indeed, what the precise 'determinateness' alluded to is, is not at all readily seen. The sentence or two of comment immediately above declare the determinateness in question to be the first and original Determinateness as such, while they make the one sentence (of the two whose copula is difficult to see), though corroborative, yet independent of the other. The former of them may also be conceived as preliminarily demonstrating the 'openness to other;' but that, as the comment holds, amounts at once to Talification. In short, the *Differentia* is at bottom a *Proprium*; and a *Proprium* is always a possible *Differentia*.

The conversion of Talification into Qualification

occurs thus: the element of talification is that by which the Something is open to the accidentality of involution with other. Now, this element *per se* is just what was called the Other as such. It is thus the other of itself, and so again self-referent There-being: but that is just an *In-itself* together with a *Determinateness* or—Qualification. Thus, Talification which appeared outer is identified with the inner, and thus the determining of the other is met by the immanent determining of the Something itself. To illustrate—the *Something* is a *chair*, the *Bestimmung* or *Qualification* is human support in a certain posture, its *Being for-other* is *solidity*, its *Determinateness* is *wood*, its *Beschaffenheit* or *Talification* is *inflammability*. This *Being-for-other* of wood expressed by its inflammability does not concern that which is reflected into the Something as chair (solidity) and fulfils the Bestimmung support; they seem indifferent to each other: it is the *solidity* in the wood, and not its *inflammability*, which concerns the chair in its function as chair. Nevertheless, the inflammability as regards the chair is *in it*; and this involves a Being-for-other, or another to which the special function of the chair is open and exposed. Or the Determinateness, wood, is at the same time moment, and contains at the same time the qualitative difference, to be different from the *In-itself*, to be the negative of the Something (the chair), or another There-being, another Thereness, *So*ness, Nessness, or just *entity* than the chair. In this way, it is evident that the function special of the chair is involved with whatever Being-for-other (quality) the Determinateness, the wood, possesses, and is thus Talification. The inflammability of the chair is held over, and *in terrorem* of, the qualification or function of the chair.

Another Being-for-other of the chair that remains outside of its qualification or special function is, that the wood is food to a certain *tick* or worm; this Being-for-other is thus talification; and how dependent the function proper or the qualification is on this talification is too obvious to require extension: the chair, in short, may fall into powder, and qualification vanish into talification.

Again, the Being-for-other which does not enter into the qualification of the chair, but is separated from it as talification, evidently *per se* just amounts to what has been named the Other as such. Take it as the inflammability of wood—that is other to its solidity; in the chair, it is just the other as such, the other of itself, so self to self-referent There-being, or a self to self-referent entity—inflammable wood. It is so, too, we see that the talification belongs to what the Something is *in itself*, or that the Something alters with the talification. The chair falls to powder under its eatableness, or into charcoal under its inflammability. For the determinateness of the chair, the wood, is at once the chair and the other of the chair. Here we can see how the other of the something is the other *per se*, the other in itself, the other of itself, the other of the other, &c.; for the wood as other of the chair is the other of itself, and so an entity referent of self to self, or wood as such. Any number of similar illustrations will not now be difficult to the reader, and the passage of qualification into talification, or of *quality* into *tality*, and *vice versâ*, as well as how it is true that Something always involves an Other which is itself Something, will not now probably be hard to see. We are not confined either to such finite things as *chairs*, &c., for examples,—we may similarly use men. The

quality of Napoleon was *to lead armies*, and to reach thus his *zenith*; but it was his tality *to be vulgarly ambitious, to seek aristocratic connexions*, and to reach thus his *nadir* and extinction. It was the quality of Burns to sing; but it was his tality *to be greedy of the moment*: as high, then, as he rose by quality, so low did he sink by tality.—The theme is new and endless; but surely it is enough to show the vein, without exhausting it—by an easy process of rhetoric or simple prosiness which will, perhaps, prove irresistible to others.—It is important to see that the Something always still expresses its own inner self in the tality, and that it is with the tality that Something alters itself. This is well seen in all the illustrations—chair, Napoleon, Burns.

The fifth paragraph tells us, what we see perfectly, that the change now alluded to is not that which concerned the traffic in its own self of the Something with the Other brought to it by its own Determinateness, but a change fairly expressed and overtly explicated as regards the Something. The first change was wholly of the nature of *In-itself*; but this is one determined: it also appears to be connected with a development of the potential interior or within-itself of the Something. Or, we may say, the first othering of Something was *implicit*, while the present is, on the contrary, *explicit*: negation is now explicitly determined as immanent to Something, or as its evolved *within-itself*, whereas previously negation was discerned in Something only by implication.

The identification of quality and tality replaces the Something. Still, in view of the qualitative difference subsisting between qualification and talification there appear two Somethings. These two Somethings, then,

are in the one Something; they are not separated by mere abstract difference, by difference as such, a difference having place in their comparison only; their difference is now rather immanent to them, inherent in them. The affirmation of neither is direct, the affirmation of both is indirect; it is a *result* of the elimination of the otherness introduced by the quality or qualification, whether of the one or of the other, into the common In-itself. This can be illustrated by the chair and the wood, which are two Somethings in their qualitative difference, and one only after sublation of the same. Or we may say, water is Something; its quality is that it is the universal menstruum that flows, or just, *par excellence*, the Vehicle; its tality is capability of becoming ice. Well, H O is in each (the water and the ice), or each is H O. This is the *one* something, but they themselves again are *two*. Yet the negation, or difference between them, is an inherent one; it belongs to the within-itself of the H O. Each, too, affirmatively is, not directly as either water or ice, but—indirectly through elimination of all determined difference—as H O. As water and ice, nevertheless, they are mutually indifferent.

'Something relates itself thus *out of its own self* to the other:' it is important here to see the etymological force of *verhält sich*. *Ver*, as we have seen, implies transition *to* and *with*, or both *trans* and *cum*: the Something *relates* itself to the other, then, in the sense that it holds itself *away* (transformingly) *to* and *with* the other. This we see (as in the *relation* of water to ice) to occur, too, *out of its own self*. The ice is set in the water as its own moment, and the ice is here the otherwise-being. The Being-within-self, or just the within of the water, includes in it this negation, this

ice, and it is by means of it that the water continues to have its affirmative being. The ice is just the developed within-itself of the water. But ice and water are qualitatively different, the ice is apart from or out of the water: this must be allowed, for Something is Something only by negation or sublation of the other. (This we saw when engaged on Something and Other as such.) Only by such sublation is it that the Something presents itself as over-against the Other, which here for the first time is itself a There-being, or a separate Entity; it is thus external to it, or, seeing that they still cohere in their Notion, it is otherness in general that results—each is something and each is other. Of the Somethings we have here, then, though coherent in their notion (H O), the one (the water) is qualitatively distinct from the other (the ice). But, inasmuch as the Being-within-itself (of the water) is the non-being of the otherwise-being (the ice) which is implied in it (the water), but at the same time distinguished or dis-cerned as beënt, the Something itself (the water) is the negation, *the ceasing of another in it*; it is explicitly put—it is in position—it is *set* as negatively preserving itself against the other, and as maintaining itself by the other. The ice is at once the negation and the affirmation of the water. The within-itself of the water is the negation of the negation (the ice)—or this is its *in-itself*, or what it is *in itself*. But negation of the ice is as simple negation *in it*. But this amounts to Limit: the negations are at once mutually excluded and mutually implied.

As regards technical terms, almost all has been already said that is required. It is not difficult to see that the Ansich becomes *vermittelt* (be-middled, be-mediated), and no longer *abstract* when the Seyn-für-Anderes is reflected into it. Still it remains relatively abstract;

the *chair* regarded as the reflexion into itself is relatively abstract as regards its determinateness, its Being-for-other, the wood, &c. The eye as the eye is a reflexion into itself, and relatively abstract compared with its coats, &c. Further on, *abstract* is seen in the sense of formal self-identity as regards the *difference* of the Somethings when involved in *alter*ation, or change. *Concrete* is seen to imply *implement*, or *filling*. *Sollen* will come to be explained again: it always refers to a *being to be*, or an owing (or *ought*-ing) to be. If the reader looks deeply at the phrase 'the other of itself,' he will see that this is an exact expression of the constitution of *Something*, as it is found developed in its own place.

We have now achieved a most important stage in the study of Hegel. This matter of qualification, &c., and the transition into Limit, I have always regarded as the *pons asinorum* over which most students have hitherto been unable to cross. (That it has been *passed*, I know.) The present writer, for his part, must confess that he lay in leaguer here *for years*, and that the paragraph in especial in which the transition to Limit formally occurs was a thousand times abandoned as utterly and wholly hopeless. As regards this particular paragraph, what is said in allusion to the *first Something* is an endless stumbling-block till the true point of view is obtained; and then, indeed, it is suddenly seen to be very simple. The opposition relating here 'first properly to a There-being itself' demonstrates the '*first* Something' to be the first of the two considered *here*, and not the *first* something as treated in the book itself. But future students will never know what they owe to those who have preceded them. The point of view, however, that removes the great difficulty of the para-

graph will be got, perhaps, from the following: if, as regards the Something and the Other of Change, the student insist on seeing in his conception the Other only as *immanent in*, and not—as other—*separated from*, the Something, he will never succeed in realising *Limit*: let him eject it as other (simple negation) and then negate it as other (negation of the negation), and limit is at once visible. Water and ice are qualitatively other—separation; they are at bottom the same—communion: limit is *between* both *and* both; as negation of the negation, it unites both, as negation simply it divides both. The Something first claims and then denies—first drags in and then ejects—and this is the function of the character in question (Limit). In short, assumption of the other, rejection of the other—these are the fulcra of the movement from Beschaffenheit to Grenze.

It will not have escaped the reader, probably, that the portion of Hegel's Logic which we have just discussed concerns that matter which mainly appears in Ancient Logic as the Predicables: the Genus, the Species, the Differentia, or Differentia specifica, διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός, the Proprium, the Accidens, the Definitio, &c., have all place here. It will be sufficient to indicate this; the extension of it by the reader himself will usefully familiarise him with the various materials. It belongs to the worth of Hegel that he has, as it were, re-vitalised these—otherwise—mere grammatical vocables, and exhibited them in their living connexion with the Absolute. (This last word, however unintelligible, just amounts to the very well-known and familiar *rerum natura*.) In fact, it is always to be kept in view that, so far as Hegel is concerned, the *reflexions* are always *vital*, are such as have occurred in the development

and formation of the thought of all of us—of thought as thought.

In number 3, now, we have the very important and striking evolution of the Notion of Limit. It is not easy to get into the mood of mind, the *recueillement*, the peculiar *Vertiefung*, which is necessary to the realisation and proper intelligence of the determinations which present themselves here. There is a mode of reading the pertinent sentences, and of looking at the occurrent distinctions, which ends in a result so flat and shallow and trivial, that really one feels tempted to say, if we are to consider this the veritable outcome, then assuredly Hegel might have spared himself all his pains both of thought and writing.

The Pyrenees are just as much Spain's limit on the side of France, as France's on the side of Spain; the Channel just as much limits off France from England, as England from France; the Rhine which divides Alsace from Baden, equally divides Baden from Alsace, &c. . . . In passing from French to Spanish soil, we say, There France ends, here Spain begins; contrariwise, in passing from Spanish to French soil, we say of the same sod which in the first instance was designated as beginning of Spain, that it is the termination of Spain; and what was regarded before as the termination of France, converts itself into its commencement.*

If such platitudes as these are to be supposed to mirror the depths of Hegel, then plainly Hegel can be useful only as an adjunct to the resources of our infant schools. It is in the same neighbourhood that we find Rosenkranz giving painful birth to profound philosophy in the following form: —

To destine a man for the vocation of the artist, who pos-

* Rosenkranz: Wissenschaft der Logischen Idee; Königsberg, 1858; Part I., pp. 140, 141.

sessed not any original capacity for such a function, were in vain. The eye has the destination to see, *because in light it has its quality;* IT IS LIGHT-GREEDY.

That is, the eye sees because it sees! But it is something quite else that we must endeavour to see here in Hegel — the primordial thoughts, namely, which contain the universe, or — the same thing from another side — those thoughts which, acquired in latency, now latently constitute in all of us the soul and substance of everything we see or feel. At pp. 364, 365, 366, vol. i., we shall find a useful comment of Hegel's own on what now occupies us. There we are told that the individual, as but a sum of references to other, has his being not in himself. There we hear also of herbs remaining equal to themselves when involved with other, or of making themselves good in said other and through said other. Lastly, we hear of the *pang* attributed by Jacob Böhme to qualities, the bitter, the fiery, the sour, &c., in that they maintain and produce themselves only in the stress of conflict. In beginning the discussion of Limit, it is with such considerations as these that we are to prepare our minds. In short, we are to carry vividly with us our findings in regard to *tality*, for tality is the region — and it is a vital one — in which lies the limit that at once unites and separates Something and Other. We are to see assertion and negation meet in limit — we are to see that this one line of aqua fortis, limit, sums and contains in it the virtue of Something on this side, and of Other on that; that it *is* the Something, and that it *is* the Other. Of a truth, there is no more genuine, no more exquisite, no more penetrating and comprehensive Metaphysic in the world, than what γ here exhibits to us. To a man who has a turn that

way, the delight in the successive steps and in the result is no less entrancing than that which was experienced by Pythagoras on the squaring of his triangle, or that of Keats on first looking into Homer. Something and Other are to be conceived in potential mutual grips, then, and not side-by-side indifferents; each *is* in the line of contact, and each is negated — or is not — in the same. Now, we are still to conceive ourselves in presence of our original materials: we have still before us the original Something and the original Other, though thickened mutually by mutual reflexions— Being-in-self, Being-for-other, Being-*in-it*, qualification, talification, &c.—till now the evolution has reached a point at which it seeks to replace both by the single characterisation, Limit. For instance, chair was an example of the original Something, the Other of which was wood. Now, the wood introduces inflammableness into the chair; but still the chair, as a chair, sets bounds to this action on it of its own other. The chair does not succumb at once; the chair remains a chair for so long; the chair, by its very size, &c., may negate the inflammableness. Even here there is a Limit. Much more is there a Limit where the Quality of the Burns, the Napoleon, meets and potentially engages the Tality of the same. Certainly, more closely-illustrative examples are supplied by the collapse of light and darkness into colour, of acid and alkali into salt, &c.; but still it is right to see that we are not obliged to turn our backs on what we set out with, and that this is really such as to imply the matter of the new illustrations as well. Of these, colour, as between light and darkness, will probably suffice to assist the reader throughout the whole Dialectic here.

The discussion immediately before us embraces a preliminary paragraph, and three statements of moments, respectively designated by the grammata — α, β, γ. We shall bestow a remark or two on these in their order.

'Being-for-other is indeterminate, affirmative community of Something with its Other:' this applies to the relation of the original Something to its Other, as well as to that Something engaged in change and *so* involved with other—which is the point that we have reached at present, and the point, therefore, that we have specially to bear in mind. *Change*, too, as we saw, was fairly introduced, and we have thereby acquired for ourselves the right of a wider externality, and of an influence from without in general. The Limit appears at first the direct antithesis of the Being-for-other, or the Non-being-for-other. The fulcra of the dialectic movement are at once indicated by the opposing of *ideally* to *really*.

Under α, we see, firstly, that Limit, as Non-being as well of the Something as the Other, is just Non-being of Something in general; and secondly, that Limit, as Non-being of the Other, is Being of the Something. Something, then, has the Limit *in it*, and is Something through that which is also its Non-being. Thus, through Limit, Something at once is and is not, and Other at once is and is not.

Under β, we find that on the one side as well as on the other of the Limit, Something exists *out from* its limit. Darkness and light exist equally out from colour. As regards Hegel's own examples, though they illustrate well the relation of the Something being *out* from the limit, it is difficult to see where we should place their *Other*. '*It* is the middle between both, and in *it*

they cease:' how apply this to the line, or the plane, or the solid? The line is on one side of the Limit, the Point; but what are we to conceive as *the* Other, on the other side? We may ask the same question as regards plane and solid. I suppose there is no answer, but that the line, plane, solid, &c., *in the other direction* is the Other. It requires a good deal of reflexion before we retire satisfied here, however. Limit is spoken of as presenting itself to conception (figurate representation) first of all spatially, or, so to speak, in the terms of space: we are told, too, that the Conception (the figurate representation) is but the *Out-of-its-self-ness* of the Notion,—as it were, the trope, the symbol, the metaphor of the latter.

The concluding moment (γ) deserves and requires the very closest attention. It may be named the Metaphysic — and also the essence — of *distinguishableness*; and due *Vertiefung*, or a due *deepening* of ourselves into the matter concerned — and it would delight a Hegel to observe this involuntary dialectical identification of a *deepening into ourselves* with a *deepening into the thing itself* — ought to bring with it a vivid conviction of the substantial existence of an element of reflexion in the very crassest of the things of sense.

Out from or *without* the Limit, Something is necessarily unlimited. Unlimited Something is simply *Ness*-ness quite generally—unlimited *So*-ness (There-being). But the Other is situated precisely similarly: it, too, is simply *So*-ness, simply *Ness*ness, and without end. Either can be called Something, either can be called Other; but they possess not a single distinction, the one from the other: each is simply Nessness — that and nothing else. They are both, therefore, the *same thing*.

But now each is Daseyn (There-being, &c.), or each is Seyn (Being) with a Bestimmtheit (a Determinateness). Now, this Determinateness, in which each is what it is distinguishably from the other, may still be regarded as the Limit between them. But into this Limit the Determinateness of *each* enters: this Limit is their *common* distinguishableness. But the distinguishableness of each falling into the one Limit, this one Limit is at once their unity and diversity; and, again, unity and diversity of the same things, this just expresses the constitution of There-being as it manifested itself in its place. There-being and Limit, each then is found to be identical as well with Something as with Other, or we have a double identity of both. Now this implies that Something has Nessness (There-being) only in the Limit, while, again, the immediate, direct Entity of the Something being at the same time the negative of the Limit, the Something—which has but just been placed in the Limit—'just as much sunders itself from itself, and points away over and beyond itself to its Non-being, pronouncing this its Being, and so passing over into the same.' The latter part of this description refers to Something being *out from* its Limit, while its Limit is its true Self.

The illustrations that follow in the text commend themselves. Sometimes the German is more graphic than the English here: for instance, the eye itself seems to be considered in such phrases as 'in the point, the line as well *fängt an* as *hört auf*,' almost as if it were, in the point, the line as well catches on as leaves off, as well kindles up as dies out. The unrest of the Something in its Limit, as of the Line in the Point, usually represented as arbitrary conception, but now characterised as natural dialectic, is very striking. No

less striking is the demonstration of the *dimensions* of the Point in consequence of its having place only in a There-being or There-ness, which There-ness, as quite indefinite There-ness, can only be *Space*. Limit and There-being have been so identified *and* distinguished, that the perfectly abstract limit, the point, having its There-being in its limit and yet beyond it, must set itself infinitely beside itself, and give rise to the perfectly abstract There-being or *There*-ness, Space; and such is *this There-being* or There-ness in which it is. Altogether here, under Limit, one 'sups full' of dialectic — dialectic not more startling either than it is fertile and, we hope we may add, convincing. The angle, the pivot, the hinge of this dialectic lies pretty much in this—That the development of the contradictions of Limit leads to the bringing together of Something and Other as each just There-being, and finally to the crumpling of all up into Limit as the inner of both Something and Other, and the inner just of Nessness at all. *Entity*, we may remark, has also been used here as another synonym of There-being; indeed, the word *Aught*, or *Aughtness*, if always alone used, would, we doubt not, come very well, in the end, to represent and convey the Hegelian Daseyn: when Hegel began, Daseyn was as far from meaning what it means now, as to an Englishman *aught* or *aughtness* is at present.

We may remark, that illustrations from Geometrical lines and points occur in the ancient philosophical Commentators, with whom, as we shall have occasion to see elsewhere, Hegel has many points of contact, and whom doubtless he earnestly studied. In the Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides, for example, we find 'a line' spoken of as 'the first continuous and divisible nature amongst magnitudes; hence, it par-

ticipates of an indivisible, that is, of a point; and this point, though it is alloted a superlinear condition, and is indivisible, yet it subsists in the line, is something belonging to it, and is the summit of the line.' Thomas Taylor adds, as commentary to this (which is his own translation), that 'points, in a line have a linear, in a superficies a superficial and in a solid a solid subsistence; or, in other words, that in a line, superficies, and solid, they are respectively affected with the nature of line, superficies, and solid, at the same time that they still retain in each their non-quantitive nature;—hence,' —and this is the Neo-Platonic moral—'we may see as in images how incorporeal natures, when they become profoundly connected with bodies, are affected indeed with a corporeal nature, but still retain an incorporeal subsistence.' How much this is *assonant* to Hegel will be easily seen.

c. *Finitude.*

From the first paragraph we see that mere limit, or *endedness*, is not what alone constitutes the Finite, but the negation of a developing within-itself, which is simply perpetual process or Becoming.

Non-being is thus the nature of what is Finite: it perpetually is not — even in that it is. Finite things possess a self-reference that is only negative; for they are only through their negation—their developed negation, if you will; where, indeed, the *development* is but a despatching of themselves beyond, a sending of themselves out, over, the Being they at any moment have. They are *bëent*, then, but the truth (at any time) of their *Being* is their *End*. This is specially profound, and merits a long reflection. *To pass away*, this is their very Within, or Within-self. The hour of the birth—

of the manifestation—of any finite entity is the hour of its death—its disappearance. There is a double meaning in the word *End*: it means both termination and purpose.

There is an anecdote told of Hegel, that, being somewhere at table where the dishes were long of coming, he should have expressed himself, as if it were, Let them just come, ('Wir wollen ihnen ihr Schicksal schon anthun,') we will soon achieve for them their destiny. He must have had his own *Finite Things* so vividly before his mind's eye in this expression, that it will probably contain illustration for the reader here.

α. The Immediacy of Finitude.

This, as the title directly announces, is a moment of Simple Apprehension, where from its very nature little is to be said: accordingly, it will be found that Hegel is apt under such moments to occupy space with mere exoteric remark; here it is the *mournfulness of the finite* which he takes for his subject, and the first paragraph sets vividly before us the one abstract side which Understanding insists on alone regarding, that is, the eternal destination of Finite Things to their End. In the next paragraph, even in explaining how Understanding views the Finite as eternal, the dialectic breaks out which is to demonstrate the impossibility of such eternity. This dialectic is more overtly stated in the third paragraph.

β. To be to, or obligation to, and Limitation (Bound).

The usual difficulty of translating Hegel comes to the surface very glaringly in this section. The words Bestimmung, Grenze, Schranke, Sollen, Ansichseyn, Insichseyn appearing in English as Qualification (Deter-

mination, Destination, manifestible peculiar nature, &c.), Limit, Limitation (Bound), To be to, Being-in-self (Being-in-itself, In-itself), Being-within-self, &c. &c., suffice to render the translation, even in external appearance, so much 'clotted nonsense,'—so much chaotic, incoherent insanity. What is here, however, is not at all that, but, however abstruse, recondite, subtle, and profound, the clearest and most lucid intelligence. The translation, too, is correct, and, the technical terms being duly pondered, will readily enough yield meaning, however *baroque*, however *piebald* they appear.

'The *passing away* passes away'—this contradiction is *abstract*—formally self-identical, absolutely separated and by itself—in the very expression Something is Finite, or in that, the *Finite* IS. Where we are in the development, however, Something or Being (which here cohere) are no longer abstract, but *be-mediated*, or concrete. Hegel's remarks on the Platonic treatment of *The One is* illustrate a contradiction similarly *abstractly*—or isolatedly and abruptly directly—present.

That Something has an inner nature, this implies that a capability of being otherwise belongs to the very In-itself, to the very internality of the Something. This *otherwise-being* refers to an externality, though one that still only *is to be*. The inner nature of Something now being considered in reference to this externality, gives rise to the Metaphysic of the whole notion before us. Nor is this Metaphysic to be regarded as Metaphysic only; it is actual thought within us, actual thought which we follow and obey, though latently and unconsciously, in every perception and assignment of *inner nature*, &c., in any particular concrete or sensuous case whatever. These be the very secret maggots of the brain, and *as* they sprawl or wriggle through one

another. The otherwise-being, then, is a certain externality, which is *in* the Something, and which is identical with the characterisation we have already seen as Limit. Well considered, this otherwise-being can now be set as the whole *virtue* of the Something, and again it is in its nature a *reference*—a reference of the inner nature of the Something *on* its own Limit. The inner nature just *is* through this Limit to which it *negatively* refers: its Non-being is its There-being. The Limit is thus at once negated and preserved, or it is *Limitation*, *Bound*, meaning by these words a Limit that is *passable*. But if the inner nature determine Limit as *Limitation*, or as a *bound* that is passable, it has in that reference the character of a Sollen, a Devoir, a *To be to*; that is, it has not *actu* passed the bound, but it is to do so, and will certainly do so. The double edge of the negation is seen in each of the moments of the one notion. The Finite Thing, in obedience to its inner Sollen, Devoir, or To be to, is *over*, or superior to, its Limitation; but again it is Sollen, or it *is to* only because of its Bound or Limitation. This will probably suffice to suggest the notion which is followed out in such penetrating and exhaustive detail by Hegel.

Remark.

The first sentence is an allusion in especial to certain findings of Kant and Fichte, to each of whom the *ultimum* was moral progress, moral *To-be-to*, *ad infinitum*. Schwegler, epitomising in regard to Kant, says correctly, 'No sensuous nature can be holy, and one that is sensuous-rational can approximate to holiness only as to an Ideal in infinite progress;' and similarly in regard to Fichte, 'the final goal of moral action lies in infinitude; it can never be attained, as

the Ego can never be fully independent of all limitation, so long as it remains an Intelligence, a self-conscious Ego.' Both the moral and the metaphysical rôles are illustrated in these quotations; the latter will be still clearer, however, from considering the following position of Schelling, also as epitomised by Schwegler (whose epitomes in general, indeed, are so good, that they offer themselves as particularly convenient for an easy and ready reference). The 'brief,' as Hobbes would call it, of Schelling on the point referred to, runs thus:—

Absolutely apprehended, Nature is nothing else than infinite activity, infinite productivity; which, should it of itself unhindered realise itself, would in a moment with instant rapidity produce an absolute product, whereby empirical nature were not expressed or explained; if we are to do this, if we are to have finite products, then we must assume that the productive activity of nature is checked by an antagonistic activity, a retarding one, also seated in Nature herself: thus there arises a series of finite products: as, however, the absolute productivity of nature seeks an absolute product, these individual products are only phenomenal products beyond each of which again nature immediately proceeds, in order to satisfy the absoluteness of her inner productivity by an infinite series of individual products.

The Sollen and the Schranke are very clearly contained in these quotations. *There*, however, they are still, so to speak, but in a clotted state; and to be seen as they are, they stand in need of the Socratic midwifery of Hegel. In other words, neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Schelling has attained to a glimpse of the implied import *in abstracto*; the whole three of them still see it only crassly and uncertainly *in concreto*, as it were in mass; and it is left for Hegel to dissect and divellicate and demonstrate the *Begriff*, supplanting thus and

putting to flight the figurate conception, the pictorial *Vorstellung*. And in what masterly perfection is not this accomplished! The general section on Finitude is the pertinent exposition; but the whole business sums itself in the single Hegelian expression, 'the Identity of the Ansichseyn (the Being-in-self) and the Bestimmtheit (the determinateness).' The *In-itself* of *what is* seeks ever to assert itself by effacement of its own *Determinateness*. This is the *Sollen*, the *Progressus ad Infinitum*; and it is sisted only by the *Identity* of Hegel. By such strokes as this is it that Hegel asserts for himself the place royal—a place higher than, I fear, we can concede, after all, to the very highest of his predecessors, maugre, too, the vast and indispensable material he owes to all of them,—an *all* from which no single name of the whole bright series can be excluded—not Parmenides, nor Heraclitus, nor Socrates, nor Plato, nor Aristotle, nor Plotinus, nor Proclus, nor Spinoza, nor Leibnitz, nor Fichte, nor Schelling, though, for amount and importance of contribution, Kant—the honest, simple, good, the sincere, the inexhaustibly-fertile Kant—incomparably outweigh them all.

In the determining of Something as Limitation, this Limitation is already passed: limitation implies in the very subject of the limitation a reference to what in it is unlimitated; or this very reference is already beyond the limitation. There again we have the Hegelian penetrative subtlety and truth! By his allusion to the Actual, Hegel means to say that it is absurd to resist his findings as contradictory, for such things *actu* are. The caustic irony of the master breaks out in the expression, that the thought engaged in such objections—a thought that would bear itself as higher than the Actual—attains neither to a true perception of the

notion concerned, nor to a true bearing towards the actual.

'The notion which it is *in itself* implies identity with its other.' The stone is *virtually* more than as it *is there*: as it *is there*, or as its *There-being* (Daseyn) is, it is under limitation; but as it is *in itself*, it is capable of innumerable reactions with other agents; but as it is in these it is other, and thus *in itself*, even in its Daseyn or Limitation, it is identical with its other.

The independence of any *bëent-for-self* Totality, as Instinct, Life, &c., in regard to limitation carries much force with it, and much light into many difficulties of Hegel. The Self of Sensibility is beyond its negation, pain; were it not beyond it, it would not feel it as negation, and have no pain.

But it is more absurd still to be blind to the independence of limitation on the part of Reason. If, however, you just abstractly assure me that limitation, the particular, *cannot* be passed, I just as abstractly point to the universal which *has* passed. Every universal is an example, but just consider this: the world, for all its constitutive finitude, is infinite.

The necessary relation of space to man's freedom—*apropos* of Leibnitz and the magnet—is a deep glance.

Hegel is always clear and great as regards the Will, as is, indeed, but natural after a Fichte and a Kant, and there is a very luminous little word here. His caustic irony comes down again on the adherents of a perpetual and never-effected *ought-to*, whether in the field of morals, or among your ordinary crude revolutionists, who always know so much better than everybody else that, in their eyes, just everything in the existent order of things *ought-to*—be changed: Hegel assures them that in *their* case, and as regards *their*

finitude, the applicability of their own principle, the *ought-to*, is perfectly recognised!

The gist of what follows is, that we are to place ourselves in the whole notion, and not one-sidedly hold by either of its alternative moments: if the Sollen is a consequence of the Schranke, the Schranke is a consequence of the Sollen; and we are not to lose ourselves in the despairing contemplation of a process which can never be accomplished, at the very moment that we possess all the conditions of its accomplishment. Such despairing contemplation is a result of our occupying only the *abstractum* of the Ansichseyn. To seek only the *inner nature*, only the realisation of what is *in itself*, is to stultify ourselves by an *abstraction* in which we are blind to the only realisation — that, namely, which lies in the *determinateness*, the *limit*, but in its concrete connexion with the *In-itself*. The only answer to the longing of the *In-itself*, is its complement, the *Determinateness*; and in mutual reference they have reached completion and repose. So it is that the Sollen, both of Kant and Fichte, is but a perpetuating of mere finitude.

γ. *Transition of the Finite into the Infinite.*

The text seems quite simple, direct, and intelligible here, and calls for no remark. It is matter of familiar knowledge that, in the school which is named of Hegel, the Immortality of the Soul remains a *quæstio vexata*. This alone were decisive evidence to prove that Hegel as yet has remained unintelligible to the very individuals who arrogate his name; for, did they know him, the question would be set at rest by the instant triumph of one side or the other, seeing that in very truth Hegel's ruling on the point has not wanted, on

his part, the most decided expression. One may say, indeed, that from the first word to the last, the Logic, or the System generally, of Hegel is nothing but an argument for the Immortality of the Soul; and this by allowing the living notion of concrete reason to confute at every turn the empty abstractions of our mere opinion. This comes very clearly to the surface in the short section before us,—'The Finite in its passing away, this negation of itself, has reached its Being-in-Self, it has therein gone together with itself;' and again, 'out over its own self, it goes together only with its own self': these words concern at bottom the Immortality of the Soul. Here is a passage from the 'Phaenomenology' which may illustrate them: —

To analyse a Conception into its original elements, is a going back into its moments, which at least have not the form of the conception there before us, but constitute the immediate property of the Self (the Subject, the Ego). This analysis, indeed, comes only to *Thoughts*, which are themselves familiar, fixed, and settled determinations. But an essential moment is this unactual, *shared-off* thing itself; for only by this, that the Concrete shares itself, or separates itself, and reduces itself to an unreality, is it das sich Bewegende, has it movement in itself. The action of *separation* is the craft and business of *Understanding*, the greatest and most wonderful, or rather the absolute power. The sphere which remains at rest shut up in itself, and as substance possesses its moments, is the immediate and therefore not the wonderful relation. [Explanation as reference to Substance is easy.] But that the accidental as such in separation from what embraces it, that what is connected with the rest and only actual in this connexion should gain a peculiar existence and a separate freedom, this is the enormous power of the negative; it is the energy of Thought, of the pure Ego. Death, should we so name that unreality, is the fearfullest thing of all, and to keep hold of what is dead is that which demands the greatest

power. Powerless Beauty hates Understanding, because it expects this of her, this to which she is incompetent. But not the Life that fears death and would preserve itself from destruction, but the Life that bears it and maintains itself in it, is the Life of the Spirit. The Spirit wins his truth only in that in the absolute destruction he finds himself. He is not this power as the Positive which looks away from the negative, as when we say of something, this is nothing or this is false, and so, done with it, turn away from it to something else; but he is this power only in that he looks the negative in the face, and stands to it. This standing to it is the magical might which converts the negative into das Seyn, into Being.

The talismanic word here, then, is abstraction: it is only by abstraction that we give a separate reality to death; there is no death in the concrete; what passes away, passes away only into its own self. We shall have occasion to see the same thing in other forms again. Hegel probably felt it unworthy of him directly to explain a thing which lay in him so clearly on the surface: it is in no covert way, indeed, that he gives us to understand that he, for his part, saves himself in that other into which he seems to pass. In short, it is the one aim of Hegel to put to flight abstraction, restore the concrete; and that is immortality and a single life.

As regards technical terms, it does not seem that we have any longer much to say. Hegel's general principle of action in regard to such must be now apparent: as they appear, they appear along with their Notion, and further explication seems uncalled for. This may be regarded as another merit peculiar to the method of Hegel: the terms come as they are wanted, and with the express meaning which he who uses them seeks. We may add, that this is true

even of the *nuances*, or shades of meaning. The reader must have observed, for example, that the word Bestimmung, Determination or Qualification, has, of late, very decidedly taken on the sense of Destiny or End; but, to be sure, the qualification, quality, inner nature of anything is precisely the function it administers, its mission, vocation, office, purpose, &c. The general sense of Bestimmung is perhaps pretty well got in this way. Suppose *What is* a voice: well, there must be distinction in it; and its own native *distinctions* (*differences*) are just its Bestimmungen: these are its accents, modulations, or inflexions, then; they are its signs, significates, exponents, modi, &c. Or we might say, this voice, as it is a voice, cannot remain a self-identical *One* only; as such, it must part into its own constituent *Many*, into its *Variety*. Now this variety may be named its system of vocabilities, or each unit of the many of the voice will be a vocability. In reference to this voice, then, its Bestimmungen are its vocabilities; but, again, its Bestimmung is just its vocability — vocability is its qualification, function, nature, destiny, end, &c. In this way, we can make obvious the transition from one vocability to vocability in general, or from one Bestimmung to Bestimmung as such. Lastly, looking at Bestimmung as Logical Determination, as a thing from without, we might translate it, in reference to the voice, by vocabilisation. The identity of outer and inner looms out here: did an external vocabilisation (say here notation) truly enumerate all the vocabilities native to the voice, this external act would be simply identical with the internal act of the voice itself by which it should give manifestation to its implied vocabilities. We may just point out that the Logical moments show themselves

very plainly here. There is first the simple unal self-identity of the voice, its Being as such; in which Being, however, it is as yet only *implicit*, only *in itself*, only *an sich*—the moment of Simple Apprehension, δύναμις, ὕλη, &c. Then there is the other moment, the *Urtheilen* of the voice into its native constituent differences, which have, each to each, the first or qualitative negation. Lastly, there is the moment of Reason, the negation of the negation, the restoration of the differences to the one Self of the one voice. This, again, is the one fundamental Hegelian Notion. Whatever is must differentiate itself, or it would remain nothing; but its differentiation, or explication, is the movement of its own necessity: it is in itself, and it is in its differences, and it is through its differences into itself. But what is is Thought, and its Differences in their own necessity unfold themselves, first, unconsciously, and, second, consciously (through science) in the Thinking Subject. So we have, first, internal Thought as wholly *in itself*, Logic, and again external Thought, still *in itself*, Nature, and, lastly, internal and external Thought, re-united into the higher internality of *Spirit*, and now wholly für sich. Of this one Notion, every concrete that exists is demonstrably a type: take, as we have seen Hegel do, a grain of salt, for instance. Everywhere, we have abstract unity, abstract variety, and—the only and single truth at bottom—*concretely both* in *one*. This pulse is fairly to be seen—but *an sich*—in Kant: it is Hegel's merit to have made it wholly an-und-für-sich, and thus to have completed certainly *a*—perhaps *every*—and perhaps *all*—Philosophy.

Verstand, in its peculiarly Hegelian sense—initiated, but still *an sich*, by Kant occurs in the passage translated from the 'Phaenomenology.' We shall have to

note the Ver, and to think of its function, which is to signify a process of transition, the agent of which is the root. Verstehen, in the sense of to become stale, is an example in point. To Hegel, what Verstand (in its other sense) versteht, it steht ver as regards the rest. That is, in English, what understanding understands, it stands—not *under*, but the German *unter*—between or asunder from the rest. In German as in English, *separation* is involved; in truth, both are just the Ur-theilen. Unterscheiden, discernment, *dis*tinction, are all pertinent here. As in the passage alluded to, these words concern always the moment of differentiation, which is characterised as more wonderful than the first moment of self-included, self-identical substantiality; what is spoken of as 'the accidental as such separated from what embraces it.' This phrase in the text appears literally 'the Accidental as such separated from its Umfang' (or Logical Extension); and we see thus how true Hegel remains to his own principles. The Accidental separated from its Extension, appears very unintelligible, until we understand the Hegelian Notion; —then, however, we see very clearly that the separation in question concerns *Extension*, and not *Comprehension.*

Of other terms, we saw *Reel* varied by *qualitativ unterschieden*, qualitatively dis-cerned and dif-ferenced; and this will be seen to cohere well with what has just been said.

The German *Princip* is truer to its Etymology than our convenient but wholly indefinite *principle.* Vorstellung has been already spoken of as the Aussersichseyn of the Begriff. Sollen and Schranke—the latter especially—must be seen to have senses here peculiar to Hegel, just as it is not English, but arbitrary on

our part, to oppose as we have done *Limitation* (Bound) to Limit. After all, perhaps Grenze were best translated *Bound*, and Schranke Limit. The point here is to see the Notion.

'The Sollen is limited only *an sich*, or *for us*.' This seems a curious expression to occur unexplained, and may have proved puzzling to many readers. The *in itself*, we think, as undeveloped, is precisely that which is not *for us*. If we reflect, however, we shall see that we are mistaken. To say a thing is *so and so* in itself, is to say what the thing itself has not yet developed: who, then, as yet can know this *so and so*, but we only ourselves who find ourselves in a condition to predicate it? 'If the embryo is a man *an sich*, it is not a man *für sich*,' says Hegel, in another reference; but we can see, in the present reference, that if the embryo is not a man für sich, it is a man *for us*; and so what it is *an sich*, it is *for us*. This is very subtle, and Hegel, as usual, allows us to find it out pretty much for ourselves. It is true that the expression occurs in the 'Phaenomenology,' and that Hegel wishes us to regard that work as the first Part of his system. But this desire of Hegel may be attributed to an author's natural interest in his own progeny, and to an author's as natural commercial considerations; and the work in question, though, as first *draught*, important to illustrate, is inessential to complete the System. The Logic of Hegel must always be regarded as entire in itself, and independent of all assistance as respects the meaning of its terms. Then, again, as regards the 'Phaenomenology,' the collation of *an sich* and *für uns* which occurs in—it occurs also in the Preface (p. 19), and pretty much in the sense which it has here in the Logic: but the Preface was probably not written till

after the body of the work (and)—the Introduction (p. 65, Edition 1841), seems to concern something else, and quite unadapted to develop the reflexion with which we have sought to explain it above. Some such reflexion, we are disposed to believe, Hegel expected from the reader himself here, and quite independently of the Phaenomenology.

The reader will do well to observe the different translations which have occurred in reference to the difficult word Setzen. Gesetzt ist has been translated *appears*, *presents itself*, *is taken*, *stated*, *established*, *demonstrated*, *put*, *placed*, *set*, &c., the meaning always being that Logical Position has been effected in regard to what is spoken of;—what was *implicit* is now *explicit*, or technically *set*. Hegel himself varies the expression by explicirt ist, and also by exponirt ist. When *What is* is spoken of as Gesetztseyn, we are to understand that it is *illative adjectivity*. Ein Gesetztes, again, is an *effected evolute*, an *effected attribute*, an *effected adjective*, a term developed from within and referred out in place. Here, again, we see how inward and outward come together. What is implied or implicated is also explicated; it is *in* Something, yet it is other than, or *out of*, the Something. Similarly, what is involved is evolved, what is inferred is ef-ferred, what is illated is e-lated, &c. Setzen has thus an advantage over any of these words, for it implies both, or Setzen is just to *ex-imply*. We can understand now, then, that Gesetztseyn is just implication — as to Englishmen — a system of implication; for such system being thoroughly recognised, just amounts to a system of explication. We are to see that im-position involves ex-position, or that *what is*, is just position. Or we may say, the three moments

of the concrete trinity, in which each is the other, are *to implicate*, *to explicate*, and to *replicate*. Thus, too, one can see that all are but distinctions of self-identical Thought, or all is but illative reflexion,—a dialectic in which 'each member sublates itself in itself, and is in itself the contrary of itself,' and the whole seems as 'a Bacchantic tumult with everyone concerned drunk.' After all, we can see, too, that setzen is not different from bestimmen, for both refer to the *placing of the differences*. Setzen, however, is hardly so wide as bestimmen, and denotes rather a special bestimmen or determination where the reciprocity is peculiarly overt, as in the mutual relation of cause and effect, or in that of positive and negative, &c. Still, *to determine* will very generally translate setzen, as well as bestimmen.

C.

INFINITUDE.

Here, in the first place, as usual, the general heading maps out the course of the dialectic that is to follow, and names the principal moments. The point to which we have now arrived is this: The Finite passes away into its other; but the Finite is a passing away: the passing away, then, passes away. Or the Finite negates itself; but the Finite is negation: the Finite, then, negates negation, and affirmatively is. In brief: the Finite goes together with itself, and this is the Infinite. It is difference-less self-reference, at once a Being and a Becoming. These naturally can be used as definitions of the Absolute; but the whole series of the sphere of Particular Being (There-being), as subjected to the first or simple negation, is finite, and cannot be so used.

The Infinite, too, so used, as expressing in itself negation of the Finite, seems preferable to either Being or Becoming, which do not directly express independence of limitatedness, or definitude. The presence of reference to, and so of an implication of, limitatedness, finiteness, negation, in the Infinite, is at the same time hinted. The two Infinites, the true and the spurious, or that of Reason and that of Understanding, being briefly named and even characterised, the division follows.

a. *The Infinite in general.*

Here again, as in a moment of Simple Apprehension, there is a difficulty to know what to say, and what *is* said may be regarded as the summary of all that follows. Indeed, we may say, that the reference to the Finite still implied in the Infinite is the hinge, or pivot, or key to all that follows.

In the first paragraph, we see the joy with which Hegel hails the Infinite as the name at which our true light goes up to us. This is a very overt indication of Hegel's views in reference to the Immortality of the Soul.

It is through its reference to its In-itself that There-being determines itself—so far as it is There-being or negated Being—as Finite. Thus it is the nature of the Finite itself to transcend itself into the Infinite. This must be seen to be its own act, and not result of an external force. Neither must we view it as if—which is quite usual—our subjective Reason had simply crossed over the Finite into the Infinite, leaving the former still there. Finite and Infinite are not to be conceived side by side, like—as another German says—cat and dog.

What takes place, in short, is a dialectic transition in which both fall together as moments.

b. *Alternating determination of the Finite and the Infinite.*

In this a moment of Judgment the differences are, of course, kept apart, and this constitutes the gist of what we are to see, which, however, is one of the most important considerations ever, perhaps, suggested. If Hegel is right, then, the separation of Finite and Infinite is but the most extraordinary of human delusions.

The first paragraph shows the Infinite—and let us be serious in *thinking* the Infinite, and not satisfied with a mere logical term,—*as constituted*, to be Something—with determinateness—with a Limit. The Finite has thus the character of determinate or real There-being opposed to the Infinite: they seem permanently apart, then. As the Infinite is immediately or directly constituted, it awakes the Finite; or the Being, the what-it-is, or as-it-is of the one directly awakes that of the other.

The intention of the next paragraph is to thicken the contrast between the two moments: they are to be exhibited as mutually *other*. The Finite is Limitation; its nature is perpetually to seek its In-itself. Infinitude is this In-itself, the To-be-to or Is-to-be of the Limitation, and this, too, as a thing effected. This Infinite is the nothing of that Finite; but this Infinite also, as the accomplished Sollen, the effected and carried-out To-be-to, is reflected into itself, is self-referent affirmative *Being*. The Infinite, then, is bëent, and it is the negation of the Finite; but as a *bëent negation* it is *other* to this Finite. The Finite remaining as determinate real

There-being, is other to the Infinite. Yet the Finite has also the character of being sublated into the Infinite, which is thus the Non-Finite—a Being or Beingness, but in the form or sense of Negation. The Finite, then, is as the sphere of the definite realities, the Infinite as the void which is beyond all such; but still the Finite has its In-itself not in its definite and determinate There-being.—The dialectic is so double-edged, that the last *welches* (the last 'which' but one) of the paragraph, though construed with the Finite, might, without embarrassment to the sense, be construed with the Infinite—but perhaps not quite as well.

This Infinite, which has just been developed, is the bastard or spurious Infinite, that which constitutes to mere Understanding as the separating and abstracting power, the last word of wisdom. In this, nevertheless, Understanding only envelopes itself in contradictions.

The contradiction at once shows in this, that both still *are*, and an Infinite, limited by another, is only a Finite.

Understanding that would seek its Highest, its Infinite, leaves the Finite still standing: it strives into a far inane which is and is not; while that on which it has turned its back, and only turned its back, also is and is not.

The relation of the one to the other is recognised and acknowledged by Understanding; but Understanding can see in this relation, not their inseparability and unity, but only their difference, distinction, separation, and mutual independence. From Understanding it is quite concealed that the one is just the burthen of the other, or that the one is just through the other. —The reflexion of Understanding whereby it enables itself to persist in the mutual independence of each

moment is well put; at the same time, the true state of the case is hinted.

Again, the result to Understanding is expressed. But this has in it the nature of a *Process*. You pass into the Infinite; but the Infinite is inseparable from the Finite, and the Finite reappearing, the Limit is replaced, which again then is to be transcended, but only necessarily with re-placement of a new limit—*and so on ad infinitum*! The precision of the text here cannot be surpassed.

The next paragraph is equally precise — is for penetrative speech, and such only as a Hegel could originate, quite admirable, indeed, and requires no comment. The definition of sublunary Being, of mortal state, '*not* to be that, or to be *not* that, which it itself is, and which its other is,' is a subtlety of the *one mint*.

The progress *in infinitum*—what it is generally considered—in what case it appears, and its true definition as considered—the text here is unequivocal. The following paragraph is equally so; and the whole matter is seen to be, not a perpetual variety, but a perpetual *self-sameness*. In the concluding paragraph of this section, the mechanism of the Infinite Progress is again characterised, and its contradiction declared fixed because the implied unity is not reflected upon.

c. *The Affirmative Infinite.*

Perhaps, it would suffice now to conjoin under a single general comment all the remaining matter of the Infinite, whether as it appears here under the present section, or as under Remark 1. Still, the space saved would be but little, and a word of comment, paragraph by paragraph, as before, may perhaps prove so far something of a support to the reader. We continue as we have begun, then.

In the unresting alternation of the Infinite Progress the Truth lies, but *in itself*. Such alternation is but an externalisation of the Truth; or it contains the true Notion, but in *outwardness*, so that its moments fall *out* from each other. Unity of these moments, however, will result from their very com*par*ison. At the same time, the term Unity is defective, and may expect to find its own corrective complement also in some step of this movement which constitutes *outwardly* what the Notion before us is *inwardly*.

The Infinite presents itself directly as Transcendence of the Finite, as negation of the Finite. But this being so, the Finite has only the value of a something that is to be transcended; the Finite thus is *in itself* the negation of itself; and the Infinite is no more than this. The peculiarity of the one, then, is also that of the other; and neither is possible without the other. If it be objected, that this is a result of looking at them only in their reference to one another, let us see how it will be with them, each being regarded apart by itself. The first consequence is, that the Finite being there in its own independence, the Infinite is no longer Infinite; and the second is, that the Finite, just because of this independence, has lost its previous relative and transitory nature, and is all that the Infinite is.—It must be well observed by the reader that this dialectic is not a juggle, but the truth. There is a reputation still real in this world, named Sir William Hamilton: Now the nail on which this reputation mainly hung itself out to notice, and on which it mainly still hangs, (Common Sense, and the Quantification of the Predicate—by the bye, as was only to be expected, two self-contradictories—are the two others,) is this: As there is a Finite to *limit* the Infinite, the latter is

inconceivable, &c. &c.; (therefore Human Imbecility, &c. &c.) Now this *is* a juggle, and a logical juggle; or, being 'a raisonnement from a groundless presupposition,' it is 'sophistry:' it is the juggle and sophistry of an insatiable but puerile vainglory; it is the juggle and sophistry of the mental imbecility that can see one side only; and it is the juggle and sophistry of *a perfected philosophy* and *a perfected German Scholarship* many years *after* the present work of Hegel was published. Hamilton, indeed, shall have refuted Hegel! and by the above argument!!—a crumb of Hegel's own—*bastard* Infinite!!!—The dialectic of Hegel must be closely looked at; and the more closely, the more evident will it be that the iron faculty of Hegel honestly received the whole problem, honestly and strongly turned it on both sides, and equally honestly and strongly solved it. We see already this much at least, that the Finite in its very nature involves and so evolves an Infinite, and that though there is no room for the bastard Infinite of Hamilton (who ought, at his time of day, and with the studies which he pretended to have achieved, to have really been a little better informed as to the state of the case), there is an absolute necessity for the veritable Infinite of a Hegel, which is—and only can be Infinite by being—at once itself and its other.

Whether viewed together or apart, then, Finite and Infinite manifest a mutual implication.

It is by regarding each in abstraction from the other, or it is by doing violence to the concrete truth in which both co-here, that both are falsified.

Viewed in this abstraction, the character by which each specially is that which it is, becomes converted into its opposite.

The abstraction of Understanding falsifies the double

unity of the two characters in the same way as the simple.

Understanding errs by insisting on regarding their mutual reference as qualitative difference; whereas they are, the one by reason of the other,—that is, they are, because each is the other.

The transition of the one to the other must be seen to be not of the nature of *change*, of one something into another something. The transition is not of that nature, but a going together of the one into the other, into a resultant concrete unity, which is also their presupposition and their truth. The Infinite, as only out of the Finite, is but as an inane that flees; but in that it is through its sublation of the Finite, it has returned, as it were, out of this flight into the inane, and is a solid and concrete Here.

Each, then, is an affirmative as a negation of the negation; but the infinite progress exhibits them not thus in their truth.

In that progress they are compared apart, just as we compared apart the two together, and each by itself—a comparison merely external, and not touching the internal state of the case. But this same progress virtually contains, not only their difference or separation, but their connexion as well.

In simple negation they are apart; but, the nature of the reference considered, even in this movement the Finite is seen to go together with its own self.

The Infinite, in like manner, without being rid of the Finite, arrives ever only by its own self.

Each, then, is itself as negation of the negation; and understanding errs by regarding each only affirmatively, and not with reference to the negation it contains. They are moments of a whole, each through

its contrary, and, at the same time, through the sublation of its contrary.

There are the two; each is itself, but the sublation of both is the true Infinite.

The result, not abstract Unity, but Becoming; so that each of its moments but becomes.

The Infinite, in its return and reference to Self, is Being, and not abstractly such, but as being-*There* (Daseyn), positively there or here. Only the bastard infinite is the impalpable retreat into the inane, because it is the simple negation of the Finite, taking the same not up into self as negation of the negation: it is this infinite, then, which is unreachable, which is not even *there*, which is not even palpably existent, which is without Daseyn. Instead of falling in awe before this unreachable infinite, we ought to see that it is not mighty, but meagre—not sublime, but deficient.

The true Infinite is Reality, and reality in a higher sense; for as the development grows, so does Reality. But, on the whole, Reality is a term which has its place now behind us: only it is remarkable how apt we are to determine any matter in hand by the abstractest of characters, and so the furthest from the concrete truth.

Reality here, as negation of the negation, is opposed to the former Reality of There-being. The result is Identity; but the Finite is but *ideell* in the Infinite. Ideality has thus an eminently concrete sense; but it avails not to have the term, because *opinion* adheres to the affirmativeness of the Finite, and despises what it calls *only* the Ideal.

Of terms, *Diesseits*, *Jenseits*, *Aeussere*, and *Speculativ* might require a word; but what they mean is very plain, each in its place. Kant's *speculativ*, already given (p. 102 of this vol.), may be contrasted with

Hegel's, as also with the mathematical, which last refers to 'the discovering of Properties and Relations.' An *external* consideration must always regard things as outwardly apart, and not as inwardly coherent. Placing 'the Transition' last, we take next, and in the same way, paragraph by paragraph,

Remark 1.

The mechanism of the spurious Infinite is again perfectly characterised. These are happy expressions: a Contradiction which comes forward as Solution; a beginning of *Thought* over the Infinite, but with an *In*tent or Import which is taken as nothing; a flight which collects itself not, and knows not how to bring back the negative into the positive; an uncompleted reflexion, that brings not the two thoughts together. These expressions are alone sufficient to expose the nullity of Hamilton's *halfness* — if even a halfness can be allowed him. In the impatience of his vanity, and his eager greed of present, however superficial, *devourment*, Hamilton was only adequate - - the evidence is abundant — to *dip* into such writers as Kant and Hegel: the incompetence with which he manages the half, or whatever fraction he has attained to, is quite in keeping with such a dip. The bearing and general *allures* of Hamilton would simply amuse, were it not that the acceptance which he has universally met with in Great Britain has imported seriousness into the petulant sufficiency of his surface attainment and assertion, and left no room for any feeling but that of indignation.

We must know that the Progressus is the alternation of the union and of the disunion of the two moments;

and, again, we must know that the union and disunion are themselves inseparable.

The alternation is, in point of fact, as well negation of the union as of the disunion; but they are ideally together as moments in the whole. The Ideality of the differences, this is the solution. It is here that *speculative* thought shows itself.

'How does the Infinite come out of itself and into finitude?' With this question Philosophy is generally thought to be at once tested and posed. Hegel says, that we shall by-and-by see clearer into what the Infinite really is: meantime, he is nothing loath to take up the question in its direct form.

The proper putting of a question must be allowed to require some amount of training as well in Philosophy as in other matters. Now here, perhaps, the question is so put, that it seems as if only figurate conception asked, and as if the answer was expected to be only in its own dialect.

Determination does not seem quite repugnant to *Being*; though this latter is quite undetermined, because this character is not directly and at first hand expressed in it. But the Infinite seems expressly the Non-Finite, and so their incompatibility is at once taken for granted.

But here the question contains false presuppositions: it assumes a Finite and an Infinite which *are not*. The Finite and Infinite *are* as we have seen them, and not as the question presupposes them. The question, then, deserves no better answer than that the Infinite goes out into the Finite, in order to be Truth, instead of Nullity, and so the Finite; or that they are both eternally so, the one in the other.

The question, if we suppose it to grant the *unity*

claimed, may proceed to inquire, how about the *separation*? But the separation lies in the very fact that it is the Finite and the Infinite which are in the unity, which as unity, then, is only such as *ideally* comprehends both. The unity and the distinctivity are equally appertinent to, and are inseparable in, the concrete truth.

Kant and Hegel are both difficult writers; but this difficulty being looked into, will be found to arise from opposite causes in the one as compared with the other. He who will look narrowly into Kant will find that it is what Hegel calls his Geschwätzigkeit that constitutes his difficulty. With Hegel, again, apart from the peculiar thought and the peculiar dialect, it is compression which presents itself as the obstacle. Here, however, in this discussion of the Infinite, there are impediments in the way of a quite Kantian nature; or the discussion in question is carried out to too great a length. Hegel usually sees what he has got to say, and names what he has got to say, with the instant precision of an instrument of steel: here, however, he introduces us into an intricacy strange for him—the intricacy of *breadth*, that is, and a breadth produced, not by extension of treatment, but by re-iteration of repetition. The mutual reference of the one to the other is the hinge on which the dialectic of Finite into Infinite and Infinite into Finite turns; and the whole business ought to have been summed in a less number of phrases than that presented by the pages over which it has been scattered. We shall find, indeed, by-and-by, with reference to the 'Encyclopaedia,' that Hegel has really effected such concentration elsewhere. This is an important consideration as regards the art of statement, and the result

seems to be that, where a scientific truth is concerned, we ought to satisfy ourselves with one presentation of the same, fearing that any others, especially many others, and just in proportion to their Many, might be rather apt to introduce hesitancy for assurance, and obscurity for light.

The discussion above continues that bearing on the Immortality of the Soul which we have already signalised. Perhaps we should notice here a doubt which may have presented itself to the reader. The Passing-away of the Finite is a Passing-away of the Passing-away, and there is still only affirmation present. True! but if what is concerned is only of a material nature, the interests of the soul remain untouched. We admit the eternity of matter, we know that transformation in that kind involves no loss of materials: but still *form* disappears; and if the soul be *form*, it is nowise secured from the same consummation.—The answer here is, that Hegel occupies a platform where such objections have no place: the Notion is the originative spot, the point and pulse of movement and of life, and we are the Notion—that is, the Notion, as Socrates says of the Soul, is insuscipient of its contrary, death—which latter would amount in such case to utter and universal annihilation, which is absurd, &c.

If we but attentively consider what we mean when we say Finite, there will be little difficulty in realising the position which Hegel would maintain. What is Finite passes away; but if then what passes away were independent and non-relative, there were nothing; or, we might ask, where would the Passing-away pass away to? 'What becomes of the old moons?' as the African king seriously inquires.—The Finite alone has evidently a chasm on one side, and demands its complement. In

fact, there can be no Finite without an Infinite, and no Infinite without a Finite: they are but the two necessary sides or moments of one and the same concrete truth. What is, is, and determinately is; and this necessarily involves both a first and a second negation, or, what is the same thing, both Finitude and Infinitude. To take the picture, the Vorstellung, we have already used—What is, is a Voice; Being is a Voice. Were it abstract only, it were nothing. But it passes into its distinctions; it rings its changes; it undergoes the evolution of its native and constituent notes. Even so it negates these, and is itself, or *through* these is into itself. Thus, then, the Infinite (Voice) is through the Finite (Notes); thus, too, the Finite (Notification) is the first Negation of the Infinite (Voice); and thus also, lastly, the Infinite (Voice) is the Negation of the Finite (Notes), or the negation of the negation. Thus the Infinite (Voice) is 'the Process in which it submits to be only *one* of its moments as opposed to the Finite (Notes), but sublates this difference of itself from itself into the affirmation of itself, and only through this be-*mediation* is truly as the Infinite (Voice).' Thus, too, we see that 'the negation is determined as Identity; the Idëell is the Finite as it is in the Infinite (as the Notes are in the Voice),—it is as a Determination (the vocabilisation, notification), the matter or implement, which is distinguished, but not self-*substantially is*, but only as moment (in the voice).'—The Vorstellung sounds better in German: Was ist, ist eine Stimme; oder das Seyn ist die unendliche Stimme. Abstract aber ist diese Stimme nichts: oder abstract ist sie nur *an sich*. Sie muss aber auch für sich seyn, und um für sich zu seyn, muss sie sich unterscheiden; d. h. sich die Reihe ihrer Bestimmungen geben. In ihren Bestimmungen ist die

Stimme bestimmt; oder die Bestimmungen sind die Bestimmtheiten. Den Bestimmtheiten (oder der Bestimmtheit) gegenüber ist die Stimme das Unendliche. Die Bestimmtheit dagegen der Stimme gegenüber, ist das Endliche. Die Bestimmtheit ist die Negation der Stimme, zugleich aber ist die Stimme die Negation der Bestimmtheit, also die Negation der Negation. Die unendliche Stimme ist nur durch die endlichen Bestimmungen; und diese nur durch jene.

If it is the word Bestimmung which has suggested this *Stimme* as an illustration, perhaps that inquiry of Jacobi *as to how the soundless sounding of the pure identity got to accentuation in itself* may have proved no less suggestive to Hegel. For this is a main manifestation of Hegel, that he points ever to the concrete and existent actual. Pointing thus, he intimates to narrow Intellectualism, represented, it may be, by a Jacobi, or by his vastly inferior and vastly *arriéré* pupil Hamilton, 'Rest not in your insoluble abstractions; behold *actu* what you declare impossible.' Pointing thus, too, he equally intimates to narrow Materialism, that the Real which it would declare the only, is inextrically interwoven with the Ideal which it would deny; or, rather, that the web of this latter is the vital all, into which the former seems to be received but as dead and inorganic stuff, and against which this stuff, as what cannot be named, or said, or characterised, is veritably as nothing. There *is* this variegated universe; that is, there is Identity *and* Variety: either abstract side is self-stultification; there *is* but the concrete both. There is an analogy thus in the position of Hegel to that of Bishop Butler. The industry of the latter may be expressed thus: 'You, Deists, &c., find our Christianity not good enough for

your high intellectual notions (or, say with Hegel, abstractions); but look to the actual—which you cannot deny—and see how *it* comports itself with the same!' In this comparison the advantage is all on the side of the German, however, whose argument makes appeal to perfection, and not, like Butler's, to defect, or to what must be admitted at least to appear such. It is this, indeed, which gives an air of special pleading to the argument of Butler, and finally negates it. The employment of German as above, suggests, *apropos* of Languages, an illustration of the Hegelian, or what we may call the Absolute Method. He who would master a living language, let him, Firstly, devour cart-loads of what interests him in it, through interlinear translations. Let him, Secondly, with his own language before his eyes, shout aloud to himself the foreign equivalents, at least four hours daily, and for several months. Thirdly, let him hearken to the foreign language read to him, let him tell in his own words (but in the foreign language) what he has heard read, and let him—in the foreign language, of course—converse generally with the reader. These are the great features of the absolute method by which the modern languages may be more or less perfectly acquired, and any closer discrimina it is at present not necessary to mention. The reader will see that the three moments of this method may be named respectively, Hamiltonian, Ollendorffian, and Robertsonian,—without, however, implying that what is particular to these names perfectly represents the moments in question; at the same that it is only fair to point out that it is, as usual, the second moment which contains the Arbeit, the labour,—and, in this case, certainly the bulk of the merit. Now these moments

are by no means incomplete forms of those of the Notion. Simple Apprehension is the first moment—say it is English that will make itself French—it simply takes up or absorbs—the French disappears into the English, and exists there only *an sich*, or *in potentia*. Judgment, dis-cernment, separation, is the second moment—the French is flung out from the English and becomes *für sich*; what was at first only potentially *implicit* in the English, is now *gesetzt*, *explicit*, realised to *tongue* and *ear*, but still abstractly; —the two first moments, indeed, are, as they ought to be, abstract. But now comes the concrete moment, in which the second moment is reflected into the first to the development of a concrete living actuality; or, as it is here, French is reflected into English, so that the composite is equally both, An English which is at will French, and a French which is at will English—a faculty or power which is *an und für sich*.

A similar illustration we pointed out already in the tenets of Comte. Comte himself completes the two first moments of the Notion, in the forms of Religion and Metaphysic, by what we may call his Empirical Realism. Empirical Realism, however, is not a moment of Reason, but of the renunciation of Reason; it is a falling back into *one* of the abstractions—and the coarser one too—into *one* of the sides of the antithesis of Understanding: instead of an advance to the moment of Reason, it is a retrogression to a single one of the *differences* of *Judgment*.—Of course, it is unnecessary to notice that Comte did not, and could not, bring thus together his own expressions, whose origin was but empirical casualty; neither is it necessary to point out that the two former moments do not belong exclusively to past times, but are necessary

flexions of the Notion itself in all time. Not Comte, but Hegel, then, shall complete for us the triad by adding to Religion and Metaphysic his own Ideal Realism, or Real Idealism—which very plainly is a moment of Reason, and a concluding moment of Reason in that sphere.

Excellent illustration to a like effect might be obtained from Political Economy, a branch of science which awaits entire transformation from the introduction into it of the Notion. So far as I know, there is but one allusion to Political Economy in Hegel, occurring in his contemptuous remark that the English call Staatswirthschaft Philosophy. The subject involving a certain amplitude of detail, is inadmissible at present, however. We may say this, nevertheless, that Political Economy is but one of the moments in the general movement of the Aufklärung, and that, consequently, it must just share the limits and conditions and characterisation in general of that movement. This observation, short as it is, we believe to throw a flood of light on, or rather quite to determine, the particular nature and authority of the branch of science in question. At present, Political Economy is in its hour of strength, and also in its hour of weakness; that is, it has reached the moment of Judgment and gone asunder into idle abstractions. The whole movement belongs, indeed, to a moment of Judgment historically presentant; but at its dawn in Hume—for it is absurd to extend isolated and individual expressions into an *ex-post-facto* scope beyond their merely contemporary application, and to see this science (viewed strictly as such) rise, whether in the Mercantile system of Colbert, or in the Physiocratic system of Quesnay ('Tableau Economique,' 1758),—at its dawn in Hume (1752), a dawn mainly *widened* by

Adam Smith (1776), a plain, honest, solid, faithful, and excellent faculty, but without the penetrative, fertile, and various originality of Hume—it occupied relatively a sub-moment of simple apprehension, and possessed much more concrete truth than it manifests now in its complete efflorescence of abstraction. Consider, for example, the thin starched ruffles that rise now into the moral sublime over such empty abstractions as 'Demand and Supply,' 'Capital will find its own channels,' &c. &c.!—Is not this enough? The business of National Economy is to secure our material supplies, or to realise stewardship over our material necessities—an indispensably necessary, a first or the first function in every community—well, said ruffles reach the moral sublime here, too, with—This function, the Stewardship of the Nation, must be carefully guarded from the Rational, Universal, or True Will, as it is in the conjunct, and must be as carefully committed to the Irrational, Particular, and Sensuous Will (otherwise named Self-will), as it is in the disjunct: in a word, the Stewardship of the Nation must be saved from Reason and intrusted to Caprice! A very pretty abstraction of Judgment this!—just that abstraction which expressly constitutes what Hegel calls Das Böse, and what we call *wrong*, *evil*, *sin*, *crime*!—In short, no interest more imperatively demands the moment of Reason—concrete Reason—now-a-days, than that of Political Economy, which, through the extreme of abstraction, threatens to fall bodily 'on the other' at present, and dismember universal society. Yet we have come to such a pass with our 'advanced thinkers,' that it is just proper *prudence* for all of us nowadays to give in a grave adhesion to Demand and Supply, and all the rest of them, not trusting the enemy with the slightest opening through the very hint of a doubt.

I wonder if the *Times* ever suffered for its indiscretion at the commencement of the cotton dearth, in exclaiming that the law of supply and demand, though now evidently false in the concrete, was still true in the abstract! Did the *Times* fail to consider, then, that Political Economy concerning the concrete only, truth in the abstract would be to it but a small set-off against the ruin of the science in its concrete falsehood?—But verily the remnants of the Aufklärung, if we but look at Political Economy, pelt us so unmercifully—as shallowness and conceit always do—with 'ignorance,' that, as we said, a proper prudence orders us to cry as loudly as the rest, 'Long live the conqueror!' and we do our best to stifle our laughter even when we see the unique Mr. Buckle, without the qualm of the scruple of a doubt, but with ruffled crop well swelled, and outblown cheeks, magnificently advancing *to mediate between mind and matter* through what *he* calls the laws, and *we* the abstractions, of Political Economy! The reader, we hope, will understand, nevertheless, that we believe in a science of Political Economy, that we consider the interest involved to be a primary necessity, and that we call as loudly as any for the emancipation of industry from the fetters of feudalism, rejoicing also as sincerely as any in the immense and splendid success with which that process of emancipation has been already rewarded.

The abstract vacuum that names itself, or mis-names itself, Political Economy, nowadays, is, it is only fair to remark, not without its reply to the above objection to the substitution of individual caprice for general reason in this, or any other interest of humanity. *It has been found*—this is the burthen of the answer—that free individual self-interest is the best steward of the

State, *and* that ordinary provisions of Police suffice to effect the necessary control. If the *and* which we have italicised be correct, *then* it is no longer the Particular but the Universal Will with which we have to do; and, again, if the *it has been found* is correct, *then* there is an end of any objection whatever. It is to be remarked, however, that belief in sounding abstractions is perhaps *the* most characteristic feature of the Aufklärung: even, when at any time self-convicted of a blunder, it recovers itself again by clutching to some big platitude—'a wise man always,'—'a good man never,'—'the vulgar and the ignorant,'—'but a well-regulated understanding,' &c. &c.; just as it is the sublime of wisdom in Dr. Hugh Blair to repeat and re-repeat over a thousand pages, 'practise all virtue, avoid all vice—practise all virtue, avoid all vice!' This *it has been found*, we have to fear, then, is but one of these big-sounding abstractions; nay, its own *and* contains its own refutation. By this *and* Self-will is declared to be not perfectly *free* Self-will, but self-will under control of—a *form of*—that is, just—Reason! This concedes the whole question; for if you grant the smallest end or part of the wedge Reason, you will find yourself destitute of any power of resistance to my introduction of the whole. You say, for example, not only is Police to be made an affair of the State, but even such interests as those of Education or the mere carrying of our letters are not to be intrusted to individual self-interest, but must be reserved for the assignments of universal will: you say this, and you wish to stop there; but who so wroth as you when certain Theological Expositors assert their own exposition to be the exposition ultimate, the exposition final, the exposition absolute?—and yet these

expositors do no more than you yourselves! You see, then, or ought to see—for, indeed, further exposition were but a fuss of words—that when you call for individual self-interest, *but* under edge of the small end of Reason, you have virtually effected at once a complete suppression of self-interest or the Particular Will, and a complete introduction of Reason or the Universal Will; —in other words, Political Economy is an affair of the State, and not of the Individual; or it is not an affair of free individual self-interest as such, but of free individual self-interest in the sense that it is *free*, or that it has been *free'd* (from self-will, that is) by the decernments of Reason, of the Universal Will, of the State.

Remark 2.

There is matter in this short note which your common writer could not have kept himself from *trowelling* over an entire treatise, perhaps.—The ordinary view, religious or other, of the transitoriness of all finite existence, is with much subtle depth of truth identified with Idealism: even the water of Thales, as principle of all things, had the force of Ideality. On one side, the principle, as sublating the moments, and, on the other, the moments, as sublated in the principle, may be regarded as idëel.

Mental conception, as opposed to external reality, is what is usually regarded as the ideal side or element; and certainly, consciousness, seeing that it sublates or takes up all matter into itself—or, what is the same thing, seeing that all its matter is sublated into it, and only so *for* it—is the true Idealist. This position is that of subjective Idealism, which insists on its own conceptive *form*, in opposition to the matter which presents itself in that form. But with such Idealism, there is

neither loss nor gain—as regards the matter, that is. There is no loss, for, despite the form, there *is* the matter; and, in a higher sense, there is no loss, for the truth is still supposed to lie in the abstracting from this matter as that which is *not* the true In-itself or Principle. Again, there is no gain, just because there is no loss, or because this matter remains *there*—in me, if you will—just as real, and at the same time just as finite—that is, as unsatisfactory and as unaccounted for — as ever. To remove one *finity*, that of the antithesis of subject and object, does not remove the other innumerable unreconciled or unresolved finities which attach still to the matter (or object), whatever be its true relation of identity at bottom to the form (or subject). The reader may profitably see here again the genuine thinker and the spurious. To Hegel the relation of object and subject is—as regards the true business in hand—but as the veriest *particle*; to Sir William Hamilton this relation is the whole, *totum et rotundum*, and he fills his whole world with clamour about the *Cosmothetic Idealist*, the *Presentative Realist*, &c. &c., as if the mode in which the outward is regarded as connected with the inward alone constituted Philosophy, and as if the distinguishing with Greek Predicates of all such modes, actual or possible, were Philosophising!—The nature of the necessity which Hegel sees is indicated here: he would begin with the acknowledged first finity, and proceeding resolvingly through the whole series, at length wind all up together as a whole into the one Infinite, the Absolute Spirit. What a vast difference there lies between this gigantic enterprise and the single question, Is the object *I*, or is it another than *I*?—or, rather, how shall we name in Greek the different answers?

It may be worth while in simple summary now to review the ground over which we have just passed.—Well, *Being* is that which *is* when all distinction is abstracted from: it is, therefore, that which indefinitely is; it is the indefinite *What*, the indefinite *here* and *always*, the indefinite immediate; or—what all this just amounts to—it is the indefinite *First* and *Simple*. But, being indefinite, it is no more nor less than Nothing; for, *in an actual definite existence* — as the thinker always is—Nothing is no more and no less than that abstraction from all definiteness (distinction, difference) which Being is. In short, Being and Nothing are each simply the void faculty, and whichever we assume, Being or Nothing, the faculty accompanies it, and cannot be prevented from accompanying it.—This faculty, however, is not to be regarded as specially mine, or yours, or his: it is to be regarded as the Absolute faculty, both yours and mine and his, and yet that faculty in relation to which mine or yours or his is but as a meinung, an opinion—but as a tint, a shade, a reflexion: at the same time, nevertheless, tint, shade, reflexion is not without its own necessity. This faculty is the conceived *principle* and *principium* of all that is; and in reference to such principle, a beginning only can be effected by abstracting from all its differences, by returning to its own simple abstract identity—and that is Being: but simple abstract identity as distinction-less is Nothing—in fact, in every instance when we say *Nothing*, it is simply this distinction-less abstract identity *we mean*.—All this is very striking: it is the nature of thought to demand a principle; but, if it but look at what that must be which it demands, it will find that the principle can be but the abstraction from the difference, or the Identity. This is of universal

application. Just so situated is the Beginning; it is abstraction from Difference up to Identity, and there is no *further back* for it. These few thoughts have that in them to alter all human reflexion, and so all human industry at present.—This abstraction, then, which a Beginning necessitates, is just *Being* (*What is*) gone over into Nothing; and this is but a literal expression of the state of the case. But it is equally literally true that it is Nothing which has gone into Being; for in this abstraction it is Nothing now that *is*. But what does this amount to?—There is a definite existence; of that definite existence there is necessarily an eternal or infinite principle which is, was, and ever will be—no abstraction can destroy it, therefore: in this abstraction, then, which is characterised as Nothing, there is still Being. Well, then, reach this abstraction in reality as an actual beginning, or—*what is the same thing*—reach it in thought, there is a traffic in actual operation in which Being is seen, so to speak, to Beingate Nothing, and Nothing to Nothingate Being; but the one result is the formal definition of Origin, and the other of Decease; both are Becoming, and further, Being and Nothing blent, are bëent distinction, Daseyn, Entity or aughtness, sublunariness, mortal state.—Or, to take the abstraction in another manner — in every case, the principle, the faculty, is still presupposed: Being, then, the faculty, and Nothing, its contained matter, or—a view equally true—Nothing, the faculty, and Being, its contained matter — these are identical, but also absolutely distinguished; and the distinction is just that of Form and Filling. We can thus get a glimpse even here of a main Hegelian doctrine—that Form and Filling, or that outer and inner, are the same. What were the Form without the Filling, the Filling without the

Form? The Filling is what the Form is; the Form is the Filling. Being and Nothing are thus the crudest example of the negative reference to Self.—But this intermovement is in Seyn; it is Werden—the transition of what is to what is not, and again of what is not to what is.

This process, then, of Being passing into Nothing, and *vice versâ*, is Becoming—a unit in which both Nothing and Being *are*. Being becoming Nothing is Decease; while Nothing becoming Being is Origin. Becoming thus, between the two directions of origin and decease, is sisted into *Become*. But what has become is *determinate*, or it contains at once Reality and Negation, the union of which constitutes what we mean by *Something*.

But Something is its own negative; even in its very self-reference, or reflexion into Self, it just by that virtually *excludes* itself—that is, as *another*. Or the reference to self is negative of that element named by Kant the *manifold*, and which we may name the *variety* —what is self-reference, indeed, if not just sublation, negation, of the variety?—this variety, then, is *another* in general to this unity—and thus *in its very notion* Something of itself *alters* itself, *others* itself. Or Something is the negation of its own determinateness, which latter is to it relatively other; or Something as distinguishable Something implies other in it, by which, but also from which, it is distinguished.

Something and Other, then,—each is Something, and each is relatively Other. True, the *other* is a distinction indifferent to either in its own self; it is external to both, it falls *out* of both, though it is constituted by the external reference of the one to the other. Belonging, then, to neither, it may be isolated and considered by

itself. But, thus considered, it presents itself as the abstract other, the other as other, or evidently the other of itself. Physical Nature is such other; it is the other of Spirit; its nature, then, is a mere relativity, in which, not an inherent quality, but a mere outer relation is expressed. Spirit, then, is the true Something, and Nature is what it is only as opposed to Spirit. The quality of Nature, then, isolated and viewed apart, is just that it is the other as other—is that which exists externally to its own self (in Space, Time, &c.).

The other by itself is the other in itself, the other of itself, and so evidently the other of the other. It is the absolutely self-disparate, self-discrepant, self-unequal principle—it is the absolute *odd*. It is the self-negating or the self-changing principle. But even in its changes it remains self-identical, for *it* is other, and *what* it changes to is other. Change, then, for this principle is mere reflexion into its own self with resolution of otherness.

But Something is *in itself* as counter what it is *for other*. Being-in-self and Being-for-other are the two moments that constitute the Something. The one is, as it were, the constitutive, and the other the defining, element. The Being-for-other is the negating element; it is not for itself, it is for the production of the other; and yet it is the other, and without it the other could not *be*—neither for it nor for itself. This otherness in the Something—which is not the Something and which is the Something—one with it and not one with it (I am, if you lop off a leg)—contained in it and separated from it—is not so much other to it, then, as rather its Being-for-other. But in the unity of Something, both are in absolute unity with each other, or each in its own self involves and implies the other. Both are of a

derivative or dependent nature; for each is constituted by reflexion from itself to the other, and from the other to itself, and each is itself as not being the other. Or each reflects to the other, and is constituted by reflexion from the other. But what Something is for other, that is in the Something; or it is *in it* to be so and so for other. What, then, it is thus for other belongs to its In-itself, to its own genuine intrinsic worth. This consideration points to the true nature of the Kantian and common Thing-in-itself. To attempt to predicate what a thing in itself is, at the same time that all predicates (Being-for-other) are to be excluded from it, is simply the self-stultification of utter thoughtlessness.

As yet the evolution is *in itself*; or under Seyn (Being) the members appear, not relative, but independent, the notion, as yet, being but *impliciter*: in other spheres relation or correlation increases—but we are here stepping too close for a mere retrospect.

We have seen, then, the successive and consequent evolution of Being, Nothing, Becoming, Origin, Decease, Become-ness or Ness-ness, Reality, Negation, Something, Being-for-self, and Being-for-other. Now, what Something is for other, being reflected into the In-itself of the Something, constitutes that Something's Qualification or appointed nature; while what Something is for other, being reflected apart from the In-itself, constitutes that Something's Talification, or its assertion of itself as against other. But in this assertion, it at once is and is not—a definition which is identical with that of Limit. But Something in reference to its Limit is a To-be-to, or its Limit is Limitation. Again, as To-be-to, it is beyond its Limitation, and passes into Infinitude. Infinitude as opposed to Finitude is the spurious, as

reconciled with Finitude the true, Infinite; and the true Infinite is that which is by and for itself, or Being-for-self.

Suppose, now, we repeat this evolution, but expressly accompanied by the logical moments which have produced it, it may stand thus:

The most absolutely abstract object, filling, matter, or *in*tent (Inhalt) of Simple Apprehension, is Being. To Judgment now—that would discriminate, differentiate, dis-cern—this Being is Nothing; while to Reason, on the other hand, both must fall together into Becoming, as the only truth. What is Becoming to Reason, is now again to Simple Apprehension the other of it, or Become. What is Become parts before Judgment into Reality and Negation. Reason, which reflected Nothing into Being to the development of Becoming, reflects now Negation into Reality to the development of Something. The Something of Reason is to Simple Apprehension the other of it, that is, another, or simply Other. To Judgment the Other breaks into what it is in itself and what it is for other. Reason now again reflects the Being-for-other into the Being-for-self, and the Qualification (in the sense of characteristic function or quality) arises. Qualification to Simple Apprehension is the other of it, or it is Talification. Talification falls asunder before Judgment into—let us say at once, in order not to stop now—Action and Reaction. Reason reflects reaction into action, and Limit results. The Limit to Simple Apprehension is its other, or (say) Faculty. Faculty separates under Judgment into a To-be-to and a Limitation. Reason, reflecting the Limitation into the To-be-to, gives birth to the Infinite. Before Simple Apprehension the Infinite is but Finite, and the Finite to Judgment becomes the spurious Infi-

nite, or an irreconcilable antagonism of Finite and Infinite. Reason, lastly, reflecting Finite unto Infinite, there emerges the true Infinite, or the Fürsichseyn, which is its own other to Simple Apprehension, or the One—and so on.

The reflective reader may see here a good reason for Hegel's reticence—may come now to understand how it was that, like another Prospero, he broke 'his staff,' and, 'deeper than did ever plummet sound,' drowned, not 'his book,' but the receipt that made it. We allude, of course, to the changes introduced above into the Hegelian scheme—changes which, in some respects, seem to render the transitions easier and more consistent, and which, if carried out at length in a discussion as full as that of Hegel himself, would necessitate the addition of a great deal of matter.—Hegel, probably, then just feared that this would be the result of a revelation of his formula—that every puny whipster, that is, would introduce his own innovations—and that the world would become disgusted by an endless clamour rung, and he himself just utterly stultified. That Hegel was right, if so fearing he so acted, the immediate result will probably soon prove now!

A remark or two on some of the proposed changes may be here in place. To ask for the abstract object of Simple Apprehension is certainly the directest way in which we can reach pure Being or Seyn; and the reflexion of the second moment into the first, so as to *infect*, if we may say so, the negation of the one by the beingness of the other, is perhaps the shortest way to the dialectic method. That the object of Reason when transferred to Simple Apprehension should become just its other, is an assignment at least in harmony, not only with the general manner of Hegel, but with the

nature of the case, and it certainly seems to bring with it its own recommendations. Hegel's own transition, for example, to *other* in his Something and Other, seems quite irregular, and not in obedience to the regular march of the notional moments. In Hegel, too, the extrication of Become from Becoming evidently necessitates on his part an unusual exertion, nor one quite satisfactory either. Again, the section devoted to Qualification, Talification, and Limit is very confused as it stands, and can be justified only by suggesting that now or here in a very intense form we are in a moment of judgment, and the differences all fall out of each other: but surely the consistency, clearness, and ease introduced by the innovation proposed have the advantage by much of any such suggestion. Then, again, the Re-extrication of the moments out of Talification and in higher potentiation, as Action and Reaction, seems to introduce not only formal, but material advantages. Of course, we do not mean to say that Action and Reaction are the proper names of the moments extricated—these names occur much more consistently further on in the development, and they must be certainly replaced here by others of a much more abstract nature. But a very near peep into the actual operations of Hegel may be obtained by considering what has occurred here. What has occurred here, indeed,—the reader may depend on it,—occurred often to Hegel himself; and he, too, had to hunt often enough for abstract new terms by which to replace the old ones which had in the first instance suggested themselves. *Inherent* and *relative*, for example, must have occurred a thousand times to him, and been a thousand times replaced.—*Faculty*, of course, also, is here only for the nonce, and requires to be set aside for something

more abstract. I cannot help thinking, however, that were Talification, Limit, To-be-to, Limitation, Finite, Infinite, &c., entirely re-thought and in subjection to the new scheme proposed, there would result very great improvements to the Hegelian Logic. The Für-sichseyn of Reason becoming to Simple Apprehension *One*, must prove sufficiently pleasing to any student really interested in Hegel.

That Hegel has really been guided by the moments of the Notion, must, we should think, be patent to everyone. In the general system, the Logic is but the whole matter or Intent, the whole object of Simple Apprehension *in abstracto* — and so is it that the Logic really demonstrates and presents before us the Thing-in-itself. Nature is the object of Judgment *in abstracto*, or it is the Notion gone into difference as such, or it is all the moments of the Thing-in-itself fallen into outwardness. Or it is abstractly Difference, the Other, as Logic was abstractly Identity or the Thing-in-itself. The Spirit is the concrete moment of Reason—it is the concrete Totality—in which both of the abstract moments meet and realise themselves, though, at the same time, they are to be regarded as only idëel in it. It—the Spirit—is, absolutely, the only truth. But Logic, though constituting as a whole but the moment of Simple Apprehension, must submit its subdivisions to the entire virtue of the triune Notion. Accordingly, it falls firstly into Being, Essentity, and Notion; and a little reflection will show that these are objects respectively of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason; or they are respectively moments of Identity, Difference, and Totality. Being, again, though as a whole very specially a moment of Simple Apprehension, follows also in its own proper

subdivisions the flexions of the Notion; or we have Quality, Quantity, and Measure. Here Quantity is very eminently mere Difference, or it is but the externality of Quality, while Measure reunites both. Then the divisions of Quality are Being, There-being, and Being-for-self, in which forms the type of the Notion is too evident to require comment. The reader, however, may profitably ask himself, why do Seyn, Nichts, and Werden absolutely distribute the absolutely first moment, &c.? The Differences will always be found to stand for the Particular; their reflexion into an indefinite all constitutes the Universal; and their negative reflexion into unity constitutes also the Singular: consider Daseyn, Seyn, and Fürsichseyn! Of Seyn as Seyn, is it possible to say more than it *is*, it is *not*, it *comes* to be, it *ceases* to be, it always *becomes*? At all events, is Seyn ever anything else to Simple Apprehension? Simple Apprehension is always a moment of indefinite An sich, or to it the variety is always reflected into an indefinite unity. With Judgment, the function of understanding proper begins: there is an attempt to think the object; which being thought, breaks up into its differences. In this moment, then, the object is no longer an sich, it is für sich in the sense that it goes before itself in the state of Anders-seyn, of otherwise-being. As regards the three moments used distributively under Judgment, we can justify them by saying that the *Difference* is successively apprehended, judged, and reasoned. The action of Simple Apprehension is always as Unmittelbar or immediate, that of Judgment is as Mittelbar or mediate: so it is that the object of the one has always the virtue of Seyn, of Beingness, in it, while that of Judgment is as much led by the virtue of Nichts or Negation.

But these circumstances of Form become Formalities, empty, barren, wearisome, when unduly dwelt on; and attention may be profitably turned in conclusion to the importance of the matter discussed—quite apart from the form.

The first material lesson of Hegel attaches to the mere words. We are all apt to use our words vaguely; but Hegel forces us, as it were, to look into their very bellies. It is unnecessary to quote examples; all the technical terms of Hegel are such—or we may say, indeed, that his whole speech is but one long and perfect example. This is a matter of the most essential importance, and an indispensable preliminary to all thought proper. Even in this, Hegel, as a philosopher, has gone boldly to the front, and has attempted to remove in his own case, and in the whole case generally, the oldest and most tenacious objection which lies against Philosophy,—that, namely, which is drawn from the ambiguity of language.

Again, throughout, the reader must find himself exercised in such a power at once of abstraction and of distinction as must infinitely improve his own discrimination for all time to come. As regards information, surely that is not wanting, when we consider all that has been said in regard to Parmenides, Heraclitus, Buddhism, Spinoza, Kant, Jacobi, the general question of transition, the attributes of God, the necessary involution of the negative, the immense affirmative function of the negative, the conditions of creation, the constitution of Pantheism, the nature of common sense to be fore-thickened and fore-occupied by its own fixed abstractions, the crude figurate conception, certain points of morals, Idealism, &c. These are, for the

most part, but incidental topics, yet they involve much and very momentous matter.

But the main thing which we have to see here is—the beginning at length, and the realisation of Philosophy. Philosophy, in the Notion, has reached a scientific principle, and must henceforth, consequently, be reputed the most rigorously scientific of all the Sciences. We do not assist here either at the ordinary uncertiorated, unsecured, miscellaneous process of pro-and-con reasonment, pro-and-con remark; but we sit before a necessary evolution, and—as Kant declared the essence of philosophy—in *abstracto*, and simply look on. What we see is the Notion, and the Notion in its own movement, the Notion describing by its own necessity the articulated series of its own constitutive forms. The *first*, the unexplicated Notion, the beginning, is Being, the indefinite Immediate, but—seeing that *we* are *here*—Being that is *in itself* definite. But the absolutely first indefinite, or indefinite First, is Nothing; and—again seeing that *we* are *here*—no other Nothing than this Nothing is even possible. But the Notion that reflects again on Being as counter this Nothing, is already Becoming—is already, indeed, Become. This, in truth, constitutes all that a beginning or the beginning can be.

Then, again, Determinateness—is not that completely thought out, with the evolution, too, of many surprising results? Determinateness is the affirmative thing it is, very much because of negation. Other is negation; and how could anything be cognisable unless by *other* in it, or otherwise-being, otherwise-ness? Identity itself must have Difference, otherwise it were a null. Is Form possible without Matter? What *is* there, is but an entelecheia of these: these are but its abstract dis-

tinctions, its elementary distinctions; and they are those of the Notion, and always the same though in a thousand forms. What is Matter but just Identity—now for itself, or to itself? Matter is but its *other*—the other of Identity, that is—in which other it is for itself. But identity for itself is just identity in its dif-ference. That Identity by its own very necessity involves Difference, to show by, as it were—is not this a thought, a category, not in me or you, but deep, necessary, universal in the nature of existence itself? And existence—what else is existence but the spectacle, the *exhibition* of these categories? Immediate *must* become mediate—that is, no longer in itself, but through another. These are not mere formalities—they are material truths, and the most material. Through them it is that Hegel procures us a glimpse into the very deeps of Being. The same strain is but continued in Qualification and Talification, Finite and Infinite; and the result is really to show us the principles of our own existence, as it were the pillars of the universe. The truth all through is, that *opposition* is but *reference*; that 'the one moment does not sublate in an external fashion the other, but that each sublates itself in itself, and is in its own self the contrary of itself.' Identity and Difference, Form and Matter, have just demonstrated themselves so. What we see, then, is that all differences, as but first negations, negate themselves into the one whole that is —and this is the Truth, this is the Absolute. The first Seyn is *in itself* determinate, and goes over into Daseyn, finite Being, the series of its own Finities, which returns into its own single constituent Self—and that is the Fürsichseyn. The Universal is the Particular, and the Particular is the Singular. Suppose Water the Absolute: abstracting from the host of outer things—its

differences, we have pure Being, the pure Universal; but *in itself* it is differentiated, and we know it is; it goes over, therefore, into its Particular—all these outward things we see: but they again are *it*, they are idëell in it; it therefore is the Fürsichseyn, the one concrete Singular. We have used Water here in illustration; but our old figurate conception, the Voice, would apply still better. The Voice abstractly is the Universal, Pure Being, Identity, &c.; but it must pass over into its Particular, its Difference, its Daseyn—and that is its inherent scale or compass, its native or inherent implement of notes; but these again coalesce and constitute the concrete Singular which is, and that is the Voice.—In all this, the immortality of the subject is really implied. One would think, then, that the *matter* of what we have seen is certainly not in any respect less than the *form*.

There is considerable assonance in all this to much that is Neo-Platonic—a matter which, as Hegel himself remarks, might be as appropriately named Neo-Aristotelian. Proclus, for example, says of the Dialectic method, that it is 'connate with things themselves,' that it 'receives its principles from intellect,' that it 'ascends through well-ordered gradations to being itself;' and he continues, 'it also terminates the wandering of the soul about sensibles, and explores everything by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the ineffable principle of things' (in Parmenid. lib. i.). In the same work he observes—

In the first place, it is necessary to despise the senses. . . . . After this, it follows that we should dismiss imaginations (Hegel's Vorstellungen), those winged Stymphalidae of the soul, as possessing only a *figured* intellection of things, but by no means able to apprehend unfigured form and as im-

peding pure intellection . . . . in the third place, we must entirely extirpate multiform opinions (Hegel's Meinungen), and the wandering of the soul about these.

He then goes on to refer to the insufficiency of the Dianoëtic Intellect (Hegel's abstracting Understanding) and terminates the paragraph thus:—

Many, therefore, are the wanderings of the soul: for one of these is in imaginations, another in opinions, and a third in the dianoëtic power; but a life according to intellect is alone inerratic; and this is the mystic port of the soul, into which Homer conducts Ulysses, after an abundant wandering of life.

Again we find him (same work, lib. v.) saying—

Let us now consider what negations are, whether they are better or worse than affirmations . . . it is not immanifest how Plato, in the Sophista, says that Non-being, *by which he means Difference*, is related to Being, and that it is not less than Being. . . . Negations, therefore, are better than affirmations, and are adapted to such as are ascending from the partial to the total. . . . As the *one* is the cause of wholes, so negations are the causes of affirmations. . . . So the *one*, being void of multitude, gives subsistence to all multitude, and, being without number and figure, produces number and figure, &c.

In truth, passages containing such assonances to Hegel seem to constitute the stuff of Proclus. Hegel, not far on in his 'Philosophy of History,' says, 'for, like Mercury, leader of souls, the Idea is in truth the leader of the nations and of the world.' Not without analogy is that passage of Proclus, where his Philosophy is talked of as 'moving knowledge,' 'unfolding the forms which we essentially contain,' &c., 'like that God who leads into light intellectual gifts,' &c. &c. (Proclus in Eucl. p. 14.) The God here alluded to is Mercury,

and it is quite possible that the passage of Proclus was in some way or other present to the consciousness of Hegel as his own statement arose.

But this matter is not peculiar to Proclus; it belongs to the whole Neo-Platonic school. Here is a passage from Plotinus in which Hegelian elements may be still readily enough perceived as well within the figures of the original, as across the perhaps somewhat uninitiated par-blindness of the translation, executed as it is by Thomas Taylor, from whom (his 'Metaphysics of Aristotle') we have been borrowing the extracts of Proclus also:—

Let us, then, receive by our dianoëtic power this our sensible world, *so disposed that every part may remain indeed what it is, but that one thing may mutually reside in another.* Let us suppose that all things are collected as much as possible into one, so that each particular object may first present itself to the eyes; as if a sphere should be the exterior boundary, the spectacle of the sun immediately succeeding, and a representation of the other stars, and the earth, the sea, and all animals appearing within, as in a diaphanous globe: and lastly, let us conceive that it is possible to behold *all things in each.* Let there be then in the soul a lucid imagination of a sphere, containing all things in its transparent receptacle; whether they are agitated or at rest, or partly mutable and partly stable. Now, preserving this sphere, receive another in your soul, removing from this last the extension into bulk, take away likewise place, and banish far from yourself all imagination of matter; at the same time being careful not to conceive this second sphere as something less than the first in bulk, for this must be void of all dimension. After this, invoke that Divinity who is the Author of the Universe, imaged in your phantasy, and earnestly entreat him to approach. Then will he suddenly come, bearing with him his own divine world, with all the gods it contains; then will he come, being at the same time *one* and *all*, and

bringing with him all things concurring in one. There, indeed, all the gods are various amongst themselves in gradations of power, yet by that one abundant power they are all but one, or rather one is all: for the divinity never fails by which they are all produced. But all the gods abide together, and each is again separate from the other *in a certain state unattended with distance, and bearing no form subject to sensible inspection; or one would be situated differently from the other, nor each be in itself all.* Nor, again, does any one of these possess parts different from others and from itself; nor is every whole there a divided power, and of a magnitude equal to its measured parts: but it is indeed a universe, and a universal power proceeding to infinity in a power which is the parent of energy.

Taylor ('Met. of Aristotle,' pp. 426, 427) also translates as follows from the same book of Plotinus on Intelligible Beauty:—

Divine natures are not at one time wise, and at another time the contrary; but they are perpetually wise, with a tranquil, stable, and pure intellect, understanding all things, and knowing not properly human concerns, but their own—that is, such as are divine, and such as intellect itself perceives. But the gods who inhabit this visible heaven, for they abound in divine leisure, assiduously contemplate, as if it were above them, what the primary and intelligible heaven contains. But those who are stationed in this higher world contemplate its inhabitants possessing the whole of this diviner heaven. For all things there are heaven. There the sea, animals, plants, and men are heaven. Lastly, every portion of this heaven is celestial: the gods likewise who reside there do not disdain men, nor any other of its inhabitants, because everything there is divine; and they comprehend the whole of this intelligible region with the most perfect repose.

Hence the life of these divinities is easy, and truth is their generator and nurse, their essence and nutriment. Hence,

too, they perceive all things—not such, indeed, as are subject to generation, but such as abide in essence. They likewise perceive themselves in others: for all things there are perfectly perspicuous. Nothing there is dark, nothing opposing; but everything is conspicuous to all, intrinsically and universally. For light everywhere meets with light. *Each thing contains in itself all, and all things are again beheld in another: so that all things are everywhere, and all is truly all.* There everything is all; there an *immense* splendour shines; there everything is great, since even what is small is there great. There the sun is all the stars; and every star is a sun, and at the same time all the stars. But one thing excels in each, while in the mean time all things are beheld in each. There motion is perfectly pure: for in its progression it is not confounded by a mover foreign from the motion. Permanency also there is disturbed by no mutation: for it is not mingled with an unstable nature. Besides, beauty there is beauty itself, because it does not subsist in beauty: but everything abides there, not as if placed in some foreign land; for the being of each is its own stable foundation. Nor is its essence different from its seat: for its subject is intellect, and itself is intellect. Just as if any one should conceive this sensible heaven, which is manifest and lucid to the eyes, germinating into stars by its light. In corporeal natures, indeed, one part is not everywhere produced from another, but each part is distinct from the rest. But there each thing is everywhere produced from the whole, *and is at the same time particular and the whole.* It appears, indeed, as a part; but by him who acutely perceives, it will be beheld as a whole: by him, I mean, who is endued with a sight similar to that of the lynx, the rays of whose eyes are reported to penetrate the depths of the earth. For it appears to me that this fable occultly signifies the perspicacity of supernal eyes. Besides, the vision of these blessed inhabitants is never wearied, and never ceases through a satiety of perceiving. For there is no vacuity in any perceiver, which, when afterwards filled up, can bring perceiving to an end . . . . rather by perceiving he more assiduously perceives.

Here (from Plotin. Enn. iii. 8. 3.) is a bit of ancient Idealism, apposite to the modern, whether subjective or absolute: — Καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν μου θεώρημα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωροῦντες γράφουσιν· ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ μὴ γραφούσης, θεωρούσης δὲ, ὑφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαὶ, ὥσπερ ἐκπίπτουσαι. Which translated, as if it were the Absolute spoke, might run thus: —

And my speculating (seeing) creates what is speculated (seen), just as Geometricians speculating draw lines (in thought): but I not drawing lines, but speculating, there rise up the lineaments of the corporeal objects as if falling in projection out of me.

The nature of the Neo-Platonic teaching, and its analogy to the Philosophy of Hegel, may be seen in almost every the usual expression of Thomas Taylor, who so perseveringly kept company with Plotinus, Proclus, and the rest. In the Introduction and Notes to his translation of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, we have the following: —

Wisely, therefore, (p. xv.) does Plato assert that the philosopher ought not to descend below species, and that he should be solely employed in the contemplation of *wholes* and *universals*. For he who descends below these, descends into Cimmerian realms, and Hades itself—wanders among spectres devoid of mind, and exposes himself to the danger of beholding the real Gorgon, or the dire face of Matter, and of thus becoming petrified by a satiety of stupid passions.

Again (p. xvii.) — :

Objects of sense rather resemble the delusions of sleep than the realities of vigilant perception.

Once more (p. 400) —

I shall rejoice if I have been able to add anything of my own which may contribute to elucidate the conceptions of

these divine men, and induce the reader to abandon with generous ardour the grovelling contemplation of sensible objects, profoundly dark and incessantly flowing, for the exalted survey of the all-splendid and ever-permanent forms in the world of mind.

Lastly (p. 428) —

Every Idea is not only the paradigm, but likewise the producing cause, of Sensibles: for something else would be requisite by which *sensibles are generated and assimilated to ideas*, if these divine forms remained sluggish and immoveable, and without any efficacious power, similar to impressions in wax: for it is absurd to admit that the reasons in nature possess a certain fabricative energy, but that intelligible forms should be deprived of productive power. Every divine form, therefore, is not only paradigmatic, but paternal, and is by its very essence the generative cause of the Many.

Thomas Taylor lived probably in a thick element of confused splendour, and is not by any means (who is?) an immaculate translator; but the sufferings, the persecutions, the patient poverty, the dauntless perseverance, the uncheered but assiduous labour of the noble, ardent man, entitle him at least to our respect; and not this only, but the successful outcome of that enormous labour compels the gratitude of every earnest and true Student. Sir William Hamilton errs, as usual, then, in the interest of his own unscrupulous flippancy, when he turns his sharp nail on the good Taylor; and (so far as my poor judgment may have any right to speak in the case) we are still much safer with this latter than with his critic, as a translator of Greek Philosophy. We will be thankful, then, for what Hamilton calls his 'mere rubbish.'

It would be easy to adduce, both from Aristotle and from Plato, many passages (which we had marked for the purpose, indeed) breathing the same spirit as those

already cited from Proclus and Plotinus; but we shall leave this to the reader's own activity. Towards the end of his article on Plato, in the 'History of Philosophy,' Hegel will be found translating from the former thus:—

The empirical manner of thinking found in Geometry and the kindred sciences, thou seemest to me to name Raisonnement; and, consequently, reasoning (Schliessen, reflectirende Erkennen) finds itself between the *νοῦς* and what we name *δόξα*.—Thou hast apprehended perfectly correctly. In accordance with these four distinctions, I shall name the four relative bearings of the soul: *α*, *νόησις* (Begreifen), Comprehension, a thinking of what is highest; *β*, *διάνοια*, the second; *γ*, the third, is Belief or true opinio (Meinung); *δ*, and the last, is the Vorstellung or figurate knowledge (das bildliche Wissen): these are the degrees of Truth, of Clearness.

Hegel, commenting on this, proceeds: —

Plato defines thus the Senses as the first mode; as second mode he defines reflexion, so far as it introduces Thinking into a consciousness otherwise sensuous. And here, he says, is the place where Science makes its appearance; Science rests on Thought, the determination of general principles, first sources, hypotheses. These hypotheses are not manipulated by the Senses themselves, are not sensuous in themselves; they certainly attach to Thought. But this still is not genuine Science which consists in considering the universal *per se*, the spiritual universal. Plato has comprehended under the term *δόξα*, sensuous consciousness, properly sensuous conception, opinio, immediate knowledge. In the middle between *opinio* and Science, as such, there lies ratiocinating cognition, inferential reflexion, reflecting cognition, that forms for itself general laws, definite genera, out of said immediate knowledge. The highest, however, is Thought in and for itself, which is directed to the highest.

The reader will have no difficulty, then, in view of such utterances,—(*δύναμις*, *ἐνέργεια*, *ἐντελέχεια*, κ.τ.λ.,

will be fresh in his memory as well)—in perceiving the analogy which Hegel bears to the most important Greek philosophers, both early and late.

There is a passage in Reid* which describes the Neo-Platonic philosophers in the usual conventional, vague terms, as mystically adoring and seeking union with the One; still, nevertheless, the description is so couched, that to a student of Hegel there is involuntarily suggested by it, that this mystic One is but the Logical Idea. We may suppose said student to be pleasantly surprised with this, and to be still more pleasantly surprised when he afterwards finds Hegel himself saying somewhere precisely the same thing.† On these grounds, however, should he, or any one else, infer the philosophy of Hegel to have derived from either new or old Platonics, or from either new or old Aristotelians, he will only fall into a very serious mistake. The philosophy of Hegel derives directly only from the generalised Categories of Kant in themselves and in their realisation or externalisation in the Things of Sense: Hegel's Philosophy, in short, in the Notion, coils itself *in nucem*, and *the* Notion, or this nut, came straight to him from Kant. We are to suppose, how-

* Reid, p. 264, Hamilton's edition, says, in reference to the Alexandrians, 'By a proper purification and *abstraction from the objects of sense*, we may be in some measure united to the Deity, and, in the eternal light, be enabled to discern the most sublime intellectual truths.'—The italics will strike the key of Hegel.

† 'If at times the excellence of the philosophy of Plato is placed in his—scientifically valueless—Myths, there are also times, named even times of *enthusiasm*, when the Aristotelian Philosophy is prized because of its speculative depth, and the Parmenides of Plato, certainly the greatest art-work of the Ancient Dialectic, is honoured as the veritable unveiling and *the positive expression of the divine life*, and even, amid much impurity of that which gave rise to it, the misunderstood *Ecstasis* is in reality nothing else than *the Pure Notion*.' —Phaenom., ed. 2nd, p. 55.

ever, that — once his philosophy was formed—Hegel was nothing loath to make as prominent as might be every analogy whatever which tended to associate him with the great masters of the ancient world: the one longing is almost overt in him, indeed, that he should be placed *now* as Aristotle was placed *then*. The reasons which prompted this desire were probably of a universal nature in the main, though concealment of the closeness of the derivation from Kant may not have been unconsidered.

It will tend to strengthen the view just expressed to point out that there are descriptions in existence intended to refer exclusively to the philosophy of Plato, which, nevertheless, can be applied almost line by line to the philosophy of Kant — a philosophy which we know and see owed nothing to Plato, but which was the result of a very natural train of inferences — a train which we may say we also actually *see* — from certain main positions of David Hume. Descriptions of this nature will be found at pages 262 and 263 of Hamilton's Reid, where the describer (Hamilton) has not the slightest thought of Kant at that moment in his mind. The analogy lies very obvious in this, however, that mental forms, which *awakened by*, *mingle with*, *the contributions of sense*, are in reality not one whit more Platonic than than they are Kantian. The verses of Boethius at p. 263 contain distinctive features which might have been copied quite as easily and correctly from Kant as from Plato.*

* These verses are the following:—

'Mens est efficiens magis
Longe causa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans
Ac vires animi movens

No doubt, Hegel, by his reference to the ancients, was enabled to bring the determinations he had arrived at in connexion with Kant into more magistral place, as dominant centres, as it were, in definitively vital, absolute, and infinite spheres; no doubt, he was enabled thus to cover, as it were, the whole field: nevertheless, he owed not this to any *direct* action of either Plato or Aristotle, but rather to a reaction on these through the findings of Kant. Rather, we may express it thus: To Hegel, the light of Kant lit Aristotle; and to the same Hegel, by such reciprocity as he loved, the relighting of Aristotle re-lit Kant. Thus, if the findings of modern Philosophy have been very much moved into place by the previous findings of the ancient, it must also be said that only through the former were these latter themselves re-found. Indirectly to Kant, directly to Hegel, then, is it that we owe at present that revival of the study of early philosophy which has expanded in Germany to such enormous dimensions, which has exhibited itself in no contemptible form in France, and which even in England has been adequate at least to—some impotent pawings. From Hegel specially is it that we derive the ability now to recognise in Aristotle, not the sensual materialist that controverted, but the absolute idealist that completed Plato. This is much, and the proof of it is certain: to that the single chapter of the 'Metaphysic' which closes the Encyclopaedia of Hegel would alone suffice;

Vivo in corpore passio,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Tum mentis vigor excitus
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus similes vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines.'

Stuff from without, *Form* from within,—the whole description may be predicated of the Kantian theory quite as truly as of the Platonic.

but we know also from elsewhere that Aristotle, even as much as his mighty modern compeer, concluded —*ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν*— *καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.*

If it be true, then, that it is to Hegel we are indebted for the new thew whereby we have obtained the new power over the old philosophy, and if it be also true that this Hegel himself has hitherto remained like some swart Magus charmed into insoluble opacity by virtue even of his own spells, we may well — when this Hegelian trance shall have been unbound — anticipate for the history of philosophy, and for philosophy itself, such perfection in a speedy sequel, as, but a short while since, no one would have permitted himself even to dream.

THE TRANSITION.

It is not difficult to see that Ideality may be named the Quality of Infinitude; for is not Infinitude just that in which the whole wealth of the Finite is ideally held? That the Infinite, too, is but a process of Becoming, is also plain; for its life and reality is but the evolution of its native differences, the Finite, just as the notification or vocabilisation, a process of Becoming, is the life of our illustration, the absolute Voice. But as Becoming becomes into There-being, so there is transition in the Infinite. Sublating the Finite, and sublating, in this same act, its own self as an only abstract Infinite, it is a return, as it were with both, into its own self, and is thus reference to its own self, Being. But this Being is no longer abstract; it contains negation, There-being; it is distinguishably and palpably *there*, or *here*: but again, as it is in its express nature negation of the negation, or the negation that refers

itself to itself, it is that There-being—that definite, palpable existentiality which is properly named Being-for-Self; that is, it is the existentiality which absolutely is, that existentiality which is to and for itself, which is its own inner variety and life, and which has no call for an outer, whether of support or derivation: in short, it is the true Fürsichseyn.

CHAPTER III.

BEING-FOR-SELF.

If this (first) paragraph be read in the light of our general illustration, the Absolute Voice,—and, after all, probably the very best name for Thought (especially now that it is viewed as the Absolute and Only), would be the Absolute Voice,—the various expressions which constitute it will spring at once into meaning.

'In Being-for-Self, qualitative Being is completed:' that is, the voice, *the One*, having run through its native constituent notes, *its variety*, *its many*, has returned into itself as still the Voice and the One; and thus *completion* (oneness and allness) is given to its whole qualitative Being; in other words, a complete answer has been given to every question of *Qualis*, *What Sort*, in its regard. This, too, is 'infinite Being;' it is unended and unendable; it is entire, *totum et rotundum*,—the Absolute Voice. The Being of the voice, before a single finite note, 'the Being of the Beginning,' was but abstract, 'determination-less.' The Notification, which to the Voice is as '*There-being*' or Thereness (the presence of a definite somewhat) to consciousness, is the sublated and negated voice, the *immediately*, or directly, and at first hand, sublated and negated voice, just as an object, or the series of objects, is the immediately sublated and negated *Being*—*First Being* of *Thought or Consciousness* (say). It is worth while remarking that the sublated voice is

quite as much the *lifted-up* voice as the negated one, and just so we may see that the sublated Being, if negated as to its universality (an *other* being introduced) and apparently for the moment left out of count, is *lifted up*, made prominent, eminent, or even, as it were, *tilted up* into the edge of a single, passing, momentary *note*, or *finite object*. In this *There-ness*, this other of a Note, or Object, the Voice, Being, 'is still retained;' but still all for the moment seems to have gone into the single edge of this note or object; there seems nothing but it: the Voice and the Note, Being and There-being, are in simple unity, certainly; but still in the first instance the Note or the There-ness is *a usurping one side that seems quite all and other to its own universal*. The two sides, then, though *in themselves one*, 'are mutually unequal;' they are *ungleich*, not level, uneven;—as we said, there is *a tilted-up edge*; or all this — and the whole truth of the case — can be conveyed in the single expression *their unity is not yet Mutuated*.

We have used for Gesetztseyn *Mutuatitiousness*; but this is the first time we have used *mutuated* for gesetzt. This is the place, now, however, for the introduction of such new mode of statement. By *mutuated*, I mean *overtly placed by and for an occult*. This sense has been growing on us; and in this we are not singular; for we hold it evident that it so grew on Hegel himself. There is something of this in our own word *set*, and accordingly it has been frequently used for setzen in the present translation and commentary. To *set* in the sense of to *stake*, or to *set to music*, indicates *substitution*, *mutuation*; and a setter-dog *sets* the game. Then a *set* is a certain *more* of which one *sets* the other, and *without* the other were null. The German

setz, however, has in it, like the Latin *vice*, much more of this reciprocation and exchange than the English *set*.—Thus, es setzt means there *arises*; es wird Etwas setzen implies a warning that something (disagreeable) will replace the present state of matters, or *this* that now is, *sets that* that also is, though in the future; and Setz-schiffer means a substitute captain, a *locum tenens*, one, i. e., that is for and by another, and in turn sets or implies this other. *Implies* seems a good rendering for the word in question, but what is implied is, derivatively and otherwise, rather set *in* than set *out*, and it is an explicit implicitness that is wanted, as it were, an eximpliedness or eximplicatedness. In fact, the sense of *overt statement* must be as evident in the word adopted as that of implication. It is easy to see, indeed, that statement, as also expression, exposition, and the like, really conveys what we attribute to this Setzen: it and these are, so to speak, all *overts* by and for *occults*. The same thing is to be seen in the Logical form, the *Modus Ponens*, which probably at least *helped* to lead Hegel to the term; there we see that the First *sets* the Second, and it is the second which is left *overt*. We may allude, in passing, to the use of Aufhebend in the *Modus Tollens*; and the quotation from Cicero, *tollendum esse Octavium*, in the remark relative to Aufheben, demonstrates the analogy to have been present to Hegel himself. By *mutuated*, then, is meant something overt, something *expliciter*, something formally stated, expressed, put, placed, or set, but still something that is *reciprocally* stated, &c., and so something consequently that reciprocally *states*, &c.

The two sides, Voice and Note, Being and Therebeing or Object, are still mutually unequal, uneven, or

their unity is not yet *mutuated*. We can see now the full force of the mutuated; each side remaining abstract, or separate, there is difference, duality, mutual inequality; but when it is seen that the voice still *is* in the note, Being still *is* in There-being, then reconciliation has taken place, the concrete truth is restored, the unity of the two sides is *mutuated*, is *set*. What follows about Finitude, Determinateness as such, relative and absolute Determinateness, is now easy. 'In Being-for-self, the Difference between Being and Determinateness or Negation is posited and equated'—this also is plain; the dif-ference between the two sides, Voice and Note, is mutuated and ausgeglichen, *levelled-out*, equated.

'Quality, Otherwiseness, Reality, Being-in-itself, Ought-to, &c., are the imperfect *infigurations* of the Negative into Being, &c.' The series of Notes is a series of infigurations, indentations, into the voice, and they are imperfect so long as they are held to be different from the voice. Einbildung, however, must be seen to imply its usual sense of *subjective conceit* and *conceiting*, as well as its literal meaning of *infiguration*: the assignments in question have that in them which approximates them to subjective fancies; they are not regarded in their truth when regarded as absolute. The application of our illustration to what follows may now be left to the reader. We may remark in passing on ungleich, ausgeglichen, and Einbildungen as examples of that favourite Hegelian irony in which the direct, literal, structural sense flirts or coquets with the reflex, figurative, and conventional one. Indeed, Setzen, Daseyn, Differenz, and even Vollendet, are in the same key: as regards Setzen, Hegel has gone back to its ancient idiomatic, collo-

quial sense; Daseyn is to be seen both as *There*-ness and as *this Being here below*; the Differenz is the difference, as the Unter-schied is the inter-cern; and we are even to see that Vollendet applies to what is not only *ended*, but *full*. As we have seen, too, this verbal care of Hegel extends itself into a syllabic one: in Vergleichung, for example, we are perpetually made to see that it is a com*par*ison. Then the terminations *haft*, *ig*, *lich*, *sam*, are never lost sight of; and, as regards the verbs, such prefixes as *er*, *ver*, *zer*, are his very instruments. As respects these, the student of Hegel ought to consult the more advanced grammars.

A.

BEING-FOR-SELF AS SUCH.

Here the notion Being-for-self is completely precised.—The distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness, which is wholly German, ought to be well borne in mind. The expression *appearant* is a translation of erscheinend which seems forced on us: we are to see that a certain duality is always implied in this word; there is an outer *show* or *shine* or *seeming* or *appearance* which appears *other* and independent, but which is still only a moment, only idëell in another and inner. Self-consciousness, though further advanced and more concrete than Being-for-self, is still abstract when compared with the Absolute Spirit.

a. *Here-being* (*There-being*), *and Being-for-self.*—b. *Being-for-One.*

The distinctions here are subtle, but they are simple, and they are intelligibly put. In Being-for-self the real and the ideal sides, or the Finite and the Infinite;

that is to say, the Notes and the Voice, Daseyn and Seyn, have fallen equal, have fallen identical. So far as there is Notification, there is Voice; and so far as there is Voice, there is Notification; or so far as there is definite Being, there is infinite Being, &c. There is present but a single ideality, which, at the same time, is rather a single Many than a single One. We have before us, so to speak, a sentient material breadth; so far as there is sentiency there is matter, and so far as there is matter there is sentiency; the diffusion and the concentration, the extension and the intension, are coincident; but there is not properly a One on either side—there is only a Being-for-One. We have, in fact, only a simple solution, in which *solvent* and *solvend* are co-extensive: but such solution cannot be viewed as yet quite One; it is rather a self-identical breadth than a self-identical One.

From this there will now be little difficulty in reading (b.) the Being-for-One.—'There is only *a* Being-for-Other;' the notification reflected into the voice is but a single system, a single Being-for-other, and so a Being-for-one. The notification is the sublated other: the voice is at once sublatedness of this other, and referent of itself to itself as to this sublated other: the voice, then, like the sublated notification, is also only *for-One*. The conclusion, 'God is, therefore, *for himself*, so far as he is himself that that is *for him*,' is not only of vast importance, but of simple intelligibleness.

Remark.

What is said about the expression peculiar to the Germans when inquiring into the *what sort* or the quality of any man or thing, What for a man is he?—What for a thing is it?—sheds a quite decisive light

on the distinction in question, the Being-for-One. The applicability of the phrase reflexion-into-self here comes out very clear. The general sense of this passage enables us to see that Hegel's für is *for*, and not *as*; Seyn-für-Anderes, therefore, is Being-for-another, not *as* another. Nevertheless, what is *for* another is *as* that other; what is *for* consciousness is *as* consciousness, is in the form of consciousness, is consciousness;—there is a small dialectic here that would have pleased Hegel. The substitution of *as* instead of *for* in the relative expressions of the paragraph that follows will contribute towards the general light.

This light is Idealism, and there is that in the second paragraph here—as also in the first—to render it irresistibly intelligible if not irresistibly convincing. One here can as little resist believing, as resist seeing, the object eclipsed into the subject, and both constitutive only of a single ideal Being-for-One.

In this Remark there follow further words of the most penetrative lucidity as regards Idealism in general, and the Idealisms of Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte in particular. In these critiques the strokes are few and single, but each is a creation, or each is a destruction. Philosophy is complete or incomplete only as it is complete or incomplete Idealism. This is plain, for the only quest of Philosophy is *principles*, *unities*; and it ought to be plain to us, as it has been very plain to Hegel, that such quest—to be complete—can only terminate in *the* principle, *the* unity,—a result which, as expressing *all* eclipsed into one, is and can be only Idealism. But has any Philosophy hitherto either *seen* this or *done* this? Of any Philosophy yet has *the principle* been anything else than an abstract conception, or just an abstract utterance, in

the face of which the actual still smiled unconjured? By here a stroke and there a stroke, Hegel demonstrates this to be the state of the case both with Spinoza and the Eleatics. Justice is done to the character and to the greater perfection of the scheme of Malebranche, at the same time that this latter is reluctantly undermined and respectfully removed. It is impossible to praise too highly the extraordinarily pregnant, lucid, and comprehensive summary here, or the equally extraordinary dexterity with which, a support or two being undone, the whole structure is made to crumble and vanish before our eyes. It is as if art wonderfully lit up a sudden universe,—as wonderfully, as suddenly, to withdraw it again.

The critique of Leibnitz is equally masterly. The incongruities, the gaping edges, the incoherences, the general gratuitousness of the entire scheme, are all touched into such intensity of light that the whole vanishes. Such episodes as these assist us greatly as regards an understanding, as well of the painful abstractions of the text, as of the aims and objects of Hegel in general. By this Idealism 'lying more within the limit of the abstract notion,' is probably meant that it is more an affair of abstract notions, and just of subjective imagination in general, than the Idealism of Malebranche, which followed nearer the stream of the actual. 'Should one remind us that this movement of thought falls itself within an ideating monad, &c.:'—the ideating monad alluded to is, of course, Leibnitz himself—Leibnitz, too, conceiving other monads the same as himself.

The remark ends with a single but effective word as regards the Thing-in-itself of Kant, and the Anstoss of Fichte, the appulse, the unimaginable stone of offence, the reflecting plane from which the Ego's own energy

returns to himself as the object. To Kant all that is in the subject is his own, whether in the shape of sensations or in that of categories: Kant, however, postulated still Things-in-themselves as sources of the sensations. Fichte again placed these Things-in-themselves also in the subject under the name of an Anstoss, a source of reflexion, which was *in* the subject and *out* of the subject, and performed *for* the subject all the functions of Things-in-themselves. Manifestly either expedient can only be *said* to be the Ego's; it is not traced to, it is not resolved into, the Ego; it remains a free other or otherwiseness, a negative and independent Ansichseyn; it is assumed *in*, but it stays *out*, and is never sublated by process of proof. To the last, then, there remains Dualism, for which there is no cure but Sollen and the *Progressus in Infinitum*.—Where we translate 'departure is thus made, &c.,' the er of the original may seem to be evaded: the antecedent of this er was to Hegel most probably the Anstoss; but if we go higher for it and assume it to be Anderer Idealismus, we shall get a meaning that includes the expedient of Kant as well.

c. *One.*

The moments collapsing into indistinguishableness, immediacy (Being) results for the Being-for-self—a negative immediacy; Being-for-self is thus Being-for-self-ity, the One.—The transition here is very delicate, and the defining phrase, 'the abstract limit of itself,' infinitely subtle. We saw this phrase before in the case of *the point*, and it will be useful to look back and see that the point differs from the *One* now arrived at. The point, too, is the abstract limit, but *in einem Daseyn*; as point, there is a There-being at its side; here There-being has disappeared.

The reason for the externalisation or distribution of the moments is also extremely fine: they must appear as separate independent units, seeing that they refer to a one so absolute and negative: it is in the form of negative independent immediacy, and so must they be as *its*. We have here the *umbra* of a Thing and its Qualities, *and more than that*. As regards the six moments themselves, they will all be found to lie in the *one*, by reflecting on what its development has brought along with it, and what it now implies. 'Of each determination thus its contrary must be equally said.' This because the six moments will be found to be *so paired*, and each is as independent as the other, at the same time that each is *inseparable* from the other. *Tality* is appropriately used here, as it is a quality dependent on involution with other; and the determination results in every case here from involution with other, which other must also be equally said. Looking back, the phrase, 'There is only one determination present, the *reference to itself of the sublation*,' is an exceedingly happy one: the result can only be *Immediacy*, *Being*; Fürsichseyn is Fürsichseyendes, or Being-for-self is Being-for-self-ity; and again, as this Immediacy is the result of a *Negating*, from such a negated Being-for-self-ity, 'all its inner import has disappeared,'—'it is the absolutely abstract limit of itself—the One.' The reader may still illustrate all this for himself by a reference to the Voice and its Notification. The Voice, as unity of its own self and its notification (which stands for the Seyn-für-Eines, the Being-for-One), is Fürsichseyn, Being-for-self. But there is only one determination present now—the reference to itself of the sublation, indistinguishable one-ness, immediacy, Being, a bëent immediate one-ness that has resulted

from negation; the voice thus is an absolutely abstract one, and, conceived as *Thought* or *all that is*, evidently *the* One. The voice so placed evidently implies negation in general; then two negations, i.e. the negation of itself by the notification which is the first negation, and the negation of this negation back into itself, which is the second. The two things negated, voice and notification, are, thirdly, the same; fourthly, they are directly opposed; fifthly, there is reference to self-identity as such in the voice; and sixthly, it refers negatively to its notification, but still to itself. The voice being thrown down into an absolutely abstract One, these its moments seem thrown off from it, to stand around it externally, independently, but still inseparably.

B.

ONE AND MANY.

The One being *immediate*, its Moments are as *There*-beënt. The One still contains the Negative (which was lately the Being-for-One), and so, though One, it has still determination. In its reference to Self the One is still *Self*-determination, and *without end*, entirely, infinitely. These differences, the determination and the Self-determination, are now, in the immediacy that has come in, beënt. Ideality is transformed into Reality, the hardest and abstractest,—One. But the determinateness of the Beingness is as opposed to the infinite negation of the Self-determination, or what the One is *in itself*, that it is now *in it*. The negative, that is, is distinguished as other. The unity is now a *reference*, and as *Negative* unity it is negation of itself as of another.

We are to conceive the Negative as One and identical

with the One. We are to conceive also, nevertheless, that within the One there is a traffic of the One with its own Negative, so that also within the One a certain Diremption takes place—a certain rise of *an sich* into an ihm, of *in itself* into *in it*—to the distinction of the One from the One. The One is as One, but it is a negative One: this it is *in itself*; this it is also *in it*; that is, this it is distinguishably to its own self; but if it is this distinguishably to its own self, it sets itself as another, 'it is the negation of itself as of another, Exclusion of the One as another out of itself.'

The Determination of an absolute One—the notification of the voice—is evidently its negative. The immediacy introduces the form of Being, and the moments become external to each other. Even shrunk into its abstraction, the One is intensely *bëent*, and its moments are independently *There*-bëent. Ideality is Reality.

The development here is so abstract and subtle, that there is great difficulty in getting the true Vorstellung for the Begriff, the true Conception for the Notion. A plural outer world is not, however, to be too soon disengaged: the One is to be left in simple traffic with the negative as negative. What puzzles the reader, and even an attentive one, is that, the moments being reciprocal, there is a difficulty of perceiving, which Hegel intends the One to be in as excl*uding*, and which as excl*uded*. But the metaphor of the voice is still applicable. Notification and voice are identified in the one unity, the voice—but this is immediacy, Being; notification and voice both *are*; the determinateness of Being stands opposed to the infinite negation; that is, the Notes are opposed to the infinite negation of them—the one voice which is negative in that it absorbs them, and infinite in that it is entire, *totum et rotundum*.

What the voice is *in itself*, it is now *in it*, or the Notes (the Negative) rise in it and show, and so on. It just comes to this, the moments re-assert anew their difference; the determination (the Negative) separates from its recipient negation, and fresh distinctions arise. The poles, real and ideal, or material and formal, which have just collapsed, re-extricate themselves for a further collapse on a higher stage. And this is the case universally with Hegel: detach anywhere the smallest particle of his mass, and it will be found magnetic like the mass itself; it will throw itself in poles, one of reality and one of ideality, but neither of which is less real or more ideal than the other; so that the whole is an absolute ideality that is at the same time an absolute reality. This we see in the very first form, Being, Nothing, and Becoming. At first sight, one thinks of artifice; one says to oneself, Give me what is at once affirmative and negative, identical and non-identical, and I will make anything you like of it; but one calms oneself when one looks to the actual and sees what *is* there—above all, when one reflects that these, after all, are but expressions of the one living notion itself which contracts to an atom and expands to a world. The *an ihm* must be viewed as a certain rise of the *an sich* into visibility; the abstract barren bottom of the vase becomes the pregnant middle. What has been just said, too, must be seen to be only preliminary to what follows under the *minuscules*, a, b, c.

a. *The One in its own self.*

It appears contradictory, after what we have just read, to find the One *unalterable*; and the whole industry may seem a mere trifling, a mere playing with

words. But what we have just read (immediately under B) is only preliminary, and if we but look close, we shall really find this one sentence that ends in *unalterable* to be genuine Metaphysic: the Absolute, God, is really so determined when Thought contemplates him as the One *in its own self*, i.e. in its irrespective Absoluteness. This may be a hint to the reader that it depends on himself all through, whether the words of Hegel shall remain abstract and words only, or shall become concrete and alive—Things. The Notion, followed only in its naked nerve, is thin to invisibility; and the words that cannot seize it, or rather that do not seize it, for the reader, break asunder into an externality, as idle and contemptible, as trodden nutshells: with him it rests, however, to look till these broken nutshells cohere into a transparent, plastic menstruum which, not shows, but *is* the Notion: with him it rests to expand the same into Vorstellungen which are the universe; for all here is *sub specie æterni*.

This section (a) is very important in several respects. In the first place, the development is sufficiently simple, and requires not the assistance of repetition in another form, but only the touch of a word here and there. The conclusion drawn of the unchangeableness of the One, contains yet another lesson for us; it may teach us to remain true to our thoughts, and not to interrupt them by the contradictions of a divided reference, the end of which is but foolish wonder, perplexity, doubt, ignorance.

An ihm selbst ist das Eins überhaupt—there is here in the very position of the words the usual Hegelian occult fulness of thought; to translate it, 'In its self' *means* any 'one' *on the whole*, will show this. Per-

ception of this must have been in Hegel's head, otherwise it would have been natural to begin, The one in its own self is the one on the whole, &c.

The Seyn, Being, that is referred to as indeterminate, but not in the same way as the One, is, of course, that we began with.

We have here three very instructive specimens of that troublesome word Setzen, which even *mutuation* does not yet seem to have laid: these are *gesetztes* Insichseyn, *set* (settled) Being-within-self; diess *Nichts* ist ein *Gesetztes*, this Nothing is a *set issue*; and So diess Nichts gesetzt als *in Einem*, this Nothing so-determined and as in *a*. The French *constater* would very perfectly render Setzen in all these expressions, and the French *constater* means to ascertain, to determine, to settle, to establish, to fix, &c. Of these English words, the word determine is the best in the sense of to *make out* and establish, a sense somewhat different from that contained in it when used to translate bestimmen, in which case it means to specificate, notify, characterise, &c. In the first of the three examples, we have the absolute before us, One, but full; its circle of determination complete within it, absolutes Bestimmtseyn, Absolute Determined-Ness—what is this but consummate Insichseyn, Insichseyn, Being-within-Self, just *as such*? In this sense it is gesetztes, a certain somewhat just definitely established and determined as that certain somewhat. The Being-within-self, here, therefore, is just *the* Being-within-self, itself—*Arthur*, 'not Lancelot nor another.' Thus it is gesetztes Insichseyn, *set* (settled) Being-within-self, Being-within-self in actual *position*, formally *posited*, Being-within-self, *as such*, Being-within-self *explicit*. In the second instance, it results from the simple

incomposite immediacy of the One that there is *Nothing* in it, and this nothing is called ein Gesetztes, a set issue. Now the meaning is that, a concrete having gone away before us into an abstract (the concrete Being-within-self into the abstract oneness Nothing), it is for this reason that Nothing here is a Gesetztes; it is put as an *Explicit* here for another; the concrete has *set* or *settled* into this abstract; it is a set issue, a settled (together) *Explicit*, a settled consequent or resultant, a consequent or resultant settled-ity: *the water in a wink is ice*, Being-within-self in a wink is Nothing;—this Nothing is a Gesetztes—it results from, it replaces another, it is an *Explicit*. It may also be named a *Determined* or a *Determinate*, *this* having determined into *that*. From all this, it is evident that the common meaning of the words will not suffice us here, unless we can contrive to immerse them ever and anon in the secret light of Hegel's own thinking. Ein Gesetztes, then, is the exponent consequent or the resultant Explicit of a transition, almost as if it were an *ex-occultate*. The third gesetzt just means *constituted*: so constituted a Nothing in *a* or *in a one* is just the void. The reader will observe, however, that the very same process is pictured in this *constituted* as in the other words. The word mutuate, too, the process of transition or mediation it involves being considered, will convey the meaning of every one of the three expressions: in the first, we have *mutuated Being-within-self*, in the sense of something formally mutuated, formally expressed or stated after-process—in a word, it is Being-within-self *express* (and the direct or derivative sense must here be seen to coquet with the ordinary one); in the second, the Nothing is very evidently a mutuate, an overt representative of another after-process—here, too, in a word,

an *expression* (in the double sense—and of another); and in the third, 'this nothing so *mutuated* or *expressed*,' conveys the same meaning on the same terms. Again the meaning of setzen has grown on us.

It will scarcely be necessary to make any remark on the exquisite felicity of the extrication of the void or vacuum. Only the inexperienced reader, always struggling painfully against the feeling of being just *lost*, may once again in his bewilderment cry out, But what is this—what does it all mean? One thing it does *not* mean, and that is creation—what is commonly meant by creation. Creation, in this sense, does not exist to a Hegel. It is not to be supposed, then, that Hegel has the slightest desire here to *make* the vacuum —to *create* empty space. This is Logic; we have to do here only with thoughts; there is no question here of a single dust-atom, nor even of the space it might occupy. But we have here, nevertheless, the genetic *thought* of a Void. There is evidently progress in this world; *but progress is a thought, and cannot exist in outward matter.* This alone is a guarantee of the ideal *fundamen*, of the intellectual, of the spiritual nature of the Absolute of the world. Let us assume it so, then. Thought is the Absolute, or—to use the common parlance—the nature of things (*natura rerum*) is Thought. But Thought being this, and the life of Thought being progress, a Beginning is postulated. But this Beginning is just—Thought *is*;—that is, the beginning is Being, Seyn. Thought now starting thus with itself and with this as beginning evolves out of its own necessity by virtue—and that is necessity—of its own triple flexions (which flexions on a certain considerably advanced stage of the evolution name themselves Simple Apprehension (Understanding), Judgment, and Reason) the whole

articulation of its own innate constitution. Now through Hegel we have got so far on with this series of articulation or articulate series; so far that we have reached the *Thought* of the vacuum—the development of an actual There-beënt vacuum is another affair, and has yet to be waited for. Let the reader, then, see that as yet we have to do only with Thoughts, and as they evolve themselves out of each other by their own necessity (which means, in obedience to the native flexions of the *concrete Notion*);—but let him see as well that these thoughts are the thoughts of *Things*, and that they constitute what is essential in Things, that without which Things were not, or that without which it would be impossible to say *what* these Things were. This ought to assist the reader to *orient* himself.

b. *The One and the Void.*

'The One is the Void as the abstract reference of the Negation to itself:' here the reader ought to see that this 'Negation' is Thought itself. Thought is the One, but the reference of a One to itself can only be abstract; that is, this reference is the reference of a Negation to itself;—Thought in self-reference as only One has, so to speak, the sentiment of Negation, though sentiment as sentiment belongs to another sphere. The mechanism by which the dif-ference is *express*, *explicit*, patent, or simply understood and accepted, is very fine, and gesetzt is again illustrated. 'Has again reached a state of There-being;' the original is simply 'has reached a There-being,' and Hegel would probably not have liked the addition 'state of;' but, perhaps, it will assist realisation of the position, and not, on the whole, injure the development; for 'to reach a There-being' is

veritably to reach a palpable Here-ness or There-ness, a definitely relative, actual, existential *state*, though most of these words present themselves only later in the development. 'The One and the Empty (Void, Vacuum) have as their common simple basis, the negative reference to self;' this is exquisitely simple, but it is a *flash* that lights up at once—what was impossible to Sir William Hamilton, who could never contrive to crawl out of the hole of this abyss—the very *infinitude* of Space. Here-being and There-being are of course both for Daseyn, and though neither can absolutely represent that word, the opposition of the two phrases may picturesquely assist here. Daseyn is always a definite—a palpable Being-ness in relation to other. The advantage of Daseyn is, that Hegel gets out his usual irony in it—a sense that coquets between its ordinary meaning of this Being here below, this sublunary life, this mortal state, and its literal meaning of just being-there. Here-being were to be prefered in English, perhaps, because it seems best to preserve the *equivoque*.

Remark.

The Atomistic.

We shall in the first place supplement this Remark by translating the form in which it appears in the third edition of the 'Encyclopaedia.' There it runs thus:—

The Atomistic Philosophy is that in which the Absolute is determined as Being-for-self, as One, and as plurality of Ones. The Repulsion which manifests itself in the Notion of the One, has been also assumed by it as the primary and original Force; not Attraction, however, but—what is just *the* Thought-less—*Chance*, it is, which is to bring the resultant plurality together again. The One being fixed as

One, its combination with any others is certainly to be regarded as something quite external. The Vacuum, which is assumed as *other* principle to the atoms, is Repulsion itself conceived as the *beënt* nothing between the atoms. The modern Atomistic—and Physical Science still retains this principle—has given up atoms in so far as it takes to diminutive particles, molecules; in this way it certainly assists sensuous conception, but has wholly abandoned the determination of Thought. Further, a Force of Attraction being added to that of Repulsion, the antithesis has been certainly made com*plete*, and we have given ourselves much credit for the discovery of these so-called forces of nature. But their mutual connection—the concrete and true interest here—requires to be rescued from the obscurity and confusion, in which it has been still left even in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of a Science of Nature. In recent times, the atomistic view has become in Politics still more important than in Physics. According to it, the Will of the Individuals as such is the Principle of the State, the source of Attraction (Association) is the Particularity of our Needs and Greeds, and the Universal, the State itself, is the external relation of Contract.

These episodes, which the *Remarks* constitute, are always both agreeable and auxiliary. Here, for example, this searching critique of atomism reflects a light both of meaning and importance back on the few abstract words which we have just read in the preceding paragraph. Such original incisiveness of eye extends of itself a warrant of truth to the Hegelian products, however trifling they may sometimes seem when *externally* looked at. There is matter in the Remark as extracted from the *Encyclopaedia* of later development than the position on which we as yet stand in the *Logic*; and the reader will do well to return to it when he shall have completed *Quality*. The greater fulness of the *Political* allusion is the reason which has placed it here. Hegel is always content to

say the least possible, and here he says no word but simply places the Political Confession (Profession) of the day side by side with Atomism. This side by side is quite sufficient to justify the general attitude of the present Germans, whose slowness of Political movement depends on quite other reasons than that cumbrousness and unwieldiness which our own scribblers—not at all blind in their smirking shallowness, but simply lofty in their *constitutional* superiority — compassionately ascribe to them. What Hegel's mere *indication* suggests is concrete wisdom, not the idle abstractions of that empty conceit that knows better than its neighbour and than all its neighbours. We may remark in passing that there is here another utterance of Hegel, not without application to Political Economy, though specially directed to Politics in general. The passage contains no point of difficulty, unless that bearing on the Ground of Motion. This Ground is placed in the *Negative* reference of the One to its *Negative*. Now we have already said that the voice, as absorbing the notification, could be named the negation of the latter, as also that this same latter constituted, as determination, the negative of the former. Where we are in the development, then, the voice is One, and its determination, its notification, is *its*; but in this abstract oneness—(we do not stop for the particular development)—the One refers *negatively* to its own *negative* (which is at bottom itself, though now presentant as *there*). *But negative reference to another is Repulsion, and Repulsion of another is Motion.*

c. *More or Many Ones.*

REPULSION.

The first paragraph accomplishes at full, what we

have sketched in one or two of the preceding sentences,—the extrication of the determination, the negative of the One from the One as an Other;—and this amounts to *More* Ones.

We may remark that this extrication is pretty much the secret of Hegel. There is an original Duality which is also not Two, but One; this is the Original Antithesis, the Original Reciprocity, the Absolute, the Notion, the single Necessity, or rather this is the Protoplast of Necessity itself: the One *and* its Determination are Two; but the One is the Determination, and the Determination is the One. What is then, is God, the Absolute Spirit, who *in himself* is Thought. But Thought is just the Notion, the Reciprocal Unity, the Necessity which we have just seen: it distinguishes itself from itself; it *is*, and its determination also *is*; but *it* is the infinite negation that absorbs its determination, and its determination is the negative, the finite negative of *it*; it then is the negation of the negation, that in which each side is the negative of the other: in one word, this is the pure negativity. The One *sets* itself: this is the whole secret. Or we may say, it sets or settles into itself. We may conceive Thought as a successive *congealment* into another. Water congeals into ice. The ice is seen—and may be supposed to be *explicit*, *expressed* up out of the now occult other, the water. The water seems to have gone together into the ice, or to have *set* or *settled* into the ice. This *settled*, viewed in its double meaning, the one from without and the other from within, is pretty much Hegel's gesetzt, which bears literally the force of set or settled together into, and, applied to Thought, that of determined, established, decided, &c. It is this life of the One, then, an Explication, Exposition, or even

an extrusion and ejection, which has led Hegel to the use of this peculiar word Setzen. All is a Gesetztseyn, a mutuation or promutuation of the infinite One that ever is. There is but the Voice and its Notification. The Voice is the Absolute Seyn; and the Notification is its infinite Werden. The Universe is but the glory of God; Existence, but the sport, the play of himself with himself. In an extract from Kant, we saw Creation, Schöpfung, alluded to in its original sense of scooping or drawing up. This may have proved suggestive to Hegel, who views creation as but this sublation of God up out of himself, this voluntary involuntary scooping or drawing-up of God himself out of himself. To say, then, that creation, or that existence, is but Gesetztseyn, *settlement*, has its own picturesque truth of meaning, whether we view the process as taking place in the physical or in the intellectual world. The process of the Logic, then, is to be conceived as the process of God; and Hegel meant no metaphor, but literal truth, when he named this process 'the demonstration of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of Nature and a single finite Spirit.' Now of this whole process, the one secret is the secerning of the One's determination out of the One—in the end, indeed, to restore it again, leaving but the Absolute Spirit and his eternal and infinite life. The Negation turns on its Negative; that is, *settles* into its Seyn, its Being, which is at first necessarily indefinite—Hence, the whole!

As regards the expression, 'as they stand in *a*, or in *one* reference, their difference is *gesetzt*,' the meaning may be, as the *Two* are in *One*, their difference is *express* (expressed); the sense being an equivoque of physical or direct Expression, and of intellectual or

reflected Expression. The difference is settled, inferred, understood, taken for granted, accepted, &c. A. and B. are married people, but they have separated: when it is said the cause of this separation is not A., then B. may be said to have *settled* or to be *settled*, or to be *ex-pressed* as the cause. An effect may be viewed as the ex-pression of its cause. Ice is an *expression* of water. In manipulating mathematical formulæ, we get new *expressions*. Whether physically or metaphysically, then, the *overt mutuate* of another after-process is the expression of this other which is now occult—occult in the Ex-pression. What A. implies is *express* or *explicit* when overtly set, settled, or determined as B.: A., then, *ex-presses* or determines B., and *vice versâ*. The process always is a settling, setting, or congealment of A. to the *Ex-pression* of B.—this whether in Nature or in Thought; it is a reciprocal occultation into Appearance, a reciprocal sun-setting into a reciprocal sun-rise.

The reference of the negation to the negation as of another to its other, this may be put, the reference of the One *in* its negation *to* its negation as, &c.—'The Being-for-self of the One is essentially the Ideality of the There-being and of the Other;' the Voice is essentially the Ideality of the Notification, which in the development is now *ex-pressed* as There-being and another; 'it refers itself not as to another, but only to itself;' the general reference of the voice, though its notification is now distinguished and ex-pressed as so-and-so, is still—and even in that regard—to itself. Still the Voice is fixed as One, as One that is *per se*, a direct existence; consequently, its *negative* reference—as to its notification—is as to a Beënt, and, the negativity of the reference considered, to a There-beënt

and another. But this other, the notification, is still *essentially* reference of the One, the Voice, to its own self: it is not then indeterminate negation, not the mere Void; it is itself One—a plurality of Ones.

The next paragraph is easy. It (this last step) is not quite a Becoming; a relative Becoming, proceeding, that is, from *Being*, ought to come to *Nothing*, but here it is just One coming to Ones. The One that is referred, the notification, has the negative in its reference to the Voice, and *vice versâ*. What we have, then, is just only the One's own inherent reference—the inherent reference of the Voice itself. But this inner reference implies duality; that is, the One, the Voice, repels itself, in the shape of the notification, from itself, in the shape of the Voice, or—the One's own negative Self-reference is Repulsion. (Evidently Self-reference must always be of this nature where there is a One possessing a Determination, an articulate circle of manifestations.)

'This repulsion thus as *position*:' *position* is, of course, here for Setzen, and may be varied by *Settlement*, *Ex-pression*, *Ex-position*, *Explicit-ment*, or any other similar expedient that may be calculated to convey a notion which now ought, at least, to be tolerably familiar. This repulsion is evidently that belonging to, or inherent in, the Notion itself; it occurs within the Notion, it is *an sich* or ansichseyend, *in itself*, or *in-itself-beïnt*. The difference of the repulsion of outer reflexion is plain; this latter presents itself as an already existent mutual holding-off of Ones just so found. 'Schon *vorhanden*,'—there is a great temptation to translate this, *already to the fore*; this Scotch phrase accurately conveys the *equivoque* of the *Vor*, which is *before* both in Space and Time—not that

there is any question as yet of actual Space and Time.

The becoming of the plurality cannot be called as yet so much a being produced as a being *set*, or as a becoming *set*, where of course *set* is the usual *expressed*, *explicit*, &c. The fulcrum here is still the independence or absoluteness of the One and of each One: it is only *its own self* it repels, and this is *vice versâ*. Each is an equal Beënt in independent reciprocity.

They are thus mutually 'prae-set,' as it were *expressed* or *ex-plicit*, or *so settled—prae*, i.e. settled so beforehand, — and that amounts to *pre-(sup)-posed*: *set*, *(sup)-posed*, *ex-pressed* by the inherent repulsion of the One in its own self; *prae* (or *pre*), that is, that this was an affair of beforehand, or already there, and so an arrangement 'set as *not* set,' which phrase for curt incisive vigour cannot be surpassed. Their origin through *ex-pression* is sublated; they are equally beënt, equally self-referent, or just equally self-referent Beënts.

In such entire isolation, they are not other to other, not *for* one another. Any reference between them is but the void—determined too not as limit, but simply as Non-being.—*Virtually* the thing is different, but this is the way in which it is now *set*. It is competent to some one to object here, 'Ay, just so; it is always a mere juggle, never absolute truth; to accomplish what you want, you hide something and show something; and then, again, when you change your mind and want to go on to something else, you show what you have hidden, and hide what you have shown.' The objection has its own plausibility, but it must fall to the ground, if the whole advance of civilisation, the whole progress of society, the whole life of Thought

itself can be shown to depend on, and consist of, nothing but this onwards and onwards of *Settlement* after *Settlement*, *Expression* after *Expression*, *Determination* after *Determination*, *Position* after *Position*; in which each new Apparent not only replaces but implies its predecessor and all its predecessors. There is but a single life in the universe, and that from bubble on the beach to the sun in the centre, or from this dead sun itself to the Spirit that lives, is a perpetual *Setting*. (It is curious that this word, directly to us *a going down*, should be now, indirectly to us, through Hegel, *a rising up*: this is but again the infinite Exchange, an Ebb and Flow that has still an onward, the Systole-Diastole of the Living One.)

The repulsion of the One from itself (the repulsion on the part of the Voice of its own Notification from itself), is the Explication (the *Ex*-pression) of that which—*in itself*—the One (the Voice) is. But Infinitude (the One absolute infinite Voice), as explicated or laid asunder (auseinander), is here *come out of itself Infinitude* (the endless units of the endless Notification of the endless or Absolute Voice); but it is come out of itself through the immediacy of the Infinite, of the One—(the Voice becoming immediate to itself just as a One has withdrawn itself to itself from its Notification, which is just thrown off from it as an endlessly Different and External). This Infinitude (the original is simply *Sie*, and may refer to Repulsion, but we prefer to refer to *the come-out-of-itself* Infinitude; the Repulsion, indeed, would involve the same reference) is quite as much a simple reference of the One to One (the endless Notification is still the One Voice), as rather the absolute referencelessness of the One (this the independence of the endless Notification as in the

Negative reference, i.e. as distinguished from the Voice); the former as according to the simple affirmative reference of the One to itself (even in its Notification), the latter as according to the same reference as negative (Voice and Notification being distinguished and separated). Or the plurality of the Ones is the own proper *Setting* (*Ex*-pression) of the One (this in its repulsion, as negative reference to its own determination, which as regards our 'Voice' is the Notification); the One is Nothing but the Negative reference of the One to itself (this both as regards the Universal, the Voice, and the Particular, the Notification—this single phrase, indeed, is a statement adequate to the whole case, and takes in both aspects), and this reference, therefore, the One itself, is the many ones (this is plain from the last parenthetic comment—the Voice is the Notification, the Notification the Voice, or the negative self-reference of the voice implies what it negates, &c.) But just thus the plurality is directly external to the One (the units of the Notification are external to the Voice); for the One is just the sublation of the Otherwiseness (the One Voice brings its endless brood of Notification under its own *identity*), the repulsion (i.e. of its determination, the Notification) is its reference to self (is the Voice) and (so) simple equality with itself. The Plurality of the Ones (the endless units of the Notification) is infinitude as unconcernedly self-producing Contradiction (i.e. of the *One* Voice, and of the endless *Many* of the Notification, which, viewed here *sub specie aterni*, or as the Absolute, can only be named a Contradiction which infinitely and unconcernedly reproduces itself: this paragraph is as a mirror of the absolute and actual which may be looked into—infinitely).

Remark.

The Leibnitzian Monad.

Leibnitz, in his Monad, seemed to have reached the conception of an ideating Absolute; but he immediately fell into gross inconsistencies and gratuitous incumbrances. For instance, after assuming such Absolute, he unnecessarily assumed a plurality of such. This plurality involves the repulsion which we have just considered; but Leibnitz, without thought of this repulsion, conceived it only as an external, abstract, indifferent plurality. In it the Ones were without relation, and it itself, wholly undeduced, was just assumed as *there* and *given*. The Monad has indeed an inner plurality, but this affects not its character as indifferent One, for which any others are as good as non-existent. There is no thought in Leibnitz of deriving an outer Many from an inner repulsion. The Atomistic again possesses not any thought of Ideality at all. Its atom is but dry individuality, wholly outer, without a Within, which might unite the genetic Twain of Form and Matter. Its plurality, indeed, is supposed to possess mutual connexion; but this connexion is not wrought out consistently and satisfactorily. The plurality of Leibnitz is so just by primordial decree, so that any mutual connexion in it falls into the monad of monads, or just—into the reflecting philosopher.

The last touch is quite Hegelianly caustic, and the whole critique smacks of the usual iron, austere exhaustiveness.

C.

REPULSION AND ATTRACTION.

a. *Exclusion of the One.*

We spoke of the 'genetic Twain of Form and Matter,' —nevertheless *prematurely* be it understood, for the

Twain have yet a considerable road to travel before they assume these names. Still, it is true that the One before us (the Voice) stands for Form, as the Many (the Notification) stand for Matter. We note this as well to indicate this prematureness, as to warn the reader not to understand by Matter, as is usually done, mere earth, mere inorganic stuffing. The Notification stands in no such relation to the Voice; indeed, there is a mode of looking to which the Notification would appear the form of the Voice, its native form and circle of forms: still the Voice has no other *matter* than that *form*; that form is what it *contains* or *holds in it*; but it does not simply contain it, or hold it in it—it is identified with it; if it is matter, it is matter absorbed and assimilated, matter organised and incorporated into the Voice; it is the Voice itself, but so viewed as contained or held in; it is its *intent*, its *Inhalt*;—and this is the proper name for Matter when, as above, opposed to Form. All this, as has been said, is premature, however.

The first paragraph transforms active repulsion into neutral Exclusion. The One (the Voice) self-referent, the *for-One* (the Notification) self-referent,—both are simply mutually exclusive. This is the manifest contradiction, that the infinite One (the infinite voice relatively to its Notification—the latter also, indeed, relatively to the former) is set or expressed in an immediacy of Being. From this immediacy the repulsion ceases to find itself repulsion; it just finds what it repels *there before it*. This is Exclusion.

The plurality, though determined as mere plurality and not relatively others, have still in the repulsion their common connexion. The amber at once disjoins and conjoins the flies.

The repulsion, then, is the means of establishing them in a Daseyn, in a definite relative There-being or Here-being mutually. This is plain by a reference to the Voice and its Notification, but in the form to which both are now reduced—infinitude in immediacy, an infinitude of Ones. Their repulsion is their *common reference*; for each is what the other is; or this mutual repulsion is the ex-pressed Daseyn, relative finite existence, of the many Ones, for their mutual There-being amounts to that—it is a *Here*-being that is also *There*. 'They negate themselves (each other mutually),' &c.: this duplicity of translation is necessary in order to convey fully Sie negiren *sich* gegenseitig. 'They set each other as such that they are only for-One,'—each takes the other to be no absolute but a relative that has its affair in a One; they, then, in a body are the Being-for-One of the Being-for-Self. 'But they *negate* just as much at the same time this, *that they are only for One*;* they *repel* this their *Ideality* and *are*.' All now is Infinitude out of itself, Voice and Notification an infinitude of Notes mutually There-beënt—an infinitude of There-beënt voices, then—each would be for itself—would negate its only Being-for-One, would repel its Ideality and simply *be*. The One is Being-for-self and Being-for-One indistinguishably—a thoroughly independent voice. But each Note is Beënt in the many Notes; the Being-for-One, then, as it is determined in the Exclusion, is therefore a Being-for-Other. That is, the single Note, after all, is not independent, but relative; its Being is not, as it was seen at first in the Being-for-Self, a simple Being-for-One, but in very truth a Being-for-Other. This is really what the Exclusion brings us to in the development. But observe the full force of such words as Explication and Exclusion: they

must be taken at once in reflected sense as they are, and in direct sense as a *folding out* and a *closing*, which *closing* is at the same time a *closing out*. The contradiction which the word involves in itself—a *closing*, a movement inwards, which is a closing *out*, a movement outwards and so of the others—is put to full account. The Voice counter the Notification, a Many which it *is*, but which it also *sublates*, is 'Wider-spruch, *contradiction* unconcernedly producing itself:' we see here the same verbal equivoque. But to return—each Note then is relative, is not for itself, but for One, and that another one. We can carry the image to the mutual relations of finite spirits, Men ;—in fact, what is here is the One Spirit, and the Many Spirits which are, or which, indeed, *is* What is.

The double side in the repulsion or mutual negation, at once of self-preservation and of dissolution, is plainly brought out.

The next paragraph has the same theme. The dialectic seems too trenchant ; but its effect is mitigated by the explanation of the next again paragraph that it was *our* com*par*ison.

The many Notes *are*, this their mutual reference presupposes; and they are so far as they at once negate and negate the negating. The double edge all through is subtle but not difficult to an attention that will apply itself. The double edge is this: in that each is negated, it is implied as ideal ; but in that it negates it is real : now both characters come to each here ;—no Note of the Many but negates, no Note of the Many but is negated.

The paragraph that effects the transition into Attraction is sufficiently intelligible.

Remark.

The Unity of the One and the Many.

This is in every way a deep and admirable Remark. The Nature of Self-will, of the Bad, is most luminously indicated; and the most important lesson is thus read us which it is possible to conceive. In our selfishness, we *lose* ourselves, at the very moment that we hug ourselves in the thought that it is but ourselves we *gain*. Even in that we would turn only to our own selves, it is only on our own selves that we have absolutely turned the back. The One is the Many, the Many is the One. Reconciliation, then, is to abandon the One, which is but the Negativity of Self; or rather not to abandon it, but to turn it towards the Many, identifying that which it assumes to be only its negative, as its own genuine and true Self.—What we have here, placed in connexion with that Atomism, Political and other, which has been already mentioned, yields a Moral or a Social Atomism; and such is the historical attitude of humanity at this very instant of time. Each man nowadays seeks but himself: everywhere it is but one universal rivalry of individuality, and that only an external one. Self-interest in the form of one's own individual self-interest, in the form of self-will—that is, of caprice,—has been proclaimed the only wisdom, and has all but received even legal enactment. No wonder, then, that at this moment the whole social fabric should be felt to totter. No article of material existence but is sapped by self-will: we are poisoned when we would be fed; we are in rags when we would be clothed. Our houses smother us, our bridges break into chasms that devour us, even our very roads rise up as monsters to extirpate us—and all this because we

have called to Self-interest to brand his consuming mark into them. Nor is it otherwise with the spiritual side: self-interest, being allowed the right, has seized it too, and made it material. Whatever is spiritual nowadays is, just as whatever is material,—a commodity. But look to the result—a universal revolt of the Will of the Unit against the Will of the One! The best proof of this state of the fact lies in this—that each one sees and censures this condition of things in others, and is absolutely blind to it in himself. The very Mistress, for example, who shall this moment be loud *against* the revolt of domestic servants, shall, the next, be equally loud *for* the revolt of *the sex*. 'The injustice to woman commences at her birth: *the parents regret to find her not a boy*!'—Are we always, then, to abstract the *Difference* and turn against it? Nay, at the very moment that we turn against the *Difference*, as but a Relative, as not the Absolute—at that very moment is it not the longing of our whole soul actually to make absolute this very *Difference*? This we, this atom we call we, is a very good atom and the very best of atoms, make *it* immortal and absolute by all means; but the *Difference*! is our atom but the *Difference*, and is it only against our atom we turn when we turn against the *Difference*? Yes, it is even so; we do but abstract our own *Difference* and turn upon it; and another Menenius were very acceptable now to persuade us again into the identity — but the differentiated identity —of the concrete. The social Atomism which sapped and dissipated Rome, the mightiest empire that time had ever seen, was animal enough; but what we witness now is baser. The coldest, shallowest, meanest, every way the most miserable Atomism of which universal history can speak, is Commercial Atomism,

Politico-Economical Atomism,—the Atomism of Manchester. And in this Atomism, the very arrangement which it demands as best, is *it*, let us say even the superior atom, so very much at its ease? *Rebuked*—however superior it may be—by yet a superior superiority, on 'change, in the street, at church, in its newspaper, it retires from the misery of the day to that solitary evening hour—solitary, but alone the rose of life to it—when, gnawing *at still a difficulty*, and, *not yet enough*, and comparing the ash of the present with the live-coal of the past, it once again admires the vanity of vanities, and bitterly mellows itself towards the oblivion and the Elysium of an eight hours' sleep!

But there is more here than an exposure of Atomism — Immortality itself is here! The pure notion has — in purity — followed its own movement, its own native dialectic: the One is Many, and the Many One; the Differences are in Identity, and Identity is in the Differences. — It is impossible fully to expose to a reader all the burthen of these wonderful paragraphs: each is but a water-drop, that and nothing more; but to him that looks into it, it radiates into—that which is.

'Each is excluding the others,' sounds not quite satisfactorily; still it is literal and intelligible.

b. *The one One of Attraction.*

This section is sufficiently exoteric to require no comment. Towards the end, the German word which is translated Extension is Umfang: now Umfang is opposed to Inhalt, as logical Extension to logical Comprehension; but here, nevertheless, something of its literal meaning, its *fang um*, its grasp about, is also to be seen.

The reader ought not to fail to see here, however, the *divine sense*, how all is *sub specie æterni*; and, indeed, it ought to be matter of wonder to him, how a simple prosecution of the pure notion should be able to lead to such concrete Wisdom—the peace of reconciliation, the establishment of all those great religious truths which, at least lately, have had the character rather of aspirations than of known facts. Clues to the attitude indicated may be attempted to be conveyed thus: In the first paragraph of the preceding Section (a), what is the full force of that 'exhibited Contradiction, Infinitude ex-pressed into Immediacy of Being;' or in the last paragraph, same Section, what is the full force of that 'going-together-with-Self?' The reflexion must be seen to be double: if a consciousness goes together with its own self, it has certainly its own self *inwardly*; but in going together with its own self, it has also gone together with its own self *outwardly*; the contracting inwardly into its own abstract negativity is a proportional dilating outwardly into its own self as the differences, its differences, the Objects, the *seen* outward concrete. Thus doubly is it a going together with its own self; and thus is it the *Dis-played Contra-diction*—Infinitude unfolded into the Immediacy of Being. Here again, under (b), the full force of the one One that is the realised Ideality must not be missed. In a word, he who has an eye to see may know how to discern himself henceforth secure in the Finite Infinite, the Relative Absolute, with God assured to him, Immortality assured to him, Free-will assured to him, —and all this by virtue of the simple Notion.

c. *The Reference of Repulsion and Attraction.*

Beziehung, the German word for Reference, has a

stronger sense than its English counterpart, amounting to a *be-drawing*, as it were a *drawing together*, and almost equivalent to *connexion*. What we have here, then, are Repulsion and Attraction in mutual connexion; and by these words we are to understand, not a merely physical Repulsion and Attraction, but a Metaphysical also, — a repulsion and attraction *sub specie æterni*, in the realm of thought, in the world of Spirits.

The apparent *immediacy* of the Repulsion, to the foundation of the self-dependent Ones, with the apparent — in the first instance — externality of the Attraction, is the first point; and to what all this *in rerum natura* is directed must now be evident. Both, then, appear, in the first instance, as abstract, as *per se*.

Repulsion, thus alone, would be simply the irretrievable dissipation of the Ones. But thus, again, the Ones were not, as they are determined to be, repellent, excludent. The Repulsion still implies Reference; what excludes is still in *liaison* with that which is excluded. But this is Attraction; repulsion itself implies Attraction. Abstract Repulsion, and Beënts only *self*-referent, are thus negated.

Repulsion and Attraction, then, at first view independent, are, in effect, mutually presuppositious, the one of the other.

Each has precisely the same constitution; each is the other; and each is so, not through the other, but through itself.

They are so while merely relative.

The implication of Repulsion and the Ones is again made prominent.

Attraction is similarly gone into; and its implication of Many, even while it would set ideality or the One,

made equally evident. This, in fact, is the true Metaphysic of the necessity of Thought, i. e. of Existence, that there should be *at once* and *both* One and Many: so some of the weightiest of human interests are thus brought to a settlement.

Each negates itself and sets itself as the other, and the other of itself. The Attraction of the There-beënt units is their ideality, the setting of the One. But in the One, Attraction just sublates itself. To set a One is to be the negative of itself, that is, Repulsion.—The thoughts here are sufficiently fine; but they are also sufficiently obvious, and sufficiently *fact*. The words are few and abstract; but if they be gazed into, and in the proper mood of mind, they will expand to the concrete — and that, too, with resolution of the most fundamental problems of existence.

'But not only is the *In itself* as such long since gone over into the Being-for-Self:' we are to consider that the development has advanced, and, moreover, that this development is actuality, and not mere expression of a book.

For this concluding paragraph of Being-for-Self, in which Quality, completed, passes over into its opposite, Quantity, let us avail ourselves again of our metaphor, the Voice; but let us conceive this time that it is a conscious Voice. Well, this Voice is a One that repels from itself its own self (in its Determination, its Notification) as its absolute (i. e. abstract) Otherwiseness (the Many). Its series of Notes is just its absolute otherwiseness; but also its *abstract* otherwiseness, in that it is abstractly looked at, and not, in that reference, identified with itself. But in that it refers itself to this sequent Notification, negatively, or as to its Non-being, it sublates it, it refers itself in it only to

itself. The Voice is thus but a *mediation* of Repulsion and Attraction, of a negative reference to itself as *setting* the Notification, and of an affirmative (yet negative) reference to itself as *sublating* it. The Voice, then, is just this Becoming, in which its form as Immediate, as Beënt, as beginning, as *catching-on* (dass es *anfängt*), as Note in the Notification, and equally its form as result — as the One, Immediate, excludent Voice — have disappeared. The process, then, which the Voice is, assumes the Voice itself always as *sublated*: in the reference outwards, it encounters not itself, but its otherwiseness, its Notification, — there then it is sublated; and in its reference inwards it is again sublated, in that it sublates into itself that really which it is — its Notification. The sublation as *Consciousness* is a relative sublation, a *reference* which is a *different* Repulsion and Attraction at once; or it repels its Note (Object) as *Note*, and attracts its Note (Object) as *its*. But Consciousness becomes Self-consciousness, or the Conscious Voice becomes the Self-conscious Voice;— that is, through negation of the mutual externality, the mutual immediacy and There-beingness, it goes over into the infinite (the unended, the endless) reference of mediation, or re-mediation. Again as result, then, the Self-conscious Voice (Notification included, Notification just *it*) is that Becoming that in the retentionlessness of its moments (its Notes) is a collapse, a precipitation, a going together with itself into simple immediacy—a simple immediacy at once as Absolute and Infinite — or a simple immediacy at once of its own Absoluteness as Voice, and of its own Infiniteness as Notification. But Voice and Notification gone together into this mutual indifference — an indifference both of One and Many — an indifference in which any reference to

Being is sublated, or in which any particular Beingness is just indifferent—have gone together into simple *Quantity*.

Read in a similar mood, as it were, of pictorial reflexion, the two remaining paragraphs, which briefly sum together the moments we have gone through, will yield a similar captivating felicity and marvellous far-reachingness. The qualitativeness of the Voice and its Notes is readily seen to be founded on what is meant by Being or by Immediacy. Again, the qualitative immediacy of any one Note is seen to have Limit, Determinateness, so identified with its very Being, that with its alteration the Note itself disappears: the Notification presents itself thus as Finitude. If one conceive to oneself a wandering light or reflexion, one will be able to realise to oneself, how with the slightest shift, with the alteration, that is, the objects themselves change, and that is—disappear. The qualitative unity is so immediate, so without mediation, or intervention of other, in any one Note, that difference, so far as it is concerned, seems to have disappeared. The Note, however, is *in itself* at once Being and Negation, or Being and Nothing; but this difference being only *in itself* and concealed from it by its own immediacy, falls as *Otherwiseness* in general, *out of* it. To the Voice, its single Note is so immediate, or the Voice in its single Note is to itself so immediate, that the difference just falls *out* of it as the *Otherwiseness* of the various Notes. This Otherwiseness is sublated into the Being-for-Self of the One Voice; and all settles into the One Unity—that is, a determined or differentiated Unity—but a Unity *self*-determined. Thus the Voice, even in its Negation, the Notes, is but *consonant* with its own self.

This Unity is thus Being, affirmative, negation of negation, remediated immediacy: the Voice can be readily seen to be all this, and so consequently, as the Unity that passes through and continues through its own determinatenesses or limits, the Notes, which are set as sublated within it. It is also There-being, relative distinctivity, but no longer in the form of the abstract Notes, but in these, as now identified with the one Voice, with that which simpliciter is. In this self-continuity of being, the *One* itself has in a manner vanished; *One* has gone over and beyond itself, as it were, into *Unity*,— limit determined as limit *simpliciter*, but a limit which is none—a limit which, as regards the Voice, is *in it* and within it, but indifferent to it; but the indifferent limit is again Quantity.

Remark.

The Kantian Construction of Matter by means of Forces Attracting and Repelling.

Into any explanation of this Remark it will be unnecessary to enter, the reader being now already amply supplied with all that is necessary to enable him to comprehend it. It will constitute another sample of Hegel's irresistible incisiveness, and of his exhaustive and utterly overwhelming argumentation.

It is worth while pointing out that Repulsion and Attraction, Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces, Discretion and Continuity, Intension and Extension, &c., are but the same elements which we have seen from the beginning, but in new and higher forms. This of itself is a proof of the truth of the Notion. Thought thus in its own movement assuming by due degrees all the Forms of the Concrete, — this in itself is irresistible *demonstration*, — irresistible demonstration

that What is is Thought, or that Thought is Substance. These Forms themselves, in fact, by-and-by convert themselves of themselves into the Reciprocals of Simple Apprehension and Judgment, which coalesce in Reason, and constitute the Notion itself in direct Logical manifestation. It is worth while adding, also, that this word Setzen just finds its explanation in the peculiar organic Reciprocity that is the pulse and life of the whole movement. What is Gesetzt, is the momentarily overt, apparent, ex-press, ex-plicit Moment, —an outcome of process, which process has now disappeared and is only implicit. But the process of implication and explication involved here must be seen to be directly reciprocal: if there be a movement down, there is equally a movement up; if *in*, then equally *out*. The currents meet as in two inverted cones; as the one current rushes out into one cone, the other rushes out equally into the cone it meets: but these currents are One; Draught and Back-draught are identical; there is present, in reality, but a single movement. Perhaps, the best illustration is what we have seen already as the going-together-with-itself: that which is, Consciousness, the Voice, the One, in going together with its own self inwardly, equally expands into its own self outwardly; the Infinitude of its out-of-its-self-ness, its constituent Notes, lighten *up* or *out* to the Voice at the very instant that it would darken itself *down* or *inwardly* into its abstract One.

IV.

TRANSITION FROM *QUALITY* TO *QUANTITY*.

BEFORE passing to Quantity, it may be well to seek to perfect our general view of Quality by adding to the detailed exposition of the *Complete Logic* which the preceding has attempted to convey, the condensed summary of the subject which presents itself in the *Encyclopaedia*. But, in taking up this latter work, we cannot resist extracting certain preliminary passages (generally from the First Edition as *the shortest statement*) which seem calculated to assist the student. And first from the

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(under which I include the 'Vorbegriff' that precedes the Logic and), on which we shall spend a very few words only, in order to give prominence to such eminently Hegelian characteristics as are useful or indispensable to what follows as regards the System itself. The commencement may be paraphrased thus :—

'The objects (subject-matter) of the Sciences in general are granted as presupposed, — as *there* without more ado; that is, they are already given in *conception*, or they are allowed to pass as admitted common possessions, awakening no question and demanding no justification. It is thus, too, as regards the method of these sciences: this, too, is granted as

a matter of course; and we are permitted to begin and prosecute our investigation according to a current and conventional manner which everyone accepts as right and natural—so right and natural, that any doubt of its legitimacy never occurs. What forms a striking portion of this manner, too, is this—that the very terms and notions which are applied in characterisation of the objects discussed, are themselves just taken up—out of *conception*, as it were—in the same loose and uninquiring fashion. As regards the facilities of a *beginning*, of a *method*, and—in a large sense as apply-to a general mediating element of decision and discussion—of a *terminology*, the Sciences in general, then, have a great advantage over the science of Philosophy, which, widely different from the rest, is seen at once to be under an obligation to demonstrate the necessity of its object, the necessity of its method, and the necessity of its characterising means or medium, or machinery of terms. In Geometry, Arithmetic, Jurisprudence, Medicine, Zoology, Botany, &c., for example, we have just to begin with the familiar *name* of the respective objects, Magnitude, Space, Number, Justice, Disease, Animal, Plant, &c.; and that suffices—without it every occurring to us to doubt of the existence of any such objects, or to demand—at the hands of thought as thought—a demonstration of the necessity of the same. But, beginning thus, it is evident that we begin with the mere crude instinctive *conception* or Vorstellung of that into which we inquire; and, as regards progress, it is evident also that all considerations which we apply in description or characterisation of the same arise in like manner out of an element of current conception, and that the whole business is just an empirical appeal from the Vorstellung of the writer

to the Vorstellung of the reader *concerning* a Vorstellung—not, however, without the frequent emergence of an inconvenience, which, indeed, were only to be expected—namely, that Vorstellung differs from Vorstellung to the production, possibly, of a blind debate which protracts itself endlessly. The movement of cognition in the ordinary sciences, then, is one of mere conception; there is no necessary First, and no necessary transition thence to another and another, and an end: the line of movement, too, lies across a field that is blindly *given*, among much on both sides of it that is blindly granted, and which the movement itself constantly blindly uses up for its own progress and advance.

'With Philosophy it is otherwise: neither its method nor its medium of characterisation and determination can refer themselves to *conception* (Vorstellung); and, for its object or objects, these belong as little to conception as to sense. Conceptions, certainly, in the order of time precede Notions; but it is by turning on the former, and through and by means of these, that thought attains to the latter—attains, that is, to cognition and comprehension. Necessity is the element of Philosophy; and object, method, and determining media are alike inadmissible, unless stamped by its ineffaceable impress. In such field, Proofs, Demonstrations, are the requirements, and Presuppositions and Assertions are idle and inapplicable. In short, it is within Philosophy itself that a beginning—which as such must be inderivative and incomposite, and which yet even so seems necessarily a presupposition—that the object, that the method, that the characterising terms must exhibit and demonstrate themselves; and anything that is said now by way of what is named

introduction can be only of the nature of an anticipation. Religion, it is true, has the same objects as Philosophy: both regard the True, and that, too, in the highest sense—that God is the True, and alone the True. Again, both would understand the Finite, and Nature and Man; as also the relation of these both to each other, and to God as their truth. Philosophy must really therefore, then, presuppose a certain acquaintance with its objects, as well as an interest in them: but the element of Religion is sentiment, feeling, while that of Philosophy is the Notion, Thought. But as regards the objects of Philosophy, we are not restricted to Religion for illustration; but there justifies itself a preliminary appeal to common, crude, current conception itself: for it is matter of universal acknowledgment, that the man who commences with the perceptions and the greeds of mere sense is speedily impelled beyond these to the presage and presentiment of an Infinite and Eternal, both as regards knowledge and will—a presage and presentiment which prompt the questions: What can I know—of God—Nature—my own soul? What ought I to do? What dare I hope? True; there are those who, unable to deny this natural human tendency, still utterly reject these the objects at which it aims. There are those, indeed, who suppose themselves to possess Philosophy, notwithstanding that they profess to know only what immediate sense gives them to know: but for the refutation of these, while conception (common sense) can point at once to its own presage, Thought brings forward just Philosophy itself.'

After these pregnant sentences, appears a paragraph (§ 5 in the First Edition) which we do not recollect to be represented anywhere in the subsequent editions,

and which, for that reason and for its own importance, we translate pretty closely thus:—

'Philosophy, then, is the Science of Reason, and of Reason conscious of its own self as all that is. Engaged in any cognition but the philosophical, Reason, as a subjective element on the one side, presupposes *given* to it on the other an object, in which, consequently, it recognises not its own self: such cognition, therefore, is but cognition of what is finite, or it is a finite cognition. Suppose the objects of such cognition to belong even to Self-consciousness, as Right (Justice), Duty, &c., they are still particular objects, beside and apart from which, as apart from, or without of, Self-consciousness itself, the remaining riches of the universe are to be found. The object of Religion is, indeed, in itself the infinite object which is to comprehend all others: but these conceptions of Religion remain not true to themselves, for, in spite of them, the world in the eyes of Religion still remains without —apart from—the Infinite, self-substantial by itself; and what it (Religion) proposes as the highest truth is still, for the consciousness that would discriminate and distinguish, inexplicable, incomprehensible, a secret, a something *given*, and just in the form of a something given and external. To Religion, truth is as feeling, vision, aspiration, figurate conception, devotion generally,—not, it is true, uninterwoven with thoughts, but still truth not in the form of truth. Its mood, indeed, is all-embracing, but, compared with other forms of consciousness, Religion constitutes but a region apart, but a region of its own. Philosophy may be regarded also as the science of Freedom, because in it the foreignness, the otherness of the objects, the finitude of consciousness vanishes, while contingency, physical

necessity, relation to an outward, dependency, longing, and fear perish; only in Philosophy is Reason perfectly at home, shut in to its own self. It is from the same grounds that in this science Reason is freed from the onesidedness of a merely subjective Reason, which were regarded as property of a peculiar talent, perhaps, or as gift—like art with the artist—of a special divine good—or it may be bad—fortune: here, on the contrary, Reason being but Reason in the consciousness of its own self, this science is capable in its own nature of constituting universal science. Neither is this science that Idealism in which the objects of cognition have only the value of a something set up by the Ego, of a subjective production confined within self-consciousness. Because Reason is conscious of itself as that which is, subjectivity—the Ego that conceives itself as a separate individual beside the objects, and its own modi as in it and as diverse from those of everything else out of it or over it — this subjectivity is taken up and resolved into the rational universality.'

In this paragraph the declarations of Hegel are both valuable and clear: in particular, the relation of the individual to the universe—a point always of great interest to the student of Hegel—is remarkably plainly characterised. The relative doctrine taught may *seem* to be the absorption of the individual into the Absolute. It is fair to remark, however, that such inference, especially in the naked manner in which it is thus and generally stated, is not by any means necessary; and that Hegel's orthodoxy were still safe, even had he not, by withdrawing the passage, involved the opinions it contains so far in doubt—But the One is Many, &c.

From §§ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (1st Edit.) we translate as follows :—

'Philosophy, in so far as it exhibits the *entire range* of the philosophical sciences, but at the same time with definite indication of the parts, is—*Encyclopaedia* ; and in so far as it exhibits at once the distinction and the connexion of the parts as due to the necessity of the Notion, it is—*Philosophical Encyclopaedia.*

'Philosophy being throughout rational cognition, each of its parts constitutes a philosophical whole, a self-inclusive sphere of the general Totality; but in every such part the philosophical idea is, as it were, in a particular *specificatum* or element. Each single sphere, just because it is a totality in itself, breaks through the limitation of its element and founds a higher sphere. The whole presents itself, then, as a sphere of spheres, of which latter each is a necessary moment of the whole; and the system of its own proper elements constitutes the complete *Idea*, which again just *appears* (as a single *manifestation*) in each individual.

'Philosophy is also by very nature Encyclopaedia, inasmuch as the True can only exist *as* Totality, and *through* discrimination and assignment of its distinctive differences, the necessity of these, and the freedom of the whole : that is, Philosophy is necessarily—*System.*

'A philosophising without system cannot be anything scientific; for such philosophising, besides that it expressly offers itself as rather a mere subjective manner of looking or thinking, is contingent in its matter (its objects), inasmuch as this matter can receive its authorisation only as a moment of the whole, and apart from this whole must remain an ungrounded presupposition or mere subjective certainty.

'By a system of Philosophy, there is erroneously

understood only a philosophy of a certain one *principle* that is contradistinguished from others: the principle of veritable Philosophy, on the contrary, is to include in itself all particular principles. Philosophy exhibits this in its own self, while its history also manifests partly that the various philosophies but constituted a single Philosophy in various stages of development, and partly that the special principles of these — one underlying one system, another another — were but branches of one and the same whole.

'The Universal and the Particular [the Common and the Various] must be accurately distinguished, each in its special constitution. The Universal, formally taken, and placed *beside* the Particular, becomes itself particular. Were such position imposed on objects of ordinary life, the impropriety and ineptitude would strike at once. Suppose, for example, that a person in want of fruit should decline cherries, pears, grapes, &c., on the plea that they were cherries, pears, grapes, &c., and not fruit!—In the case of philosophy, nevertheless, people think themselves free as well to justify their contempt of it by the objection that there are so many philosophies, and each is only *a*, not *the* philosophy,—as if the cherries were not also fruit,—as to set a philosophy whose principle is the universal side by side with those whose principle is a particular—nay, side by side with doctrines asserting that there is no philosophy or bestowing this name on a mere To and Fro of thoughts, which assumes the True as something given and directly there, and only applies reflexions to the same.

'As Encyclopaedia, nevertheless, the science will not be exhibited in the complete evolution of its particular details, but only as limited to the beginnings (*principia*) and rudimentary notions of the individual sciences.

The whole of philosophy, though capable of being regarded as a whole of many particular sciences, constitutes truly but one science; while each particular science is at once a moment of the whole and a whole in itself.

'Whatever is true in any science, is so through and by virtue of Philosophy, whose Encyclopaedia therefore comprehends within it every veritable science.

'Ordinary Encyclopaedias, unlike the Philosophical, are only *aggregates* of sciences empirically and contingently fallen on; many of which, too, as mere bundles of facts, are but sciences in name. The unity to which, in any such aggregate, the sciences are reduced, is, as it was but *externally* that they themselves were fallen on or taken up, equally an external one,—an Order, an arrangement (a ranking). This order must always, for the same reason and because the materials are of contingent nature, remain an *Attempt*, and exhibit incongruent edges. Besides, then, that the philosophical Encyclopaedia excludes (1) such mere aggregates of facts as, for example, Philology is, it excludes also (2) such sciences as are founded in mere arbitrariness, like Heraldry: sciences of this nature are out-and-out *Positive*. (3) Other sciences are also called *positive*, which possess, however, a rational foundation and principle: this latter element in them belongs to Philosophy; the *Positive side*, again, remains special to them. This *Positive* element, too, is of various kinds. (1) In the ordinary non-philosophical sciences, their principle (*beginning*), that which is the veritably True in them, has the contingent as its *end*, because they have to introduce and reduce the universal into the empirical unit and actual. In this field of mutability and contingency, not the Notion, but only Grounds or Reasons can be

made available. For example, Jurisprudence, the System of direct and indirect Taxation, &c., require final exact determinations which lie without and apart from the determination proper of the Notion, and leave for decision, therefore, a certain latitude or margin which may be disposed in one manner on one reason and in another on another, and is insusceptible of any certain and definitive *last*. In the same manner, the Idea of Nature in its singularisation (or endless separation into units) runs out into contingencies, and Natural History, Geography, and Medicine fall into distinctions of fact, into species and differences which are determined by external accident or the sport of caprice, and not by Reason. History, too, falls to be included here, inasmuch as, though the Idea be its true nature and substance, its manifestation or appearancy is in contingency and the field of self-will. (2) Such sciences are also in so far *positive*, as they do not recognise their determinations as finite, nor demonstrate the transition of these and of their whole sphere into a higher one, but assume them as valid *simpliciter*. With this finiteness of the Form, as the first was the finiteness of the Matter, there connects itself (3) the finiteness of the *cognitive ground*, which is sometimes raisonnement, sometimes feeling, belief, the authority of others, in general the authority of inner or outer perception. That Philosophy also which seeks to found itself on Anthropology—facts of consciousness, inner perception, or outer experience—belongs to the same class. (4) It is still possible that it is merely the form of the scientific statement that is empirical and notion-less, while in other respects thoughtful observation arranges what are only outer appearances in a like manner to the inner sequence of the Notion. There is added, perhaps,

that through the antagonism and multiplicity of the appearances (phenomena) which are brought together, the *external, contingent circumstances* of the conditions are removed, and the Universal steps before us. A thoughtful Experimental Physic, History, &c., would in this manner present the rational science of nature and of human eventualities and deeds in an external image which should mirror the Notion.

'The whole of science (*scientia*) is the exposition of the *Idea*; the division (distribution) of the former, therefore, can be understood only by reference to the latter, and, like this preliminary conception of Philosophy itself, can be something only anticipated. The *Idea*, however, demonstrates itself as Reason directly identical with its own self, and this at the same time as the capability to set itself—in order to be for itself—over-against itself, and in this other to be only by itself. Thus science falls divisively into three parts:—

I. Logic, the Science of the Idea in and for itself.

II. Philosophy of Nature, or the Science of the Idea in its *Otherness.*

III. Philosophy of Spirit, as of the Idea which from its *Otherness* returns into itself.

'It has been already remarked, that the Differences of the various philosophical sciences are only characteristics of the Idea itself, which latter alone is what exhibits itself in these various elements. In Nature it is not an other than the *Idea* which is to be recognised, but it is in the form of externalisation, just as in Spirit it is the same Idea as *bëent for itself and in-and-for-itself becoment.* Such a form in which the Idea *appears* is at the same time a fluent moment; therefore, any particular science is just as much this—to recognise its matter (object) as bëent object, as also

this—to recognise immediately in the same its transition into a higher sphere. The conception of the Division, therefore, is an external reflexion, an anticipation of what the Idea's own necessity produces, and shows this inaccuracy—that it sets up the various parts or sciences *beside* each other as if they were stable and substantial in their mutual contradistinction, like species or sorts.'

To a reader who has advanced this length, the above passages will be readily intelligible without comment; and they will serve to strengthen any conception already formed of Hegelian penetrativeness, comprehensiveness, and systematic wholeness. We proceed now to make a few extracts from

THE PRE-NOTION

which precedes the Logic; using specially for this purpose, §§ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 35, 36, and 37 (First Edition).

'Logic is the science of the *pure Idea*,—that is, of the Idea in the abstract element of Thought.

'It may, without doubt, be said that Logic is the science of Thought, its forms and its laws; but Thought is at strictest the pure identity of cognition with itself, and constitutes, therefore, only the universal *determinatum*, determinateness, or the element in which the Idea is as logical. Thought is truly the Idea, but not as thought formal; on the contrary, as the Totality of its own forms which it itself gives to itself. Logic is the hardest science, in so far as it has to do, not with perceptions—not even with abstract ones, as in Geometry—or other sensuous forms, but with pure abstractions, and demands, on the part of its student, a power of retiring into pure thoughts, of holding such fast,

and of moving in them. On the other side, again, it may be regarded as the *easiest* science, inasmuch as its import is nothing but one's proper thought and its current notions, and these are, at the same time, the *simplest*. The utility of Logic concerns its relation to the particular subject or individual so far as he would give himself a certain training and formation for other objects. The training of Logic consists in this—that in it we are exercised in thinking, for this science is the thinking of thinking. So far, however, as the element of Logic is the absolute form of the True, and even more than this—the pure True itself,—it is something quite other than what is merely useful.

'In form, Logic has three sides: (α) that of understanding, or the abstract side [the dianoëtic]; (β) the negative-rational or the dialectic side; and (γ) the positive-rational or the speculative side [say the noëtic].

'These three sides do not make three parts of Logic, but are moments of every logical Real,—that is, of every Notion, or of every True in general. They may be set under the first or dianoëtic moment, and thereby held asunder from each other; but, so held, they are not considered in their truth.

'(α) Thought as Understanding holds fast the fixed individual and its difference from others; and such limitated abstract has the value to it of what is independent and self-subsistent.

'(β) The dialectic moment is the self-sublation of such individuals, and their transition into their opposites.

'(1) Dialectic, isolated by understanding and taken by itself, constitutes, especially when manifesting itself in scientific notions, Scepticism, which views mere

negation as the dialectic result. (2) Dialectic is usually regarded as an external art which arbitrarily produces confusion in accepted notions and a mere show of contradiction, the decisions of the understanding and the accepted notions being still supposed the True, while the show itself is to be considered but a nullity. Dialectic, however, is rather to be regarded as the true and proper nature of the decernments of the understanding, of things, and of the Finite in general. Reflexion is properly a going out over and beyond the isolated individual, and a *referring*, whereby the individual is placed in *relation*, but for the rest remains still in its isolated validity. Dialectic, on the contrary, is that *immanent* going-out which exhibits the onesidedness and limitation of the decernments of the understanding as that which it is,—the negation, namely, of this and these. Dialectic constitutes, therefore, the motive soul of progress, and is the principle by which alone there comes immanent connexion and necessity into the matter of science, just as it is in it that the true, and not the external, elevation over the Finite lies.

'(γ) The positive-rational or speculative side recognises the unity of the distinctions even in their antithesis, the *positive* element which is retained and preserved in their resolution and transition.

(1) 'Dialectic has a *positive* result, because it has a *determinate import or matter*; or because its result is really not the *empty*, *abstract* nothing, but the negation of certain *distinctions* which are retained and preserved in the result—because it is a result, and not a simple nothing. (2) This rational act is, therefore, though abstract and of thought, still at the same time a *concrete*, because it is not *simple formal* unity, but *unity*

of distinguished distinctions. Philosophy, therefore, has nothing whatever to do with mere abstractions and formal thoughts, but only with concrete notions.

'As regards matter, the Determinations of Thought are considered in Logic in and for themselves. In this way they present themselves as the concrete pure thoughts, that is, as the Notions, with the force and import of that which constitutes the absolute ground and foundation of all that is. Logic, therefore, is essentially Speculative Philosophy.

'Under the speculative moment, Form and Matter are not sundered and severed, and held apart, as under the two preceding. The forms of the *Idea* are its *distinctions* [say its native inflexions or intonations], and it were impossible to say where it should get any other or truer *Matter* than these its own forms themselves. The forms of the mere Logic of Understanding are, on the contrary, not only not something true *per se*, but they cannot be even only *Forms* of the True. Rather, since, as merely formal or formell, they are affected with the essential antithesis to the Matter, they are nothing more than Forms of the Finite, of the Untrue.—Because, however, Logic, as pure speculative Philosophy, is the Idea in the element or form of Thought, or the absolute still shut in to its eternity, it is the *subjective* or *first* science, and there fails it still the side of the completed objectivity of the Idea. It not only remains, however, as the absolute ground of the Real, but, in manifesting itself this, it demonstrates itself as the real, universal, and *objective* science. In the first universality of its notions, it appears *per se*, and as a subjective special activity, without and apart from which the entire wealth of the sensuous, as of the more concrete intellectual, world is still supposed to

live its own life. But when this wealth is taken up in the Philosophy of the real part of the science, and has there manifested itself as returning into the *pure Idea*, and possessing in it its ultimate ground and truth,—then the logical universality takes stand no longer as a separate entity counter said wealth of the Real, but rather as comprehending this wealth, and as veritable universality. It acquires thus the force of speculative Theology.

'Logic, with the value of speculative philosophy, takes up the place of what was called Metaphysic, and treated separately. The nature of Logic and the stand-point of scientific cognition now receive their more particular preliminary elucidation in the nature of this Metaphysic, and of the Critical Philosophy which ended it.—Metaphysic, besides, is a thing of the past only in reference to the history of Philosophy; in itself, as lately manifested especially, it is the mere Understanding's view of the objects of Reason.

'In order to place oneself on the stand-point of science, it is requisite to renounce the presuppositions which are involved in the subjective and finite modes of philosophical cognition, viz.: (1) that of the fixed validity of limited and opposed distinctions of understanding generally; (2) that of a *given substrate*, conceived as already *finished* and *ready there* before us, which is to be taken as standard decisive of whether any of those distinctions are commensurate with it or not; (3) that of cognition as a mere *referring* of such ready-formed and fixed predicates to some given substrate; (4) that of the antithesis of a cognising subject and a cognised object, which latter is not to be identified with the former; and of this antithesis each side, as in the preceding, is to be equally taken *per se* as a something fixed and true.

'To abandon these presuppositions cannot be demanded so much for the reason that they are false—for science, in which these forms present themselves, has to show this in their own case—as for the reason that they are figurate conceptions and belong to immediate thought—thought imprisoned in the *given*, opinion (Meynung),—for this reason in general, indeed, that they are *given* and *presuppositions*, whereas science presupposes nothing, but that it would be pure thought. In effect, we have to begin in complete emancipation from every presupposition; and, in the resolution *to will to think purely*, that is accomplished by the freedom which abstracts from everything, and holds steadily its pure abstraction, the simplicity (uniplicity) of Thought.

'Pure science (*scientia*), or Logic, falls divisively into three parts:—

I. The doctrine of Being.
II. The doctrine of Essence (inner nature).
III. The doctrine of the Notion and the Idea.

Or into the doctrine of Thought, or *the* Thought:

I. In its immediacy—the Notion *in itself*.
II. In its Reflexion and Be-mediation—the Being-for-self and the *Shine* of the Notion.
III. In its return into itself, and in its developed Being-by-self—the Notion in and for itself.'

All the above terms have been already commented on, with the exception of Shine (Schein) and Being-by-self (Bey-sich-seyn). Schein is just the *Shine* or *show* of a thing—not the thing in itself, but just its *shining*, *showing*, or *seeming*: it may thus be mere *seeming*, or it may be true seeming which amounts to manifestation. Could we give the English word *seem* the sense of *shine*, or *shine* the sense of *seem*, a trans-

lation would have no difficulty. To be *by self* is to be *chez soi*, at home, or contented in seclusion to, and identification with, oneself.

We come now to

'The First Part of Logic,
or
The Doctrine of Being,
and there to

A.
QUALITY,
and
a. *Being.*—b. *There-being.*—c. *Being-for self.*

'Under Quality, then, we have

a. *Being.*

'*Pure* Being constitutes the Beginning, because it is as well pure Thought as the indefinite simple Immediate, and the first beginning cannot be anything mediated (a product of means) or further determined.

'But this pure Being is the *pure Abstraction*, consequently *absolutely negative*, and, taken also immediately, just *Nothing*.

'Nothing, as this self-equal Immediate, is conversely the same thing that Being is. The truth of Being as of Nothing is, therefore, the *unity* of both: this unity is Becoming.

b. *There-being.*

'Being in Becoming as one with Nothing, and so Nothing as one with Being, are only disappearant; Becoming, through its contradiction in itself, falls together into the unity in which both are sublated: its *result* is, consequently, *There-being*.

'(α) There-being is Being with a Determinateness, which is, as immediate or beënt determinateness—Quality. There-being as in this its determinateness reflected *into itself*, is *There-beënt-ity*, *Something*. The categories that yield themselves in There-being are now to be summarily stated.

'Quality, as *beënt* determinateness counter the *Negation* that is contained in it but distinguished from it, is *Reality*. The negation no longer the abstract Nothing, but as a There-being and *Something*, is only form in this latter—it is as *Otherwise-being*. Quality, in that this *Otherwise-being* is its own determination, but firstly distinguished from it, is *Being-for-Other*,—a Breadth (Latitude) of the There-being, of the Something. The Being of Quality as Being, counter this reference to other, is the *Being-in-itself* (or just the *In-itself*).'

(The distinguishableness of anything is evidently an otherwise-being, an otherwise-ness, in it, while as evidently its distinguishablenesses constitute a *breadth*.)

'(β) The Being, held fast as distinct from the Determinateness, or the *Being-in-itself*, were only the empty abstraction of Being. In There-being, the determinateness is one with the Being; which determinateness, set as *Negation*, is at the same time *Limit*, *Limitation* (*Bound*). The *otherwise-ness* is, therefore, a moment, not indifferent *out of* There-being, but its *own*. *Something* is through its Quality, firstly, *finite* (*end*lich), and secondly, *alterable* (ver*änd*erlich); so that Finitude and Otherableness belong to its being (it is at once *end*-ed and *end*-able).

'Something becomes another; but the other is itself a something: it becomes, therefore, equally another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

'This Infinite is the spurious, bastard, negative, false,

or Pseudo-Infinite, inasmuch as it is nothing but the negation of the finite, which, however, just so arises again, and consequently is just as much not sublated—or this Infinite expresses only the *To-be-to* (Sollen) of the sublation of the finite. The Progress into the Infinite keeps standing by the enunciation of the contradiction which the finite involves; namely, that it is as well something as its other, and is the perpetual continuation of the alternation of these mutually introductive determinations.

'(γ) What is here in fact is, that Something becomes another, and the Other another, just generally. Something in relation to another is already another in its regard; consequently, as that into which it passes is quite the same thing as that which passes—both have one and the same and no further determination than that each is *another*,—Something thus in its passing into Other goes together only with its own self; and this reference, in the passing and in the other to its own self, is the True Infinite. Or, looked at negatively: what is othered is the Other—it becomes the Other of the Other. Thus Being, but as negation of the negation, is again restored, and is the *Being-for-self*.'

In translating the above paragraphs, certain supplementary passages have been omitted. Before proceeding to *Being-for-self*, however, it may be well to spend a word on any points in these omitted passages which may seem calculated to embarrass the student. With reference to § 84 (Encyclopaedia, Rosenkranz', or Hegel's 3rd, Edition), that 'Being is the Notion *in itself*' is not difficult; for Being (Seyn) applies to everything of which we say *is*, or it *is*; and everything of which we say *is*, is just the Logical Notion *in itself*, that is, *materialiter*, not *formaliter*. The Bestimmungen, the determinations

(and the reference in this word is always to the logical moments of the logical notion, which, of course, vary with the sphere), the distinguishable forms in the sphere of Seyn (Being), are evidently *beënt*, *other* to *other*, while their *progressive determination* (the dialectic movement in that field) is plainly a *passing into other*. This, of course, is an attempt to express Being and its peculiarities in terms of the Notion; and certainly Hegel will be at least allowed to have brought before us an *ingenious* analogy. That this progress is 'a setting *out* of the Notion as it is *in itself*,' is also plain: anything running through the circle of its qualities or powers sets *out* the Notion that *in itself* it is, and this at the same time can be seen to be 'a going into its own self,' 'a *deepening* of Being into itself.' Hegel then asserts that his doctrine of Being is at once representative and resolvative of the whole of the Seyn or Being; and thus we are led to understand what his object is in this doctrine.

The next paragraph declares the determinations of Logic to constitute the definitions of the Absolute, the *metaphysical definitions of God*; but that this is more especially the case with spheres that are First and Third, while those that are Second refer to the Finite. To define God is to *think* God, or to express God in thoughts; and Logic ought to comprehend all thoughts as such. It is a defect in the form of Definition in general, however, that in such operation there floats ever before the conception of the Definer a *Substrate* which is to be the receptacle of the defining predicates. For example, the Absolute, which we may suppose to stand for God as thought, is, in reference to its predicates, quite void, and only suppositious—a substrate; but the *thought* of the substrate—and that is the whole

thing—is in the predicate. The predicate, then, is alone substantial, and the substrate, or even the form of a proposition, appears superfluous.

From § 86, we learn that all difficulties in regard to the commencement with pure Being may be removed by simply discerning what a beginning in general implies. We are told, too, that the Fichtian Ego-Ego and the Schellingian absolute Indifference or Identity are not so very discrepant from the Hegelian Seyn or pure Being. The former, however, are objectionable as involving *process*, that is, as being *products* of means: in fact, properly put as a beginning requires, both of them just become Seyn or Being, while Being again just implies them. Being is the first predicate, then; and so the first definition is, the Absolute is Being. This is the Eleatic definition, and also the common one, that God is the sum of all Realities; the limitation that is in everything being abstracted from, there remains for God only the reality that is in all reality.

In § 88, there are several points of considerable interest. In the first place, we see that the whole Hegelian business is the Setzen of the An sich—the exposition, or simply the *position*, of the *In-itself*, the explication of the implication, that *formaliter* EXPRESSED which *materialiter* IS (and that just amounts to the Aristotelian moments which we have already so often seen). We see also that the manner of philosophical cognition is different from that that is usually employed, that of common sense, or of figurate conception; for, as Kant has already told us, the former is a knowing *in abstracto*, while the latter is a knowing *in concreto*. From this we see how much Hegel has simply been in earnest with the relative teaching of Kant. We have

also the Metaphysic of a Beginning alluded to: the thing (whatever may be put in question) is *not yet* in its beginning, but still its beginning is not just the nothing of the thing, but the *being* of this latter is certainly also in its beginning. This must be referred to, and collated with, what has been already said in regard to a Beginning, Being, Becoming, &c. Lastly, we are made to see very clearly how the proposition *Ex nihilo nihil fit* is tantamount to a proposition of the eternity of matter, of Pantheism. 'The ancients have made the simple reflexion that the proposition, From something comes something, or From nothing comes nothing, just in effect annihilates a Becoming; for that from which there comes, and that which comes, are one and the same thing; what we have before us is only the proposition of the abstract identity of the Understanding. It must, however, strike us as surprising to see the propositions, From nothing comes nothing, or From something comes something, even in our days quite unsuspectingly maintained, without consciousness that they are the ground-principle of Pantheism, as without any knowledge of the fact that the ancients have exhausted the consideration of these propositions.'

From § 89, we learn—and with conviction—that every one concrete consists of opposing notæ or significates; that it is the province of the abstraction of Understanding, as Understanding, to see only one of these, to lighten this one up to the darkening out of the other, and the fallacious appearance of a part as a fixed, isolated, individual whole. Hence also it is manifest that the demonstration of antithesis is not necessarily productive of a simple negation, is not necessarily reductive of the subject of antithesis to a simple nothing.

In § 95, the terminal remark in reference to the true relation of Finite and Infinite is a perfectly successful Hegelian statement, and a full compensation for the confusing tediousness and length which we have already animadverted on as the fault of the similar discussion in the detailed Logic. Our explanations in that reference, however, shall be allowed to dispense us from translating this remark, however admirable, here.

If in § 86 we found that the Absolute is Being, we see from § 87 that it is equally true that the Absolute is the Nothing. This not only because the Absolute is Difference as well as Identity, but because, all Difference being reflected into the one of this Identity, that one is as good as Nothing. This is illustrated by the nature of the Thing-in-itself, which *is to be* all substance, all being, but just emerges as an absolute void—Nothing. Both considerations, in fact, are the same.

It is curious, I may remark by way of conclusion here, that the ultimate generalisation of all generalisation should be Being, and quite as much Nothing. Of that there can be no doubt. This Nothing, too, is the only Nothing possible—in effect it is *the* Nothing, just what we mean by Nothing. Thrown back from these generalisations as quite abstract, as quite untrue, as nothing, one looks once more at the concrete; but what is it, again, in ultimate abstraction but a Becoming?—it never *is*. These are really the *initial* generalised abstractions: if we want to think *purely* of what is—of the laws, forms, or principles of all things in general, apart from each thing in particular—it is *so* we must begin. But, in spite of the *Becoming*, there is a *Become*, a *Distinguishable*, a *Here-being*, a *There-being*,—what we call *mortal state*. This has

Reality; this has also *Negation*; it is so *Something*. As its Reality against its Negation, it is Something *in itself*; and, *vice versâ*, it is Something *for other*. Its Something-*for-other* identified with what it is *in itself*, is its *Qualification*. But its *Qualification* is its *Talification*, and both coalesce in *Limit*. In its *Limit*, Something is not only *ended*, but *endable*; that is, it is *Finite*. But its *end*, the *finis* of the *Finite*, is the *Infinite*; and that is the *One* into which all variety is reflected. But this reflexion of variety into the One is the negative reflexion of this one into its own self; and, again, this *negativeness* of the Reflexion implies other than the One—*more* ones—(or, it is allowable by anticipation to say more *I's*, more *Egos*).—But thus we are fully in the field of Fürsichseyn, or of

C. BEING-FOR-SELF.

'(α) Being-for-Self, as Reference to itself, is Immediacy; and, as Reference of the Negative to itself, it is Being-for-self-ity, One, the One,—what is within itself distinction-less, and so excludent of the Other out of itself.

'(β) The Reference of the Negative to itself is *negative* reference, so distinguish-ment of the One from itself, the Repulsion of the One,—i.e., the *setting* of many or simply more Ones. By reason of the Immediacy of the Being-for-self-ity, these Many or More are *Beënt*, and the Repulsion of the Beënt Ones becomes so far their Repulsion the one of the other as of entities *already to the fore*, or Mutual *Exclusion*.

'(γ) The *Many*, however, are, the one what the other is; each is one, or one of the Many; they are, therefore, one and the same. Or the Repulsion regarded in it itself is, even as negative *comportment* of the Many

Ones mutually, equally essentially their *Reference* mutually; and as those to which in its repulsion the One refers itself are One, it refers itself in them to itself. The Repulsion is thus quite as essentially Attraction; and the excludent One or the Being-for-Self sublates itself. Qualitative Determinateness, which in the One has reached its absolute determinedness (ihr An-und-fürsich-Bestimmtseyn), is with this gone over into Determinateness that is as *sublated* Determinateness,—i.e., into Being as Quantity.'

These are translations of §§ 96, 97, 98 in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia, (for the future we shall chiefly follow this edition,) and they constitute the entire Encyclopaedic summary of the whole subject of Being-for-Self. This alone, even independently of the similar summaries of Being and There-being, would suffice to demonstrate as well the inadequacy of the Encyclopaedia to convey the System, as the fact that it is nothing but a handy leading-string, or useful synopsis to the student who has already penetrated, or is engaged penetrating, into the business itself—the complete Logic.—Further comment, after what has been so fully extended already, will be here unnecessary: 'the Reference of the Negative to itself,' the 'Excludent of the *Other* out of itself,' 'already to the fore,' 'in it itself,' 'comportment' italicised for the equally-italicised Verhalten,' &c., may now be trusted to the intelligence of the reader.

Perhaps it may be worth remarking that Hegel displays in what we have just read certain Gnostic analogies. Of the systems so named, we learn that it was a leading idea that 'God, the sum of all veritable Being, reveals himself in this way, that he hypostasises his Qualities, or allows them to pass out of

himself into existence as Substances; but still directly from God there issues only one substance, the νοῦς, Reason; and it is from this latter that the rest follow, but always so that the one is successively out of the other, the divine substance being extenuated in proportion to the remotion from the centre.' Speculative Philosophy is not unrepresented in the definition of Gnosis as 'Higher Wisdom, a Religious Wisdom, that by aid of foreign Philosophemes would lay deeper the foundations of the Positive and Traditional.' We know, too, that in Alexandria, the seat of Gnosticism, there was a desire and an effort to reconcile and unite 'opposing Philosophemes;' there, 'when the fair blossom of Greece, which the bland heaven had evoked, was faded and withered up, *Art* sought to replace what Nature no longer spontaneously offered.' These are certainly Anklänge, assonances; but it is not to be supposed that they were suggestive to Hegel; rather they ought to be suggestive to us only—suggestive of the analogy of the Historical Occasions: and, for the rest, we have to be thankful that Hegel has probably effected, by tenacious dogging of the pure Notion, what the Gnostics, soaring into the figurate Conception, were only able to convert into the monstrosities of dream.

We pass now from *What sort* to *How much*; nor is it difficult to see that How much is indifferent to What sort, or that it is just *the indifferent limit.*

V.

A SUMMARY OR TRANSLATION, COMMENTED AND INTERPRETED, OF THE SECOND SECTION OF THE COMPLETE LOGIC, *QUANTITY*.

We have seen the collapse of the entire round of the constituents of Quality into a simple identity from the qualitative indifference of which, its own opposite, a wholly new sphere, *Quantity*, emerges. This emergence, what Hegel names the *Unter*schied, the se-cernment, the se-cession, the dif-ference, we have now more closely to consider.

This section opens in a strain of singularly rich and beautiful reflexion, which is also always somehow of a double aspect. On one aspect, it is still Qualitative Being-for-Self which we have before us — the Voice,— thoroughly identified with, and indifferent to, its own Determinateness — the Notes ; and on the other aspect we suddenly find that this is Quantity. The life of the Voice is now just indifferent continuity of *one* or *ones*; and what is that but Quantity? This reference being kept steady, the expressions of Hegel, however coy and elusive, will become intelligible. Quality—a Note— will be readily granted to be 'the *first*, the *immediate*, or the *direct* Determinateness;' whereas Quantity is a Determinateness which is indifferent, so to speak, to what it *is* —indifferent to the *Being* it conveys : 'it is a Limit which is none ; it is Being-for-Self directly

identical with the Being-for-Other;—the Repulsion of the many ones (the Notes), which is immediately their non-repulsion, their continuity' — or the Voice which is in the Notes and through the Notes, at once Being-for-Self and Being-for-Other. The duplicity of this description is very evident: inwardly it applies to our latest qualitative values, but outwardly it just names Quantity, which is now then *explicit*.

Again, the Notes appear no longer to have their affair in themselves, but in another, the Voice, while at the same time both they and it are reflected into themselves as indifferent limits: that is, 'the Determinateness in general is *out of itself*, a something directly external to itself and to the Something; such a Limit, its indifference in its own self, and the indifference of the Something to it, constitutes the quantitative Determinateness of a Something.'

It must be regarded as a great triumph of the *method* of Hegel, that a mere dogging of the pure Notion as it trends away off in its own self before us, should lead to such an exhaustive statement of the idea of Quantity — a statement, too, as will be found in the end, no less exhaustive of the complete theory than of the mere initiatory idea.

The general *division* which follows now will be more intelligible *after* the Discussion; and as for the Remark, it contains some slight illustrative matter. A corn-field, for example, is still a corn-field, though its quantitative limit be altered; but by alteration of its qualitative limit, it becomes meadow, wood, &c. A red, whether more or less intense, is still red; but its quality being changed, it ceases to be red, and becomes blue, &c. Thus, from every example, we may see that Quantity always concerns a Beingness, which is

indifferent to the very determinateness which it now, or at any time, has. Quantity is usually defined 'anything that will admit of increase or decrease.' To *increase* is to make more—to *decrease*, less—in *quantity*. The definition is thus tautological and faulty. Still, the true notion is implied: we see the *distinction* of Quantity to be its own indifference to becoming other; which othering or alteration, too, is always external.

CHAPTER I.

QUANTITY.

A.

PURE QUANTITY.

'QUANTITY is sublated Being-for-Self;' the Voice is identified away out into the Notes and on with them; 'or, the repelling One has become the *referring* One, relates itself to its Other as in identity, and has gone over into Attraction. The absolute denyingness of the repelling One is *melted out* into this *Unity*; but still this Unity as containing the One is influenced by the immanent repulsion — *it is unity with itself as unity of the Being-out-of itself.* Attraction is in this way the moment of *Continuity* in Quantity.'

But this Unity is, so to speak, no *dry* unity; it is the Unity of Somewhat, of the Many, of the Units. Continuity, then, implies Discretion. The one unit is what the other is; and it is this *sameness* which the Repulsion *extends* into the Continuity. Discretion for its part is confluent; the *discretes* are the *same thing*, *one* then,—and so continuous.

Quantity is the Unity of Continuity and Discretion, but firstly in the form of Continuity, inasmuch as it has just issued from the self-identically determinate Being-for-Self. Quantity is now the truth, the Wahrheit, the wareness, the perceived factuality of the Absolute, which in the last value of the Being-for-Self was left as the self-sublating self-reference, the self-perpetu-

ating Coming-out of-itself. 'But what is repelled is its own self; the Repulsion, therefore, is the genetic profluence of its own self. Because of the self-sameness of what is repelled and driven off, this very dis-cerning is uninterrupted continuity; and because of the Coming-out-of-itself, this Continuity, without being interrupted, is at the same time plurality, which just as much abides in its equality with itself.'

These last sentences very tolerably convey Hegel's central conception of the Divine Life, which is always a perpetual One in a perpetual Many — a perpetual Self in a perpetual Other. What *is*, is the *One* flicker of a *Two*; what is, is nictitation.—Again, one sees very clearly into the *moments* here: they are Continuity and Discretion, Quantity, the same but different. That Continuity will become extension, Discretion intension, one can readily anticipate: one can see, indeed, that Continuity will become by-and-by the *outer*, and Discretion the *inner*. Nor is it to be forgotten that Continuity and Discretion, Repulsion and Attraction, One and Many, Being-for-Self and Being-for-One, Finite and Infinite, Something and Other, &c., were originally Being and Nothing—the first abstract truths, as Becoming was the first concrete one, though but in naked abstraction all the same.

Two very important Remarks are here now intercalated. In the first, the first point noticed is, that Quantity is everywhere the *real Possibility* of the One, the Unit; but that, *vice versâ*, the One, the Unit, is no less directly continuous. The tendency of *Conception* to confound continuity with *composition* is then remarked on — composition as a mere external putting together of the Units; each of these — as we saw in atomism — being all the while self-identically inde-

pendent. This idea-less externality of view is to be exchanged for the living internality of the concrete notion. Even Mathematic rejects such composition of indifferent discretes — what at any time it regards as Sum is but for the occasion so, and even in its discretion is an infinite Many.—A quotation from Spinoza next occurs, which maintains two modes of conceiving Quantity,—one through *imagination*, and one through *intellect*; the former finite, divisible, composite,—the latter infinite, indivisible, single. It is interesting to see in Spinoza the Hegelian distinction between *imagination* (Vorstellung) and *intellect* (Begriff), at the same time that it is not for a moment to be supposed that it was derived from him: as well might we assert — inasmuch as it is quite capable of being regarded as potential germ in that direction — that to this passage in Spinoza Kant owes—what mainly constitutes him—his *manifold* of Sense and his *unity* of the Notion. There is here a further parallelism, indeed: Spinoza characterises the *view* of Imagination as abstract or superficial, and that of Intellect as substantial; now this, again, concerns the Many of Sense and the One of Intellect;—Imagination (Sense) sees abstract superficiality, Intellect concrete substance. We may understand from this how it is that Hegel regards the operation of the first moment, Simple Apprehension (identified with Verstand), as of an abstract nature. The object of this faculty, indeed, is always abstract identity, surface-sameness, Seyn; it is another faculty that seeks *substance*, the Wesen, the Notion.* It is

* The *Remark* to the 'Relation of Outer and Inner' (Log. ii. 180) explicitly states this. 'In every natural, scientific, and spiritual development, *this* offers itself, and *this* essentially is to be recognised—that the *First*, in that *Something* is only first of all *inwardly* or in its

not only interesting, but corroborative, to come thus on thoughts in different great writers, which thoughts, though with very different *lookings* in each, involve at bottom the same truths: at the same time, it is not the competent *student*, but only the feverishly ambitious and feverishly imbecile (and so exasperated) *dipper*, who will talk in such cases of *plagiarism*.— Time, Space, Matter, Light, the Ego, are then characterised as examples of pure Quantity, and in those penetrating terms peculiar to Hegel: Space, an absolutely continuous Out-of-itself-ness, a self-identical Otherwise-ness and again Otherwiseness; Time, an absolute Out-of-itself-coming-ness, a production of the One, the Instant, the Now, which is the immediate disappearance of the same, and always, again, the disappearance of this disappearance; so that this self-production of Non-being is no less simple self-equality and self-identity. As for Matter, Leibnitz remarks, 'It is not at all improbable that Matter and Quantity are really the same thing;' and Hegel adds, 'in effect these notions differ only in this—that Quantity is the pure Notion, while Matter is the same thing in outward existence.' Lastly, the Ego is, as pure Quantity, an absolute Becoming-otherwise, an infinite removal or omni-lateral repulsion into the negative freedom of the Being-for-Self, which remains still, however, directly simple continuity — the continuity of Universality, or of Being-by-Self — which is uninterrupted by the infinitely varied limits, the matter of sensations, perceptions, &c.

The second Remark is a Critique on Kant in regard to his Antinomies, and its consideration will have fitter

Notion, is just on that account only its immediate, passive, external, particular identity as there-b̈eent.' But see the whole Remark.

place elsewhere. We cannot pass it, however, without observing that it is an analysis of such annihilative penetration and resistless force as is without even the approach of a rival, whether before or since. It will assist the reader here to know that the difficulty concerning the infinite divisibility of matter rests simply on the opposing of Continuity to Discretion, at the same time that both are one and the same thing; and that the solution, consequently, is effected by pointing out the *onesidedness* of the opposition, and the *necessity* of both moments coalescing in the identity of Quantity. The remark ends with some exceedingly interesting references to the Eleatics and to Heraclitus—to Diogenes, who, by *walking*, supposed himself to refute the sophism (falsely so named) of Zeno in regard to motion—to Aristotle, to Bayle, &c. Hegel bestows great commendation on the Aristotelian solution of the contradictions of Zeno in regard to the Infinite Divisibility, and is evidently convinced of its satisfactoriness. This solution would seem, indeed,—though, of course, far from being accompanied by the ultimate definiteness of the Hegelian vision,—to have been *at bottom* the same as Hegel's, and to have consisted in the opposing of the concrete whole and real to the opposition of the abstract moments—in the opposing, that is, of the concrete real quantities Time, Space, Matter, Motion, &c., to the abstractions Continuity and Discretion. Hegel observes here — 'Bayle, who, in his Dictionary, art. Zenon, finds Aristotle's solution of Zeno's dialectic "pitoyable," understands not the meaning of, Matter is only *in possibility* infinitely divisible: he replies, If matter is infinitely divisible, then it *actually* contains an infinite number of parts; and so what we have is not an infinite *en puissance*, but an

infinite that really and actually exists. Rather, the Divisibility is itself only a possibility, not an *existing so of the parts*, and multiplicity in general is set in the continuity only as moment, as what is sublated.—Sharp-sighted Understanding,—in which, too, Aristotle is very certainly unsurpassed,—is not adequate to comprehend and decide on the speculative notions of this latter, just as little so as the coarseness of sensuous conception already mentioned (Diogenes) is adequate to refute the argumentations of Zeno: said Understanding errs in this, that it takes for something—for something true and actual—such mere thought-things, such mere abstractions as an infinite number of parts; while said sensuous Conception, on its side, will not let itself be brought beyond what is empirical and up to thoughts.'—The conclusion here in reference to Diogenes is very clever, for it is made in perception of the possible objection that, after all, the reply of Diogenes to Zeno's argument against the possibility of motion was the same as that of Aristotle,—the opposition, that is, of the concrete fact to the abstract thought; and that, if there were any difference between the two, it was but one of *expression*, Aristotle's reply being couched in terms of the tongue (writing), and that of Diogenes in terms of the legs (walking). Hegel has certainly correctly enough *prevented* this objection.

There is a light in the above passage from Hegel of a very *trying* quality to the pretensions of such men as Coleridge, De Quincey, and Sir William Hamilton. At page 102 of his own edition of Reid's Works, the last-named very distinguished writer will be found averring, in a note, that 'the fallacy of Zeno's exposition of the contradictions involved in our notion of

motion has not yet been detected'! I suppose the ordinary reader will admit that he has been taught to believe, both by the voice of universal rumour and Hamilton's own, that Greek and German were *the* familiars of this latter, and that, accordingly, he had refuted Hegel and thoroughly mastered Aristotle—or even, perhaps, superseded him!—Coleridge will be found saying somewhere that Zeno, in the matter of his contradiction in regard to Infinite Divisibility, had forgot to bring Time into account; and De Quincey will be found somewhere, in commentary of Coleridge, firing up, as usual, into the figurate Conception with loud exclamation, that here at last was a voice across the ages solving the mystery! Coleridge's explanation here is but a vague *mention* of Time, a schoolboy's guess, without sight of what it meant or of what was to be done with it;—Coleridge, in fact, would in all probility have been quite powerless before the rejoinder—Why, Time itself is an example of the same Contradiction. Greek and German were the strong points of Coleridge and De Quincey also! It is just possible that Coleridge's remark and De Quincey's Comment (though with less probability in the case of the latter) preceded 1812 and the Logic of Hegel; but what of Aristotle?—and why should such Grecians not have directly consulted him, well known (Bayle) to have written on the point in question, when they had their attention expressly directed to the Zenonic problem?—Take it as one may, the *reality* of Hegel, the *substance* of Hegel, becomes of even mountainous solidity in the comparison involuntarily suggested—or rather there is no comparison, one of the terms being, in relation to the rest, manifestly transcendent.

B.

CONTINUOUS AND DISCRETE QUANTITY.

'1. Quantity contains the two moments of Continuity and Discretion. It is to be set in both as its significates. It is *immediate* unity of these, already at first hand; i. e., it is itself set at first hand only in one of its significates, Continuity, and is thus *Continuous Quantity.*

'Or Continuity is, indeed, one of the moments of Quantity, which (Quantity) is completed only with the other moment, Discretion. But Quantity is concrete unity only so far as it is unity of *distinguished* moments. These, therefore, are to be taken as distinct and different, certainly—not, nevertheless, to be resolved again into Attraction and Repulsion, but in their truth each as remaining in its unity with the other, i.e., as *the whole.* Continuity is only coherent, solid unity as unity of the Discrete; thus *expressed* it is no longer only moment, but entire Quantity—*continuous Magnitude.*

'2. *Immediate* Quantity is continuous Magnitude. But Quantity, on the whole, is not an Immediate; Immediacy is a Determinateness (a Quality) of which Quantity is the very sublation. It is, therefore, to be set or expressed in the determinateness which is immanent to it: this is the one or unit. Quantity is *discrete Magnitude.*

'Discretion is, like Continuity, a moment of Quantity; but it is itself also entire Quantity, just because it is a moment in it, in the whole, and, therefore, even as distinguished, steps not out of this whole, not out of its unity with the other moment. Quantity is Ausser-einanderseyn, asunderness, out-of-one-another-ness *in*

itself, and continuous Magnitude is this Asunder-ness as setting itself forward without negation, as a coherence that is equal and alike within itself. But discrete Magnitude is this Asunder-ness as incontinuous, as interrupted. With this Many of Ones there are not again present, however, the Many of the Atom and the Void—Repulsion in general. Because discrete Magnitude is Quantity, its Discretion is itself continuous. This Continuity of the Discrete consists in this, that the ones or units are alike, are equal to one another, or that they have the same *unity*, the same *oneness* (i.e., of being the *Like* of one another). Discrete Magnitude is therefore the Asunder-ness of the many or repeated One, *as of the Like* (as of this Like of one another, or of the *Sameness*), not the many One as such, but expressed as the *Many* or Much *of one Unity*.'

The above is an exact translation ; and translation is necessitated here by the impossibility of accomplishing any closer summary than the text itself. This is a *Constant Quantity* in Hegel, who seldom offers any loose tissue of *raisonnement* to give a chance of *distillation* or compression into summary. (The true state of the case, then, is, not the impossibility of extracting any sense from Hegel *without* distillation, but this impossibility *with* distillation, or rather the impossibility of distillation simply.) But little comment seems necessary. The *immediacy* of the Continuity of Quantity at first hand depends, it will be remembered, on the qualitative indifference, the value, from which it issued. Indeed, this value, the indifferent For-itself-beënt One, should never be left out of mind here, as it is precisely from this One that Quantity *is*, or that Quantity derives its peculiar character. The *One* is but the prototype of the Discrete, as the *One-*

ness is but the prototype of the Continuous. The *indifference* of the For-itself-beënt One, is just the *continuance* of this One; there is nothing but One, One, One, onwards *in infinitum*: what is this but Quantity in both of its moments? The reader, in short, must never forget ever and anon to *orient* himself by a reference to the—*sub specie æterni*.—'Immediacy is a Determinateness of which Quantity is the very Sublation:' we saw this to be the case when Quality passed into Quantity; that transition was simply oneness, immediacy passing into indifference; but still in the indifference there is the immanent *One*, which is the Discrete of Quantity: Quantity, then, may be *expressed*, may be set as *explicit*, as *overt* in this its moment of discretion, or it may be so *stated*. Again, this One that is the Discrete, is also the One, One, One, the One-ness that is the Continuous; and either moment is Quantity and the same Quantity, the Discrete as the One at all, the Continuous as the one One of, or through, all the Ones. This will suffice also to supply the necessary commentary to what follows as regards 'the Like of one another,' &c. The derivation of our *asunder* from the German auseinander will also be obvious. The Reader must be struck with the marvellous truth to the nature of Quantity contained in language that is meant in the first instance to apply only to the indifferent absolute One we had reached in Quality. This is the true nature, then, of the Hegelian *progress*, as it is of Thought, and just of the universe in general,—Setzen, *Explicitation*; whatever at any time we have before us suddenly becomes *explicit* as *another*, a *new*. The phrase *many One* has been necessitated by the corresponding phrase of the original; it will be found not to shock if the reader read with his

mind thoroughly addressed to the self-equal, self-like (discrete) One, that is also the many (continuous) One, of the one, but continued, For-itself-beënt One. The indifference is the Many One,—the *Continuum*; but the one One that is persistently immanent all this time in the indifference, in the continuance, is the *like* One, the One of the *Oneness*,—the *Discretum*. Both are the same, both are quantity; or quantity *is* only at once through their sameness *and* their distinction: without immanent difference or distinction there is no such thing as recognition of an Inhalt, an object, a concrete, in any case; and in every case the question is which moment is the *set* one, the *express* or *explicit* one, and which is the implicit one that is for the time only *in itself*? — Bestimmung, it will be seen, has been translated *significate*; it might have been translated *function*; but, indeed, Bestimmung always refers to *signification*, *denotation*. As regards the *immediacy*, in which Quantity appears as continuous, it is to be remarked that the first moment of *the* Notion in all its forms is one of immediacy: it is always the moment of identity, of understanding or simple apprehension, and that is immediacy. The three moments may be respectively named, then, Immediacy, Mediacy, and mediated, or re-mediated, Immediacy: Apprehension (understanding) takes up just what is before it; Judgment refuses it as it is, and asks for it *in another*; Reason *resumes*. Re-extrication of the moments from each new whole, and in the form, or with the peculiar nature, of this new whole, is the spring and the means of the movement, or just the *movement*: thus Being acting on Nothing, but *in* Becoming, arose as *Origin*, while Nothing acting on Being, but in Becoming, arose as *Decease*; Being acting on Nothing, but in There-

being, re-appeared as Reality, and Nothing acting on Being, but in There-being, re-appeared as Negation; Being acting on Nothing, but in Something, manifested itself as Ansichseyn, in itself-ness, *the* Something's own being, and Nothing acting on Being, but in the Something, manifested itself as the *Being-for-other*, the Being of the Something when under the negation of another, that is, relatively to another, and so on.

Remark.

'The usual separation of these Quantities.

'In the ordinary figurate conceptions of continuous and discrete magnitude, it escapes notice that each of these magnitudes has *in it* both moments, as well continuity as discretion, and that their difference depends only on which is the *explicit* determinateness, and which that that is only *in itself*. Time, Space, Matter, &c., are continuous magnitudes in that they are repulsions from themselves, a fluent Coming-out-of-self, that is at the same time not a going over or a relation to a qualitative other. They possess an absolute possibility of One being set anywhere and everywhere in them; this not as the empty possibility of a mere otherwiseness (as if one should say, it were possible that in place of this stone there were a tree); but they possess the principle of the One in themselves, it is the One of the factors which compose them.

'Conversely in the case of discrete quantity the presence of continuity is not to be overlooked; this moment, as has been shown, is One as oneness.

'Continuous and discrete magnitudes are capable of being regarded as species of Quantity, only if the magnitude is not set under any external determinateness (as a certain So-much), but under *the peculiar distinctions*

or determinatenesses of its own moments; the ordinary transition from genus to species is such as to render the former liable to the ascription of *external* distinctions dependent on some distributive principle *external* to it. Withal, continuous and discrete magnitudes are not *quanta*; they are only Quantity itself in each of its two forms. They may be named magnitudes so far, perhaps, as they have this in common with the *Quantum*, that they are a peculiar determinateness in Quantity.'

This Remark is also an exact translation, and little comment seems necessary. The One as Oneness is continuity; Oneness as One is discretion. The distinctions will not remain in *dry* self-identity: the Geometrical point *is* potential space, Attraction is Repulsion, Repulsion is Motion, &c., and the question always is, which elementary distinction is overt, express, explicit, ostensive, and which latent, implicit, indicated, indirect, &c.? Setzen contains the whole mystery: the Moon here is always either full or new. A concrete must have difference and identity; mere difference were dissolution, and mere identity were equally extinction. Space has both principles; so also Time; and these, though both pure Quantities, are still different. The One and the Many of Space are at once and together. The One of Time never *is* and always *is*; its One is its Many, its Many its One: Time is thus a symbol of the Absolute.

C.

LIMITATION OF QUANTITY.

'The discrete magnitude has firstly the One as its principle, and is secondly Multiplicity of the Ones; thirdly, it is essentially continuous, it is the One at the same time as a sublated one, *as oneness*, self-continuation as such in the discretion of the Ones. It is set, therefore,

as *a* Magnitude, and the peculiar determinateness of such magnitude is the one which in this *position* and particular Being is *excludent* one—limit in the unity. The discrete magnitude as such is supposed to be immediately not limited; but as distinguished from the continuous magnitude it is as a There-being (a special Beingness) and a Something, the determinateness of which is the one which one as in a There-being is also first Negation and Limit.

'This limit, besides being referred to the unity, and besides being negation *in this unity*, is as one also *referred to itself*, and thus it is encompassing and containing limit. The limit distinguishes itself not in the first instance here from the Something of its There-being, but is as one immediately this negative point itself. But the Being that is here limited is essentially as continuity, by virtue of which it is beyond the limit and this one, and is in that regard indifferent. The real discrete Quantity is thus *a* Quantity, or Quantum, —Quantity as a There-being and Something.

'In that the one which is limit, contains the many ones of the discrete quantity within itself, it sets these no less as sublated within it; it is thus limit in the continuity as such, and so the difference between continuous and discrete magnitude is here indifferent; or more correctly, it is limit in the continuity *of the one*, as much as in that *of the other*; in it *both* undergo transition into *Quanta*.'

These three paragraphs (of C) are exactly translated, but sufficiently difficult. Intelligence must be sought *sub specie aterni* in the first instance—we must return to look again at the indifferent absolute One with which we entered Quantity. The One, the many Ones, the one One: all lies there; these are the 1, 2, 3 with

which Hegel starts. In the indifferent life of the absolute One now, the One, the Unit, is still as the principle, but it *continues*, or is the many Ones, and also when it refers back to these and the series of these, it is one One and *a* Quantity, or Quantum. In its indifference it is certainly 'essentially continuous;' 'it is the One as sublated One, as Unity;' it is its own 'self-continuation in the discretion of the Ones.' It is thus *a* quantity, and the peculiar specificity of this quantity depends on the One that is its limit. A Ten depends on the tenth. This One (the tenth) is seen also to be the *excludent* One. The quantity to which this One is limit is characterised as Daseyn, as Etwas, and as dieses Gesetztseyn. Etwas is, of course, translated only Something; Daseyn now as There-being (special Beingness), and again as particular Being. As for Gesetztseyn, it will be found translated on this occasion, and not infelicitously, by 'in this *position*.' But why these words are used in this place requires a word of explanation. The key to the whole lies in what has taken place: the One is One, as continued it is many Ones, but as continued it is also one One. Now this last step is as a reflexion from other or others into self; but that is precisely the constitution of Something. Again, the continuance through the series of the Ones is a Werden, a Becoming, while its suspension (by the reflexion alluded to) gives rise to a Daseyn, a There-being, a definite relative So-ness. Lastly, the reflexion is a Setzen, and the result is a Gesetztseyn; the reflexion is only an *explicit*ation of what was before implicit, and the result is a new *explicit*ness, a new *position*, where this last word may be considered an equivoque of and between its ordinary and its logical senses. It will not be difficult to see now, then, that

discrete magnitude, passing through these reflexions, has become *a* Magnitude, the precise value or determinateness of which depends on the One from which the reflexion back was made; this one is the limit or the excludent one in the new *position*, or special Thereness which has been just effected through the reflexion. The tenth one in a ten will readily illustrate all this. The tenth one is the limit, the excludent one, the barrier that stops entrance to all other ones; but it is the reflexion of this tenth one into the other ones that gives birth to the particular and peculiar and every way unique and special quantity Ten or *a* Ten; the whole acquires the *edge*, the specificity of this *one*; each of the other ones is as it—a tenth; each of the other ones is it; *from* it is the new *explicit*ation, the new *position*, the new *There*-ness, the new Something—Ten. The Ten is at first as ten units—discrete—without any definite boundary line—but these ten as distinguished from the possible continuation or continuity onwards into and through other units, are a special definite Thereness and So-ness, a special definite Something of which the One (the tenth) is at once the specificity, and also—as in a There-being (negated, suspended Becoming)—the first negation and limit. Thus far the first paragraph; which being thoroughly understood, the two remaining ones will not be difficult. The reader, however, may object here—why the digression?—why leap from the very absolute of absolutes to a thing so very everyday and common as the number Ten? We answer, there is no necessity for the digression; all must still be conceived as *sub specie æterni*; the number ten is but an empirical illustration. The life, so to speak, of the qualitative One, now a quantitative One, is still to be pursued by the *clue* and the *virtue* of the

pure Notion. What is, is now pure Quantity, sublated Quality, Determinateness external to its own self, an indefinitely continuous *out*ering or uttering of itself of the One as One, One, One; *but* it is the pure Notion that is so characterised, and whatever is implicit in this characterisation, that notion shall duly *set* or make explicit for us. Now One,—and One, One, One,—and again One that, referring back, resumes these one-one-ones, is very fairly the movement of the notion in such an element. Not only is such movement characteristic of the element as element, but on the other side, it is the characteristic movement of the Notion itself;—it is again Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason; it is again Identity, Difference, and identified Difference, or differentiated Identity; it is again Immediacy, Mediacy, and re-mediated Immediacy, or just Immediate Mediacy. This being seen, another deep glance into Hegel has been effected with realisation of the distinction that Hegel is not only true to the principle, the Notion, but true to the element also; and so only is it that what he says is the exhaustive Metaphysic, even in an external sense, of whatever sphere he enters. A great deal has been written about Cause and Effect, for example, but it will be found that Hegel alone, with vigilant eye immovably fixed on the pure Notion, has been enabled to speak the ultimate word, even as external explanation, on this subject also. The number Ten, then, illustrates, but it does not create the present phase of the Absolute or of the Notion; that phase is one of pure Quantity, and is applicable not to numbers only, but to extension as well. There are many readers to whom all this prosecution of a one, one, one, &c., will appear but trifling —a trifling wholly unworthy of grown men: even so, to an external eye, a bearded Archimedes scratching

lines, triangles, squares, circles, &c., might seem but a great boy very unworthily employing himself. Archimedes, however, through these scratches brought no less a power than that of Rome to bay; through these scratches Archimedes and the like enabled us to move mountains and to change seas, enabled us to seize Space and Time themselves: these scratches, indeed, have been to us the express successive steps heavenwards. So Hegel, following these soap-bubbles of one, one, one, &c., has made us freemen of the Absolute itself.

The tenth of the ten will be found to illustrate the first sentence of the second paragraph also; it is 'referred to the unity'—Ten; it is 'negation in this unity;' it stops Ten there, and it stops others off from Ten; it is also 'referred to itself,'—it is the tenth, and so each of the others is a tenth, and the ten itself has in it (the tenth) its own particular value or virtue; and thus is it 'encompassing and containing limit.' The ten — to follow the next sentence — are thus in the tenth, the limit, 'this negative point itself'; the tenth, then, is thus not distinguished from the Something, the Ten. Still the Ten are a 'Being—essentially continuity — a Ten — beyond this limit,' this single One, the tenth, and in that respect 'indifferent to it.' It is thus a Quantity, and a Something with a specific Thereness or peculiar nature.

The last paragraph opens with renewed consideration of the tenth unit of the ten; as it is *it* which gives the whole peculiar character of the number — a ten — it is the qualitative and quantitative limit; quantitatively it limits the continuity; qualitatively it absorbs into itself all the other units—each is a tenth, but only through it; it is thus limit in the continuity generally, limit to the continuity as such, and limit also, as it

were, to the continuity of the discretes themselves (in that it sums and absorbs them). Thus is it that — (the tenth unit sublating, absorbing, or taking up into itself both) — 'continuous and discrete magnitude is here indifferent,' or that '*both* undergo transition into Quanta,' the discretes becoming each a *tenth* and so in continuity *Ten* — through the limiting tenth.

The reader will find the illustration here a very perfect key to a very blank door indeed of indefinite abstraction. Nevertheless, it is always to the Absolute that the reader must first address himself; only *so* will he find himself at home also, if we may speak thus, with soap, soda, and pearl-ash.

What is *explicit* now is Quantity as such—whether discrete or continuous—reduced to *Limit*,—let us well observe this.

CHAPTER II.

QUANTUM.

'THE Quantum, *first of all* Quantity with a Determinateness or Limit in general,—is in its perfect Determinateness the *Number* (the Digit or Cipher). The Quantum distinguishes itself—

'secondly, in the first instance, into the *extensive* Quantum, in which the Limit is as limitation of the there-beënt multiplex (or Many); in the second instance, (this There-being passing into Being-for-self)—into *intensive* Quantum, Degree, which, as *for-itself*, and even so no less immediately *out of itself*, seeing that it is as indifferent Limit even when for-itself,—has its Determinateness in another. As this express contradiction, to be thus simply determined within itself and at the same time to have its determinateness out of itself, and to point for this determinateness out of itself, the Quantum passes over—

'thirdly, as what is expressly *in itself* external to itself, into the Quantitative Infinite.'

If not intelligible now, this division will become intelligible by the end of the chapter. The Many, the Multiplex, the Ones, or Units of *extensive* Quanta, are evidently *there-beënt*; they are not *ansich*; they are distinguishably *there*; they are relative distinctivity *there*; they are palpably *there*—sensibly *there*; and they are *what* they are through negation of Becoming, Limit.

A.

THE NUMBER OR DIGIT.

'Quantity is Quantum, or has a limit; both as continuous and as discrete magnitude. The difference of these kinds has here at first hand no import.'

This has just been seen: the limit of the *continuum* is the limit also of, or affects with its own virtue, the *discreta*.

'As sublated Being-for-self, Quantity is already in and for itself indifferent to its limit. But withal the limit, or to be a Quantum, is just so not indifferent to it; for it contains the One, absolute determinedness, within itself as its own moment, which One, therefore, as explicit *in* its continuity or unity, is its limit, which, however, remains as One, as which One it (the Quantity) now on the whole is.'

This is intelligible when viewed *sub specie æterni*, and also when illustrated as before by *ten*, &c. Sublated Being-for-self is, as it were, punctuality gone over out of itself into its own opposite, and that is Quantity.

'This One is, therefore, the principle and *principium* of the Quantum, but as One *of Quantity*. So it is, *firstly*, Continuous, it is *oneness or unity*; *secondly*, it is Discrete, implicit (as in continuous) or (as in discrete magnitude) explicit Multiplicity of Ones, which have equality, likeness, sameness, continuity, the same *oneness* or unity with one another; *thirdly*, this One is also the negation of the Many Ones as simple limit, an exclusion of its otherwiseness out of itself, a determination of itself counter *other* Quanta. The One is so far, (α) limit referent of self to self, (β) self-comprehensive limit, and (γ) other-excluding limit.'

All this is pretty much what we saw already under (C.), 'Limitation of Quantity,' and it is quite susceptible of the same illustration: the tenth unit may be seen — or has been seen — to take up each of these three attitudes towards itself, towards the other units, and in sublation of these. This is so easy of application now, that no more need be said. 'An exclusion of its otherwiseness out of itself:' in the ten there are 1, 2, 3, &c.; now these, as 1, 2, 3, &c., are the otherwiseness, but they are excluded as otherwiseness by the tenth, and have become equally *tenth*, converted, that is, into the one identity.

'The Quantum in these forms completely explicit is the *Number* (the Cipher, the Digit). The complete *position* or *explicitation* lies in the special nature of the Limit as Multiplicity, and so in its distinction as well from the unity. The Number appears on this account as a discrete magnitude, but it has *in* the unity equally continuity. It is therefore, thus, the Quantum in perfect *determinateness* (specificity); this, inasmuch as the limit in the Digit is as determinate *Multiplicity*, which has for principle the One, the directly Determinate. Continuity (as that in which the One is only *in itself*, or as sublated), expressed as Unity, is the Form of Indeterminateness, Indefiniteness.'

To return to the paragraph of the text immediately preceding the last, for a moment — we would observe that the division or distribution with which it ends is exceedingly instructive, inasmuch as the general principle of such movement comes very clearly to the surface. Number, meaning any number or digit, is a limit, firstly, Self-referent; secondly, Self-comprehensive; thirdly, Excludent of other. The *self-reference* is identity, immediacy, Simple Apprehension, but in the

element before us—unity. The comprehendingness, embracingness, clipping or shutting about-ness (Umschliessend) of the Second is difference, mediacy, reference to other, Judgment, but, in the present element, Many. Under the third head we have what Hegel may be described as always specially bringing us, the *Remedy*, the Re-mediacy, identity through difference, that is, differentiated identity or identified difference, reference to self through reference to other, an *othered* self, or a *selfed* other, a concrete determinate definite One, the moment of Reason, but here, in this element, a numerical whole, a Number. That is (with special regard to the *element*), *unity* and *amount* (amount of constitutive unities, that is,—Einheit und Anzahl) are the Moments of the Number, the Cipher, the Digit. The concrete, then, is the Number, and the moments can be seen in its regard to be, the one, Identity, and the other, Difference, and both, so far, relatively abstract. Quantity, as a whole, might be more simply divided into the Universal—Quantity, the Particular—Tantity, and the Singular—Quantified Tantity or Tantified Quantity (which last is just Quantitative Relation). In the same way, Quality might have been divided into Quality, Tality, and Qualified Tality, or Talified Quality (Being-for-self). The parallelism of the other triplets which we now know, will readily suggest itself. As regards the general division of the Whole, Logic, Nature, Spirit, it can be seen to be quite parallel with Quality, Quantity, and Measure,—with Universal, Particular, and Singular, &c. &c. As for the division of Logic into Seyn (Being), Wesen (Essence), and Begriff (Notion), it is strikingly parallel with Kant's Categories of Relation, as if Hegel had said to himself, Logic is the Subject inquiring into the *Object*, that is,

into *its own relations*. Now Kant's Categories of Relation are—Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity. Seyn (Being) is analogous to Substance; historically, it is the Logic or Philosophy of the Greeks, whose constant inquiry was, What is this Seyn, this Being? A question to which there were such answers as, Water, Air, Fire, the One, Becoming, Number, the Atom, Intelligence, and lastly, that of Socrates, which, though in a particular element, was *an sich*, or *in itself*, the abstract generalised Notion afterwards perfected by Aristotle through Plato into Formal Logic. We may say, then, here that the Subject (among the Greeks, that is) had not as yet got beyond Simple Apprehension, Understanding; at the same time, it is to be admitted that Aristotle names, and occupies himself to some extent with, the concrete generalised, or universal, Notion. Wesen, Essentity, is the platform of the modern world, which, up to Kant, had demanded, in regard to the Object, What is its cause? or, what is the same thing, What is it in another? And what is this but Judgment declaring the Object *nothing as per se*? Kant for his part inaugurated the reign of Reason: his industry was Reason *an sich*, *in itself*; he declared the Wesen, the Essential Principle and Nature, to be the Notion — or Notional Reciprocity. Into this final form at least, into the absolute or concrete Universal, the conception of Kant has been perfected by Hegel. Socrates reached the abstract Notion, then, and Aristotle completed it into the abstract Logic; but Kant discovered the concrete Notion, and Hegel completed it into the concrete Logic. This single sentence tells the whole tale. The concrete Notion, as it manifests itself in Hegel, is perhaps, at shortest, this—*The Absolute is relative*. Sufficient reflection, indeed, will soon disclose the fact,

that an Absolute implies *relativity*, —that an Absolute is an Absolute just because of its relativity, or just because of the relativity it contains. The general method of Hegel, then, is, in accordance with this constitution of the nature of things, always to extricate from any Absolute — any self-identical whole may be considered an absolute — its own necessary relativity, the opposition of which latter to the former, the absoluteness, results in the collapse of both into a concrete and new identity. All this has been already said in a variety of forms: it is just the Being-in-itself-ness and the Being-for-other-ness,—in ultimate abstraction it is just Being and Nothing. The generalisation of Socrates, then, which issued in abstract induction and abstract deduction, has, in the hands of Hegel, been, as it were, *doubled*, and doubled into a concrete: at any time that advance is made to a generalised identity, note must be made of the other side, also, of the generalised difference or relativity, which will be found necessarily to constitute and give its peculiar filling to that identity. The perception of this double constitution of the nature of thought, and consequently of things, it is, that has enabled Hegel to reverse the process of Socrates; that is, instead of ascending from the *immediate* object to universal notions, to descend from these last according to their truth, and that is to say, by their own necessary self-genetic chain, which ends not but in the system of the whole — a system that comprises and gives meaning and place even to the contingency and isolated singleness of the external Immediate.

Passing to the last paragraph translated, it is not difficult to see that the number qua number is the Quantum completely explicit in the forms mentioned.

'This complete *position* or *explicitation* lies, &c.,'—that is, the principle or reason of this process expressed by these forms lies, &c. The definition that occurs at the end, of the 'Form of Indefiniteness,' is exceedingly happy.

'The Quantum only as such has a limit; its limit is its abstract, simple determinateness. But the Quantum being a Number, this limit is expressly as *manifold within itself*. It (the number) contains the many ones which constitute its distinctive being; contains them, however, not in an indefinite manner, but the determinateness of the limit falls into them; the limit excludes other units, other distinctive being, and the units included by it are a determinate number,—the *amount*, to which, as the *discretion* in the way in which it is in the number, the other is the *unity*, the *continuity* of the same number. *Amount* and *unity* constitute the moments of Number.

'As regards *amount*, we must see more closely how the many ones of which it *consists* are in the limit; the expression is correct that the amount *consists* of the many, for the ones are in it not as sublated, but they *are* in it, only expressed with the excluding limit, to which they, however, are indifferent. But *it* is not so to them. In the case of There-being (distinctive being), the relation of the limit to it had firstly expressed itself so, that the There-being remained standing as the affirmative on this side of its limit, and it (the limit), the negation, found itself without by the border; in like manner as regards the many ones, the breaking-off with them and the exclusion of any others appears as a circumstance which falls outside of the included ones. But we saw there that the limit pervades the There-being, reaches as far as it, and that the Something is thereby,

as regards its determination, limited, i.e. finite. Thus, in the quantitativity of Number, we conceive a hundred—say—so that the hundredth one, or unit, alone appears to limit the many in such wise that they *are* a hundred. This is right on one side; but then, again, among the hundred ones no one has any preference, for they are only equal; each is equally the hundredth; they belong all of them, therefore, to the limit, by which limit the number is a hundred: this number cannot want any one of them for its special determinateness; the others make up thus apart from the hundredth one no There-being (distinctivity) that were without the limit or within the limit, or in general different from it. The Amount is not therefore a Many as *against* the including, limiting one or unit, but constitutes itself this limitation, which is a determinate Quantum; the many form a number, a Two, a Ten, a Hundred, &c.

'The limiting one, now, is determinedness counter other, distinction of the Number from others. But this distinction is not qualitative determinateness, but remains quantitative, falls only into the *external* Reflexion that compares; a number remains as a one turned back into itself, and indifferent to others. *This indifference* of a Number to others is an essential characteristic of it; this it is that constitutes the In-itself-ness (the independent self-subsistence) of its nature, but at the same time *its peculiar externality*. It is such *numerical one*, as the absolutely determined one that has at the same time the form of simple Immediacy, to which, therefore, any reference to other is perfectly external. The one that is a *number* has further its *determinateness*, so far as that determinateness is *reference-to-other*, as its moments within itself, in its *distinction* of *unity* and *amount*, and the amount is itself a many of *ones*, i.e., there is

within itself this absolute externality. This contradiction of Number or of Quantum in general within itself is the quality of quantum, and this contradiction will develope itself as the characterisation of this quality proceeds.'

There-being, as used in this connexion, refers to the special values of the various numbers; a Two, a Ten, a Hundred, &c., can be seen to have a Daseyn, a There-being of its own, a peculiar distinctivity which belongs to it and to nothing else. This throws light on Daseyn itself, which is always thus, as it were, the peculiar and differentiating sensibleness or palpableness of anything whatever; it is distinctive relativity. That it and its peculiarity arise, too, from a negated Werden—here a counting forward, one, two, three, &c.,—is also well seen in this example. The irrespective independent apathy, neutrality, and externality of number are well touched. Bestimmtheit, Determinateness, is also well seen here to convey absolute peculiarity, specificity, &c. —anything's express and constitutive *point*. The reader has, in regard to these passages, already sufficient illustration at command, and we may pass to

Remark 1.

The Arithmetical Operations.

An important critique on Kant contained here also we shall reserve for notice elsewhere; the remaining matter we shall endeavour to summarise—a process, as regards Hegel, possible only at rare intervals, and, for the most part, as here, only in the *Remarks*.

'Magnitude as in space (Geometrical) and Magnitude as in number (Arithmetical), though bearing the one on *continuity* and the other on *discretion*, and so far different, are usually regarded as equally *kinds* of

the same thing, as equally *Quanta*, and as equally determinate. But what holds of *continuity* cannot have the same keenness of limit, determinateness, as what holds of *discretion*. Geometrical limitation is limitation quite generally; for precision of determinateness it requires number. Geometry measures not, is not mensuration,—it com*pare*s, it *likens together*. Its distinctions proceed by *like* and *unlike*. It is thus the circle; its nature being absolute likeness of distance on the part of every circumferential point as regards the single central one, has no need of number. Like and unlike are characters, then, veritably geometrical; but they are insufficient, and number is called in, as we see in Triangle, Quadrangle, &c. Number has in its principle—the one—complete *self*-determinateness, and not determinateness, as in com*pari*son, through another. There is the geometrical point, a one certainly, but, in the line, &c., the point is no longer the point, it is out of itself into continuity—another; as essentially a one of Space, it becomes, when *in reference* (i.e. in *connexion*), a continuity, in which punctuality, self-determinateness, the one, is sublated. To maintain the self-determinateness of the one in the Out-of-self-ness of the continuity, the line must be taken as a many or multiple of ones, and must receive within itself the limit, the determinateness, the conjunct virtue, of the many or multiplicity; i.e., the magnitude of the line—and so of the rest—must be taken as Number.

'Arithmetic considers, rather operates with, Number, for Number is indifferent determinateness, inert, to be brought into action and reference only from *without*. The *arithmetical rules* concern the modes of reference or connexion. They are rehearsed in succession, and seem to depend on one another, but no principle of

mutual connexion is exhibited. From the nature of the notion of number, however, such principle of systematic co-reference may be deduced.

'From its principle, the One, Number is but an externally united compound, a purely analytic figure, without internal connexion. As thus externally generated, all counting is a production of numbers, a *numbering*, or, more definitely, a *numbering together*. Difference in this external operation, which is always the same, can come only from the mutual difference of the numbers operated on, and must always depend on an external consideration.

'Numbers as Quanta are externally distinguished by external identity and external difference, or by Likeness and Unlikeness, characters which fall to be considered elsewhere. But the nature of Number depending on the qualitative distinction of unity and amount, it is from that distinction that all others will follow.

'Again, external composition plainly infers external decomposition; so that a traffic with numbers *in general* must either, as *composing*, be *positive*, or, as *decomposing*, *negative*, and the particular *species* of this traffic, though following, will remain independent of, this antithesis.

'The *first* production of Number is the *composing* of *many* ones just as *many ones*,—Numeration. Such externality is only externally exhibited by help of the fingers, points, *counters*, &c.; what Three is, or Four is, can only be *pointed out*. Cessation, the limit of the operation being so completely external, can only be contingent or at will. A *system* of Numbers, Dyadic, Decadic, &c., turns on the distinction of Unity and Amount, and more precisely on what Amount is to be considered as Unity.

'Numbers, produced by numeration, are again num-

bered — Addition; and here from their origin the numbers are evidently mutually independent, mutually indifferent to likeness or unlikeness, mutually contingent—hence *unlike* in general. That $7+5=12$ we learn from actual *counting* in the first instance, and know afterwards from memory. It is the same thing with $7\times5=35$. The ready-made tables of addition and multiplication save us the trouble of always repeating such external counting; but there is no process of internal reasoning or *special* intuition in the whole matter. Subtraction is the negative complement of the same operation that obtains in Addition;—a *decomposition*, equally analytic, of numbers equally characterised as unlike in general.

'The next step is that the numbers which enter into the numeration are *equal* or *like*, and no longer *unequal* or *unlike*. They form thus a *Unity*, and are subject to *Amount*. This is Multiplication—the counting up of an *Amount* of *Unities*, the unities being themselves pluralities or amounts. Of the two numbers, either may be indifferently viewed as Unity or as Amount: 4 times 3 is not different from 3 times 4. *Immediate* assignment, in such cases, has been already shown to result from previous process and the intervention of memory. Division is the negative side of the same operation, and rests on the same distinction. How often (the Amount) is a number (the Unity) contained in another number? This is the same question as, A Number being divided into a given Amount of equal parts, what is the magnitude of this part (the Unity)? Divisor and Quotient are thus indifferently Unity or Amount.

'The final step in the *equalisation* is, that the Unity and the Amount, which in the first instance (as opposed

to each other simply as Numbers generally) are to be considered as on the whole *unlike* or *unequal*, become now *like* or *equal*. Numeration, the equality that lies in Number being thus completed, is now *involution*, the negative complement of which is *evolution*. Of this process, the Square is the perfect type, further involution being but a *formal* continuation, with repetition of equality as result, or with divergence into inequality. No other distinctions and no other equalisations of such are to be found in the notion of the Number or Cipher. So is the Notion constituted in this sphere; and thus by a going back *into* itself is the going *out* of itself balanced. The imperfection of solution in the case of higher equations, or the necessary reduction of these to Quadratics, receives light from the principles enunciated. The Square in Arithmetic, like the right-angled triangle, as explicated by the theorem of Pythagoras, in Geometry, is the pure self-complete determinateness of its sphere, and to the one as to the other the remaining particularities of the respective spheres reduce themselves.

'Number in *relation* is no longer *immediate* Quantum, and *proportion* finds its place in the following section on Maass or Measure.

'The externality of the matter of number leaves no room for Philosophy proper, or the exposition of the Notion as such, which depends ever on immanent development. Here, nevertheless, the moments of the Notion manifest themselves, as in external fashion, in equality and inequality; and the subject is exhibited in its true *understanding*. Distinction of sphere is in Philosophy a general necessity: what is External and Contingent is in its peculiarity not to be disturbed by Ideas, and these are not to be deformed or reduced to

mere formality by the incommensurableness of the matter.'

It is easy to object to these Hegelian classifications, that there are really only two operations in Arithmetic, Addition and Subtraction, and that devotion to the Notion is here too obviously, too betrayingly external. It is to be said, however, that Multiplication and Quadration really *are* these qualitative ascents. As regards the Square in especial, the qualitativeness which it seems to introduce will be found afterwards to have taken a strong hold of Hegel.

Remark 2.

Application of Numerical Distinctions in Expression of Philosophical Notions.

This is a very admirable Note, both important and characteristic: without losing matter we shall endeavour as much as possible to compress, however.

'Numbers, as is well known, have been applied by the Pythagoreans, and — especially in the form of *powers*—by certain moderns in indication or expression of relations of thought; and they have also appeared to possess such purity of form as to constitute them a most appropriate element in the interest of education—an element closest to the thinking spirit, and closest also to the fundamental relations of the universe.

'We have seen Number to be the absolute determinateness (as it were, *point*) of Quantity, determinateness *in* itself, and at the same time quite external; its element is the difference become indifferent. Arithmetic is analytic; difference and connexion in its object are not internal to it, but come from without. It has no concrete object with latent inner relations to be made

explicit by express effort of thought. It holds not the Notion, nor does its problem concern comprehending (notional) thought; it is rather the opposite of that. What is connected is indifferent to the connexion, which itself is without necessity; thought, then, in such an element finds the energy required an *utter outering* of itself—an energy in which it must do itself the violence to move without thoughts and connect what is incapable of necessity. The object is the abstract thought of *Externality* itself.

'As such thought of externality, Number is at the same time an abstraction from the sensuous multiplex; of this it has retained nothing but the abstract form of externality: sense thus in it is brought closest to thought; it is the *pure thought* of the proper externalisation of thought.

'The thinking spirit that would raise itself above the sensuous world and recognise its substance may, in the quest of an element for its pure *conception*, for the *expression* of its essential substance, and before it apprehends thought itself as this element, and wins for its exhibition a pure spiritual expression, stumble on the choice of number, this internal, abstract externality. So is it that early in the history of Philosophy we find Number applied in expression of philosophemes. It constitutes the latest stage in that imperfection which contemplates the Universal unpurged from Sense. The ancients, and specially Plato, as reported by Aristotle, placed the concerns of mathematic between the Ideas and Sense; as invisible and unmoved (eternal) different from the latter, and as a Many and a Like different from the Ideas which are such as are purely self-identical and one in themselves. Moderatus of Cadiz remarks that the Pythagoreans had recourse to num-

bers because they were not yet in a position to apprehend *distinctly in reason* fundamental ideas and first principles, which are hard to think and hard to enunciate; but numbers were to them as figures to Geometers—signs merely, and it is superfluous to remark that these philosophers had really advanced to the more express categories, as is recorded by Photius. These ancients, then, were, in fact, much in advance of those moderns who have returned to numbers and put a perverted mathematical formalism in the place of thought and thoughts—regarding, indeed, this return to an incapable infancy as something praiseworthy, and even fundamental and profound.

'Number has been characterised as between the Ideas and Sense, and as holding of the latter by this that it is *in it* a many, an asunder or out-of-one-another; but it is to be said also that this Many itself, this remainder of Sense taken up into thought, is thought's own Category of the External as such. The further, concrete, true thoughts, what is quickest and most living, what is *comprehended only in co-reference*, connexion,—this transplanted to such element of outwardness is converted into something motionless and dead. The richer thoughts become in determinateness, and consequently in reference, so much the more confused on one side and so much the more arbitrary and empty on the other side becomes their statement in such forms as numbers are.

'To designate the movement of the Notion by One, Two, Three, &c., this to thought is a task the hardest; for it is to expect it to move in the element of its own contrary, of reference-lessness; its employment is to be the work of sheer *derangement*. To comprehend, e.g., that three are one and one three, this

is a hard imposition, because the One, the Unit, is what is reference-less, what shows not therefore in itself any character that might mediate transition, but rather, on the contrary, excludes and rejects any such reference. Conversely mere Understanding uses this as against Speculative truth (as, e.g., in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity), and *counts* the terms which are to constitute a single unity as if in demonstration of a self-evident absurdity,—i.e., it itself commits the absurdity of reducing that which is reference pure and simple into what is precisely reference-less. By the name Trinity, it is never expected that the Unit and the Digit are to be regarded by Understanding as the *essential* burthen of the object. This name expresses on the part of Reason contempt of Understanding, which again, for its part, stubborns itself against Reason, and fixes itself in its conceit of holding to the Unit and to Number as such.

'To employ mathematical characters as symbols is, so far as that goes, harmless; but it is silly to suppose that in this way *more* is expressed than what *thought itself is able to hold* and *express*. If in such meagre symbols as those of mathematic, or in those richer ones of mythology and poetry, any deep sense is to be supposed, then it is for thought alone to summon into day the wisdom that lies only *in* them, and not only as in symbols, but as in Nature and the living Spirit. In symbols the truth is only *troubled* and *enveloped* by the sensuous element; only in the form of thought is it thoroughly revealed to consciousness: the meaning, the *import*, is only *the thought* itself.

'To apply the forms of mathematic, in explication of Philosophy, has this of preposterous, that only in the latter can the ultimate import of the former be

expected to yield itself. It is to Logic, and not to Mathematic, that the other sciences must apply for that element of Logic in which they move and to which they reduce themselves; that Philosophy should seek its Logic in the shapes (but omens or sophistications of it) it assumes in other sciences, is but an expedient of philosophical incapacity. The application of such borrowed forms is but external; inquiry into their worth and import must precede the application; such inquiry belongs to abstract thought, and cannot be superseded by any mathematical or other such authority. The result of such pure logical inquiry is to strip off the *particularity* (mathematical or other) of the form, and to render it superfluous and unnecessary: in short, it is Logic that clears and rectifies all such forms, and alone provides them with verification, sense, and worth.

'As for the value of Number in the element of education, that is contained in the preceding. Number is a non-sensuous object, and occupation with it and its combinations a non-sensuous employment; thought is drawn in thus to reflexion within itself and an inward and abstract labour—a matter of great but one-sided import. For Number involving the difference as only external and thought-less, such employment is but a thought-less and mechanical one. The endeavour consists, for the most part, in holding fast the Notion-less and in notion-less-ly combining it. The object is the void Unit; the solid burthen of the moral and spiritual universe, with which, as the noblest aliment, Education should fill full the young, is to be supplanted by the import-less Unit; with no possible result, such exercise being what is main and chief, but to deaden and stupify the mind, emptying it, at the same time, both of form and substance. Numerical calculation being a business

so very mechanical and external, it has been possible to construct machines capable of performing all the operations of Arithmetic, and that most perfectly. This alone were decisive of calculation as principal mean of education—and of the propriety of stretching the thinking Spirit on the wheel in order to be perfected into a machine.'

B.

EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE QUANTUM.

a. *Their Difference.*

The paragraphs under this head are again eligible for exact translation, the metaphysic being at once eminently characteristic and eminently intelligible.

'1. The Quantum has, as the result showed, its determinateness as limit in the Amount. It is discrete within itself, a Many which has not a Being that were different from its limit, or that might have this latter out of it. The Quantum thus constituted with its limit, which is a multiple in itself, is *extensive* Magnitude.'

'Extensive is to be distinguished from Continuous Magnitude; to the former there stands directly opposed, not Discrete, but Intensive Magnitude. Extensive and intensive magnitudes are peculiarities of the quantitative *limit*, but the Quantum is identical with its limit; continuous and discrete magnitudes, again, are forms of Quantity *in itself*, i.e., of quantity as such, so far as in regard to the Quantum the limit is abstracted from. Extensive magnitude has the moment of Continuity in itself and in its limit, in that its many in general is continuous; the limit as negation appears so far in *this*

equality of the Many as limitation of the Unity. Continuous magnitude is quantity setting itself forward without respect to a limit; and so far as it is already conceived with one, this is a limitation generally, *without discretion being explicit in it.* The Quantum, only as continuous magnitude, is not yet veritably determined *per se*, because it wants the One, the Unit, in which self-determinateness lies, and Number. In like manner discrete magnitude is immediately only distinguished plurality in general, which, so far as it as such is to have a limit, is only a multiplicity (eine Menge), that is to say, it is what is indefinitely limited. To be a definite Quantum, to that there is necessary the taking together of the Many into One, by which this many were set identical with the limit. Each of them, continuous and discrete magnitude, as Quantum in general, has only one of the two sides explicit in it, by which sides it is perfectly determined and as Number. This (the Number) is immediately extensive Quantum,—the *simple* determinateness which is essentially as *Amount*, but as Amount of one and the same Unity; the extensive Quantum is distinguished from the Number only by this, that the determinateness is expressly set in the latter as multiplicity.

'2. The determinateness, nevertheless, how much something is, by Number, is not in want of distinction from any other magnitude, so that this magnitude itself and some other magnitude should belong to the determinateness, inasmuch as the (numerical) determinateness of magnitude in general is self-determined, indifferent, and simply self-referred limit; and in Number it (the limit) is explicitly set as contained in the self-dependent One, and has its externality, the reference to other, *within itself.* This many

of the limit itself, further, is as the many in general, not unequal within itself, but continuous: each of the many is what the other is; as discrete many it constitutes not, therefore, the determinateness as such. This many, therefore, collapses *per se* into its continuity and becomes simple unity. Amount is only moment of Number; but constitutes not as a multiplicity of numerical ones the determinateness of Number, but these ones as indifferent, external to themselves, are sublated in the returnedness of Number within itself; the externality which constituted the ones of the multiplicity, disappears in the One as reference of Number to itself.

'The limit of the Quantum, that as extensive had its there-beënt determinateness as the self-external Amount, passes, therefore, into *simple* determinateness. In this simple determination of limit it is *intensive magnitude*, and the limit or determinateness, which is identical with the Quantum, is thus now also explicitly set as simple oneness,—Degree.

'The degree is, therefore, determinate magnitude, Quantum, but not, at the same time, multiplicity, or several *within itself*; it is only a *severality* (not a Mehreres, but a Mehrheit); the *severality* is the *several* taken together into the *simple* quality, There-being gone together into Being-for-self. Its determinateness must, indeed, be expressed by a Number as for perfect determinateness of the Quantum, but is not as amount, but simple, only *a* degree. When 10, 20 degrees are spoken of, the Quantum that has so many degrees, is the 10th, the 20th degree, not the amount and sum of these; in that case it were extensive; but it is only one single one, the 10th, the 20th degree. It contains the determinateness which lies in the amount

ten, twenty, but contains it not as a plurality, but is Number as sublated Amount, as *simple* determinateness.

'3. In Number the Quantum is explicit in its perfect determinateness; as intensive Quantum, however, as in its Being-for-self, it is explicitly set as it is according to its Notion or *in itself*. The form, namely, of self-reference, which it has in degree, is, at the same time, the being in externality to itself of this same degree. Number is as extensive Quantum numerical multiplicity, and so has the externality within it. This externality, as multiplicity in general, collapses into the undistinguishedness, and sublates itself in the One, of the Number, of its self-reference. The Quantum has, however, its determinateness as amount; as before shown, it contains it, although it is no longer *explicitly* in it. The degree, therefore, as within itself simple, having no longer this external otherwiseness within it, has it *out of it*, and refers itself thereto as to its determinateness. A Many external to it constitutes the determinateness of the simple limit which it is *per se*. That the amount, so far as it was supposed to find itself within the Number in the extensive Quantum, sublated itself therein—in this it is determined, consequently, further, as set *out of it* (the Number). Number being explicitly set as a One, self-reflected self-reference, it excludes from itself the indifference and externality of the amount, and is *reference to itself as reference through its own self to an External.*

'In this, Quantum reaches the reality adequate to its notion. The *indifference* of the determinateness constitutes its quality; i.e., the determinateness is the determinateness which is in itself self-external determinateness. Accordingly degree, or the degree, is

simple quantitative determinateness *under* a *severality* of such intensities as are diverse, each only simple self-reference, but, at the same time, in essential reference to one another in such wise that each has in this continuity with the others its own determinateness. This reference of degree through itself to its other renders ascent and descent in the scale of degrees, a continuous process, a flux, that is an uninterrupted indivisible alteration; each of the severals, which are distinguished in it, is not divided from the others, but has its determinedness only in these. As self-referent quantitative determination, each of the degrees is indifferent to the others; but it is no less *in itself* referred to this externality, it is only through this externality what it is; its reference to itself is at the same time the non-indifferent reference to the External, has in this (latter) reference its quality.'

The majority of readers will find all this very super-subtle and very superfluous. Reflexion, however, will convince some that it is necessary to bring to account all these myriad distinctions which pass current daily without inquiry. The Hegelian exposition is not only an explanation in the ordinary sense; but it lifts into sunlight all the secret maggots of our very brains—those hidden powers whose we are, rather than that they are ours.

b. *Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude.*

'Degree, the degree, is not within itself a something external to itself. But it is not the *indeterminate* One, the principle of Number in general, which is no Amount, unless only the negative Amount to be no Amount. The intensive magnitude is, in the first place, a simple unit of the *several*; there are several degrees; deter-

mined, however, they are not, neither as simple unit nor as several, but only in *the co-reference of this self-externalness*, or in the identity of the unit and the several. If, then, the several as such are indeed out of the simple degree, the determinateness of each simple degree consists still, in its reference to them, the several; the simple degree, therefore, implies Amount. Just as twenty, as extensive magnitude, implies the twenty ones as discrete within itself, so such particular degree contains the ones as continuity, which continuity this particular severality simply is; it is the 20th degree; and is the 20th degree only by means of this amount, which as such is external to it.

'The determinateness of intensive magnitude is, therefore, to be considered on two sides. It is determined through *other* intensive Quanta, and is in continuity with its otherwiseness, so that in this reference to that (or them) consists its determinateness. So far now as it is, *firstly*, *simple* determinateness, it is determined *counter* other degrees; it excludes them out of itself, and has its determinateness in this exclusion. But, *secondly*, it is determined in itself; it is this in the amount as *its* amount, not in it as what is excluded, or as amount of other degrees. The twentieth degree contains the twenty in itself; it is not only determined as distinguished from the nineteenth, the twenty-first, &c., but its determinateness is *its* amount. But so far as the amount is its, and the determinateness is, at the same time, essentially as amount, degree has the nature of extensive Quantity, is extensive Quantity.

'Extensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same determinateness (characterisedness, specificity) of the Quantum; they are only distinguished by this,

that the one has the amount as within it, the other as without it. The extensive magnitude passes over into the intensive because its many in and for itself collapses into the unity, out of which the many stands. But conversely this unity has its determinateness only in the amount, and that too as *its*; as indifferent to the other intensities, it has the externality of the amount in itself; intensive magnitude is thus equally essentially extensive magnitude.

'With this identity, *qualitative Something* re-appears; for this identity is self—*through the negation of its differences* — to self-referent unity, and it is these differences that compose the there-beënt quantitative determinateness; this negative identity is, therefore, *Something*, indifferent, too, to its quantitative determinateness. *Something* is a Quantum, but now the qualitative There-being as it is *in itself* is *explicit* as indifferent to this consideration of Quantum. It was possible to speak of Quantum, of Number as such, &c., without a *Something* that were their substrate. But now there steps in *Something* opposite these its determinations,— through their negation *be-mediated* with itself, and as *there-beënt for itself*,—and, in that it has a Quantum, as that which has an extensive and intensive Quantum. Its *one* determinateness, which it as Quantum has, is explicit in the diverse moments of the *Unity* and the *Amount*; this determinateness is not only *in itself* one and the same, but its *explicitation* or *expression* in these differences, as extensive and intensive Quantum, is return into this unity, which unity as negative is the *explicitly* set Something indifferent to them (the differences).'

The interpretation of the above rests so evidently on principles which we have so often stated at full length

already, that it may here be dispensed with, especially as something of résumé will be necessary again. The supersubtlety will still appear to most readers the objectionable element; and it is to be confessed that, in very weariness of the flesh, one is again and again tempted to turn away eyes of irritation from these quick and evanescent needle-points, this ceaseless to-and-fro of an all but invisible shuttle from identity into difference, and from difference into identity again, and throw one's exhausted body and vexed heart on the kindly *breadth* of the ready concrete: but again, and indubitably, this is subtlety, but not supersubtlety, what we are asked to look at is the veritable inner fibres of the very essence of things.

Remark 1.

Examples of this Identity.

'The distinction of extension and intension is generally taken so, that it is supposed there are objects only extensive and others only intensive. Then we have in physics the new dynamical view which, to the contrary mechanical one that would fill space, &c., by *extension* or a *more*, opposes an *intension* that would reach the same end through *degree*. The mechanical theory assumes independent parts subsistent out of each other, and only externally combined into a whole; while opposed to this, the notion of *Force* is the core of the dynamical theory. What—as in the occupation of space—results under the former theory from a multiplicity of mutually external atoms, is produced under the latter by the manifestation of a single force. In the one instance, then, we have the relation of Whole and Parts; in the other, that of Force and its Realisation;

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and the consideration of both finds special place further on. Force and Realisation, it may be said here, however, are certainly a *nearer* truth than Whole and Parts; but still Force is no less one-sided than Intension itself: its Realisation, Manifestation, Utterance, or *outer*ance, is but as the outwardness of Extension, and is *inseparable* from the Force; *one and the same Int*ent is common to both forms, to that that is as Extensive, as to that that is as Intensive.'

One gets a striking view here of the fundamental Hegelian truth; element succeeds element in gradual ascent towards the ultimate unity, but in each element precisely the same moments reappear as constitutive: Continuity and Discretion, Extension and Intension, Whole and Parts, Force and its Realisation, Outer and Inner—running through the whole of these, we can see the same moments and the same idea.

'The extensive Quantum sublates itself into Degree, which in turn is wholly dependent on the former; the one form is essential to the other, and the quantitative constitution of every existence is as well extensive as intensive.

'Take Number as the example: it is *amount*, and so extensive; but it is also *One*, *a* twenty, *a* hundred, &c., and the many gone into this unality is of the nature of intension. *One* is extensive *in itself*, it can be conceived as any number of parts. The tenth, &c., is this *one* that has its virtue in an outward *several* different to it; or the intension comes from the extension. Number is ten, twenty, &c.; but it is at the same time the tenth, the twentieth in the numerical system: both are the same determinateness, the same constitutedness.

'The unit of the circle is named degree, because any one part of the circle has its determinateness in the

others out of it, is characterised as one only of a shut (definite) *amount* of such ones. The degree of the circle is as mere space-magnitude only a usual number; regarded as degree, it is an intensive magnitude which has a sense only as determined through the amount of degrees into which the circle is divided, as the number in general has its sense only in the numerical series.

'Concrete objects show the double side, extension and intension, in the externality and internality of the manifestation of their magnitude. A mass as amount of pounds, hundredweights, &c., is extensive; as exerting pressure, intensive. The Quantity of the pressure is a oneness, a degree, which has its determinateness in a scale of degrees of pressure. As pressing, the mass appears as a Being-within-itself, as Subject, to which accrues intensive distinction. Conversely, what exercises this *degree* of pressure is able to move from the spot a certain *amount* of pounds, &c., and in this way measures its magnitude.

'Or warmth has a *degree*; the degree of temperature, the 10th, 20th, &c., is a simple sensation, a something subjective. But this degree shows equally as extensive, — e.g. as the extension of a fluid, of the quicksilver in the thermometer, of air, of clay, &c. A higher degree of temperature expresses itself as a longer column of mercury, or as a smaller cylinder of clay; it warms a greater space, as a less degree only a less space.

'The higher tone is, as the *intenser*, at the same time a *greater* number of vibrations; or a louder tone, that is, one to which a higher *degree* is ascribed, makes itself audible in a *greater* space. An intenser colour suffices a greater surface than a less intense; or what

is *lighter*, another sort of intensity, is further visible than what is less light, &c.

'In like manner in the spiritual world, *high* intensity of character, talent, genius, is of a correspondingly *wide*-grasping There-being, *extended* influence, and *many-sided* contact. The *deepest* Notion has the *most universal* significance and application.'

In illustration on the same side as these examples, we may observe that the death of the Redeemer is not only the most intense event in history, but just what is intensest in an absolute point of view and in the very possibility of things; hence it is, or will be, what is most extensive also both as regards time and space.*

On the other side, it may be said that intension will not always supply the place of extension, or *vice versâ*. The wooden mallet and the iron hammer, though absolutely of the same weight, are not always interchangeable. In the galvanic battery, *breadth* is not found exactly to replace *number* of plates. Lastly, we are apt to see in characters an excess of intensity that leads to vacillation and lubricity, to flightiness, and in general feebleness: we are accustomed to desire for such characters a mitigation of intensity by increase, as it were, of extension in the nervous system and the general frame. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that these seemingly intense characters are only formally so, and that the *depth* of their capability is no greater than the *breadth* of their performance. In galvanism, implements, &c., it is quite possible also to find such facts or considerations as would again reduce both sides to a balance and an identity.

* There is a similar remark in Rosenkranz: Wissenschaft der Logik, p. 486.

Remark 2.

This is a critique in relation to Kant, and is reserved for consideration elsewhere. I cannot help pointing out, however, that we have here a considerable light on Hegel's attitude to the doctrine of the Immortality. In reference to the usual argument that the soul being one and simple, is indestructible by dissolution of parts, Kant observes that the soul, though *extensively* simple, may still vanish by process of *remission* as regards its *intensity*. To this Hegel rejoins: the usual argument treats the soul as a *Thing*, and applies in its characterisation the category of extensive Quantum; Kant, therefore, has an equal right to apply that of intensive Quantum: the soul, however, is not Ding (thing) but Geist (Spirit), and 'to the Spirit,' these are Hegel's own words, 'there belongs certainly *Being*, but of a quite other intensity than that of intensive Quantum, rather of such an intensity that in it the form of immediate Being and every category of the same are as sublated; not only, then, was remotion of the category of extensive Quantum to be conceded, but that of Quantum in general was to be withdrawn: it is something further yet, however, to perceive how, in the eternal nature of the Spirit, there-being, consciousness, finitude, is, and arises therefrom, without this Spirit becoming thereby *a thing*.'

c. *The Alteration of the Quantum.*

'The distinction of extensive and intensive Quantum is indifferent to the determinateness (specific nature) of Quantum as such. But in general Quantum is the determinateness which is explicitly set as sublated, the indifferent limit, the determinateness which is just as much the negation of itself (as always in another). This

distinction is developed in extensive magnitude, but intensive magnitude is the *There-being* (the actual existent specialty) of this externality which Quantum is within itself; (it is the *appearance* as it were, the realisation in a kind of outward mortal state of the notion.) This distinction (of Quantum as negation of its own determinateness) is set as its (Quantum's) contradiction within itself—the contradiction to be simple self to self-referent determinateness which is the negation of itself—the contradiction to have its determinateness not in it, but in another Quantum.

'A Quantum, therefore, is explicitly set as, in its Quality, in absolute continuity with its externality, with its otherwiseness. Every quantitative determinateness, therefore, not only *can* be exceeded, it not only *can* be altered, but it is explicitly, expressly this, that it *must* alter itself. Quantitative determinateness continues itself so into its otherwiseness, that it has its Being only in this continuity with another; it is not a *beënt*, but a *becoment* limit.

'The One is infinite, or the self to self-referent negation, therefore the repulsion of itself from itself. (This is very fine, and not hard to see.) The Quantum is equally infinite, explicitly set *as* the self to self-referent negativity; it repels itself from itself. But it is a *determinate* one, the one which has gone over into There-being and into the limit; therefore the repulsion of the determinateness from itself, not the production of its own *Like*, of what is like and equal to its own self, as the repulsion of the One, but of its otherwiseness; it is now *explicit* in itself to dispatch itself beyond itself and become another. It consists in this, to increase or decrease itself; it is the externality of determinateness in itself.

'The Quantum, therefore, dispatches itself beyond itself; this other which it becomes is firstly itself a Quantum; but equally as a limit non-beënt, that drives itself beyond itself. The limit which in this transition has again arisen is, therefore, directly only such a one as again sublates itself and passes into another, *and so on into the infinite.*

C.

QUANTITATIVE INFINITUDE.

a. *Its Notion.*

'The Quantum alters itself and becomes another Quantum; the further determination of this alteration, that it proceeds *in infinitum*, lies in this, that the Quantum is constituted as contradicting itself in itself. The Quantum becomes another; it *continues* itself, however, into its otherwiseness: the other, therefore, is also a Quantum. But this is the other not only of *a*, but of *the* Quantum itself, the negative of it as of a limited something; consequently, its unlimitedness, *infinitude.* The Quantum is a Sollen, a To-be-to; it implies *to-be-determined-for-itself*, and such self-determinedness is rather *determinedness in another*; and conversely it is sublated determinedness in another, it is *indifferent* self-subsistence.

'Finitude and Infinitude receive thus at once each in itself a double, and that an opposed import. The Quantum is *finite*, firstly, as limited in general; secondly, as self-dispatch beyond itself, as determinedness in another. Its *Infinitude*, again, is, firstly, non-limitedness; secondly, its return into itself, indifferent Being-for-self. If we directly compare these moments, there results, that the determination of the Finitude

of the Quantum, the self-dispatch into another, in which its determination is supposed to lie (and lies), is equally determination of the Infinite; the negation of the limit is the same Beyond over the determinateness, in such wise that the Quantum has in this negation, the Infinite, its ultimate determinateness. The other moment of the Infinitude is the Being-for-self that is indifferent to the limit; the Quantum itself, however, is just so limited, that it is what is for itself indifferent to its limit, and so to other Quanta and its Beyond. The Finite and the Infinite (that Infinite which is to be separated from the Finite, — the spurious Infinite) have, in Quantum, each already *in it* the moment of the other.

'The qualitative and the quantitative Infinites distinguish themselves by this, that in the former the antithesis of Finite and Infinite is qualitative, and the transition of the Finite into the Infinite, or the reference of both to each other, lies only in the notion, only in the *In itself*. The qualitative determinateness is as immediate, and refers itself to the otherwiseness essentially as to a something that is other to it; it is not *explicit* as having in itself its negation, its other. Quantity, on the contrary, is, as such, *sublated* determinateness; it is *explicit* as being unequal with itself and indifferent to itself, and so as alterable. The qualitative Finite and Infinite stand, therefore, absolutely, *i. e.*, abstractly opposed to each other; their unity is the *internal* reference that is implied at bottom: the Finite continues itself, therefore, only *in itself*, and not *in it*, into its other. On the contrary, the quantitative Finite refers itself in itself into its infinite, in which it has its absolute determinateness. This their reference is set out at first hand in the Quantitative Infinite Progress.

b. *The Quantitative Infinite Progress.*

'The Progress into the Infinite is in general the expression of contradiction, here of that contradiction which the quantitative Finite or Quantum in general implies. It is that alternation of Finite and Infinite which was considered in the qualitative sphere, with the difference that, as just remarked above, in the quantitative sphere, the limit dispatches itself and continues itself in itself into its Beyond; consequently, conversely also the quantitative Infinite is explicit as having the Quantum in itself, for the Quantum is in its Being-out-of-self at the same time itself; its externality belongs to its determination.

'The *infinite Progress* is indeed only the *expression* of this contradiction, not its *solution*; but because of the continuity of the one determinateness into its other, it brings forward an apparent solution in a union of both. As this progress is first expressed, it is the *Aufgabe* of the Infinite (*i.e.* at once the *giving up* and the *problem proposed*; *both sides* of the English *puzzle* or *riddle* are, as it were, glanced at), not the attainment of the same,—its recurrent production, without getting beyond the Quantum itself, and without the Infinite becoming positive and present. The Quantum has it in its notion to have a Beyond of itself. This Beyond is, *firstly*, the abstract moment of the *non-being* of the Quantum; this latter eliminates itself *in itself*; thus it refers itself to its Beyond as to its Infinitude, as in the *qualitative* moment of the antithesis. But, *secondly*, the Quantum stands in continuity with this Beyond; the Quantum consists just in this, to be the other of itself, to be external to its own self: this, that is external, therefore, is just so not another

than the Quantum; the Beyond or the Infinite is therefore itself a *Quantum*. The Beyond is in this way recalled from its flight, and the Infinite reached. But because this—now become a *here* from a Beyond, a *cis* or *citra* from an *ultra*—is again a Quantum, only a new limit has been made again explicit; this new limit, as Quantum, is again fled from by itself, is as Quantum beyond itself, and has repelled itself into its non-being, into its Beyond of or from its own self, which Beyond equally recurrently becomes Quantum, and as that repels itself from itself into the Beyond again.

'The continuity of the Quantum into its other occasions the union of both in the expression of an *infinitely great* or *infinitely small*. As both have the determination of Quantum still *in* them, they remain alterable, and the absolute determinateness, which were a Being-for-self, is therefore not reached. This Being-out-of-itself of the determination is explicit in the double Infinite, which is self-opposed according to a *more* or a *less*, the infinitely great and the infinitely small. In each of them Quantum is *maintained* in constantly-recurring antithesis to its Beyond. The *great*, however much extended, vanishes together into inconsiderableness; in that it refers itself to the Infinite as to its non-being, the antithesis is *qualitative*: the extended Quantum has, therefore, won from the Infinite nothing; the latter, after as before, is the non-being of the former. Or, the aggrandisement of the Quantum is no *nearing* to the Infinite, for the difference of the Quantum and of its Infinite has essentially also this moment, that it is not a quantitative difference. It is only the expression of the contradiction driven closer into the straits; it is to be at once *great*, i. e. a

Quantum, and *infinite*, i.e. no Quantum. In the same manner, the infinitely small is as *small* a Quantum, and remains therefore absolutely, that is to say, qualitatively, too great for the Infinite, and is opposed to it. The contradiction of the infinite progress, which was to have found its goal in them, remains preserved in both.

'This Infinite, which is persistently determined as the Beyond of the Finite, is to be described as the *spurious quantitative infinite*. It is, like the qualitative spurious Infinite, the perpetual crossing hence and thence from the one member of the persisting contradiction to the other, from the limit to its non-being, and from the latter anew back to the limit. In the quantitative progress, what is advanced to is indeed not an abstract other, but a Quantum that is expressed as different; but it remains equally in antithesis to its negation. The Progress, therefore, is equally not a progress, but a repetition of one and the same,—position, sublation, — re-position and re-sublation; (the equating setzend with *ponens* and aufhebend with *tollens* is conspicuously plain here)—an impotence of the negative to which what it sublates returns through its very sublation as a Constant. There are two so connected that they directly mutually flee themselves; and even in fleeing cannot separate, but are in their mutual flight conjoined.'

Remark 1.

The High Repute of the Progressus in Infinitum.

This Remark turns largely on certain declarations of Kant; but it is not of such a nature as to suggest reservation, as is usual where Kant is in question.

'The bastard Infinite—especially in its quantitative form, this perpetual transcendence of the limit and

perpetual impotent relapse into the same—is generally contemplated as something sublime, a kind of Divine Service,—just as in Philosophy it has been regarded as an *Ultimate*. This Progress has manifoldly contributed to Tirades, which have been admired as sublime productions. *In point of fact*, however, this *modern* sublimity enlarges, not the *object*, which rather flees, but only the *Subject*, that absorbs into itself such huge quantities. The indigence of this mere subjective elevation, that would scale the ladder of the Quantitative, declares itself directly in the admission of the futility of all its toil to get any closer to the infinite End, which to be reached indeed, must be quite otherwise griped to.

'In the following Tirades of this nature there is at the same time expressed, what such elevation passes into and ends in. Kant, e. g., speaks of it as sublime, (Kr. d. pract. V. Schl.)

> when the Subject lifts himself in thought above the place he occupies in the world of sense and extends the synthesis of his existence into infinite magnitude—a synthesis with stars upon stars, worlds upon worlds, systems upon systems, and moreover also into the immeasurable times of their periodic movement, of their beginning, and persistent duration.—Conception sinks under this advance into the immeasurable Far, where the furthest world has still a further—the past, however far referred, a further still behind it—the future, however equally far anticipated, always another still before it; *Thought sinks* under this conception of the immeasurable; as a dream, that we travel a long road ever further and interminably further without apparent end, ceases at length with Falling or with Fainting (swimming of the head).*

'This description, besides compressing the matter of contents of the quantitative elevation into a wealth of

* The latter half of this citation is not found at the place cited.

delineation, deserves especial praise for the honesty with which it relates how, in the end, it fares with this elevation: thought succumbs, the *end* is *Falling* and a *Swimming of the head*. What makes thought give in and produces the Fall and the Faint is nothing else than the *weariness* of the *repetition* that lets a limit disappear and again enter and again disappear; and so ever the one after the other, and the one in the other, in the thither the hither, and in the hither the thither, perpetually arises and perpetually departs, and there remains only a feeling of the impotence of this Infinite or of this To-be-to, that would be master of the Finite, but is without the power.

'What Kant names the *awful description of Eternity* by Haller is usually also specially admired, but often just not for the reason which constitutes its veritable merit: —

> I multiply enormous numbers,
> I pile to millions up,
> I gather time on time and world on world still up,
> And when I from the giddy height
> Seek thee once more with reeling sight,
> Is every power of count, increased a thousand number
> Not yet a part of thee.
> *I drag them down and thou liest there by me.**

'When this massing and piling up of numbers and worlds is considered what is valuable as in a description of eternity, it escapes notice that the Poet himself declares this so-called awful transcendence to be something futile and hollow, and that his own conclusion is, that only *by giving up* this empty infinite progress,

* It is to be hoped the reader will excuse this rough and ready translation, any ghost of rhyme or rhythm in which rather comes than is sought,—but, after all, the original is but a similar doggerel.

is it, that the veritable Infinite itself becomes *present to him.*

'There have been Astronomers who pleased themselves in making a merit of the sublimity of their science, because it has to do with an *immeasurable* number of stars, with such *immeasurable* spaces and times that in them distances and periods, in themselves never so vast, are but as units that, never so many times taken, abbreviate themselves again into insignificance. The shallow astonishment to which they then surrender themselves, the absurd hopes some time yet in another life to wander from star to star, and for ever to acquire *such* new facts, they alleged as chief moments of the excellence of their science—which science deserves admiration, not because of such quantitative infinitude, but, on the contrary, because of the *relations* and the *laws* which reason recognises in these objects, and which are the rational infinite as against said irrational infinite.

'To the Infinite which refers itself to outward sensuous perception, Kant opposes the other Infinite, when

> the individual returns into his invisible Ego, and opposes the absolute freedom of his will as a pure Ego to all the terrors of Destiny and of Tyranny, beginning with his nearest circumstances, sees them disappear in themselves, and even that which seems eternal, worlds upon worlds, collapse in ruins, and recognises singly *himself as equal to himself.*

'Ego, in this singleness with itself, is indeed the attained Beyond; it has come to itself, is *by itself, here*; in pure self-consciousness the absolute negativity is brought into the affirmation and presence which in that progress beyond the sensuous Quantum only flee. But in that this pure Ego has fixed itself in its abstrac-

tion and emptiness, it has the There-being in general, the fullness of the natural and spiritual universe, over against it as a Beyond. There manifests itself the same contradiction which is implied in the infinite progress; namely, a returnedness into itself which is immediately at the same time out-of-itself-ness, reference to its other as to its non-being; which reference remains a *longing*, because Ego has fixed for itself its *in*tent-less and untenable void on one side, and as its Beyond the fullness which in the negation still remains present.

'To both Sublimes Kant adds the remark, "that admiration (of the former, external) and awe (before the second, internal) sublime, may *stimulate*, indeed, to *inquiry*, but cannot compensate for the *deficiency* of the same."—He thus declares said elevations insufficient for reason, which cannot rest by them and the feelings connected with them, nor accept the Beyond and the Void for what is ultimate.

'The infinite progress has been taken as an ultimate, especially in its *moral* application. The just-enunciated second antithesis of the Finite and the Infinite, as of the complex world and of the Ego raised into its freedom, is properly qualitative. The self-determination of the Ego aims, at the same time, at the determination of Nature, and the emancipation of itself from her; it thus refers itself through itself to its other which is, as external There-being, a manifold and quantitative. Reference to what is quantitative becomes itself quantitative; the negative reference of the Ego thereon, the power of the Ego over the Non-Ego, over sense and external nature, comes therefore to be conceived in this way, that morality can and shall become ever *greater*—the power

of sense, on the other hand, always *less*. The complete adequacy, however, of the will to the moral law is misplaced in the infinite progress, that is to say, it is represented as an *absolutely unreachable Beyond*, and just this is to be the true anchor and the legitimate consolation, that it is unreachable; for morality is to be as conflict; this conflict, again, is only from the inadequacy of the will to the law, and the law, therefore, is absolutely a Beyond for the will.

'In this antagonism, Ego and Non-Ego, or the pure will and the moral law, and the sensuousness and mere nature of the will, are presupposed as completely independent and mutually indifferent. This pure will has its peculiar law which stands in essential connexion with Sense; and Nature, or Sense, has on its side laws which are neither derived from the will nor correspondent to it, nor can have even only, however different from it, *in themselves* an essential connexion with it, but they are in general determined *for* themselves, full and complete *within* themselves. But both, at the same time, are moments of *one and the same single Being*, the Ego; the will is determined as the negative against Nature, so that it (the will) is only so far as there is such an element different from it that shall become sublated by it, with which, however, it (the will) comes thus in contact, and by which it is even affected. To nature and to nature as human Sense, limitation through another is indifferent, as to an independent system of laws; she maintains herself in this limitation, enters independently into the relation, and limits the will of the law quite as much as it limits her. It is *one* act, the self-determination of the will with the sublation of the otherwiseness of a nature, and the assumption of this otherwiseness as there-beënt, as continuing itself in

its sublation and as not sublated. The contradiction that lies in this is not eliminated in the infinite progress, but, on the contrary, is expressed and maintained as not eliminated and as incapable of elimination; the conflict of Morality and Sense is represented as the absolute relation that in and for itself is.

'The incapacity to become master of the qualitative antithesis of the Finite and Infinite, and to comprehend the *Idea* of the true will, substantial freedom, has recourse to *Quantity*, in order to use it as mediatrix, because it is the sublated Qualitative, the difference become indifferent. But in that both members of the antithesis remain implied as qualitatively different, each rather becomes manifest at once as indifferent to this alteration, and just by this that in their mutual reference it is as Quanta that they now relate themselves. Nature is determined by Ego, Sense by the Will of the Good; the change produced by the Will in Sense is only a quantitative difference, such a difference as allows it (Sense) to remain what it is.

'In the abstracter statement of the Kantian Philosophy, or at least of its principles, that is, in the Wissenschaftslehre of Fichte, the infinite progress constitutes in the same manner the fundamental principle and the Ultimate. The first axiom of this statement, Ego = Ego, is followed by a second independent of the first, the *opposition* of the *Non-Ego*; the *connexion* of both is taken at once also as *quantitative* difference, that Non-Ego is *partly* determined by Ego, *partly* also not. The Non-Ego continues itself in this way into its non-being, so that in its non-being it remains opposed, as what is not sublated. When, therefore, the contradictions thus involved have been developed in the system, the concluding result is

the same relation that was the commencement; the Non-Ego remains an infinite appulse, an absolutely other; the ultimate mutual connexion of it and of the Ego is the infinite progress, longing and struggle, seeking and searching,—the same contradiction which was begun with.

'Because the quantitative element is the determinateness that is *express* as sublated, it was believed that much, or rather all, had been won for the unity of the Absolute, for the One Substantiality, when the antithesis in general was set down to a difference only quantitative. Every antithesis is only quantitative, was for a time a main position of the later Philosophy; the opposed determinations have the same nature, the same substance; they are real sides of the antithesis, so far as each of them has within it both values, both factors of the antithesis, only that on the one side the one factor, on the other the other, is *preponderant*; on the one side the one factor, a matter or power, is present in *greater quantity* or in *stronger degree* than on the other. So far as different matters or powers are presupposed, the quantitative difference rather confirms and completes their externality and indifference to each other and to their unity. The difference of the *absolute* Unity is to be only quantitative; Quantitativity is indeed the sublated immediate determinateness, but it is only the uncompleted, only the *first* negation, not the infinite, not the negation of the negation. In that Being and Thought are represented as quantitative determinations of the Absolute Substance, even they, as Quanta, become, just like Carbon, Azote, &c., in a subordinate sphere, perfectly external to each other and void of connexion. It is a Third (party), an external reflexion, which abstracts from their difference and

perceives their *inner* unity, that is only *in itself* and not equally *for itself*. This unity, consequently, is represented in effect only as first *immediate* unity, or only as Being, which, in its quantitative difference, *remains* equal to itself, but does not *set* itself equal to itself through itself; it is thus not comprehended as negation of negation, as infinite unity. Only in the qualitative antithesis arises the *explicit* Infinite, the Being-for-self, and the quantitative determination itself passes over, as will presently more particularly yield itself, into the Qualitative.'

Remark 2,

Which occurs here, concerns Kant, and is reserved for the present. It is again one of those miracles of analysis of which, as yet, no man but Hegel has set the example—a perspicacity absolutely irresistible!—a singleness of statement absolutely annihilative!

c. *The Infinitude of the Quantum.*

'1. The infinite Quantum, as infinitely *great* or infinitely *little*, is itself *an sich* the infinite Progress; it is Quantum as *great* or *small*, and it is at the same time non-being of Quantum. The infinitely great and infinitely little are therefore images of figurate conception, which, on closer consideration, show themselves as idle mist and shadow. But in the infinite Progress this contradiction is explicitly present, and withal that also that is the nature of the Quantum—which as intensive magnitude has reached its reality, and in its *There-being* is now explicitly *set* as it is in its *Notion*. This identity is what we have to consider.

'The Quantum as degree is simple, unal, referred to itself and as determined in itself. In that through this

unality the otherwiseness and the determinateness in it is sublated, this determinateness is external to it, it has its determinateness out of it. This its out-of-itself-ness is at first hand the *abstract non-being* of the Quantum in general, the spurious Infinite. But further this non-being is also a magnitude, the Quantum continues itself into its non-being, for it has just its determinateness in its externality; this its externality is itself therefore equally Quantum; that, its non-being, the Infinitude, becomes thus limited, that is to say, this Beyond is sublated, is itself determined as Quantum, which is thus in its negation by its own self.

'This, however, is what the Quantum as such is *an sich*. For it is just itself (es selbst) through its outerliness; the externality constitutes that whereby it is Quantum, is by its own self. In the infinite Progress, therefore, the *Notion* of the Quantum is *Express, Explicit.*

'Let us take it (the Progress) at first hand in its abstract distinctive features as they lie before us, *then there is present in it the sublation of the Quantum, but equally also of its Beyond, therefore the negation of the Quantum as well as the negation of this negation.* Its (the Progress') truth is their unity, in which they are but as moments. This unity is the solution of the contradiction of which the Progress is the expression, and its (this unity's) closest meaning consequently is the *restoration of the notion of Quantity*,—that it is indifferent or external limit. In the infinite Progress as such, it is usually only considered, that each Quantum, however great or small, must be capable of disappearing, that it must be capable of being transcended; but it is not considered, that this its sublation, the Beyond, the downright Infinite itself disappears also.

'Even the *first* sublation, the negation of Quality in general, whereby Quantum becomes explicit, is *an sich* the sublation of the negation, — the Quantum is sublated qualitative limit, consequently sublated negation,— but it is at the same time only *an sich* this; it is set as a There-being, and then its negation is fixed as the Infinite, as the Beyond of Quantum which stands as a *Here*, a *This side*, as an *immediate*; thus the infinite is determined only as *first* negation, and so it appears in the infinite progress. It has been shown that there is, however, more present in this last,—the negation of the negation, or that which the infinite is in truth. This was before regarded as that the *Notion* of the Quantum is thus again restored; this restoration means, in direct reference, that its *There-being* has *received* its closer determination; there has arisen, namely, the *Quantum determined according to its Notion*, which is different from the *Immediate Quantum*—the externality is now the contrary of itself, explicitly set as moment of the Magnitude itself,—the Quantum so that by means of its non-being, the infinite, it has in another Quantum its *determinateness*, i. e. qualitatively is that which it is. Nevertheless, this comparison of the *Notion* with the *There-being* of the Quantum belongs more to our reflexion, to a relation that is not yet present here. The immediately next determination is, that the Quantum has returned into Quality, is now once again qualitatively determined. For its peculiarity, Quality, is the externality, indifference of the determinateness; and it is now explicitly set, as being in its externality rather *itself*, as therein referring itself to itself, as in simplicity with itself, i. e. as being *qualitatively* determined. This Qualitativity is more particularly determined, namely, as Being-for-self; for the reference to

itself to which it has come, arises out of Mediation, the negation of the negation. The Quantum has the Infinite, the For-self-determinedness no longer out of it, but in itself.

'The Infinite, which in the infinite Progress has only the empty sense of a Non-being, of an unreached, but sought Beyond, is in effect nothing else than *Quality*. The Quantum as indifferent limit passes out beyond itself into the infinite; it seeks so nothing else than the for-self-determinedness, the qualitative moment, that, however, in this way, is only a To-be-to. Its indifference to the limit, consequently its defect of beënt-for-self-determinateness and its going out beyond itself, is what makes the Quantum Quantum; that, its going-out, is to be negated, and to find for itself in the infinite its absolute determinateness.

'Quite generally: the Quantum is sublated Quality; but the Quantum is infinite, transcends itself, is the negation of itself; this its transcendence is, therefore, *an sich* the negation of the negated Quality, the restoration of Quality; and this is explicitly set, that the externality which appeared as Beyond, is determined as the *own moment* of the Quantum.

'The Quantum is thus set as repelled from itself, whereby there are therefore two Quanta, which, nevertheless, are sublated, only are as moments of *one unity*, and this unity is the determinateness of the Quantum. This (Quantum) thus *referred to itself* in its externality as indifferent limit, and consequently qualitatively set, is the *Quantitative Relation*. In relation the Quantum is external to itself, different from itself; this its externality is the referring of one Quantum to another Quantum, of which each is only valid in this its reference to its other; and this reference constitutes the

determinateness (the special virtue) of the Quantum which is as such unity. It has in this reference not an indifferent, but a qualitative determination; is in this its externality returned into itself, is in the same that which it is.'

There is the possibility here of some very auxiliary remarks.—First of all, the contradiction in the notion of an Infinitesimal, an infinitely great, or an infinitely little, is accomplished with the usual Hegelian masterliness in a very clear, and, as things are, very necessary exposition. It is to be at once Quantum and no Quantum, that is, it is *an sich* the infinite Progress: now it is the reduction of this contradiction to the unity of relation which is the relative merit of Hegel. The limitless externality which lies in the notion of Quantum or Quantity is qualitative; and therefore it is a cheap wonder that falls prostrate before the infinite quantities that can be conjured up in the quantitative Progress; for with such *quality* such *quantity* is the turn of a hand. The bearing which intensive magnitude—as that, as it were, qualitative *One*, which has nevertheless its affair in an external *Many*—has on the subsequent determination of Relation must not be lost sight of. Degree, quite generally as degree, has what constitutes its determinateness external to itself; but there is no end to the possibility of degree, therefore this its own constitutive externality is endless; or *vice versâ*, the constitutive externality being endless, degree is endless; and we have thus in perfectly explicit expression the quantitative spurious Infinite. In this Infinite, the externality, the Many, can be seen to be relatively to the One, the degree, this degree's *abstract non-being* as such; or this abstract non-being, the *possibility* of degree, is just the spurious Infinite.

Now all this is the very *Notion* of Quantum in general: Quantum is *itself*, is what it is, through its own outwardness. We may even intensify the outwardness implied in the notion here; for we may say, the Quantum is what it is through that outwardness which it is, and also through that outwardness which it is *not* — any quantitative assignment being absolutely relative. This relativity, the notion of a One from Two, is well before the mind of Hegel. As always relative, the assignment — Quantum — can be seen, then, always to *flee — in infinitum*. From this flight it is Hegel's business, by virtue of the Notion, to recall it.

I have translated Schlecht-*Un*endliche, downright Infinite. The sense assigned is an old idiomatic use of Schlecht as seen in Schlechthin, Schlechtweg, &c.; and again, looking close, the *Un* of Unendliche seems italicised, which somehow plays very much into the hands of Schlecht in the sense of downright. Beyond all doubt, however, we have here the usual Hegelian irony; what here is *downright* to figurate conception or ordinary reflexion is *spurious* to Hegel.

The reader will assist himself greatly here if he will recall the *sub specie æterni*, and reflect that it is the pure Notion, the Absolute, which lies under all these forms. It was the sublation of Finite There-being, for example, that led through the absolute Being-for-self into the form of Quantity at all: all then was One, One, One,—that is, Quantity; but in that Quantity, the One, Quality, still is. 'Quantity, then, is *an sich* the sublation of the negation'—of what negation?—why, of the qualitative negation, of qualitative limit, of the fact that the Voice had a Notification

different from itself: Quantity is the negation of this qualitative limit; what is, is One, but even so it must be One, One, One: Quantity is the *condition* of its *life*, of its very *one-ness*. All this is very plainly present, especially in the last four paragraphs, which have been just translated. The One is always One, the *immediate*; so the non-immediate is its non-being, the negation of itself: thus it is *caught* (befangen) in the spurious Infinite, the Sollen of all kinds, and is 'das unglückliche Bewusstseyn,' the unhappy consciousness that cannot find *itself*, but is for ever lost in its *other*. All this disappears before the simple consideration that the *other* is just the *condition*, the *presupposition* of *itself*; that the other is *for* it; that *it* is through the *other*; that it is One just because it is One, One, One; that *it* is the *other*, and the *other* is *it*. This is return of the Quantum into Quality: its determinateness as Quantum is its own externality; but its own externality was the determinateness of Quality also: sublation of the externality produces a like qualitative Being-for-self in both. In fact, read by this absolute light, these paragraphs will yield a perfectly marvellous meaning. While on one side all the assignments of Quantity are placed before us in a rigorous exactitude of form that is now for the first time witnessed, on the other side we have the Absolute itself demonstrated to us, and in those necessities which are the purest outcomes of its own reason, of its own pulse, that is, of its own self. Here, for example, we see that Quantity is not a thing apart and by itself, not something peculiar, independent and isolated, but absolutely one with quality, absolutely one with what is: it is part and parcel of the One All, and it is not part and parcel,

but is that One All; for in no other way could there be One, One, One, a life, Quality: Quantity, in fact, is but the abstract expression of that concrete fact. To generalise and abstract may be necessary, but it is more necessary nowadays to conduct our abstractions back into the *life* from which they have been sundered. This life is one and many: these many are not to be fixed as dead immovable solids (bits of ice) taken up from the One, the life, they are to be taken back, re-dissolved and seen as they are in the living One. That Quality is Quality, then, is just that Quantity is Quantity, or that there is Quantity: there is an absolutely necessary nexus between the two entities; they are but sides of one and the same. How were an internality possible without an externality to *extend* it? There is not *here internality*, then, and *there externality*; but what is, is at once external and internal, and such constitution is an absolute necessity of thought or of the Notion. He that would see rightly, then, must always see in connexion, in co-reference. The Absolute Negativity, the negation of the negation, this is the key-note: what is, is a fire that feeds itself; the fire and its fuel are one; the former is through the latter, but the former always is, therefore the latter always is, and the one is the other. Such is the nature of the Divine Life: it is infinite, for that which it is through, the aliment, is infinite and itself. Thus is it the pure negativity or the negation of the negation, for it *is* through its other, its negation, which at the same time it negates: the Attraction that is *explicit* is for ever fed by the Repulsion that is *implicit*. In this way it is that Hegel has taken firm hold of the formula of the Absolute; and this negation of the negation, this necessary duplicity in the character of every

actual concrete existence by which it has two abstract or relatively abstract sides, he has followed out through the entire circle of the universe, up from the abstractest determination to the concretest, and this too by an absolutely necessary method, and with an absolutely necessary beginning and end. The duplicity which we see here in regard to Quality and Quantity is the single regulative truth of things, and, the element of thought being it and it nothing but thought, it is not more regulative than constitutive; it is what is, it is the Absolute, it is the pulse of God himself—at least as expressed in this universe. Quantity is a necessary *position*—it is but Quality, completed Quality. Quality, when full-summed, consummated in itself, is Quantity, by virtue of its own life, its own continuance. Quantity, which is the life of Quality, its continuance, without which Quality were not, which is required to *extend* Quality, returns by virtue of its own notion and veritable constitution into the Quality which it was supposed to have left. We need not say, indeed, Quantity without which Quality were not; for that is simply tautological, Quantity being very evidently just the same thing as Quality, though on the other side. That Quality be, Quantity is a necessary condition, and so is it a necessary ingredient of Quality itself. Without the Quantity that extends it, Quality is inconceivable and impossible; but conversely without the Quality that, so to speak here, *intends* it, Quantity is inconceivable and impossible. What were Quantum and Quanta if only Quantitative Quantum and Quanta? Quantum and Quanta must contract into the ultimate virtue, into the essential drop of Quality,—the ones are the One: Quantum and Quanta are only for Quality; they are only Qualitative. Time, Space,

Matter, the Ego,—these we have already seen cited as examples of pure quantity; but they are all of them qualitative, and there only because they are qualitative, they are necessary *positions* of the Absolute in the way in which we have seen such necessity as regards Quantity when referred to Quality. That they are qualitative is evident from this, that each has its own *peculiarity*; that is, they are not absolutely the same pure Quantity, and so not absolutely pure Quantity at all: pure Quantity as such is just the out-of-itself of Quality, or, what is the same thing, its *continuance* but in *discretion*, discretion and continuance being but another example of the absolute duplicity by which neither is possible without the other, or either is the other. Quality is the One; but to be the One, it must be One, One, One endlessly, or Quantity: but the One refers these Ones to its own oneness—Quantitative Relation. However it may be with the Absolute, it must be admitted, at least, that Hegel in pursuit of his Absolute has absolutely worked out and perfected, and for the first time in universal history, the Metaphysic or Theory of Quantity. Whether, then, what we may assign as the ultimate dictum of Hegel—Thought is the one ἀνάγκη, and the ἀνάγκη of Thought gives this Universe—be true or not, we must be thankful for the vast light his metaphysic has thrown on the particular and on all particulars. This brings us to say that before entering on the important enunciations of Hegel in reference to the Calculus and the higher analysis in general, which form the subject-matter of the three very long and laborious Remarks by the first of which we now stand, it will be advantageous to renew the values of Quantity we have just obtained, especially those which bear on what is called

the Quantitative Infinite, True or False, Genuine or Spurious, Legitimate or Bastard.

The Qualitative Infinite we probably understand thoroughly, and on both aspects, from the illustration of the absolute Voice and its Notification. The Notification as finite Note after finite Note endlessly, is that alternation of endedness and unendedness that but replace each other and repeat themselves, which is the spurious Infinite of Hegel. The absolute Voice itself, which is through these notes, *and* these notes, is the true Infinite. In effect, Finite and Infinite are but a certain stage of *the* Notion, of the one double single, or of the single duplicity. An Infinite without a Finite were null, as a Finite without an Infinite is inconceivable and impossible: neither, then, is possible without the other; each implies the other;—either is the other: the one truth is the single duplicity that is both. When we see Finite by itself, and Infinite by itself, we see a concrete Notion, or a phase of the concrete Notion, in each of its two *abstract* sides alternately. The truth is the absolute Voice which is through its other, which other it also negates or sublates; and so is it the negation of the negation, the pure negativity, the veritable Infinite.

This Infinite as One passed through what we may call Monadology or the Metaphysic of the Monad into the indifferent continuous oneness which emerged as Quantity. Quantity showed itself immediately as Continuous or Discrete; both of which went together again in the notion of limit, which was found to be not only the common, but the entire truth of each. Limit next manifested itself as Quantum or Number, which went asunder into Extensive and Intensive Quanta, but collapsed again into the quantitative Something which, as

the very quality or notion of Quantum, is endless self-externality, or the quantitative Infinite. The quantitative Infinite is first the spurious Infinite of Quantum fleeing ever into its indifferent limit. But this flight or transcendence is in its truth a transcendence of the one Quantum as well as of the other: this is a reference of Quantum to Quantum, is qualitative, and the true Quantitative Infinite of Quantitative Relation. Simple consideration *sub specie æterni* of the One that issued from Quality and emerged in Quantity leads readily to all these forms. But, not to go too far back—as limitless one, one, one that is always away over into another one, it is the spurious infinite, while as return to its own oneness in all these ones it is the true Infinite and a return to Quality. This can be characterised, too, as the *true reflexion for us* here. Lastly, in an objective mode of looking, the oneness that results from the reflexion of one to one is—Quantitative Relation, and is here the true Quantitative Infinite, as it is Qualitative, or as it is the return of Quality to itself from Quantity. I may add, that once having the absolute as *One*, or just the form, character, determination, or term of *One*, the whole of Quantity, and of all that holds of it, is *potentially* given.

Remark 1.

The Precise Nature of the Notion of the Mathematical Infinite.

'The Infinite which the higher analysis has introduced into mathematical science, while it has led to vast results in *practice*, has been always attended with great difficulties in *theory*. The latter, indeed, has never been able to justify the former; confirmation has been required for the results, as it were, from without; and the operation itself has been rather granted as incorrect. This is a false position in itself—un-

scientific—and no science so situated can be either sure of its application or certain of its extent.

'What is interesting to Philosophy here is, that while this, the Mathematical Infinite, is at bottom the True Infinite, it is the False or Metaphysical Infinite before which it is summoned and required to justify itself. The former, indeed (mathematic), defends itself by rejecting the competence of the latter (metaphysic), and by professing to own no authority but that of its own consistency on its own field. But while, on the one hand, metaphysic cannot deny the value of the splendid results achieved by mathematic in consequence of the Infinite in question, it must be admitted that this latter science, on the other hand, is unable to procure for its own self a clear conscience as regards the notion it has introduced and the dependent processes.

'So far as the difficulty concerns the *Notion* alone, that is a matter of no moment to any science which has rightly possessed itself of an *element*, and truly *distributed* it. But here in the science concerned there is a contradiction in the very method on which, as a science, it rests. It permits itself, for example, to handle Infinite Quanta as if they were Finite Quanta, and yet to apply in determination of the former expedients which it absolutely rejects in the case of the latter. Justification, it is true, is sought for the application of these expedients, in the fact, that their results can be *proved* from elsewhere. But while, on one side, *all* results have not been so proved, it is, on the other side, the very object of the new method, not only to shorten, but in certain respects to supersede the old, and obtain results impossible *to* the old. Again, a *result* cannot justify a *manner per se*; and the manner here has this inexactitude in it, that it now

introduces as the very essential of the operation, what it presently rejects as too small to be of any account. Nay, what is more extraordinary still, the results obtained from this process, the inexactitude of which is admitted, are, as Carnot says, 'not merely free "from sensible error," but rigorously *exact*.' And we know all the while that something actually was omitted — something not quite zero. This is not truth as such — correctness as such — neither of which admits of a less or a more. Again, be it with the result as it may, Proof as such is an interest, and in mathematical science *the interest proper*.

'It will be interesting, then, to examine closer the various modes in which the general notion involved has been viewed, as well as the various expedients which have been adopted to justify it.

'The usual definition of the mathematical Infinite is, that it is *a Magnitude beyond which*—when it is infinitely great — there is *no greater*, or — when it is infinitely small—*no smaller*, or which, in the one case, is greater, and, in the other, smaller, than any assignable magnitude. This definition does not express the true notion involved, but only that contradiction which is the spurious Progressus; and again if Quanta are, as mathematic elsewhere avows, *what can be lessened or increased*, then plainly it is not Quanta as such that we have now before us.

'This is already something gained, and this is what usually just fails to be seen: the Quantum as such is sublated, its character is now of an *infinite* nature, and yet its *quantitative determinateness* is to be conceived as still somehow *persisting*. It is in continuing to regard what is *infinite* as *finite*, as Quantum, that *more* or *less* becomes capable of being falsely attributed

to what is infinite. The infinite of a unity that is 2, or 3, or 4, &c., for example, may be regarded as *greater* than an infinite of a unity that is only 1, &c. How this depends on an infinite being still regarded as Quantum is evident. Kant—(but, as usual, this is reserved).

'We have seen that the True Infinite Quantum is infinite in itself (*an ihm selbst*); it is this inasmuch as both the Quantum as such and its Beyond of Externality, through which Beyond it has its constitutive determinateness, are *equally* sublated. The Quantum is thus gone into unal self-reference. It itself and its externality, however, are still there as moments: it is the infinite Quantum as containing and being its own negated externality. But this is Quality: it is not any particular assignable Quantum: it is the constitution of Quantum as such universally, and so Quality.

'One can readily sublate the infinite series of Notes, through which the Voice is, into the one infinite Voice; but, though the one infinite Quantum can be conceived as only through the series of finite Quanta, it is not so easy to conceive a qualitative infinite Quantum by sublation into its unity of the whole infinite variety or externality of the finite series. This, however, is what is required to be done: the *relativity* of Quantity is to be conceived in its own infinite qualitative form. Its infinitude is that it is a qualitative determinateness. The relativity, once firmly caught, can be seen to be but Moment, Quantitative determinateness in Qualitative form. As moment it depends on its other; it has its determination from this other; it has a meaning only in relation to what stands in relation with it. Apart from this relation it is nothing; and is, in this respect, unlike Quantum as such, which as such seems wholly passive, indifferent as regards relation, and even in

relation to possess its own immediate, settled form. But as moment in relation, its passivity and indifference disappear; its immediacy is sublated; it is what it is through another. Quite generally now, then, the Quantum that has taken up this attitude to its own externality (quite generally) can be seen to have sublated itself into a Qualitative Unity; it is infinite Being-for-self, but possesses and is quantitative Being-for-One. Or we may say that quantitatively it is a Für-Eines, a Being-for-One, while qualitatively it is a Being-for-self. Or again we might almost say that it is quantitative *matter* (the For-One) idealised into qualitative form (the For-self). This distinction is very difficult to realise. Though something has here been added in elucidation, the reader will do well to re-read—'c. The Infinitude of the Quantum,' together with the relative comments—for this notion is evidently intended to be the key-note of all that follows. The moments are simply these: there is Quantum and its Beyond; so put they flee each other and we have the spurious Infinite through their alternate repetition; but they are not to be repeated: the Quantum is to be seen to depend on the Beyond; the Beyond is to be seen to constitute it: the Beyond, then, is to be taken up into it to the formation of a single notion, a one infinite qualitative whole,—the *quality* being the *peculiarity* of its constitution.*

'This notion will be found to constitute at bottom the mathematical Infinite; and it itself will become clearer in the progress of a consideration of the various stages of the expression of the Quantum *as a moment*

* Exact translation was not at first intended in this Remark—hence the admission of additions as above, though compression was the general object.

of relation, from the lowest, where it is yet at the same time Quantum as such, up to the higher, where it obtains the signification (value) and the expression of special infinite magnitude.

'The first example, then, will be Quantum in relation as exhibited in fractions. The fraction $\frac{2}{7}$, for instance, is quite a finite expression, and possessed of a quite finite value, the exponent or quotient; nevertheless it is different from the whole numbers, 1, 2, 3, &c. It is not *immediate* as they are, but *mediate*; the virtue it possesses is neither 2 nor 7, but as it were that virtue which depends on the relativity of these two virtues mutually. The sublation of *immediacy* has introduced quite a change, then: the immediacy is no longer the essential, but the mediacy; and so long as the latter is retained, the former may be as it likes. Thus a certain infinitude emerges: 2 may become 4, 6, &c.; and for 7 we may substitute 14, 21, &c. In this way we see more plainly that it is not an immediate 2 or 7 with which we have to do; for both the 2 and the 7 may be changed infinitely, provided only their relativity be preserved: $\frac{2}{7}$ has now, then, taken on a certain qualitative character, inasmuch as its quantitative character—its composing Quanta—manifest a certain indifference, in having become susceptible of infinite change. The 2 and 7 together, then, are very different from what they are apart: the passive, inert, quantitative limit which each, as 2 or as 7, has, is sublated into a certain infinitude; their value seems no longer merely quantitative, and of the nature of 2 and 7; this value, or their virtue, seems to have gone over into a qualitative *drop*, the qualitative Being-for-self, while at the same time quantitative determinateness seems still to be preserved, to enter as moment, as the Being-for-One.

The 2 and the 7 *are moments* in fact; they are no longer 2 and 7, but each is what it is as in the relation, and so endlessly variable. That the virtue here is qualitative will readily appear, when it is recollected that Quality is but seyende Bestimmtheit, beënt Determinateness. The beënt Determinateness which is here again may be considered of an infinite nature, as it rests on an infinite relation, or on Quanta which are of an infinite character. The Quantitativity of 2 as of 7 remains, but as *in itself* qualitative, seeing that each is what it is only in relation to another.

'Such fraction, however, is no perfect expression of Infinitude: the finite and quantitative character of divisor, dividend, and quotient—their mutual indifference and externality as Quanta—are too obvious. Its value as an illustration depends wholly on the infinitude which comes upon its Quanta when they cease to function as direct or immediate Quanta,—on the fact that *Quantity* seems to become indifferent, if the *Quality* but remain.

'The more general form $\frac{a}{b}$ might appear, so far, more eligible as an expression for the Infinite; nevertheless, as valueless in itself, as altogether symbolical and dependent on another, it is quite indifferent and external, and so inapplicable as illustration here.

'The relation as we have seen it in the fraction, then, implies these two characters: firstly, that it is Quantum; secondly, that it is not immediate but mediate Quantum, or that it implies the qualitative antithesis (i.e. a one of two, a reflexion into self from reflexion to other). The single virtue of the relation is the determinate but indifferent thing it is, because it has returned out of its otherwiseness (the contraposed

numbers) into itself, and is so far an infinite. In other words, it is the secret quality that 2 has to 7, or 7 to 2, that is the thing, no matter what quantitative amount this secret quality may assume. The two characters are more distinct when developed in the following familiar form.

'The fraction $\frac{2}{7}$ can be expressed as ·285714 . . ., $\frac{1}{1-a}$ as $1+a+a^2+a^3+$, &c. In this form, the fraction is as *an infinite series*; the fraction itself is called the Sum or the *finite expression* of the series. These terms were, perhaps, more correct, however, if *converted*. Comparing the two expressions, $\frac{2}{7}$ on the one side of the equation and its decimal expansion on the other, and so with the other fraction, we find that the side which is the expansion or infinite series expresses the fraction no longer as relation, but as Quantum, as an Amount, as a number of Quanta which add themselves to each other. That the Amount consists of decimal fractions, and so again of relations, is not a consideration here; for the question refers wholly to the Amount and not to the nature of the Unity concerned. A number consisting of several places of figures is still an Amount; and the Unities of the Amount are not required to be considered in their peculiarity as units of the general decimal system. Nor is it to be objected that all fractions do not, like $\frac{2}{7}$, yield an infinite decimal series; for every fraction may be expressed as a numerical system of another unity than the decimal one.

'In the expansion, the Infinitude of relation has disappeared, then, and has now the form of an endless series.

'But this series is evidently the spurious Infinite. It is the contradiction to state what is a relation and of qualitative nature as relation-less and mere Quantum. Thus,

carried out to what extent it may, there is always a *minus*: such series is but a Sollen, a To-be-to; a Beyond that is ever beyond is here inevitable. This is the permanent contradiction that ensues from the attempt to express what is qualitative as a quantitative amount.

'The *inexactitude* is here in actuality, which is only in appearance in the true mathematical Infinite. Both in mathematic and in philosophy the two Infinites, True and False, are to be carefully discriminated. In spite both of some early and of some recent attempts, infinite series is no legitimate or necessary expression of the true Infinite. Such series is inferior as an expression even to the fraction.

'The infinite series remains a Sollen, a To-be-to; it expresses *not* what *it is to* express. What it expresses is burthened with a Beyond, and is different from what it is to express. It is infinite as incomplete, and reaches not the other which is to complete it. What is properly there is a Finite, and stated as a Finite: it *is—not that*—which it *is to be*. The *finite* expression, on the other hand, the *sum*, is without deficiency. It *has* what the other only *seeks*. The Beyond is recalled from flight. What it *is* and *is to be* are unseparated and the same.

'The distinction is closer this:—In the infinite series the *negative* is *outside* of what is *stated*, as that is only a part of the amount. In the *finite expression*, on the contrary, a relation, the negative is immanent as the determinedness of the sides of the relation through one another; it is thus as returned to within itself, a self-referent unity, negation of the negation (*both* sides being but *moments*); it has thus the character of infinitude within itself. The finite expression is thus the

infinite expression; the sum is a relation. The infinite series is in truth *sum*, no relation, but an aggregate. The series, then, is what is finite; it is an imperfect aggregate, and remains defective; it is determinate Quantum, but less than it should be. What fails again is also a determinate Quantum, and it is this deficiency that constitutes what is *in*finite in the series—this in the formal point of view that it is what *fails*, what *is not*, a *non-being*; in real meaning and value it is a determinate Quantum. What *is*, only with what is *not*, constitutes what *is to be* but is not able to be. This word *infinite*, even in the case of the series so called, is to common opinion something *high* and *holy*; such opinion is but superstition, the superstition of understanding; that depends, however, only on a *want*. (*Negative*, as used above, has reference to the necessary *negation* required for qualitative distinctivity or determinateness. 'Formal point of view'—it is only as regards *form* that the series is *in*finite, that what fails is always *not*, &c.)

'It may be remarked that there are infinite series incapable of being summed; but this is an external and contingent circumstance with reference to the form of series as such. These involve an incommensurability, or the impossibility of representing the implied quantitative relation as a Quantum. The infinitude of such series is of a higher order than in those that may be summed; but the form of series as such is still, even in these cases, the spurious Infinite.

'The usual metaphysical Infinite, and not the true mathematical Infinite, it is, then, which ought to be called, not the Absolute, but the Relative Infinite. There must be a conversion of dignity in these references. What cannot sublate its *other* is Finite; what

has sublated this *other* and united it to itself is Infinite.*

* For the sake only of the illustration it contains, it may be worth while noticing the curious attempt of Thomas Taylor, in his 'Dissertation on Nullities,' to prove, through expedients which are at bottom only the *spurious Infinite*, that there exist 'Nullities,' 'not Nothings,' but 'infinitely small quantities' that 'belong to, without being quantity,' and 'have a subsistence prior to number and even to the monad itself.' Such Nullities are 1—1, 2—2, 3—3, &c.; and these, in order, are stated by Taylor to be infinitely small quantities of 1, of 2, of 3, &c. Of 1—1, he says, it 'is not the same with 0, or, in other words, 1—1 considered collectively, or as one thing, is not the same with 1 considered as taken from one, so as to leave nothing.' The key-note of this Thomas 'Taylor's Theorem' is, that $\frac{1}{2}$ is equal to $\frac{1}{1+1}$, which, when expanded, becomes 1—1+1—1, + &c. *ad infinitum*. Taylor, while he accepts the summation of this series at the hands of the Mathematicians, seems—for he is by no means explicit—to object to these gentlemen that they are 'very far from suspecting' that they have accomplished at the same time the summation of the 'infinite Nullities.' He, for his part, however, evidently sees very clearly that, 1—1 being 0, (1—1) + (1—1), which is the single characteristic and constitutive act of the series, must be but a summation of 0 to 0 all through; and consequently that, as this summation issues, not in nothing, but in $\frac{1}{2}$, 1—1 is, after all, not a Nothing, but a 'Nullity,'—a quantity infinitely small. Taylor then proceeds to point out—what 'it is singular that neither Euler, nor any other Mathematician, should have considered' — 'that $\frac{1}{3}=\frac{1}{1+1+1}$, $\frac{1}{4}=\frac{1}{1+1+1+1}$' and, in short, all fractions whose numerators are Unity, and whose denominators are distributed into Unities, will, when resolved into infinite series, be equal to this same 1—1+1—1, &c. infinitely.' He does not on that account, however, alter his original conclusion that 'the sum of the infinite nullities is $\frac{1}{2}$.' Surely, nevertheless, he has now an equal title to infer that this same sum is $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, &c. Nay, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, &c., *ad infinitum*, being all equal to the same thing and consequently to one another, surely he has now an equal title to infer that 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and in general all number or numbers whatever, are similarly equal! Another instance of a like confusion is this: 'If 1—5, in whatever way it may be considered, was always the same as —4, and 1—2 the same as —1, then, since —1 divided by —4 is equal to $\frac{1}{4}$, 1—2 divided by 1—5 would also be equal to $\frac{1}{4}$; but on the contrary, it is equal to the infinite series 1+3+15+75, &c.' Taylor's error is the omission to perceive that all his Infinites are 'spurious:' had he but *completed* them by what Hegel names the 'defect,' the 'failing determinate Quantum,' and Euler—a few pages before the one cited by Taylor himself—the

'It is in the sense of these findings, that Spinoza opposes the notion of the True to that of the False Infinite, and illustrates the same by examples.

'Spinoza defines the *Infinite* as the *absolute affirmation* of the existence of a nature of any kind; the *Finite*, on the contrary, as *determinateness*, as *negation*. The absolute affirmation of an existence is to be taken, namely, as *Self-reference*, not as what is because *another* is: the Finite, on the contrary, is the negation, a ceasing as mere *referentiality* to *another* that *out of* it begins. Absolute affirmation is inadequate, however, to the notion of the Infinite; which is not *immediate* affirmation, but as what is restored through reflexion of the other into itself, or as negation of the negative. But the substance of Spinoza and its absolute unity are fixed and immovable: they have not the form of the self with self-mediating unity; they possess not the notion of the negative unity of the Self, subjectivity.

'remainder' (which remainder is, in the cases mentioned, $\pm\frac{1}{1+1}$, $\pm\frac{1}{1+1+1}$, $\pm\frac{1}{1+1+1+1}$, $\frac{75}{1-5}$, equal respectively, $\pm\frac{1}{2}$, $\pm\frac{1}{3}$, $\pm\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{75}{-4}$ or $-18\frac{3}{4}$), he would have found them instantly converted into the original relations, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, and $\frac{1}{4}$. These two one-fourths suggest that, on similar reasoning, Taylor might have declared $1-1+1-1$, &c. $= 1+3+15+75$, &c.; but in this and in the other cases, absurdity and confusion disappear directly the *spurious un-ended* is *ended* by what it *wants*—the relative *remainder*. Elsewhere Taylor — possibly, in similar cases, Mathematicians generally—might reflect with profit on the Hegelian distinction between operating (through 'increase' and 'diminution') on what is Quantity, and on what is Quantity no longer. Schoolboys, with a single string, produce, by passing loop through loop and tightening loop on loop, a very sufficient whip-cord, which seems to consist of a series of sufficiently solid-looking knots: one pull at the tail of the last one, however, and the whole series vanishes into its first *One*, the single string. Thus Taylor's series remained solid to him because he forgot to pull the tail, the remainder. This at least illustrates what Hegel is so anxious to make clear, the *spuriousness* of unended *Progressus* regarded as an Infinite, and will, perhaps, be excused by the reader.

'Spinoza's example of the Infinite is the space between two circles, one of which, without touching, and without being concentric, is contained within the other. 'The mathematicians,' he says, 'demonstrate that the inequalities, which are possible in such a space, are infinite, not from the infinite number of the parts, for its magnitude is fixed and limited, and I can assume such spaces as greater and smaller, but because *the nature of the thing itself* exceeds every determinateness.' This infinite of Spinoza, then, is present and complete, not any unended number or series; the space, in his example, is limited, but it is infinite because 'the nature of the thing itself exceeds every determinateness,' because the magnitude contained in it cannot be expressed as a Quantum. The infinite of a series he names the *infinite of the imagination*; that again which is self-referent, *the infinite of thought*, or *infinitum actu*. The latter is *actually* infinite, because it is complete within itself and present. The other has no actuality, something fails it. The $\frac{2}{7}$ or $\frac{1}{1-a}$ is, like Spinoza's space, so far finite, and can be assumed as greater or smaller; but it admits not of the absurdity of a greater or less Infinite; for this Quantum of the whole affects not the relation of its moments, 'the nature of the thing,' that is, the qualitative determination of the magnitude. What in the infinite series is *there* is not only a finite Quantum, but, moreover, a defective one. Imagination clings to the Quantum as such, and reflects not on the qualitative peculiarity which constitutes the reason of the existent incommensurability.

'This incommensurability—that of Spinoza's example—comprehends within it the functions of curved lines,

and brings us nearer to the true mathematical infinite which is connected with such functions and with the functions of variable magnitudes in general.

'In $\frac{2}{7}$ both numerator and denominator, as we have seen, are, in a certain manner, infinitely variable; $\frac{a}{b}$ again is infinitely variable in a still more unrestricted sense: if in the functions of *variable quantities*, then, x and y are to be distinguished from such quantities as 2, 7, a, b, &c., the principle of distinction must rest on something else than variableness as such or in general. *Variable quantity*, then, as an expression that is to be specifically distinctive, is extremely vague, and, at the same time, very badly chosen for characters of quantity which have their interest and their principle of operation in *something quite else* than their mere variableness.

'In $\frac{2}{7}$ the 2 and the 7 are, each of them, a fixed independent Quantum, and any co-reference or connexion is not essential to them. In $\frac{a}{b}$ too, both a and b are such quanta as are supposed to remain the quanta which they are apart from, and independent of, the relation. Moreover, $\frac{2}{7}$ and $\frac{a}{b}$ have fixed quotients; the relation constitutes an amount of unities, the denominator corresponding to the latter and the numerator to the former. To express it otherwise, whatever change is made on the 2 and the 7 (as into 4 and 14, &c.), the relation as Quantum remains the same. This is all changed, however, in the function $\frac{y^2}{x} = p$, for example. Here x and y represent variable Quanta capable of receiving determinate values; but

it is not on x and y, but on x and y^2, that the quotient depends. That is, x and y are not only variable, but their relation is no fixed quantum but as a quantum also absolutely variable. The reason of this peculiar variableness of the quotient is, that the relation is not of one quantity to another, but of one quantity to the *square* of another. This introduction of a *power* into the *relation* is the *circumstance* to be regarded as the *fundamental determination*: the relation of a magnitude to a power is no *quantum*, but essentially a *qualitative* relation.—Now in such functions as that of the straight line, the relation does not concern a power; $\frac{x}{y} = a$ contains a fraction quite similar to $\frac{a}{b}$; the fraction is an ordinary one, the quotient an ordinary one: such functions, therefore, are only *formally* functions of variable quantities, and have not that character to which the principle of the Calculus applies. In view of the specific difference which we have here so strongly before us, it would have been proper to have introduced for the functions named variable not only a specific name, but specific *signs* also, and different from those of the usual unknown quantities in algebra. It is to fail to see the peculiarity of the Calculus and the need from which it sprung, that there should be included within its matter such functions as those of the first degree. It is right to complete the generalisation of a method, but it is a misunderstanding here so to leave the specific difference out of view that the interest of the science seems to concern variable quantities *in general*. Much formalism of consideration and of operation would have been spared, had it been seen that what

was in question was not quantitative variableness as such, but relations to Powers.

'But, in addition to this, there is another peculiarity that distinguishes the mathematical Infinite. In the relation $\frac{y^2}{x}$, the y and the x have still the force and the value of Quanta; but this force and value disappear in the Infinitely Small Differences. dx, dy are no longer Quanta, nor do they represent Quanta; they have meaning only in connexion, *a sense only as Moments*. They are no longer Something in the sense of a Quantum, they are not finite differences; but they are not nothing, not indeterminate zero. Apart from their relation they are zeros, but they are to be taken only as moments of the relation, as *determinations* of the Differential Coefficient $\frac{dx}{dy}$.

'In this notion of the Infinite, Quantum is veritably perfected into a qualitative There-being (specific existence): it is in *explicit position* as actually infinite; it is sublated not only as this or that Quantum, but as Quantum in general. Quantitative specificity remains, however, as Element of Quanta, as principle; it is Quanta and quantitative specificity, as some one has also said, *in their first Notion.*

'Against this notion is it that all attacks, bearing on the fundamental principle of the Calculus, have been directed. The misapprehensions of mathematicians themselves in this connexion occasioned these. Generally they have been unable to justify their object as notion; but this notion cannot be evaded; for here it is not finite determinateness that is concerned; rather on this field such determinatenesses are converted into *identity* with *their opposites*, just as curved

lines are converted into straight, the circle into the polygon, &c. The operations of the Calculus, then, are entirely contradictory to the nature of finite values and their connexions, and should have their justification only in the *Notion.*

'That, as vanishing, these infinite differences should have been conceived as a *middle-state* between Something and Nothing, was an error. This has been already discussed on occasion of the Category of Becoming in Remark 4. A *state* is a contingent and external affection; it is the disappearing, the Becoming, —that is, the *truth.*

'What is infinite, it has been further said, is incapable of *comparison* as a greater or a less; a relation of infinite to infinite, orders or dignities of the infinite—distinctions which are spoken of in the science itself—are therefore not legitimate. The *conception* of Quanta and of the comparison of Quanta in relation still underlies this objection. But rather, it should be said, what is *only* in relation is no Quantum. A Quantum is what can have its own indifferent, independent existence apart from the relation—what, therefore, is indifferent to its distinction from another. What is qualitative, again, is that which it is only in its distinction from another. In this sense, these infinite magnitudes are not only capable of *comparison*, but they are only as moments of comparison, of relation.

'If we examine now the chief mathematical views of this Infinite, we shall find that they all imply the same thought of the thing itself (which we have just expressed), but not fully expiscated as notion, and that they are driven to expedients in the application at variance with the stricter principle.

'The thought cannot be more correctly determined

than Newton has given it; that is, the conceptions of movement and velocity (whence *fluxion*) being withdrawn as burthening the thought with inessential forms and interfering with its due abstraction. Newton says of these fluxions (Princ. Mathem. Phil. Nat., lib. i. lemma xi. Schol.) that he understands by them *disappearing Divisibles*, not *Indivisibles*—a form belonging to Cavalleri and others, and implying the notion of a Quantum determined in itself; further not sums and relations of definite parts, but the *Limits* of sums and relations. It may be objected that vanishing quantities have no *last relation*, because what is before their disappearance is not a last, and after, there is nothing. But the relation of such magnitudes is to be conceived *not before* they disappear and not *after*; it is the relation *with which* they disappear (quacum evanescunt). So of magnitudes that become, the *first* relation is that *with* which they become.

'Newton now proceeds to explain what is to be understood by such and such an expression: this belongs to the scientific method of the time, and has no foundation in the truth of things. The *notion*, which is *in itself necessary*, being demonstrated, any explanation of what is *to be understood* becomes superfluous as mere historical demand or subjective presumption. But Newton's words apply plainly to the notion as here demonstrated. We have quantities which disappear or are no longer Quanta; and we have relations, not of definite parts, but relations which are *limits* of relation. Not only the Quanta or sides of the relation disappear, but the relation itself so far as it is Quantum. The limit of a quantitative relation is that in which it both is and is not, or, more accurately, that in which the Quantum has disappeared, and there

remains the relation only as qualitative relation of quantity, and its sides similarly as qualitative moments of quantity. Ultimate magnitudes, *Indivisibles*, however, are not to be inferred from an ultimate relation of vanishing magnitudes. This were to deviate again from the abstract relation to such sides of it as should be supposed to possess a value apart from their co-reference, *per se*, as Indivisibles—as something that were a one, relation-less.

'The *last relations*, he urges, are not relations of *last magnitudes*, but limits, to which the *relations* of the infinitely decreasing magnitudes are nearer than any *given*, that is to say, finite, difference : the limit moreover is not exceeded, to the production of nothing. *Last* magnitudes were indeed Indivisibles, or Ones. In the last relation, however, any indifferent one that were without relation, as well as finite Quantum, disappears. Here, however, conceptions of infinite decrease (which is only the infinite Progressus) as well as of divisibility, have no longer any immediate sense, if the notion of a quantitative element, which is only moment of a relation, be held fast in its purity.

'As regards the continuance of the relation in the disappearance of the Quanta, there is to be found (elsewhere as in Carnot, 'Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du Calcul Infinitésimal') the expression that *by virtue of the law of continuity* the vanishing magnitudes still retain the relation (or ratio) from which they spring, before they vanish. This conception expresses the true nature of the thing, so far as not that continuity of Quantum is understood which it has in the *infinite progress*, that is, so to continue itself in its disappearance that in the Beyond of itself there

arises again only a finite Quantum, only a *new term of the series*; a continuous progress is always so conceived, that the values are gone through, which then are still finite Quanta. In the continuity of the true infinite, on the contrary, it is the relation that is *continuous*; it is so *continuous* that it rather wholly consists in this, to isolate the relation alone, and to abolish any element that is not the relation, any Quantum which as side of the relation were to be supposed to remain Quantum apart from the relation. This purification of the quantitative relation is the same thing as what is meant by an empirical existence of any kind being *comprehended in its notion* (begriffen). Such existence in such case is raised beyond its own self in such wise that its notion contains the same characterising constituents as it itself, but taken up in their essentiality and into the unity of the notion, in which they have lost their indifferent, notionless subsistence.

'Newton's *generative magnitudes* or principles are equally interesting. A generated magnitude (genita) is a product or quotient, rectangles, squares, or sides of these,—in general a finite magnitude. "Such being considered as variable, as in continual movement and flux, increasing and decreasing, he understands by the name of moments their momentary Increments or Decrements. These, however, are not to be taken as particles of a definite magnitude (particulæ finitæ). Such were not themselves moments, but magnitudes generated out of moments; what is to be understood is rather the Principles or Beginnings (Elements) of finite magnitudes." Here the Quantum is distinguished from itself, or how it is as product or there-beënt, and how in its Becoming, in its Beginning and Principle, that is to

say, in its notion, or what is here the same thing, in its qualitative characterisation: in the latter the quantitative differences, the infinite increments or decrements, are only moments; only what is become is that which has gone over into the externality and indifference of There-being, the Quantum. If, on the one side, such conceptions are to be acknowledged to imply the true notion, on the other side these forms of increments, &c., are to be seen to fall within the category of the immediate Quantum and of the Progressus, and to constitute the fundamental vice in the method—the permanent obstacle to the isolation into its purity of the qualitative moment in quantity in contradistinction to the usual Quantum.

'The conception of *infinitely small magnitudes*, which, however, is contained *impliciter* in the Increments and Decrements themselves, is very inferior to the above determinations. These are described as such, that not only they themselves in comparison with finite magnitudes, but their higher orders in comparison with their lower, and even the products of several in comparison with a single one, may be *neglected*. This call to *neglect* is more strikingly prominent with Leibnitz than with others who preceded him. This call it is which, if it has won facility for the Calculus, has also given to its operations an appearance of inexactitude and express inaccuracy. Wolf, in his way of making things popular, that is to say, of making turbid the notion and of setting in its place incorrect sensuous conceptions, has sought to render this *neglect* intelligible by such examples as, in taking the height of a mountain the calculation is not affected, if a particle of sand be blown away the while; nor does the neglect of the height of the house or tower

interfere with the accuracy of the calculations of lunar eclipses.

'If the *fair play* of Common Sense accept such inexactitude, all geometricians unite to reject the conception. In such a science as Mathematic there can be no question of *empirical* exactitude; its mensuration, whether by operations of the Calculus or by constructions in Geometry, is quite different from that of empirical lines and figures, as in Land-surveying. Proofs from elsewhere, besides, establish that there is no question of a less or more of accuracy, while it is self-evident at the same time that an absolutely exact result cannot issue from a process that were incorrect. Then, on the other side, the process itself *cannot do without* this *neglect* — despite its protestations that what it neglects is of no account. And this is the difficulty, this is what requires to be made intelligible, and any appearance of absurdity in it removed.

'Euler, in adopting Newton's general definition, would, in considering the relations of the Increments, regard the Infinite Difference as zero. (Institut. Calc. Different., P. I., c. iii.) How we are to understand this, lies in the foregoing: the difference, if zero quantitatively, is not so qualitatively; it is no zero, but a pure moment in the relation. It is no difference *by so much*; yet, again, it seems strange to characterise what is infinitely small, as increment or decrement or difference; and such external arithmetical operation really seems performed, addition or subtraction, in that, as regards the finite magnitude present from the first, something is added to it, or taken from it. It is to be said, however, that the transition from the function of the Variable to its Differential, must be regarded as of

quite a different nature, namely (as already determined), as a reduction of the finite function to the qualitative relation of its quantitative elements. Again the difficulty reappears when the increments are called zeros; for a zero has no determinateness, and seems insusceptible of the relation still attributed. Conception here has correctly reached the negative of the Quantum, but does not hold it fast, nevertheless, in its positive value of qualitative determinations of quantity, which, isolated from the relation and taken as Quanta, are zeros.—Lagrange (Théorie des Fonct. Analyt., Introd.) remarks of Limits or *ultimate* Ratios, that though we can very well conceive the ratio of two magnitudes so long as they remain finite, we can form no clear or distinct notion of this ratio so soon as its terms have become zero. In effect, the understanding must transcend this merely negative side with respect to the terms of the ratio being null as Quanta, and take them up positively as qualitative moments. What Euler says further as regards zeros that are yet relations, and so to be otherwise expressed than zeros, cannot be considered satisfactory. He seeks to support this on the difference between arithmetical and geometrical ratios. In the arithmetical there is no difference between 0 and 0; in the geometrical, however, if $2 : 1 = 0 : 0$, then proportion is such, that the first 0 is twice the second. In common arithmetic, too, $n.0 = 0$, i.e. $n : 1 :: 0 : 0$. But just by this that $2 : 1$ or $n : 1$ is a relation of Quanta, there cannot correspond to it any relation or expression of $0 : 0$.

'In the instances given, the veritable notion of the Infinite is really implied then, but it is not stamped out and taken up in its specific determinateness. It is not to be expected, then, that the operation can prove

satisfactory. The true notion is not there kept in view; finite Quantum intrudes; and the conception of a merely *relatively* small cannot be dispensed with. What is infinite has still to submit to, and is susceptible of, the usual arithmetical operations, addition, &c.; and is thus so far finite. Justification, then, is required for such duplicity of view which would consider infinite magnitudes now as increments or differences, and again *neglect* them as Quanta, immediately after having applied to them the forms and laws of Quanta, of what is finite.

'There have been many attempts to remove these difficulties; I adduce the most important.

'It has been sought to procure for the Calculus the evidence of the Geometrical method proper and the rigour of the ancient demonstration—expressions of Lagrange. But the principle of the one being higher than that of the other, renunciation must be made of that sort of *Evidence*, just as Philosophy has no pretensions to that plainness which the Sciences of what is sensuous (Natural History, &c.) possess, and as eating and drinking are a much more intelligible business than thinking and comprehending. As for the rigour of demonstration—

'Some have endeavoured altogether to dispense with the notion of the Infinite. Lagrange mentions Landen's method as a pure analytic process that, without any infinitely small differences, assumes, first of all, various values of the variables, and sets them equal in the sequel. He decides that the advantages proper of the Calculus—simplicity of method and ease of operation—are thus lost. There is something here corresponding to that, from which Descartes' method of Tangents proceeds. This process, on the whole, belongs to

another sphere of mathematical treatment than the method of the Calculus; and the peculiarity of the simple relation to which the actual concrete interest reduces itself—that is, the simple relation of the derived to the original function—is not made sufficiently prominent.

'Many, as Fermat, Barrow, Leibnitz, Euler, and others, have always openly believed themselves warranted to omit the products of infinite differences, as well as their higher powers, only on the ground that they *disappear relatively* to the lower order. On this alone rests with them the *fundamental position*, that is, the determination of what is the differential of a product or a power, *for to this the whole theoretical doctrine reduces itself.* What remains is partly mechanism of development, but partly again application; which latter, as will appear again, constitutes in effect the higher, or rather only interest. As regards what is before us, the elementary instances may be worth mentioning, that, for the same reason of *unimportance*, it is assumed that the Elements of Curves, namely, the increments of the Abscis and of the Ordinate, have to one another the relation of the Subtangent and of the Ordinate; with the view of obtaining similar triangles, the arc, which forms to the two increments the third side of a triangle, formerly rightly named the *characteristic* triangle, is regarded as a straight line, as part of the Tangent, and withal the increment extending to the Tangent. These assumptions raise these forms, on the one hand, above the nature of finite magnitudes; on the other hand, again, there is applied to the moments named infinite a process that is valid only of finite magnitudes, and in which nothing can be neglected because of its unimportance. The difficulty under

which the method labours appears in such procedure in its full force.

'An ingenious artifice of Newton to get rid of the unnecessary terms in finding the Differentials, may here be mentioned. He (Princ. Math. Phil. Nat., lib. ii. lemma ii. post propos. vii.) finds the Differential of the product in the following way. The product, when x, y are taken, each of them *smaller* by the half of its infinite Difference, passes into $xy-\frac{xdy}{2}-\frac{ydx}{2}+\frac{dxdy}{4}$; and when x, y are taken *greater* by the same amount, into $xy+\frac{xdy}{2}+\frac{ydx}{2}+\frac{dxdy}{4}$. The first product now, being taken from the second, there remains over $xdy+ydx$, and this remainder Newton wishes us to regard as the excess of the increase by a whole dx and dy, for this excess is the difference of the two products; it is therefore the Differential of xy. In this process we see that the troublesome term, the product of the two infinite Differences, $dxdy$, neutralises itself. But, the name of Newton notwithstanding, we must venture to say that this—certainly very elementary—operation is nevertheless incorrect; it is incorrect that $\left(x+\frac{dx}{2}\right)\left(y+\frac{dy}{2}\right)-\left(x-\frac{dx}{2}\right)\left(y-\frac{dy}{2}\right)=(x+dx)(y+dy)-xy$. It can only be the pressing necessity of establishing an interest of such importance as the Calculus of Fluxions, which could bring a Newton to palm on himself the deception of such a proof.'

It must be admitted that Hegel has succeeded here in striking his harpoon into that vast whale Newton. I dare say, by this time, however, even a Newton may

submit to carry the *marks* of a Hegel. It is possible that some readers may fail to see at once what Hegel, nevertheless, means here; and they may be disposed to ask, where does Hegel get this $(x+dx)\ (y+dy)-xy$ of his? That the equation said to be incorrect is really incorrect, is evident by inspection, or, at all events, on effecting the expansion; in which case it is seen that the equation in question amounts to a setting equal of $xdy+ydx$ to $xdy+ydx+dxdy$, a result self-evidently false. But then this is just the reverse of what Newton does: Newton proposes no such equation—and the question recurs, what does Hegel mean? —where does he get this equation?—and why does he saddle it on Newton? The answer is simple: Hegel's $(x+dx)\ (y+dy)-xy$ is the usual way (the ordinary $u'-u$) in or by which differentiation is introduced. Or to state it better — though the previous statement will probably prove useful to some readers— Hegel's Expression *is* what Newton *says* his is,—"*the excess of the increase by a whole dx and dy.*" If it was clever in Newton thus slyly to fling out the importunate *tail*, it is certainly much cleverer in Hegel thus more slyly to fling it back again.

'Other forms employed by Newton in the derivation of the Differential are rendered impure by the concrete adjuncts of Motion, &c. The introduction of the serial form, too, brings a temptation to speak of attaining *what accuracy we please* and to *neglect* what is *relatively unimportant*, &c., not always to be resisted: it is thus that, in his method of resolving equations of the higher degrees by approximation, he leaves out of consideration the higher powers which arise by the substitution into the equation of each new-found but still inexact value, for the clumsy reason of their

smallness; (*vide* Lagrange, Equations Numériques, p. 125.)

'The blunder into which Newton, in the resolution of a problem, by the omission of higher powers which were essential, fell, which blunder gave his enemies the opportunity of a triumph of their method over his, and of which Lagrange (Théorie des Fonct. Analyt., 3ème P., ch. iv.) has demonstrated the true origin, proves the *formality* and uncertainty which still existed in the employment of said instrument. Lagrange shows that Newton threw out the very term which—for the problem in hand—was wanted. Newton had erred from adhering to the formal and superficial principle of omission because of relative smallness. It is known, namely, that in Mechanic a particular import is attached to the terms of the series in which the function of a motion is developed, so that the first term or the first function relates to the moment of velocity, the second to the accelerating force, and the third to the resistance of forces. The terms of this series are thus not to be regarded as only parts of a sum, but as *qualitative moments of a whole of the notion.* The omission of the remaining terms which belong to the pseudo-infinite series acquires here a wholly *different sense* from the omission because of their relative smallness.* Newton's error arose, then,

* 'Both considerations (i.e. the qualitative and the quantitative) are found very simply beside each other in the application by Lagrange of the Theory of Functions to Mechanic (Théorie des Fonc., 3ème P., ch. i., art. 4). The space described considered as function of the time elapsed gives the equation $x=ft$; this developed as $f(t+\vartheta)$ gives

$$ft+\vartheta f't+\frac{\vartheta^2}{2}f''t+,\&c.$$

The space, then, appears in the formula,

$$=\vartheta f't+\frac{\vartheta^2}{2}f''t+\frac{\vartheta^3}{2\cdot3}f'''t+,\ \&c.$$

The motion by means of which

from not attending to that term which possessed the qualitative value sought.

'In this example, it is the qualitative *sense* on which the process is made to depend. In agreement herewith the general declaration may at once be made, that the whole difficulty of the Principle would be at once removed if—instead of the formalism which places the determination of the Differential only in—what gives it its name—the problem to find the *difference* of a function from the *alteration* it undergoes when its variable magnitude has received an increase—the *qualitative* import of the principle were assigned, and the operation made dependent thereon. In this sense the Differential of x^n manifests itself to be com-

this space is described, is, it is said, *therefore*, that is to say, because the analytic development gives several — rather an infinite number of terms, — *composed* of several partial motions, of which the spaces, correspondent to the time, will be

$$\vartheta f't, \quad \frac{\vartheta^2}{2} f''t, \quad \frac{\vartheta^3}{2\cdot 3} f'''t, \quad \&c.$$

The first partial motion is, in known motion, the formally uniform one with a velocity designated by $f't$, the second the uniformly accelerated one which derives from an accelerating force proportioned to $f''t$. "As now the remaining terms *relate to no simple known motion, it is unnecessary* to *take* them specially *into consideration*, and we will show that *they may be abstracted from* in the determination of the motion at the beginning of the time-point." This is now *shown*, but shown only by the *comparison* of this said series (*all* the terms of which should belong to the determination of the magnitude of the space described in the time given) with the equation given, Art. 3, for the motion of a falling body, $x=at+bt^2$, in which equation only these two terms are to be supposed contained. But this equation has itself obtained this form only by presupposition of the *explanation* which is *given* to the terms that arise through *analytic development*: this presupposition is, that the uniformly accelerated motion is *composed* of a formally uniform motion proceeding with the velocity acquired in the foregoing time, and of an increase (the a in $s=at^2$, i.e. the empirical coefficient), which is ascribed to the force of gravitation,—a distinction which has noways any existence or ground in the nature of the thing itself, but is only the expression — falsely made physical — of what results in the case of an assumed analytic operation.'

pletely exhausted by the first term of the series which results from the expansion of $(x+dx)^n$. That the remaining terms are not to be considered, does not depend on their relative smallness;—there is no presupposition in this case of an inaccuracy, a blunder, an error which is to be balanced and amended by another; a point of view from which Carnot mainly justifies the usual method of the Infinitesimal Calculus. In that the question is *not* of a *Sum*, but of a Relation or Ratio, the Differential is completely found *by the first term*; and where further terms, differentials of higher degrees, are required, their determination is not to be considered as the continuation of a series as *Sum*, but the *repetition* of one and the same *ratio*, which ratio is all that is wanted, and which consequently is already *complete* in the *first term*. The necessity of the form of a series, its summation, and of what depends thereon, must then be wholly separated from this *Interest of the Relation*.

'The elucidations which Carnot gives on the method of infinite magnitudes are of the purest and clearest. But in passing to the operation itself there enter, more or less, the usual conceptions of the infinite *smallness* of the omitted terms *relatively* to the others. He justifies the method by the fact that the *results* are correct, and by the *utility* which the introduction of *imperfect* equations, as he calls them, that is to say, of such as exhibit such arithmetically incorrect omission, has for the simplification and abbreviation of calculation, rather than by the nature of the thing itself.

'Lagrange, as is well known, has taken up again the original *serial* method of Newton, in order to be relieved of the difficulties which attend the conception

of the infinitely little as well as the method of first and last ratios and limits. His Calculus of functions, its merits of precision, abstraction, and universality being justly acknowledged, rests on the fundamental proposition, that the Difference, without becoming nothing, *may be taken so small, that each term of the series shall exceed in magnitude the sum of all that follow.* Even in this method a beginning is made with the categories of the *increase* and of the *difference* of the function whose variable magnitude receives the increase, by which increase the troublesome series comes in, from the original function; just as in the sequel the terms to be omitted are viewed only as *sum*, and the reason of omission is placed in the relativity of their *Quantum.* Partly the omission is not, as universal principle, reduced to the *qualitative* consideration, which we saw exemplifying itself in some applications (where the terms neglected were exhibited not as quantitatively but as qualitatively insignificant); partly, again, the omission itself is omitted in the very principle which, as regards the so-called differential coefficient, characteristically distinguishes the so-named *application* of the Calculus with Lagrange, as will be discussed more at full in the Remark that follows the present one.

'The *qualitative character* which has been pointed out, is to be found in its directest form in the category, *limit of the ratio*, which has been above mentioned, and the carrying out of which in the Calculus has given rise to a special method. Lagrange decides that this method wants ease of application, and that the expression *Limit* is without definite idea. We, then, shall take up *Limit* in its idea, and see closer what has been stated as regards its analytic import. In the

conception of Limit there certainly lies the adduced veritable category of the *qualitative relational* character of the variable magnitudes, for the forms which come in from them, dx and dy, are held to be only as moments of $\frac{dy}{dx}$, and $\frac{dy}{dx}$ itself is viewed as a single indivisible sign. That the advantage is thus lost which may be derived from the separation of the sides of the differential co-efficient, for the mechanism of the Calculus in its application,—this we may pass by. The limit is now, then, to be *limit* of a given function;—it is to assign in reference to this function a certain *value*, determined by the *mode* of the derivation. With the mere category of limit, however, we were no further than with what has been the object of this Remark, to show, namely, that the *infinitely little*, which presents itself in the Calculus as dx and dy, has not merely the empty, negative sense of a non-finite, a non-given magnitude, as in the expressions, an infinite number, *in infinitum*, &c., but the definite sense of the qualitative determinateness of the quantitative elements, of a moment of relation as such. This qualitative assignment is yet without definite application, and limit so far is similarly situated; but limit at once *means* more. Limit is limit of *Something*; it expresses a certain value which lies in the function of variable magnitude; and we have to see the nature of this concrete rôle. It is to be the limit of the ratio of the two increments which increase two variables conjoined in an equation, and the one a function of the other;—the increase here is quite indefinite, and there is no use, so far, of the infinitely little. But the manner of finding this limit leads directly to the same inconsequences as in the other methods. This manner,

namely, is the following. If $y=fx$ become increased by k, then fx alters itself into $fx+p\,h+qh^2+r\,h^3$, &c., and so $k=ph+qh^2$, &c., and $\frac{k}{h} = p + qh + rh^2$, &c. Now, let k and h vanish, and all vanishes except p, which p is now to be considered the limit of the ratio of the two increments. Though $h=0$, then, $\frac{k}{h}$ is not to be at once $=\frac{0}{0}$, but is to be supposed still to remain a ratio. The conception of limit now is to be supposed to extend the advantage of warding off the inconsequence which appears here; p is, at the same time, not to be the actual ratio that were $=\frac{0}{0}$, but only that particular value to which the ratio *infinitely approximates*, so that the *difference* may be taken *smaller* than *any given* one. The preciser sense of this approximation in regard to *what* approximate will be considered again. That, however, a quantitative difference which may be taken smaller than any given one (and *must* be so taken), is no longer quantitative at all—this is self-evident; but there is no advance even so, as regards $\frac{dy}{dx}=\frac{0}{0}$. If, on the other hand, $\frac{dy}{dx}=p$, i.e., if it be assumed as a definite quantitative ratio, as is in effect the case, then the presupposition which has set $h=0$ is in a dilemma—a presupposition by which alone $\frac{k}{h}=p$ is found. But if it be granted that $\frac{k}{h}=0$, and with $h=0$, k of itself becomes $=0$; for the increment k to y *is*, only if the increment h *is*,—then it were necessary to say what p is to be, which as p is a quite definite quantitative value. To this there is at once the simple

dry answer that it is a co-efficient and so-and-so derived,—the first function of an original function, and determined in a certain definite manner. If we content ourselves with this—and in point of fact Lagrange has virtually contented himself with this—then the universal or general part of the Calculus, and directly this form of it, which is named the Theory of Limits, are quit of increments and their infinite or discretionary smallness—quit of the difficulty of getting out of the way all the terms of the inevitable series except the first, or, rather, except only the co-efficient of the first—quit of the formal categories of the infinite, of infinite approximation, of continuous magnitude,* and of all others the like, as *effort*, *becoming*, *occasion of an alteration*, to which men have been driven in the exigency of the case. But then it would be still necessary to show—besides the mere dry definition (sufficient for the Theory), that it is nothing but a function derived from the expansion of a Binomial—what *meaning* and *value*, i.e., what *connexion* and *application* this same p still has for further mathematical requirements: this will be the subject of Remark 2. We proceed to discuss at present the confusion which the so current use of the conception of *approximation* has occasioned in the understanding

* 'The category of continuous or fluent magnitude comes in with the consideration of the *external* and *empirical* increase effected on the variables; but, the scientific object of the Calculus being a *certain Relation* (usually expressed by the differential co-efficient), which specific peculiarity may be also named *Law*, to this peculiarity the mere continuity is partly heterogeneous, partly mere abstract empty category, seeing that as regards the law of continuity it determines nothing. What formal definitions one may be misled into, the following will exemplify:—"A continuous magnitude, *Continuum*, is every magnitude considered in a state of genesis such that the progress is not *saltuatim*, but uninterrupted." This definition is tautologically the same as the *definitum*.'

of the specific qualitative determinateness of the relation, which was the proper interest to be considered.

'It has been shown that the so-called infinite differences express the disappearance of the sides of the relation as Quanta, and that what remains is their quantitative relation, pure so far as it is determined in qualitative form; the qualitative relation is here so little lost, that it is rather that which just results from the transformation of finite into infinite magnitudes. In this, as we have seen, consists the whole nature of the thing itself. So disappear in the *ultimate ratio*, for example, the *Quanta* of the Abscis and Ordinate; but the sides of this relation in principle remain, the one the Element of the Ordinate, the other the Element of the Abscis. Now, in resorting to figurate conception, and assuming the one Ordinate infinitely to approximate to the other, the previously distinguished Ordinate passes into the other Ordinate, and the previously distinguished Abscis into the other Abscis; but essentially the Ordinate passes not into the Abscis, nor the Abscis into the Ordinate. The Element of the Ordinate, to remain by this example of variable magnitudes, is not to be taken as the Difference of one Ordinate from another Ordinate, but is rather as the Difference or qualitative-quantitative value relatively to the Element of the Abscis; the Principle of the one variable magnitude stands in relation to the Principle of the other. The Difference, in ceasing to concern finite magnitudes, has ceased to be a multiple within its own self; it has collapsed into the simple intensity, into the specificity, of one qualitative relational moment opposed to the other.

'This state of the case is obscured, however, by conceiving what has just been named Element—say

of the Ordinate, *so* as Difference or Increment that it is only the Difference between the Quantum of one Ordinate and the Quantum of another Ordinate. The *Limit* has here thus not the sense of a Relation or Ratio; it is nothing but the last value to which another magnitude of the same kind constantly approximates, and in such a manner that it may be as little different from it as we please; and that ultimate relation or ratio is a relation of *equality*. Thus the infinite Difference is the libration of the difference of a Quantum from a Quantum, and the qualitative nature by reason of which dx is essentially not a relational character with reference to x, but with reference to dy becomes lost from view. dx^2 is allowed to disappear with reference to dx, but still more does dx disappear with reference to x; and that truly is as much as to say, it has *only a relation* to dy. The endeavour of Geometricians has been specially directed to the rendering *intelligible* of the *approximation* of a magnitude to its limit, and how as regards the difference of Quantum from Quantum, it is no difference and yet a difference. But besides this the approximation is in itself a category that says nothing and makes nothing intelligible; dx has the approximation already behind it—it is not near, nor yet a nearer; and infinitely near were itself the negation of the being near and of the drawing near (approximation).

'Since it has happened that the Increments or infinite Differences have been considered only on the side of the Quantum that disappears in them and only as *its* limits, they are moments *quite without mutual relation*. We might infer from this the inadmissible conception that it is allowable in ultimate relation to set, say, Abscis and Ordinate, or even Sine, Cosine,

Tangent, versed Sine, and whatever else, all equal to each other. This conception seems at first hand to be motive, when an Arc is treated as a Tangent; for the Arc is for its part incommensurable with the straight line, and its Element is directly of an *other Quality* than the Element of the straight line. It seems still more absurd and inadmissible than the interchange of Absciss, Ordinate, versed Sine, Cosine, &c., when *quadrata rotundis*—when a part however infinitely small of the Arc is taken as a portion of the Tangent, and treated consequently as a straight line. But this operation is to be essentially distinguished from the interchange censured; it is justified by pointing out that in the triangle constituted by the Elements of Arc, Absciss, and Ordinate, there is the *same relation* as if the Element of the Arc were the Element of a straight line, the Tangent; the *angles* are the same, and these constitute the *essential Relation*—that, namely, which remains for these Elements when the finite magnitudes belonging to them are abstracted from. We might even say, straight lines, as infinitely small, have become curved lines, and the relation of them in their infinitude is a curve relation. In its definition, the straight line being the *shortest distance* between two points, its distinction from the curve would seem to rest on Number (Menge), on the *smaller* number of what is distinguishable in this distance, which is therefore a consideration of *Quantum*. But this consideration disappears in the line when it is taken as intensive magnitude, as infinite moment, as Element; but so also disappears its distinction from the curve which rested only on the difference of Quantum. Thus, as infinite, straight line and arc retain no quantitative relation, and consequently also—by reason of the assumed de-

finition—no qualitative diversity any longer relatively to each other, and the former passes into the latter.

'Analogous to the equating of heterogeneous forms, is the assumption that *infinitely small* parts of the same whole are *equal* to one another; an assumption in itself indefinite and completely indifferent, but which, applied to an object that is heterogeneous in itself—an object, that is, which possesses essential irregularity of quantitative character—may produce a peculiar inversion. This we see in the proposition of the higher Mechanic, that, in equal infinitely small times, infinitely small parts of a curve are described, in *uniform* movement, inasmuch as this is said of a movement in which, in equal *finite*, that is, existent times, *finite*, that is, existent *unequal* parts of the curve are described—a movement, then, which as existing is irregular and is so assumed. This proposition is the expression in words of what is to be supposed as represented by an analytic term that yields itself in the development we saw of the Formula respecting a motion irregular but subject to a certain law (Note on Lagrange and relative text).

'Earlier Mathematicians sought to express in words and propositions results of the newly-invented Calculus (which besides always concerned concrete objects), and to present them in geometrical delineations, essentially for the purpose of applying them as Theorems in accordance with the ordinary method of proof. The terms of a mathematical formula into which the analytic method sundered the magnitude of an object, e.g. of motion, received now, in consequence of such views, a *re*al import, e.g. of velocity, accelerating force, &c. They were held to furnish, in agreement with such import, true *positions*, physical laws; and their

real connexions and relations were supposed to be determined in accordance with the analytic combination. An example of this is the statement that in a uniformly accelerated motion, there exists a particular velocity proportional to the times, and moreover that there constantly accrues to this pseudo-uniform velocity an increment from the force of gravity. Such propositions are presented, in the modern analytic form of Mechanic, absolutely as products of the Calculus, without anyone troubling himself as to whether they have *per se* and in themselves a *real* sense—one, that is, to which there is a correspondent existence, and whether this sense can be proved. The difficulty of rendering intelligible the connexion of such forms when they are taken in the real sense alluded to—e.g. the difficulty of rendering intelligible the transition from the downright or pseudo-uniform velocity to a uniformly accelerated one—is held to be quite removed by the analytic manipulation as a manipulation in which such connexion is a simple consequence of the now once for all established authority of the operations of the Calculus. It is given out as a triumph of science to find out by the mere Calculus laws *beyond experience*, i.e. expressions of existence which have no existence. In the earlier still *naïve* period of the Calculus, it appeared, indeed, just what was right that, as regards those definitions and propositions presented in Geometrical delineations, a real sense *per se* should be assigned and made plausible, and they themselves applied in such sense in proof of the main positions concerned. See the Newtonian proof of his fundamental proposition in the Theory of Gravitation, Princ. Math. Phil. Nat., lib. i. sect. ii. prop. 1, compared with Schubert's Astronomy (1st ed. iii. B. § 20),

where it is admitted that the truth is not *exactly so*, i.e. that in the point which is the nerve of the proof, the truth is not as Newton assumes it.)

'It will not be possibly denied that in this field much has been accepted as proof, especially with the help of the mist of the infinitely little, for no other reason than that what came out was always already known before, and that the proof, which was so constituted that *it came out*, brought forward at least the *show of a scaffolding of proof*;—a show which was always still preferred to mere belief or to mere knowledge from experience. I have no hesitation, however, in regarding this mannerism as a mere jugglery and charlatanery of proof, and in including under this category even Newtonian proofs, particularly those bearing on what has just been referred to, on account of which Newton was raised to the skies and above Kepler, as having mathematically demonstrated what the latter had *merely found from experience.*

'The vacant scaffolding of such proofs was set up for the demonstration of physical laws. But Mathematic is not at all competent to demonstrate quantitative determinations of Physic, so far as they are Laws which rest on the *qualitative nature* of the moments; this for the simple reason that Mathematic is not Philosophy, proceeds *not from the Notion*, and has, therefore, what is Qualitative, unless taken lemmatically from experience, lying beyond its sphere. The desire to uphold the *honour* of Mathematic, that all in it is *rigorously proved,* has tempted it to forget its limits; thus it appeared against its honour simply to acknowledge experience as source and as only proof of propositions of experience; consciousness (opinion) has become of late better *formed* for the appreciation of

this: so long, however, as consciousness (opinion) has not clearly before it the distinction between what is mathematically demonstrable and what can be only got elsewhere, between what are only terms of analytic expansion and what are physical existences, the interest of science cannot raise itself into rigorous and pure form. Without doubt, however, the same justice will yet overtake that scaffolding of Newtonian proof, which has been fulfilled on another baseless and artificial Newtonian structure of *optical experiments* combined with reflexion (inference). Applied Mathematic is yet full of a similar *mélange* of experience and reflexion, but, as of said Optic, since a considerable time, already one part after the other has begun in point of *fact* to be ignored in science, with the inconsequence, however, of leaving alone the contradictory remainder,—so is it also fact that already a part of those illusory proofs has fallen of itself into oblivion or been replaced by others.'

It was, in the first instance, intended, not strictly to translate, but to *convey* this Remark by compression of the words through change of phrase or otherwise, without, however, omission, but rather with addition, of matter where it might seem necessary. Examples both of compression and of addition (the latter especially, where the notion of the quantitative infinite is concerned) will be found; but in such a writer as Hegel, always compressed to the necessity of the notion, but, at the same time, to the same necessity equally *full*, attempts of either kind will almost always prove abortive. So it has been here, and I am disposed to believe now that an exact translation, while infinitely less troublesome to myself, would have been less motley and more satisfactory to the reader. As it is, however, I venture to say that there is given, on the whole,

at once a correct and intelligible statement of the relative thought of Hegel. This is something; for, to the best of my belief, this most important note has remained hitherto absolutely sealed. Rosenkranz, indeed, mentions three writers who have followed Hegel on the subject. The first of these, C. Frantz, as in opposition to, is to be assumed ignorant of, the views of Hegel, which plainly, so far they go, are inexpugnable. As regards the other two, E. Huhn and H. Schwarz, Rosenkranz quoting nothing from either (which surely he would have done, had he found they made plain statements such as these of Hegel, the importance of which no one with even the slightest tincture of mathematic, or through whatever rust of time and desuetude, can miss seeing, once they *are* made plain), and nothing seeming to have reached this country on the subject at all, I am disposed to believe that they have both failed to see, or evolve, the light which was necessary. In fact, what is wanting to intelligence here is not mathematic, but metaphysic: the Remark, indeed, must remain quite unintelligible to anyone not long acquainted with the language of Hegel, and perfectly at home with his one vital thought—*the* Notion. My belief, therefore, is, that—*on the whole*—the entire Remark *has* remained unintelligible. My belief, moreover, also is, that, despite the imperfection of form, of which I am very sensible, and for which I sincerely apologise, it is now, as I have already said, perfectly intelligible—*if taken after, and in full understanding of, all that precedes it.* There may seem, in the first instance, no positive material gain for mathematic here, and accordingly the mathematical reader may be expected to rise from his first reading not only disappointed, but hostile. Feelings both of disappointment

and of hostility will vanish, however, if he but persevere. Hegel approaches the subject, it must be reflected, not as a mathematician, but as a metaphysician, and all that he wishes to be made clear in this remark is the simple Notion. There is only one question, then, to put: *is* the Notion, obscure before, now clear? Besides this, we may ask also, by the way, are these numerous particular critiques of his just? Indeed, we may ask, thirdly, is not the general result a new, clearer, and distincter power of vision, taken quite universally, and here specially in regard to all that holds of mathematic?

As regards the last of these questions, it can hardly escape any one that, with reference to the Calculus in general, as well as its various forms in particular and the chief subordinate conceptions in both respects, never has the determination of the negative been more sharply, more specifically and absolutely stamped out. Quanta, by very definition no longer Quanta, yet treated as Quanta; Quanta, as named or as believed, yet treated as it is impossible to treat Quanta; omission *because of* insignificance, but omission obligatory and indispensable *in spite of* insignificance; proof necessary from elsewhere, yet pretensions above any elsewhere; great results of the operation, but the operation itself granted incorrect; an incorrect operation, but absolutely correct results; a specific nature claimed from variableness of Quantity, but variableness of Quantity equally elsewhere; a specific nature really so-and-so characterised, yet matter not of this specific nature admitted; a science *par excellence* the science of exactitude and proof, yet expressly inexact and confessedly oppressed with difficulty as to proof: these are some of the examples by which this determination

of the negative is accompanied. Again, the concluding observations in regard to the show of mathematical proof in matters known from experience alone, are extremely striking, and no less instructive; as the notices of Newton, Leibnitz, Euler, Lagrange, the method of Limits, &c. &c., are hits so instantaneously and felicitously *home*, that the conviction from the reason, is hardly more than the delight from the irresistible skill, of the thing.

The great merit of Hegel here, however, is the Notion. You utterly stumble and uselessly lose yourselves in an irrelevant wood, he says, when you insist on seeing the thing in increments and decrements, the omission of the insignificant, approximations, continuations, nisus, &c. &c. The question of Quantity ought to be no difficulty to you, for you are simply to abstract from it and take up what is positive enough and seizable enough as Quality: what is present is only the qualitative relation of quantitative *principia*, which as principia are *elements*, but not Quanta. Seize but the relation, he says, and you may give it what quantity you like.

To understand Hegel aright, then, here, we must put ourselves perfectly at home in the first place with the notions of Quality and Quantity. You think of salt and of sugar, of pepper and of pap, of heat and cold, of wet and dry, of soft and hard, of light and heavy—of stick, stone, metal, glass, and what not, and you think to yourself, you sufficiently understand what Quality is. But this that you have so before understanding, is only the Vorstellung, only the figurate conception, only the metaphor, the hypotypose, the representation of the thing. What you want is the thing itself, and that is—the Notion. But Quality is the precipitation of the

Werden, the Becoming; Quality is the One of Being and of Non-being; it is not more through what it is, than through what it is not; it owes as much to its difference as to its identity: quality thus has—unlike the unended series—'its negative within itself.' It is complete, or infinite, that is, *not ended*; or it has sublated its other, and thus it is infinite. The series, on the contrary, has its other out of it,—so it is indeterminate; when it attains to this other, this negative, this that fails it, it will be at once through that negative a determined Something, it will have attained a qualitative character. Quality is beënt determinateness, and as a one of two, always of the nature of relation, or of the negation of the negation. Quality, universally taken, is what is; but Quality as What is, *is*, *is*, *is*; that is, it is Quantity. Quantity is the out of itself of Quality; or it is Quality's *necessity to be.* In this way, the Qualitative and the Quantitative Infinite are alike and equal. Quality as What is, is 'the nature of the thing itself which exceeds all determinateness,' and Quantity is indifferent to it: *it* remains the same in *all* Quantity. The infinite discretion of is, is, is,—this is What is, is. The Being-for-self is for itself only because at the same time *what* it is, is for it: the Being-for-self and the Being-for-One are identical. Now the Being-for-One as the *What* is, is this endless discretion, or it is the quantitative form of Quality. But this referred to the pure quantitative sphere is the quantitative infinite. Or, simply the Notion of Quantity itself, a Notion necessitated by the Notion of Quality, is the Quantitative Infinite. Quantum, taken not as any particular Quantum, but quite generally, is at once external non-being quite generally, and its negation; it is the one that is boundlessly many, and yet one; it is quantitativity; its

infinitude is this, its one qualitative nature, or specific constitution. Quantity is the relation that Quality has to itself in that it *is*: Quantity is thus One and Many and Infinite. Being, were it *only* Being, would at once decease; Being *is* Being only by reason of a Non-being through which it is, is, is; to *be* it must *not* be. All this again refers to Quantity as taken *sub specie æterni*. That I *should* live, requires a To-morrow when I do *not* live. This is a negation to me as finite existence; but *sub specie æterni* that negation is taken up into, is made one of, is made one with, the Absolute Life. What has been said here as absolutely *sub specie æterni*, is equally susceptible of being said with reference only to pure Quantity. The Quantum quite generally is through its other, and so the negation of the negation: it is through the *out*, and the *out* through it, for the *out* is it. Repulsion in Quantum is but self-reference; that Repulsion is its what; it is through its Repulsion that which it is. The one is the *what*, and the what is the one; there is a look *out* and a look *in*. The one's *what* is just all these ones; and that is just the one Quantum endlessly, but one. It is the one continuity of all that multiplied discretion. Quantum's own wing ever stretches and includes its other: there is no occasion either to conceive it always stretching, stretching *ad infinitum*, but the two may be seen together and *in potentia*. Quantum is the Fürsichseyn of all that Füreines. Hegel now sees the True Mathematical Infinite to represent all this. The relation of Quantum to itself is as to a power, is as to its own square; this is its own self-reference where *unity* and *amount* are alike, equal, and the same. Quality in Quantity indeed, as *out* of its *in*, may be said to *square* itself. I cannot help thinking Hegel to have even

directly had such thoughts as these. I think also he must have seen, and intends us to see, that any qualitative One is similarly situated (as Quality in general) to Quantity. Quantity is but its *Power*, its Square; and the Quantity is quite indifferent to *it*, so long as *it*, Quality, or the qualitative One, is there. Now $\frac{dy}{dx}$ is to anyone so thinking the perfectly abstract general expression of a qualitative *one* in quantitative reference. The relation of *Power* is involved in it, the relation itself, and its sides or moments are no longer Quanta, but they have retreated into their principle, their element. *Retreated* here is a bad word if it recalls decrement, for in $\frac{dy}{dx}$ there is no question of increment or decrement, of Quantum; all that is 'at its back' (im Rücken). To Hegel, then, the whole problem now is very simple: the consideration before us is qualitative, not quantitative; it is a relation; and this relation is expressed in the differential co-efficient; and so it is that all question of other terms, of increments and decrements, &c. &c., does not enter, and ought not to enter. Quality in relation to its own self is Quantity, and so relatively to it, or as it, Quantity is the infinitely little. Quality is the limit which Quantity ever approaches and never is, or always is. It is the same thing with any quality in particular as with Quality in general. The relation of ordinate to abscis is qualitative and, as such relation, independent of any Quantum that may be assigned to it. $\frac{dy}{dx}$ is the ultimate quantitative potentiality of any quality whatever; it is quantitative potentiality as such. The one thing necessary for intelligence here, as always, is to see *both* of

the moments and be able to re-nect them into their concrete *one*. What mistakes are rampant nowadays because of a neglect of this one precaution, or rather because of entire ignorance of all elements that belong here! The world is deeply disappointed; its heart is broken; all the hopes which its own beauty has made grow in it wither rapidly down; religion fails from its grasp, and philosophy, which promised so much, is unintelligible or seems but babblement: hark now how loud the cry of Materialism, that knows but, and cares but for, the *carcase*! *Eminent men of science* see a matter-mote rise up by an easy flux of development into a man, but (with an involuntary grin) *through* the monkey! The brain secretes thought, as the liver bile: this whole product of some strange chance, which need not be inquired into—take your dinner rather—will just go together in the centre as a vast mass some day—in the centre of infinite Space! Is there not an echo of self-contradiction in your own words, startling even to yourselves, Messieurs les Matérialistes? To say nothing of infinite Time, of infinite Space, which alone are always adequate to absorb any and every amount of matter the materialists may bring in explanation of them, does not the mere sight of matter uselessly heaped together there in the centre through all time suggest a glance back to all time and the easy question, Time being infinite in the direction back as well as in the direction forward, and gravitation, moreover, being the *only* power, why has a whole *back* infinitude failed to bring this gravitation to its hearth in the centre—why is a future infinitude still necessary? It is not *thought*, then, it is but *thoughtlessness* which sees the whole universe reduced in course of time to a single central mass; it is but figurate conception amusing itself with

very idle and very unsubstantial bubbles. That gravitation, loss of heat, &c. have not already effected what we are assured they will effect, or simply that they *have to* effect this consummation, is a demonstration rigorously exact of heat not always being directed outwards, as of gravitation not always being directed inwards.

If thought, not thoughtlessness, would inspect the problem, it would find that Attraction is only possible through Repulsion; that were there no Repulsion, there were no Attraction, and *vice versâ*. There is but the one concrete Reciprocity. It is perfectly certain that Action and Reaction are not more necessary reciprocals than Attraction and Repulsion. A like one-sidedness it is which leads the friends of the monkey, in comparing him with man, to abstract from the Difference and regard the Identity alone. But what is this identity? It is hardly worth while modern philosophers making such a fuss about our identity with monkeys, were it only for what Sallust tells us, that we have our bodies in common *ceteris animalibus*. That man is an animal and that monkey is the caricature of him, has been known for thousands of years; and the modern *philosophers* who live by the cry (strange, is it not?) know it not one single whit better than it was known at first, nor have they deposited one single stone of the *bridge* from the *Difference* to the *Identity*, nor yet will they—in *their* way—should they take an infinite time to the task. A strange *métier* this, then, that would *enlighten* us by telling us we were monkeys originally, though it has nothing to show for itself but the worn-out triteness of thousands of years! Yet we are expected to admire, applaud, and—*per Jovem*—even pay! It is the same abstraction from the *Difference* which misleads other

Eminent men to mis-spend whole laborious lives in twisting the idle sand-rope of Transformation. The *Difference* is there not one whit less than the Identity, and though you fly in your researches utterly round all space and utterly throughout all time, you will never eliminate it: it is impossible for you ever to take up an Identity unaccompanied by its Difference. Your quest is thus at once absolutely certain and utterly impossible: and this simply because What is is at once *identical* and *different*. The power of metamorphosis lies with Thought only; it is not in Nature. Never shall we see a first *Natural* Identity—which all mankind will accept as such—gradually giving itself Difference and Difference up to the present, as we might see ice become water and water steam. Such transformations are possible to the Notion only. Nay, these very thinkers acknowledge this same truth: they do not accept what is *as* it is—they seek it in its principle. What is this but accepting the metamorphosis of Thought? Thought is nothing but metamorphosis—the metamorphosis of the isolated singular *many* into the *one* universal. It is inconsistent, then, in these writers to accept thought only a certain way, and not follow it out into the ultimate universal, the element of thought itself. They may say, 'Though we generalise, we still leave the individuals, and know always that our generalisations are but abstractions.' We too can say that we still leave the individuals; but we cannot say that our generalisations end as idle abstractions which have only formal application to what is, but, on the contrary, as truth itself and as *the* truth, and *that* the material and constitutive truth of the whole of things. This is a difference. Thought is the secretion of matter, as the bile of the liver, you say:

on the contrary, it is matter that is but the secretion of thought. Show me your first atom, show me it become time, space, matter, organisation, thought; then I ask you, was not this first atom all these virtually at first? Could it have become these, had it not been so virtually at first? But that it should imply such virtue—that is Thought—these are thoughts. Or even to say it was at first virtually Thought, is to say that Thought was the veritable prius. Your path, then, ends in mine. But you have not this path; you have not made a single step on it; you have only talked of it; and you can only talk of it for ever: for your first problem, a deduction of Time and Space, is utterly impossible to you with Matter only. We, on the contrary, have a path; We, thanks to Kant and Hegel, can prove Thought to be the prius and the principle; We can prove all to be but the Notion *an sich*. Once possessed of the concrete notion, We can re-live its life up to the fullness of the universe. The two positions, then, are widely different. Yet, since 1781, when the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' and since 1812-16, when the 'Logik' was published, what innumerable writers have preferred obeying the impatience of their own vanity to patient assimilation, first of all, of the Historical Pabulum that at these dates was issued to them, and without which they could be nothing! Formal attitudinists on the gas of genius, men of fervour, men who could *evolve*—Systems, Poems, Pictures, Religions, Alchemy, anything—these we have had by the thousand; but how many men who knew that, in themselves, mere form only, they required the rock of another to which clinging they might, absorbing and assimilating matter into form, grow into their own complete entelechie? These men would be matter

and form unto themselves, so they consumed themselves in futile subjective pulses, and died so. He only who knows how to connect himself to his historical other, will ever attain to an actuality of manhood. Be a man's formal ability what it may, unless he attain to this, his products, however blatant, are but vacant idiocy. So only even is it, that he can be original. Thomas Carlyle found his other in German Literature—but the germs of what he found lay first of all in himself; it was his own hunger that made the food; and if Thomas Carlyle is not original, what English writer is? But for its Difference, abstract Identity dies of inanition then. So it is as regards the *nisus* of genius. So it is as regards the *nisus* nowadays of a materialistic pseudo-science. In every concrete there are two abstract moments which are not seen truly unless together. So it is as regards the Attraction and Repulsion which are still before us in Quantity, and whose union only is adequate to that quantitative infinite which Hegel finds represented in the mathematical infinite. Quantum, even in that it repels its other, flees into it; and even in that it flees into it, it flees into its own self: no flight *expliciter* without but is a flight *impliciter* within. Quantum, then, is this one infinite relation, this boundless relativity, this without of itself that is the within of itself, this negation of the negation. And such is the mathematical infinite: Quantity as such has disappeared, there remains only the Qualitative element and in relation of potentiation. The thought is abstract; but it is not more difficult than the abstract Something or any other pure Notion.

It may be objected that Hegel does not sufficiently illustrate and, on the whole, bring *out* the fact that the relation implied is one of powers. That it is

really so, we know now to be certain, for he has himself eliminated all variables of the first degree, but to know the fact is not necessarily to know the reason of the fact. Again, having *asserted* the first peculiarity of the mathematical infinite to depend on a relation of potentiation, he equally *asserts* the second peculiarity, and in complete isolation from the first. We can easily conceive $\frac{dy}{dx}$ to be qualitative relation only; but these are not squares, and Hegel has not been careful to bring the two peculiarities together. That the relation of one quantity to the square of another is qualitative, is also but an assertion; intelligence and conviction are not secured by either reasoning or illustration. We know that Hegel regards the square, where Unity and Amount are equal, as of a qualitative nature; but this knowledge seems to throw but little light here. As regards this last point, it may be worth while suggesting that the relation of the sides to the hypothenuse, being a relation that concerns the square of the hypothenuse, the result is qualitative, the triangle is always right-angled. But such illustrations must be left to the mathematician by profession. As regards objections, it is to be borne in mind, too, that the subject is not exhausted; and that we have the promise of seeing in the second Remark, how the abstract notion takes *meaning* in actual *application*, which application, too, is termed the important part of the whole subject. It is with great regret, then, that I find myself (by the Number at the head of the page) obliged for the present to stop here, seeing that my matter already amounts to more than it is perhaps prudent to intrude on the public as a first venture on a subject so difficult, and, at least to super-

ficial observation, so equivocal, as the Philosophy of Hegel. Enough, however, has been done to enable the mathematician or the metaphysician to complete the rest for himself. The judgment of a pure mathematician has really been so peculiarly trained, that, perhaps, any such will never prove decisive as regards any Hegelian element. Still, it is much to be desired that such a vast mathematical genius as Sir William Hamilton, of Dublin, could be induced to verify the findings of Hegel so far as they bear on the concrete science. As they appear abstractly expressed in the present Remark, they seem perfectly safe from assault; but there are others (alluded to also here), such as the earnestness with which Hegel seeks to vindicate for Kepler his own law from the hands of Newton's illusory mathematical Demonstration, on which one would be well pleased to possess a thoroughly-skilled opinion. There is at least something grand in the way in which Hegel would set up Time and Space themselves as the co-ordinates that to the divination of Kepler and to the necessity of the notion of Hegel yielded and yield the law $\frac{S^3}{T^2}$ or $\frac{A^3}{T^2}$. Hegel may be wrong; but he possesses such keenness of distinction, that it is difficult to conceive any intellect—as the epoch is—too high to gain from it. It lies, too, on the surface to say that these Vectors, Tensors, Scalers, &c., of Sir William Hamilton are but forms of continuity and discretion in application to the concrete Quantity, Space.

By way of giving at least a formal close to the subject, I add here the whole of *Quantity* as it appears in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia. The reader will be thus enabled to see as well Hegel's immense

power of summary as the insufficiency of any such to a student who but learns, however advantageous it may prove to the student who has completed his course. He will also see that, besides the mathematical notes, which are two in number, what has yet to be completed of the general subject as it appears in the Logic is small, and that the bulk of it is already given in these pages. Some amount of change in the *divisions* he will also be able to discern; and the very fact of change on the part of Hegel it is important to know.

B.

QUANTITY.

a. *Pure Quantity.*

Quantity is pure Being, or the pure Being, in which the Determinateness is no longer explicit as one with the Being itself, but as *sublated* or *indifferent.*

(1) The expression *magnitude* (Grösse) is not appropriate to Quantity, so far as it specially designates *particular* Quantity. (2) Mathematic usually defines magnitude as that which may be *increased* or *diminished.* However objectionable this definition may be, as again implying the *definitum* itself, it involves this, that the nature of Quantity is such that it is explicitly *alterable* and *indifferent*, so that, notwithstanding an alteration, an increased Extension or Intension, the *thing* itself, a house, red, &c., ceases not to be a house, red, &c. (3) The Absolute is pure Quantity,—this position coincides in general with this, that the determination of *Matter* is attributed to the Absolute, in which (Matter) Form is present indeed, but an indifferent determination. Quantity also constitutes the

fundamental determination of the Absolute, when it is taken so that in it, the absolutely Indifferent, all difference is only quantitative. For the rest, pure Time, Space, &c., may be regarded as examples of Quantity, so far as *the Real* (or what is real) is to be conceived as *indifferent filling* of Space or Time.

Quantity, firstly, in its immediate reference to itself, or in the form of equality with itself as explicit or set in it in consequence of the Attraction, is *continuous*; in the other term contained in it, the *One* (Unit), it is discrete magnitude. The former, however, is equally discrete, for it is only continuity of *the Many*; the latter equally continuous—its continuity is the One as *the same* of the many ones, the *unity*.

(1) Continuous and discrete magnitude must not, therefore, be regarded as *kinds* or *species*, as if the nature of the one did not attach to the other, but as if they contradistinguish themselves only by this, that *the same whole* is now explicit under the one, and again under the other of its discrimina. (2) The Antinomy of Time, of Space, or of Matter, as regards its infinite Divisibility, or again, its consisting of Indivisibles, is nothing else than the assertion of Quantity now as continuous, and again as discrete. Time, Space, &c., being *explicit* only as continuous Quantity, are *infinitely divisible*; in their other term, again, as discrete magnitude, they are *an sich* (*in* themselves) *divided*, and consist of indivisible Ones: the one term is as one-sided as the other.

b. *Quantum.*

Quantity essentially *explicit* with the excludent determinateness which is contained in it, is Quantum, limited Quantity.

The Quantum has its evolution and perfect determinateness in the *Digit* (Number), which contains within itself (implies), as its Element, the One, in the moment of Discretion the Amount, in that of Continuity the Unity, both as its qualitative moments.

In Arithmetic, what are called the arithmetical operations are usually stated as contingent modes of treating numbers. If a necessity and withal an understanding is to lie in them, the latter must lie in a principle, and this only in the moments which are contained in the notion of the Digit itself; this principle shall be here briefly exhibited. The moments of the notion of Number are the Amount and the Unity, and the Number itself is the Unity of both. But Unity applied to empirical numbers is only their *Equality*; thus the principle of arithmetic must be, to range numbers into the relation of Unity and Amount, and bring about the Equality of these moments.

The Ones or the Numbers themselves being mutually indifferent, the Unity into which they become explicitly transposed appears in general as an external putting together (collection). To count is, therefore, in general to *number*, and the difference of the *kinds* of counting lies alone in the qualitative nature (tality) of the Numbers which are numbered together; and, for the tality, the determination of Unity and Amount is the principle.

Numeration is the first, to make Number *at all*, a putting together of as many *Ones* as is wished. A *kind* of counting (an arithmetical operation), however, is the numbering together of such as are already numbers, and no longer the mere unit. Numbers are *immediately* and *at first* quite indefinitely Numbers in

general—unequal, therefore, in general: the putting together or numbering of such is *Addition.*

The *next* determination is, that the Numbers are *equal* in general; they constitute thus one *Unity*, and there is present an *Amount* of such unities: to number such numbers is to Multiply;—and here it is indifferent how the moments of Amount and Unity are apportioned in the two numbers, the Factors, indifferent which is taken as Amount, and which again as Unity.

The *third* characteristic determinateness is finally the *Equality* of *Amount* and *Unity.* The numbering together of numbers so characterised, is the *raising into powers*, and first of all into the *square.* Further potentiation is the formal repetition of the multiplication of the number with itself which runs out again into the indefinite Amount. As in this third form, the complete equality of the sole present difference, of Amount and Unity, is attained, there cannot be more than these three operations in Arithmetic. There corresponds to the numbering together, a resolution of the Numbers according to the same determinatenesses. With the three operations mentioned, which may be so far named *positive*, there are, therefore, also three *negative.*

c. *Degree.*

The limit is identical with the whole of the Quantum itself; as multiple in itself, it is *extensive*—as simple in itself, *intensive* magnitude: the latter is also named *Degree.*

The difference of continuous and discrete from extensive and intensive magnitudes consists, therefore, in this, that the former concern *Quantity in general*—the latter, on the other hand, the limit, or the determinate-

ness of Quantity as such. Extensive and intensive magnitudes are, in like manner, not two sorts of which the one should possess a distinction which the other wanted; what is extensive is equally intensive, and *vice versâ*.

In degree the *notion* of Quantum is in *explicit position*. It is magnitude as indifferently independent and simple, but so that it has the determinateness by which it is Quantum directly *out of* it in other magnitudes. In this contradiction, viz. that the *beënt-for-self* indifferent limit is absolute *Externality*, the *infinite* quantitative *Progress* is expressly *explicit*,—an *immediacy* which immediately strikes round into its counterpart, *mediatedness* (a going over and beyond the Quantum that has just been posited), and *vice versâ*.

A Number is thought, but thought as a Beingness completely external to its own self. It belongs not to perception because it is thought, but it is the thought which has for its characterisation the externality of perception. The Quantum not only *may* therefore be increased or diminished *ad infinitum*; it itself is through its Notion this dispatch of itself beyond itself. The infinite quantitative Progress is just the *thought*less repetition of one and the same contradiction which the Quantum in general is, and Quantum as Degree, or expressly set in its determinateness. As regards the superfluousness of enunciating this contradiction in the form of the infinite Progress, Zeno in Aristotle says justly: it is the same thing to say something *once*, and to say it *always*.

This outerliness of Quantum to its own self in its beënt-for-self determinateness constitutes its Quality; in it it is just itself and referred to itself. In it are united, Externality, i.e. Quantitativeness, and Being-

for-self, i.e. Qualitativeness. Quantum thus put is in itself the Quantitative *Relation*,—determinateness which is no less *immediate* Quantum, the Exponent, than *mediatedness*, namely, the *reference* of some one Quantum to another,—the two sides of the relation, which at the same time are not valid in their immediate value, but have their value only in this reference.

The *sides* of the relation are still immediate Quanta, the qualitative and the quantitative moments still external to each other. Their truth, however, viz. that the Quantitativeness itself is in its externality reference to itself, or that the Being-for-self and the indifference of the determinateness are united, is *Measure*.

VI.

THE COMMENTATORS OF HEGEL: SCHWEGLER, ROSENKRANZ, HAYM.

In the interest of one's own self-seeking to demonstrate the shortcomings of one's predecessors, is a procedure now so vulgar that it would, perhaps, have been better taste to have left to others the task which is here begun. Any plea in excuse can found only on the important aid which may be so afforded to a general understanding of the single theme, and is only to be made good by the result.

There are many other Commentators of Hegel, but we have selected these — examples, too, of feelings impartial, partial, and hostile—as the latest and most generally-acknowledged best. Now, each of the three has devoted a vast amount of labour and time to the study of Hegel, and all of them have, more or less, attained to a very considerable relative knowledge. It is not, then, what is in general meant by ignorance that we would object here, but only a peculiar and insufficient state of knowledge in this way, that the path of this knowledge has been ever on the outside, from particular to particular, with darkness and incoherences between, and without perception of the single light in which the whole should show—without attainment of the single Rück, of the single turn, stir, touch

by which the painful and unreachable *Many* should kaleidoscopically collapse into the held and intelligible *One*. In a word, whatever general connexion they may have perceived between Hegel and Kant, and however often they may have used, each of them, the word Begriff, they have all failed to detect that literal one connexion and that literal one signification which have been accentuated in the preceding pages. Hegel was *literal* with Idealism; the whole is Thought, and the whole life of it is Thought; and, therefore, what is called the History of Philosophy will be in externality and contingency, but a Gesetztseyn of Thought, but an explicitment, a *setting* of one thought the other. So it was that Spinoza was Substance, Hume Causality, Kant Reciprocity, and Hegel *the Notion*—the Notion as *set* by Kant, and as now to be developed subjectively by Hegel into the Subjective Logic which ends in the Idea. So it was that he, as it were, *anallegorised* actual history, even contemporary history, even his own position, into the plastic dialectic of his abstract Logic. Hegel was literal with Idealism up to the last invisible negation of the negation—up to the ultimate pure Negativity within which even the triple muscle of *the* Notion lay a hidden *Nisus*, retracted into transparency. To Hegel even the very way which had led to this was, so far, *false*; it was but the chain of the *finite* categories; and their whole truth was this negative *One*. Thus it was that Hegel completed the whole movement of which Kant, Fichte, and Schelling had been successive vital knots; but still this completion he reached only by making good his attachment directly to the first of them. This was effected by the entire *realisation* and *vitalisation* of Logic, even scholastic Logic (which Kant had begun), by reduction simply of the All into the simply

technical moments of Logic as named Simple Apprehension, &c., through substitution of his own *conscious concrete Notion* (which, in a word, is but the one existent, and the only existent, Entelechie of Difference and Identity), for the unconscious abstract Notion of Kant that lay in the question: 'How are *à priori* Synthetic Judgments possible?' It is this *literality* which we assert to have been universally missed, and we claim to have discovered *the* Notion which Hegel meant, what we call the concrete Universal, as well as the precise nature of the genesis of this notion with special reference to Kant.

It often happens that, when particular announcements of this nature are made, many previous general expressions come to be collected which seem very fairly to convey the particularity announced. Now these *ex post facto* coincidences, as they may be termed, while they belong to the peculiar industry of the mere rats of literature, are themselves particularly delusive and deceptive. In these very volumes we have many instances in point. Some of these instances we shall adduce by way of illustration just as they occur.

'Hegel is quite in earnest when he maintains the co-incidence of History and of Logic:' this (vol. i. p. 38) is a very explicit and perfectly categorical statement; nevertheless, it was probably written years before the true thought, or anything like the true thought, of the fact which it seems to convey, had dawned on the mind of the writer. Plato's ταὐτὸν and θάτερον, as well as a triad of an sich, ausser sich, and für sich, are spoken of, not far from the same neighbourhood, but quite blindly as to the true issues involved. 'Thus Hegel, horsed on his idea, penetrates and permeates the whole universe both of mind and matter, and

construes all into a one individuality: The Whole is to be conceived as an organic idea—a concrete idea: He who understands Hegel's word Begriff, understands Hegel.' These statements * are also very strikingly correct, the last in especial seems to reach the root; yet they are made years in advance, and had I left the subject then, I should have left it wholly ignorant of Hegel. Here follow a few more such blind guesses, results of *external* comparison, on the part of one absolutely denied as yet entrance to the *internal* truth. 'The process pictured in the History of Philosophy is the process of Philosophy itself: It is the peculiar nature of the Idea to be the union of the universal and the particular in the individual: Kant's categories form really the substance of Hegel: Hegel's general undertaking, indeed, seems to be, to restore the evolution immanent to thought itself (which evolution has only presented itself concretely and chronologically in the particular thinkers preserved in History)—to restore this evolution to universal consciousness in abstract purity, &c. &c.' †

Such instances, however, are so far unsatisfactory in that they rest only on one's own authority. Two examples which we have already seen in this connexion from Spinoza may be attended with more conviction. The first occurs under Remark 1 of the first Chapter on Quantity: it is that which relates to a Quantity of Imagination as different from one of Intellect. Now, both Kant and Hegel are here anticipated and in leading distinctions; nevertheless, it is quite certain that Kant knew nothing of this, and that Hegel

* They occur vol. i., pp. 79, 80.

† To be found respectively at pages 82, 89, 97, and 195, of vol. i. The last, however exact it seem, is due only to an *external* look at the first portions of the 'Phaenomenologie.'

was able to perceive it only when he had made his own progress *in* Kant and *from* Kant. The other example is that of the Intellectual and Imaginative Infinite, which occurs, about one-third of the way on, in the long Mathematical note with which *Quantity* is terminated in vol. ii.

On the whole, we have, for our part, no hesitation in concluding that words which as they fell from their speaker related only to some isolated particular, or to some result of mere outside comparison, may be found *ex post facto* very fairly to convey some whole inner and vital truth of wide application.

Schwegler.

We have already spoken with sincere respect of this most accomplished man and admirable writer; and it is to be acknowledged at once that he has not only perfectly availed himself of many of the main lessons both of Kant and Hegel, but that he possesses also an accurate acquaintance with the bulk of their details. Nevertheless, we hold that, having failed to penetrate into the very inmost articulation of Kant's *à priori* elements, he missed the key without which it was impossible but that Hegel must have remained a mere outer assemblage and, on the whole, impervious to him. The few considerations on which this opinion rests we shall mention in the order in which they occurred to us in perusing his book, the 'History of Philosophy in Epitome.'

The first point to which we shall advert is contained in the first four pages of the excellent little work alluded to, and relates, on the part of Schwegler, to objections to, or rather to a rejection of, the Hegelian equation of Philosophy and its History. In passing to this we may

remark, that for a Hegelian he unduly accentuates the relation between Philosophy proper and the Empirical Sciences: 'Philosophy (as the thought Totality of the Empirical) stands in reciprocity with the empirical sciences; as it on one side conditions them, it is itself again, on the other side, conditioned by them. There is just as little, therefore, an absolute or completed Philosophy (in time, that is to say, generally in the course of History) as there is a completed Empiric' (or science of all that reaches us by experience). There is here, on the whole, and for the position, too much stress laid on the empirical sciences, and too little on the fact of an independent Logic, which is above contingency, which is a necessary and objective crystal of the Empirical, and which, if it changes, at least fluctuates not at will of the mere vicissitude of the latter. The identification of the historical with the logical evolution Schwegler combats from the position of the contingency of the former. He says, 'This view is neither to be justified in its principle, nor made good historically.' But he who were thoroughly on the stand-point of Hegel, would see that, while the contingency (even that of those who appear on the stage of History) is not denied, but, on the contrary, its relative necessity demonstrated, the *principle*, *all* being at bottom but an evolution of *Thought*, *must* be true, and must be capable of being actually discerned across the fluctuation of the Outward. Schwegler's imperfect discrimination of the elements concerned is seen also in his particular objections as to the notions of Heraclitus and the Eleatics (with reference to a place for them in Logic) that they are 'impure and materially coloured,' or as to the Ionic Philosophy that it began 'not with Seyn (Being) as abstract notion, but with

what is concretest and crassest, the material notion of water, air, &c.;' and that, accordingly, 'Hegel would have more consistently quite rejected the Ionic Philosophy.' It is rather eminently Hegelian quite to acknowledge the impurity and crassitude of all commencements; though it is equally Hegelian that this impurity and crassitude should, under pouring of the menstruum of thought, clear into the lineaments of the notion which, despite the clouding opacity, was never absent. Schwegler admits himself that the function of Philosophy is to find in Vicissitude a Fixed, that Philosophy begins 'there where an ultimate ground of the Bëent, of what is, is philosophically sought;' and this is precisely the position he opposes.

'History is not a count to be exactly summed up: there must be no talk of an *à priori* construction of History.' But do such expressions really affect Hegel? Would Hegel *à priori* construct history, or even count it up like a sum in arithmetic? The concrete is a hither and thither of contingency; there are difficulties and checks of all kinds, chronological and other: Hegel denies them not; he would only with masterful hands rive them from before the face of the notion. 'The *datum* of Experience is to be taken as a *datum*, a something given over to us just so, and the rational system of this *datum* is to be analytically set out; the Speculative Idea will for the arrangement and scientific connexion of this historical *datum* furnish the Regulative: Almost everywhere the historical development is different from the notional: While the logical progress is an ascent from the abstract to the concrete, the historical development is almost always a descent from the concrete to the abstract: Philosophy is synthetic, the

history of Philosophy analytic: We may maintain, therefore, with more justice exactly the opposite of the Hegelian Thesis and say what is *an sich* the first is *für uns* just the last.' It will not be difficult to perceive that there is the same incomplete consciousness of Hegel's true position in these extracts also, the burthen of which Hegel would partly accept and partly reject, as what has been said already will enable the reader to see. It is worth while, perhaps, remarking that the evolution of thought being Gesetztseyn, is at once of an analytic and a synthetic nature. Schwegler's *reversal* of the Hegelian 'an sich oder für uns' is also worth pointing out. We have another instance of it at pages 82, 83, where he says, 'Virtue is to be defined as the keeping of the due middle in practice—not the arithmetical middle, the middle *an sich*, but the middle *für uns*.' Schwegler is, of course, at liberty to use these terms as he pleases; but, as we have seen, the distinction implied in them by Hegel is one eminently subtle and difficult, and may accordingly have escaped Schwegler. Hegel's use of them as *synonymes* is beyond a doubt. Under 'Die Schranke und das Sollen,' 'the Limitation and the To-be-to,' we have already seen and come to understand 'das Sollen ist nur an sich, somit für uns;' it has been pointed out also that this distinction, while it probably begins in the 'Introduction' to the 'Phaenomenologie,' is to be found in the 'Preface' as well; and here are three more examples to the same effect: Encyc. § 162, and Logic, vol. ii. pp. 20 and 73, we have, 'Begriffe an sich, oder was dasselbe ist, *für uns*,' —'nicht nur an sich, das hiesse für uns oder in der äusseren Reflexion,'—and 'so ist es an sich oder für uns bestimmt.' Hegel's intention with the phrase is

beyond a question, then, and the synonyme of 'outer Reflexion' in the last example but one not only confirms the signification already attached to it, but considerably lessens the difficulty with which it seemed burthened. He, then, who reverses this distinction, though of course free to do so, risks his reputation as a student of Hegel.

From pages 45 and 67, I adduce now two passages, which—the former as regards *the Notion* and the latter as regards *the Idea*—show that, even in writing on Philosophy, a German may say *the* Notion and *the* Idea when he means thereby neither *the* Notion nor *the* Idea of Hegel, but simply the abstract universals of generalisation: 'That all human action reposes on knowledge, all thought on the notion, to this result Plato was already able to arrive through the generalisation of the Socratic Teaching itself:' 'If Plato had taken his station in the Idea in order to interpret and explain the Given and Empirical, Aristotle takes his place in the Given in order to find and demonstrate in it the Idea.'

With reference to Aristotle, Schwegler has occasion to speak of what must have suggested *the* notion of Hegel to him had he known it; but (pp. 73, 74, 75, &c.) even in talking of 'Zweck' and 'Entelechie' as 'vollendetes Wesen,' and in reducing the four Aristotelian Causes to Matter and Form, he is not tempted to remark on the striking essential analogy to *the Concrete Notion*, but, on the contrary, concludes in this absolutely anti-Hegelian fashion: 'There remains to us, therefore, the two ground-principles *which pass not into each other*, Matter and Form.' There is a certain defence to Schwegler here in this, that it is from the position of Aristotle he speaks, and not from that of

Hegel: but then the irresistible temptation to correlate Aristotle's notions with *the* notion of Hegel, had he known this latter,—if not here, at least elsewhere?

Schwegler's summary of Kant is a very excellent one, and perhaps the very best that, in a general literary point of view, has been yet given. When compared, however, with the skeleton which on this subject Hegel bore in his head, and which he allows us to see in his various critiques, and especially in that which occurs at the commencement of the Encyclopaedia, we see how much this summary of Schwegler is in its kind *external*. Light here with him is always in proportion to the *easiness* and not to the *difficulty* of what is summarised; and thus the discussion of the Religious and the Practical parts is much more satisfactory than that of the strictly Metaphysical. We just touch on a particular point or two:—

At page 154, we find: 'The Kritik of Pure Reason, says Kant, is the Inventarium of all our possessions through pure reason systematically arranged.' This strikes strangely on one at home with Kant; for everyone who is really so, has been so much accustomed to hear the Kritik, however complete as ground-plan and system of inchoative principles, always spoken of as but *propædeutical* to the Science of Metaphysic itself, or to the Transcendental Philosophy as such, that it grates at once. And this is really the truth, and these words of Schwegler's are never used by Kant in any such connexion: on examination they will be found to be taken from the Preface, and to be used there, not in reference to Kritik, but to Metaphysic. It was only in the future that Kant contemplated such complete *Inventarium* as a completed system of Philosophy. The matter may seem small, but

it points at least to a certain slovenliness of information on the part of Schwegler.

At page 150, again, we have: 'The question, therefore, which Kant set at the head of his whole Kritik, How are *à priori* synthetic judgments possible? . . . . must be answered with an unconditional No.' This, too, grates; for we know the contrary: we know that Kant has pointed to whole spheres of such judgments, and has demonstrated in his way the rationale of them; nay, we know that that is the express one object of his whole Kritik and Kritiken. It may be said that Schwegler must have had in his mind, that to every fact of actual knowledge Kant postulated elements of *sense* as well as those of *intellect*. But such defence were null, and from more points of view than one; for, in the first place, the knowledge of these *à priori* principles, though abstract, were still a knowledge, and would not be denied by Kant; in the second place, there are, in Kant's system, *à priori* elements of *sense*, as well as of intellect, which give occasion to the conjunction necessary for such *à priori* synthetic judgments, and have been expressly anatomised by Kant for this very purpose; and, in the third place, Kant actually details *classes* of such *à priori* synthetic judgments. Nay, at page 159, Schwegler himself says: 'These are the only possible and authenticated synthetic judgments *à priori*, the ground-lines of all and every Metaphysic.' Thus, then, Schwegler categorically contradicts himself, and declares that there *are* such judgments—this in spite of his 'unconditional No!' Again, though it is true that the judgments mentioned are to be viewed as Metaphysical ground-lines, it is not true that these are the *only* synthetic judgments *à priori*; for does not Kant regard all the propositions of pure Mathematic as *à priori* synthe-

tics, .and are not these a goodly number?—These things belong to that special central domain of Kant which came to him straight from Hume, which was his own principal and *principial* industry, and which passed straight from his hands into those of Hegel, to constitute there the central domain of this last also—the domain which, if we are correct, is precisely that which has remained unvisited, and is thus the cause of all existent difficulty and ignorance. Here, then, we conceive Schwegler not only open to the charge of slovenliness, but of very deficient information, and that, too, in regard to a main—or rather *the* main topic.

Then to Schwegler the Hegelian system arises directly out of that of Schelling, and he has no perception of that whole field of considerations the issue of which is the partial elimination of Fichte and Schelling, and the attachment of Hegel directly to Kant: in short, he knows only the common and stereotyped view of what is called the *Literature of the subject*! He says, p. 222, 'From reflexion on this one-sidedness (of Schelling) the Hegelian Philosophy arose; it holds fast, as against Fichte, with the then Schellingian Philosophy, that not a Singular, the Ego, is the Prius of all Reality, but a Universal, which comprehends in itself every Singular.' We may point out, in passing, that the phrase 'a Universal which comprehends in itself every Singular,' were correct language if applied to what we name the concrete notion. It has no such application, nevertheless, but refers only to the common consciousness on this subject—that Hegel, namely, leads all up at last into the 'Absolute Spirit.' We find him, indeed, a line or two further down speaking of the 'Idea as the Absolute,' without mention anywhere of the relation of *the* Notion to the Idea.

At pages 223, 227, 228, his perception of the method

and general industry of Hegel will be found to be wholly *from without*, wholly as of a process and endeavour *external and mechanical*; there seems not even a dream of the one living force which is the creative pulse of the whole. 'The Absolute,' he says, 'is, according to Hegel, not Being, but Development; explication of differences and antitheses which, however, are not self-dependent, or at all opposed to the Absolute, but each singly as all together form only moments within the self-development of the Absolute.' 'The Hegelian Logic is the scientific exposition and development of the pure Reason-notions, of those notions or categories which underlie all thought and being, which are as much the ground-principles of subjective cognition, as the immanent soul of objective Reality, of those Ideas in which the Spiritual and the Natural have their coincidence-point. The realm of Logic is, says Hegel, Truth as it is without veil für sich. It is, as Hegel also figuratively expresses himself, the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of the world and any finite Spirit.' 'Hegel has endeavoured, 1, completely to collect the pure Reason-notions; 2, critically to purge them (that is to say, to exclude all that were not pure perception-less thought); and, 3,—what is the most characteristic peculiarity of the Hegelian Logic,—to derive them dialectically from one another, and complete them into an internally articulated system of pure Reason.' 'The lever for this development is the dialectic method that advances by negation from one notion to another.' 'Negation is the vehicle of the dialectic march. Every previously established notion is negated, and out of its negation a higher, richer notion is won. This method, which is at once analytic

and synthetic, Hegel has carried out throughout the whole system of the Science.'

This language is not incorrect; it is largely Hegel's own. But this is its defect; Hegel's indirect ways have not been penetrated, and the one secret found. What sense, for instance, is there in this *negation* of which Schwegler speaks? How different it would have been could he but have explained it! We have objected already to an expression above being considered figurative. It appears to us also that Hegel himself would have very much objected to that ascription to him of *collecting* the categories and *critically purging* them. In short, what we have here are but *external* views, and, on the whole, the Literature of the subject!

Nor does Schwegler, when arrived at the *notion* of the notion, manifest any consciousness of what is truly before him. Speaking (p. 231) of Reciprocity, which we know now to be the very *nidus* where *the* Notion is born, he says, 'We have, therefore, again a Seyn (a Being) that disjoins itself into several Self-dependents, which are, however, immediately identical with it: this unity of the immediacy of Being with the self-disjunction of Essence is the Notion.' And this is all: there is not one word of that marvellous dialectic in which we get sight of the *Particular* as in a transparent distinction which is none, between the *Universal* and the *Singular*, each of which is but negative reflexion into self and the same negative reflexion, and thus come at length actually to see *the* Notion, actually to realise at length the notion *of* the notion. After the sentence just quoted, Schwegler proceeds to define the notion, and he begins thus: 'Notion is that in the other,' &c. He says Notion is so and so, not the Notion is so and so; the notion, therefore, is to him just

notion, just notion in general, the abstract universal of thinking as opposed to sense. In fact, when a German begins a sentence with a noun thus without article, the idiomatic English translation would require us to begin with the indefinite article,—to say here, then, *a notion* is so and so. But let us give the whole definition: 'Notion is that in the other which is identical with itself; it is substantial Totality, the moments of which (Singular, Particular) are themselves the whole (the Universal), Totality which as well allows the difference free play as it embraces it into unity within itself.' When a man once knows the notion, it is not difficult for him to see *assonances* to it in this definition; but would he ever have learnt it from it? These are but vague words, vaguely and imperfectly copied from others; and what their own author is determined only to see in them is *a notion in general*, the Socratic Universal, Plato's Idea, as the Idea of a man, a table, &c. This is evident from the words, 'it is that *in the other*.'

'The spiritual substance (p. 241) of the Revealed Religion or of Christianity is consequently the same as that of Speculative Philosophy, only that it is expressed there in the wise of the Vorstellung, in the form of a history, here in the wise of the notion.' There is no reason to suppose here either, that *the* notion is meant; the particular words are just Hegel's own; Hegel himself uses Begriff in some three senses; and there is no reason to suppose, from anything in the whole book, that Schwegler ever saw more in *the notion* than Plato's abstract universal, as now specialised and particularised, at most, by Kant and Hegel under the name of Categories, and as opposed to Vorstellung.

It is to be said, too, that the whole statement of Hegel's system in Schwegler is *external*, and reads to

everyone at first—to everyone at first, at least, who is not already an adept—just like a caricature, for which conviction can be expected from no sane human being. On the whole, we believe ourselves right, then, however willing we may be to ascribe to Schwegler participation in the spirit and extensive *external* knowledge both of Kant and Hegel, in denying him to have entered a certain internal adytum of either, which, nevertheless, is absolutely essential to *knowledge*.

Rosenkranz.

Though not superior to Schwegler so far as participation in the spirit of Kant and Hegel is concerned, Rosenkranz has, probably seen more clearly into the intimate connexion between these two, studied more closely the Particular of the latter of them, and brought himself just generally into more intimate relations with the dialectic whole. Nevertheless, we cannot make out that Rosenkranz has ever discerned either the literal attachment of Hegel to Kant, or the one thing that unites both and constitutes the single principle of the former—the Concrete Universal. In support of this opinion we shall take our evidence from the 'Wissenschaft der Logischen Idee,' which, as published so lately, and as expressly devoted to a review and reformation of the Hegelian Logic, promises to be amply sufficient as relevant authority.

It is to be admitted at once that Rosenkranz has again and again perfectly expressed the process of the Absolute, as that which is as well First as Last, Beginning as Result, that which returns into itself, the movement which from itself determines itself, &c. Nor less is it to be admitted that he has a hundred times accentuated the 'unity of opposites,' as well as (at

least once) directly mentioned the triplicity, Identity, Difference, and Reduction of Difference into Identity. Nay, Rosenkranz has actually told us foreigners that the first thing we had to do was to understand Kant's question, 'How are *à priori* synthetic judgments possible? and this idea of an *à priori* synthetic judgment he has further identified with the more abstract statement, 'a unity of opposites.'* Nevertheless, we cannot help believing Rosenkranz to possess but a *scattered vision*, the rays of which, were they fairly brought together, would, perhaps, astonish himself. We cannot believe him to see that, as Aristotle made explicit the abstract universal implicit in Socrates, Hegel made explicit the concrete universal implicit in Kant. Neither can we believe him to see that this concrete universal is the one logical *nisus* (nameable Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason), of which this world, with all that is subjective in it, and with all that is objective in it, is but the congeries. With the exception of Hegel, has any man yet reached this simplicity: Sincerity with Idealism means, that the *matter* (objects) of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, is identical with these its *forms*; or has this been ever said before? And yet, when it is said, it is easy to see that the identity of Being and Thinking means the same thing. In this last form there is no clue, however; whereas the other—

The 'Science of the Logical Idea' opens in this manner: 'Every man is flung unasked into a Together of circumstances to which he must accommodate himself as conditions of his development. Thus in my youth I encountered the Hegelian Philosophy as one

* Rosenkranz, however, had not far to look for this identification: Hegel himself (Encyc. §. 40) says, 'Synthetic judgments *à priori* (i.e. original co-references of Opposites).'

of those Powers, in struggle with which my destiny has shaped itself. Years long alternately attracted and repelled, my relation to this Philosophy has assumed finally this issue, that I have devoted my life to its critical correction and systematic perfection. I should like to complete it from within out, in order to promote the enjoyment of its veritable worth, as well as the fruitfulness of its application to all the sciences, &c.'

Now, what have we indicated here?—A life of struggle—of never-ending—*and yet unended*—struggle! Veritably Kant and Hegel are as those deserts of fable which lead to palaces of prophecy, but, meanwhile, whiten only with dead men's bones! Rosenkranz, a man of unbounded acquirement, of rich endowment, of keen susceptibility, of quick talent, has now a life behind him, and its one object—Hegel—is unconquered still! Surely at least such interpretation of the quoted words is not unjust. Alternately attracted and repelled during long years: this is not success, this is not the language of possession; these are but the words of the baffled but still passionate wooer. There is bitterness as he looks back, too, on the length of the struggle, and thinks of what has been gained; he sees a Together of circumstances accommodation to which was but necessity; and he cannot help dwelling on his having been committed to them unasked. The task is not yet complete either: he would only like to complete it. It is true that Rosenkranz would have us assign the incompletion to Hegel, but we shall be nearer the truth should we assign it to himself.

These considerations are strengthened by the avowals of the next paragraph, which records his experience as Professor of Philosophy. He had begun with Hegel *simpliciter*; doubts arose; for ten years he threw him-

self on Aristotle, but alternated him with Hegel; he separated Metaphysic from Logic; he takes Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel together and compares them, &c. This is not the repose, the oneness, of an intellect convinced, of a mind assured. If Hegel is right, his Logic supersedes all that has gone before it; for in it he professes to have brought the science down through all these two thousand years which separate us from Aristotle, and to have perfected it up to the highest level of the present day. Seclusion to Hegel, accordingly, would be intelligible if Hegel has succeeded, as regression to Aristotle if Hegel has failed: but what are we to say of an *alternation* of both?—and why formally explain and compare Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel as three interests apart, independent, each for itself? If Hegel is right, his Logic is the only one that requires to be taught, and the contributions of Aristotle and Kant can be duly exhibited as they present themselves in their respective places there. And if Hegel is not right, why trouble with him at all?

The critique of various later Logics that follows, confirms the same inference of doubt, hesitation, vacillation on the part of Rosenkranz. Hegel's Logic being what it pretends to be, there is but short work needed as regards these others. Rosenkranz seeks to classify these Logics, too, from the notion of Thinking in general, and, being a sworn enemy of all abstraction unverified by the concrete, he would like to correlate each theoretical stage of the classification with an actual historical stage. As regards this latter particular, he knows no treatise but his own 'where a similar attempt is made.' All this, as in a perfected Hegelian, is far from satisfactory. Hegel's Logic is simply the development of the Notion qua Notion—that is, of Thought qua

Thought. Hegel's Logic ought, then, at once to have supplied what Rosenkranz wanted, a Topic and criteria, namely, for all the various presentant Logics. Hegel's Logic, too, is supposed to be correlative to historical fact, though it could not by anticipation of, so to speak, posthumous Logics, prevent Rosenkranz from ranging these too in subjection to the *pure tree*, were he so minded. In fact, to analyse the notion of Thought and develope thus new classifications of Logic, is simply to put the Hegelian Logical classifications to the rout, is simply to be untrue to Hegel, is simply to show that one's mind is not as yet made up, but remains still without conviction or belief. That such analyses and classifications should be considered still necessary, leads to but one inevitable dilemma,—either that Hegel is not understood, or that he is not worth understanding. Hegel is, of course, not absolutely the last, and, it is to be hoped, there is progress still; but really that sort of procedure of Rosenkranz is neither progress nor exposition: it is but the idle wandering to and fro of subjective unrest; it is but an idle subjective ambition.*

We come now to his proposed Reform of Hegel, to his actual objections to the master, and specially to his system of Logic.

'In the first place,' says Rosenkranz, 'its collective form oscillates between a Dichotomy, namely, of Objective and Subjective Logic, and a Trichotomy, namely,

* One of Rosenkranz' sentences in the above runs thus: 'I wanted to show proof that the abstract genealogy of the Notion makes good its necessity in living Fact.' *The* Notion here is that of Thought as made out by Rosenkranz, with special reference to his critique of the various recent Logics. This illustrates the general speech of *the Notion* in German writers. It is just *short* for the abstraction and generalisation of Thought in general: it is the abstract universal of Thought *as any such*; not as *the* Universal, Hegel's Universal, the concrete Notion,—*the* Notion.

of the doctrine of Being, Essentity, and Notion. The former division repeats the old one of Theoretical Philosophy into Metaphysic and Logic, but with an expression which is derived from the sphere of consciousness, and consequently inappropriate and deranging. The antithesis of object and subject belongs only to the spirit, not to impersonal Reason. The Trichotomy repeats the Kantian distinction of Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. This distinction of Simple, Reflexive, and Speculative characters is one, however, which pervades all the moments of the whole science, and is, therefore, not competent to afford an actual principle of division.'

Now, all these objections disappear before *knowledge* of Hegel. The first two divisions of Logic may together be considered objective, for they are both stages of consciousness only, not of Self-consciousness, the beginning of which constitutes the transition from the second to the third. This is seen whether we consider that, in the first two stages, we have but Apprehension and Judgment in act, or that what is acted on is but *outer*, as Quality, Quantity, Substantiality, Causality, &c., while in the third stage it is Reason acts, and consciously on its own forms. Besides, it is Hegel (through Kant) who is the subjective Logic, while Hume, Spinoza, and so backwards, are the objective Logic. Up to reciprocity the progress was not Hegel's; after reciprocity the advance is due to his conscious subject. This last consideration is only ancillary, however. Metaphysic is rightly taken into Logic; for Idealism being the truth, all the principles of things must be Logical. The Trichotomy *is* 'competent to afford an actual principle of division,' and *for* the reason which is supposed to prove it 'not.' Indeed, it is interesting to

observe Rosenkranz here naming some of the nearest forms of *the* notion and talking of one distinction pervading the whole, without the slightest consciousness of the connexion and living unity into which he might throw all. The Triads of Being, Essentity, Notion,—Understanding, Judgment, Reason,—Simple, Reflex, Speculative,—are named together; but, instead of being correlated, the general division under one of them is declared incompetent because another of them pervades all the moments of the whole! The reason *pro* is to Rosenkranz the reason *con*. The 'going up of the light,' however, that Kant speaks of in reference to Thales and the equilateral triangle, Galilei and his inclined plane, Torricelli and the weighing of the air, Stahl and his chemical transformations, &c., is a curious thing! A man shall read over the right passages scores of times; he shall even have executed a translation of the Encyclopaedia, say; yet the light of *the* notion shall only rise to him when occupied on some other! So here Rosenkranz names individuals, but brings not together into the One.

Logic as Logic, then, is its own element, and knows not a Psychological distinction; but Logic, regarded as a History, was immersed in the object, till through Kant and Hegel it rose to the subject. Hume's Causality is outward, but Kant's Categories are inward, and from Kant the principle that moulds is subjectivity.

The second objection brought forward is to the transition of the subjective notion into objectivity, as mechanical, chemical, and teleological; and also to the admission of Life, the Good, &c., into Logic; as if Logic 'were that total science which includes in it even reality itself.' To this we may add, that Rosenkranz objects also to the transition of the Logical Idea into Nature,

as 'the crux of the Hegelianic,' and that, so far as the Teleological notion is concerned, he here offers us a Logic re-distributed in its interest, and so that it (the Teleological notion) appears intercalated between Essentity and the Notion.

It must be borne in mind, in the first place, here, that our present object is not to answer objections to Hegel, but to apply these in test of the relative knowledge of the objector. It is not for a moment to be pretended that Hegel is perfect, that there are not sins in him both of omission and commission, or that he may not be amended by certain of the suggestions of Rosenkranz. But surely it is inconsistent to seek to force upon Hegel matter which, it can be shown, he himself refused. The following passage (Op. cit. p. 530) will, perhaps, sufficiently explain the grounds generally of these objections of Rosenkranz:—

The transition of the idëell causality of the notion into the reality fulfilled by it is the transition of the End out of its possibility into actuality, its execution or realisation. This connexion is presented by Hegel as a syllogism; the notion of the End is through the Means to clasp itself in its Execution together with itself, so that there is to be assumed in the result no other *In*tent than was already present in the beginning. We have already admitted that a formal syllogism may be certainly as well pointed out here as in the process of Mechanism or of Chemism; but we have also noticed that a syllogism in the sense of the *logical* notion of the unity of the Universal, Particular, and Singular is still not to be found in it. A detailed critique of the logical incongruities into which here Hegel has fallen, has been given by Trendelenburg in his 'Logische Untersuchungen.' We fully agree with him when he says of the Teleological notion—'If, in the manner of Hegel in the application stated, the Syllogism be looked for in actual existence, the three terms are then arbitrarily distributed to three dif-

ferent Realities in the relation of Universal, Particular, and Singular, without holding fast the reciprocal relation of logical subordination. In the teleological *nexus*, the subjective thought of End is in and for itself universal; but it is not the universal genus of its Means and of its Realisation: the Means are in themselves the Particular and Different, but still not the species of the former thought; they are really subjected to it and are ruled by it, but still not logically subordinated as its species; the realisation of the End is a Singular, but neither the individual of the heterogeneous Mean, nor of the thought that projects the End. If it be said that the Mean is subordinated to the Design and the Result to both, then this real dependence is to be rigorously distinguished from the logical one, which arises from the relation of the Comprehension and Extension of Notions, and alone conditions the Syllogism.'

What Trendelenburg says here is simply that Hegel, when he is in the third chapter of his *Second* section, is not at the same time back in the like chapter of his *First*. This consideration, had it occurred to Rosenkranz, might have strengthened his amiability to resist the authority of the imposing Trendelenburg, who only commits here, as is but the ordinary habit of all professed Logicians, an Ignoratio Elenchi.* That is, Hegel would have admitted the objection, but maintained that his position was untouched. Hegel, in fact, knows all

* Observe how much the somewhat *laboriose* Latin of Trendelenburg is behind the pithy vernacular of Hegel. The former (El. Log. Arist., Adnotata, §40) says: 'Ejusmodi igitur refutatio justa conclusione sive inductione sive syllogismo instituta *elenchus* vocatur, cui quidem primitus id adhæret, ut in eadem aliquis disputatione argumentando cogatur aut quod affirmavit negare aut quod negavit confiteri.' Hegel, again (Log. i. 406), says: '*Elenchen* d. i. nach des Aristoteles Erklärung, *Weisen*, wodurch man genöthigt wird das Gegentheil von dem zu sagen, was man vorher behauptet hatte.' To the neatness here the *Italics* are not the least contribution. It will be difficult to find the same neatness in Aristotle, and possibly Trendelenburg follows not Aristotle but Hegel here.—A definition so good is of general interest.

that already, and he just expressly does what he is reproached with. It is the same objection that lies against the admission into Logic of the notion of Life, &c.; and at page 244 of the third volume of his Logic, Hegel will be found formally explaining the grounds of his action. These grounds, however, concern the intimate structure of his whole philosophy; and as that has been missed, they themselves have not been regarded. The reader will do well to refer for himself here. The transition of the notion into objectivity is equally clear before the consciousness of Hegel, and equally necessary from the very nature of his system. From page 121 of the second volume of his Logic we see that he expressly contemplates three orders of Seyn (Being). He says there:

'It is to be remembered beforehand that, besides immediate Seyn firstly, and secondly *Existence*—the Seyn that springs out of Wesen (Essentity), there is a further Seyn—the Objectivity that springs out of the Notion.' Hegel manifests an equally express consciousness as regards Teleology; 'Where design is perceived,' he says (Log. vol. iii. p. 209), 'there is assumed an Understanding as its originator; for the Teleological notion there is required, therefore, the own, free existence of the notion.' At page 77 of the second volume we have also this other distinct statement: 'This co-reference, the whole as essential Unity, lies only in the Notion, in the designful End . . . . The teleological ground is property of the *Notion*, and of be-mediation through the same, which is Reason.'

Of the designful, clear eye, with which Hegel worked, then, we are not allowed to doubt; nor ought it to be difficult for us to be convinced that there could be no Zweck, no purpose, no design in existence before

subjectivity, and that it would have been absurd in Hegel to develope a consequent in anticipation of its antecedent. Besides, we know now that the change proposed by Rosenkranz would be historically false; for the Begriff, Kant's Begriff, Hegel's Begriff, was the notional Reciprocity that rose out of Hume's Causality. Yet Rosenkranz 'wants to maintain the right of the historical development'! Not only does he contradict this development, however, but, even by his own showing, that of the notion also; for he himself observes (p. 17) that 'the forms of Seyn are categorical, those of Wesen hypothetical, and those of the Begriff disjunctive;' which alone might have suggested to him Reciprocity as the immediate foregoer of the Notion. That Mechanism and Chemism should be forms of Causality, is no objection to their being treated where they are; for they are evidently concreter forms than abstract causality,—forms of the Begriff in objectivity itself. To Hegel, Logic is the prius of all; and in it, first of all, there appears in the abstract form of the notion whatever is afterwards found in the more concrete spheres of Nature and Spirit. It belongs, indeed, to the depth of Hegel's discernment that the Good should be regarded by him as a cognitive element, and should constitute to him the transition from Understanding to Reason. Why *Beauty* should not be included (another objection of Rosenkranz) may depend on this, that its abstract elements—as Kant also seems to have thought —are not discrepant from those of Teleology, and that its own place is, *like that of Religion*, only in a very concrete sphere.

But what has been said above is of no moment in comparison with this: the objection that Teleology, &c., are not technically exact syllogisms, is alone cru-

cially decisive of absolute failure to perceive the single secret of Hegel. Admit this objection, and the whole fabric of Hegel lies in pieces at our feet—perhaps not even with the exception of the doctrine of the syllogism itself. The principle which has given birth to Being, Nothing, Becoming,—to Being, There-being, Being-for-Self,—to Quality, Quantity, Measure,—to Ground, Phaenomenon, Actuality,—to Substance, Cause, Reciprocity,—to Being, Essentity, Notion,—is absolutely the same as that which gives birth to Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology; and if the objection of being but *formal* syllogisms is fatal to these three last, it must be considered equally fatal to all the others, for they also are in precisely the same manner but *formal* syllogisms. A man who uses the language of Hegel cannot help naming the principle of Hegel; but to name is not necessarily to see. And this we hold to be the case with Rosenkranz. Had he been perfectly awake to what was in hand, he would have hesitated before contradicting the express, deliberate, perfectly conscious action of Hegel; and the last thing that would have occurred to him would have been to say, these forms—whether later or earlier than the syllogism—not being exactly the syllogism proper, must be rejected. How could they be the syllogism proper, if either later or earlier?—and to this syllogism *proper* is the whole system of Hegel required to shrink? Nay, observe this perfectly conclusive point: Rosenkranz actually denies the presence of *the* notion in any triad but (as we may say) *its own*, that, namely, where it is *explicit*: 'a syllogism,' he says, '*in the sense of the logical notion of the unity of the universal, particular, and singular is still not to be found in it*,'—and the context will show that for *it* we may here read *them*. To

yield to Trendelenburg here was to confess essential ignorance.

These same views—and something more—he expresses, at pages 504–5, thus :—

But now there was yet another revolution in linguistic usage introduced by Hegel; namely, as regards the word *Notion*. He declared that Substance and Subject were to be taken, not as if the Subject were to be subordinated to Substance, but, on the contrary, as if the latter were to be subordinated to the former, and maintained that essentially for the notion of truth the thing was to recognise Substance as Subject. He sought here, as the eternally memorable preface to the 'Phaenomenologie of the Spirit' exhibits in the grandest struggle of endeavour, to put an end to the blind necessity attaching to the causa immanens of the Spinosism which, under the form of the Absolute, was now dominant, and to say that the self-determination of Substance it was which was ground of necessity. With this thought he stood to the Schellingianism of the day in the same relation that the monadology of Leibnitz bore to the immobility and indifference of the one Substance of Spinoza. Schelling's tractate on Free-will was, some years later, an express testimony to the truth of Hegel here, and sought, by his example, to leap from the position of mere Reason to that of Spirit, though of Hegel's suggestion and instigation mention there was none. Now, when some time later Hegel in his 'Logik' advanced, in reference to the Reciprocity of Substance with itself, from Necessity to Free Will, he grasped together the whole domain of the Ideas under the name of the Subjective Notion, and at first occasioned thereby an indescribable confusion; for this word had had till then the signification of a subjective Vorstellung, repræsentatio, or of a subjective Thought, conceptus, or of an abstract determination of understanding, notio. Certainly it was not unusual to say in German Notion also for the necessity of a thing itself; for, It all comes to the notion of the thing, is as much as to say, It all comes to the necessity of the essential inner

nature of the thing. But now Notion was required to mean the *subjective unity of the Universal, the Particular, and the Singular.* There were little to be said against this, since Aristotle applies λόγος in the same manner, but subjective was to express here not only our subjective thinking of a notion, but the *self-determination to its differences* which lies in Substance (im Wesen), wherein we have unconditionally to acknowledge a great progress, an emancipation of logical forms from all improper psychological admixtures and adulterations. Thus far, then, therefore we should be considered to agree with Hegel. But now he had collocated the Kantian Categories as those of Being and Essentity under the name of the *Objective* Logic, and so made—from the notion of Substance out—the transition from the objective to the subjective Logic; and now, then, again in the subjective logic, the subjective notion was to set itself anew as the objective notion; which objective notion, however, was only to extend to the *forms of the objectivisation* of the notion; which forms are its realisation, for the complete notion, the unity of subjective and objective, was to be only the Idea. Among these forms Hegel reckons now the Teleological notion, and presents it thereby properly only as a Mean of the subjective notion for its realisation. Here he were completely fallen out with Aristotle, who subordinates matter and form to the notion of design, were it not perceivable, partly that what Hegel calls the subjective notion coincides with the Teleological notion as the *First*, from which the movement issues; partly that he has carried over the objective notion of End into the notion of the Idea as Self-End. Only by means of this confusion of the *logical notion* with the *notion of the Idea* are many utterances of Hegel to be justified; he talks of the notion, of the divine, the creative—the free, self-dependent notion, and means thereby the Idea. If the objective notion is to be product of the subjective, it must possess also the articulation of this latter in the distinctions of Universal, Particular, and Singular. Hegel in effect has endeavoured, in harmony with his method, to demonstrate this, but, as we believe, with a double error:

firstly, that is, through the presence of a formal syllogism in the mechanical, chemical, and teleological processes which are to constitute the forms of the objective notion; and, secondly, by this, that these processes in the sphere of the idea are able to develope themselves into systematic unities. But the former determination is too little, and the latter too much. The former is too little, for a formal syllogism presents itself as early as the categories of Being and of Essentity; the latter is too much, because the objectivity in it has no longer the sense of intermediation but even that of the adequate expression of the notion. In the mechanical, chemical, and teleological processes as such, there fails the *middle term of the Particular*, in the manner in which, as the own distinction of the Universal, it forms the transition to the Singular, &c.

Rosenkranz continues in this way to censure the transition of the notion into mechanical, chemical, &c. objectivity through syllogisms which are merely formal, and possess not the veritable universal, particular, and singular of the technical syllogism proper. He alludes, as we see, to the presence of a formal syllogism in the earlier categories; but he gains nothing thus on the question of insight. He seems to say only that, as a formal syllogism was present then, a formal syllogism is not enough, is 'too little' now; and not a ray appears to strike from him of the true principles involved. But the above passage has been principally quoted as bearing on this last question. We have here Rosenkranz expressly declaring what he knows about *the notion*. It is not worth while entering into any special analysis, however: with the double, triple, and variously multiple confusion of notion and notions which exists in the above, it will be sufficient to contrast the simplicity of *the* Notion, Kant's notion, Kant's Copernican notion raised into the Hegelian, Kant's

Reciprocity raised into the Hegelian Begriff—that Begriff of which Hegel himself gives us the Begriff, and which we have no excuse in failing to understand,—the *one simple* and *single* concrete Notion. What does the Begriff of the Begriff, the Notion of the Notion, mean? It means that the Begriff, the one Notion which had been each and every one of all these manifold Forms from Being up to Reciprocity, is now formally the Begriff, has now reached its own appropriate form as Begriff, and this is true both *Historically* and Logically. This, then, is the divine, the creative, the free, the self-subsistent Begriff, and Hegel means *it*—expressly *it*—and *not* 'the Idea,' when he uses all such expressions: for if the Idea is its ultimate Logical stage, it itself is still the heart and soul and spirit of the Idea. In his preface to the second edition of his Logic, Hegel tells us with a pen of power that the categories are the substantial *Intent* of all natural and spiritual things, but even in them, pure as they are, there obtains the distinction of a soul and of a body. Now this soul is *the* Notion: not any *general* notion, subjective or objective or whatever other as Rosenkranz may be content to view it, but the one special Notion which has been already demonstrated. Hegel's words are these:—*

> But these thoughts of all natural and spiritual things, the substantial *Intent* itself, are yet such an *Intent* as possesses manifold varieties, and has even still the distinction in it of a soul and of a body, of the Notion and of a relative Reality; the deeper base is the soul *per se*, the pure Notion, which is the inmost of objects, their single pulse of life, as also of the subjective thinking of the same.

'Vom Begriff im Algemeinen,' with which the third

* Log. vol. i. p. 18.

volume of Hegel's Logic opens, is an extended explanation of *the* Notion, is an extended Notion exoterically (almost) of *the* Notion: here is what Rosenkranz makes of it: —

> The full introduction which Hegel has given to the subjective Logic turns on this—to show how Substance determines itself as Subject, how Necessity sublates itself into Freedom. This is the proposition which, with full consciousness of its infinite significance, he had first enunciated in the preface to the 'Phaenomenologie,' 1807, and which, rightly understood, lies at the bottom of his whole Philosophy. This is the proposition out of which Schelling constructed his second philosophy, a scholastically confused imitation of Hegel's Philosophy of the Spirit, &c.

It is impossible to say that this is not true; still it falls short of the truth. The section in question turns on something deeper and more universal than is here assigned to it, on a more penetrating and exhaustive principle than 'the Absolute is Subject' of the preface to the Phaenomenologie, however much the one may involve the other: what lies at the bottom of the Hegelian system, too, is something infinitely more definite and simple than that, and Schelling may have constructed his philosophia secunda out of whatever he may, but it was certainly not out of *the* Notion. In short, we oppose to the generalities, to the this and the other, to the vague hither and thither of Rosenkranz, *the* Notion, that which once seen the whole Hegelian system becomes seen—in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter. As we have said, however, he who uses the language of Hegel must a thousand and a thousand times state phrases which are perceived to tell the secret of Hegel, *once that secret is itself perceived from elsewhere.* Such utterances are to be found *passim* in

Rosenkranz, and here is the very strongest that I have yet come upon:—

The admirable power of Science becomes particularly obvious at particular stages. However unsatisfactory it may frequently appear to us, however great the Doubtful which it leaves behind, at such stages we are obliged to admit that Science has already done much, and that it gives us pledges of a harmony of the universe capable of filling us with trust in the Reason of the same. With immense velocity there rushes through infinite space a nowise particularly great ball. On this ball there move to and fro millions of nowise particularly great individuals, apparently given up to absolute chance, struggling with an existence ephemeral in its duration, often breaking loose into mutual enmity, or even murdering each other. But these weak creatures have come gradually to learn that they live on a ball which moves round another in an exactly-measured path. They have come gradually to learn that they are capable of mastery over the nature of their supporting planet; that with growing insight into the laws of nature there grows as well the might of their mastery, and that it is the same Reason which they find in themselves as law of their actions and their thoughts, and which they meet without themselves in the phænomena of Nature. And amongst these absolute laws of Reason, they have come to know one that is, as it were, the law of laws, the key to all phænomena, the hidden-manifest Archeus of all Being and Becoming. This law they name in variously manifold wise, according to the particular regions in which it manifests itself. In Logic they name it on the side of subjective thought, Abstraction, Reflexion, Speculation; or Understanding, Judgment, Reason; or Notion, Judgment, Syllogism; or Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. Whatever names may be used, however, it is always the same Trias, in whose magic bands all lies bound: for what we enunciate as a law of our subjective thought, has, if it is really a law, objective existence as well. We use, therefore, these same names in order to designate objective relations. We say, for

example, a work of art is abstract when it wants the development into harmony of an inner antithesis. We say that an existence reflects itself into another. Relations of the Idea we designate as speculative. We do not call Digestion, for example, an abstract, nor yet a reflected, but a speculative process, because it involves an assimilation of the inorganic, a transition from what is dead to what is alive. Such positive unity of opposed characters is speculative or dialectic.*

In what he says of a one law, Rosenkranz seems to have got very *near* here: probably, nevertheless, it is but a ray of external and scattered vision. It is not difficult from the very outside to perceive the never-failing *three* of Hegel, and it is not more difficult to see or divine that in all these *threes* unity of system is aimed at. This is the external *form* of Hegel—a form with which we become acquainted from the first, and in which we can very soon become expert, so far as speech is concerned, while, at the same time, we are still stone-blind to the *principle*, and know of *origin* and *matter* only what we can catch up, by an all-insufficient good luck, in those desperate and desultory rambles on the surface with which the most of us begin and with which the most of us end. In the beginning of what has been named 'the struggle to Hegel,' there will be found a variety of passages in which the writer seems perfectly at home with an sich, ausser sich, für sich, with Difference and Identity, &c., and even with *the* notion, at the very moment that he is divided from this last by years. Similarly, in the case of Rosenkranz, it is difficult to believe a perfect success, despite such passages as we have quoted above —it is difficult to believe this when we find him talking of 'the obscurities and incongruities which the

* Op. cit. pp. 73, 74.

Hegelian Logic has generated *through its doctrine of the notion*,' complaining that 'the Trichotomy of Being, Essentity, and Notion *allows the notion of the Idea to be too much in the background behind that of the subjective notion*'! and adopting in preference to this Trichotomy an early and imperfect one of Hegel, in which 'the first is the system of the pure notions of the Beënt, the second that of the pure notions of the Universal, and the third contains the notion of Science.' It is difficult to believe this when we find him, in spite of Hegel, and of what he has accomplished and how he accomplished it, disjoining once again Logic and Metaphysic, designating Design as Ontological, and proposing classifications in the interest of an only external balance without regard to History or the life of the Principle. It does not consist with such success even to hear that Hegel, 'despite the height of his stand-point,' 'took into the Idea concrete existential forms,' because he was 'still entangled in the form of Science which he found to precede him,' or that it was 'indisputably the Schellingian definition of the notion of Reason as of the absolute Unity of subject and object which still forced itself on him here,' or that the passage from the Metaphysic of Aristotle 'with which Hegel has closed the second edition of his Encyclopaedia represents an unaccomplished Science,' a projected 'reintegration of all the moments of his system in a speculative philosophy'!

Neither can we think Rosenkranz, though he defends it to a certain extent and would only remove misunderstandings from it, quite on the level of Hegel as regards the transition of the Idea into Nature. This transition is a perfect parallel to that of the subjective Notion into objectivity, and both belong to the very life of the

principle of Hegel. On that principle these transitions could not fail to be; and being, they could be no other. Reciprocity alone admits of no other transition; there they just are—reciprocals by the grace of God, the one *out* what the other is *in*. As regards the subjective notion passing into objectivity, we may say specially that this is historical, that a new determination of the object did in actual truth follow the subjective notion of Kant. When one reads the transition of the notion into objectivity whether in the Logic or the Encyclopaedia, and the express explanations by which Hegel, in elucidating, formally acknowledges the doctrine and every step of the same, one feels much difficulty in believing that any one could object to this transition and yet still consider himself a Hegelian—a Hegelian who really understood his master. The Begriff that as negative Unity necessarily became Urtheil could only come together in the Schluss. (Observe both the etymological and the common meanings.) Once together, unity was restored, an immediacy, a vollständiges Selbstständiges, a completed Self-substantial,—the Object. So with the transition of the Logical Idea into Nature. This, too, is but an act of the living Reciprocity that is—that is the Notion, or that the Notion is. The Notion is now perfected into the Idea—the *inner* is full; it must fall over and asunder into the *outer*—Nature. The Entschluss and the Entlassung, the resolution and the release, are again the Hegelian equivoque that is the One Triple of the Direct and the Indirect, the Simple and the Reflex, the literal and the figurative: what remarkable consistency, that Hegel should have sought to be true to the triplicity of the Notion even in his single words! But how otherwise can *any one* state the fact? Or how otherwise can any

one *think* the relation of God to Nature? The transition of God to Nature, which as his creation is still himself, how otherwise explain? It must be said, however, that Rosenkranz brings himself at last to be much more at home with the latter transition than with the former. Reminding himself of the Johanneische Logoslehre, and putting 'in place of the word Reason the expression Logos,' he finds that it 'clinks already not so strange, when it is said of the latter that through its *regard* it produces Nature—that, in the assurance of itself, it releases Nature from itself.'

It is just this alternation of agreement and disagreement, without motive from anything in the thing itself to warrant the one now if the other then, that leads one to believe in the wandering and uncertain catch which is all probably that Rosenkranz has yet attained to as regards Hegel. Accordingly, in conclusion, we are disposed to infer that Rosenkranz has never fairly seen that single principle which was an sich in Kant, für sich in Fichte and Schelling, and an und für sich in Hegel. This principle is Notional Reciprocity: this is the *manifest* Archeus of which Rosenkranz only talks—talks as 'hidden-manifest.' Only Hegel clearly saw the peculiarity of the notion of Kant (as in his latent theory of perception)—the necessity, that is, of a union of the Universal with the Particular to the production of the Singular, which concrete Singular alone is any reality, whether as notion or thing. Once arrived here, Hegel was able to see further, that a System on this principle was the next requisite; and that the means to this was Determination, a Progressus from the first abstract to the last concrete, or, what is the same thing, from the last abstract to the first concrete. This Determination was but a general realisa-

tion and vitalisation of Logic as a whole; of which Simple Apprehension is the first act, its truth being the Universal; Judgment the second, its truth the Particular (otherwise nameable the Difference, the Other); and Reason the third, its truth the Singular,—which is the final truth, expressing that the Actual is just a single concrete, the nature of which may be conceived to be a particular universalised into a singular, which again is the one Logical Nisus, the one Logical Vis; and a Logical Vis and the Logical Vis is what is, and all that is. Logic is the completed rhythmus of thought: Seyn, what it is; Wesen, what it was; Begriff (in that it be-gripes), what it is, was, and will be. These, too, are the three Epochs both of Philosophy and of History. So it was that Hegel spoke of History being near its term. If, as is probable, each epoch, however, be a triple of all the three moments, Reason, which is now at last happily in germ—but only in germ—has still the whole of her own proper path to tread, and the term of History is still comparatively remote.

This concrete Power, then, to which Hegel remained true everywhere, and which alone gave him his Logic and his Nature, his Aesthetic and his Politic, his Religion and his History; nay, which alone is the one *subject*, the one *matter* in all these elements,—Rosenkranz has never succeeded fairly, clearly, firmly, and once for all to see, whether in its own distinct individual self-identity, or in the perfectly articulate cohesion and connexion of all its multiplex forms. His work on Logic, indeed, which professes to reform and complete Hegel, reads and rattles like an amorphous heap of dry and disarticulated bones which a merely subjective breath turns over. Here dialectic, which is the very ghost of

Hegel, has fled, and unity we have none. For the plastic demonstration of a scientific progress more strict and rigid than that of even a Laplace or a Newton, we have but a hither and thither of philological remark—not even common *Raisonnement*—as in a dictionary. Hegel, in the Introduction to his Logic (pp. 44, 45), speaks of how 'unfree' thought finds itself when for the first time in presence of the 'Speculative,' and tells us that, would it free itself, the first thing it has to do, is to accustom itself to the notions and distributions without entering on the Dialectic. The logical statement that might so result, he says further, would give 'the picture of a methodically-arranged whole, although the soul of the structure, the method, which lives in the Dialectic, appear not itself therein.' Is it possible to say even as much as this for the 'Wissenschaft der Logik,' the culminating, Hegel-amending work, of Rosenkranz?*

Haym.

Rosenkranz, whom Haym denominates, with the universal agreement of Germany in general, 'the friend and pupil of Hegel, the warmest and truest of his apologists,' published the work with reference to which we have just spoken, 'Die Wissenschaft der Logischen

* If the reader turn up in Rosenkranz what corresponds to 'Bestimmung, Beschaffenheit, und Grenze' in Hegel and in the relative commentary, he will realise probably what has just been said. Take the following sentence, where the Latin words are his own equivalents of the corresponding German ones (Op. cit. p. 136): '*Determinatio* is the *Qualitas* of Something by virtue of which it is able to maintain its own Existence in the circle of its *Destinatio* only through its *Aptitudo, Indoles,* sive *Natura*;' and a style of explanation of things dialectic will manifest itself such, that of six of its main terms any one may be indiscriminately substituted for the other with the result of a very large number of quite identical sentences. This, then, is quite *external.*

Idee,' in 1858, while the work of Haym with reference to which we are now going to speak appeared in 1857, a year earlier: why, then, do we take Haym after and not before Rosenkranz? The answer is, because the opinions of Rosenkranz were before the Public in many works previously to 1857, and because, in especial, the matter of the work on the Logical Idea—very certainly the matter criticised—had already appeared in the 'System der Wissenschaft,' 1850, and in 'Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie,' 1852—(both, of course, by Rosenkranz). Haym, then, has been selected to 'close the debate,' because, so far as is known to me, he is the latest writer who has instituted a special inquest and come forward thereafter with a special and deliberate judgment on the general question of the worth of Hegel.

Haym remarks * of the Preface to the Phaenomenologie, that 'it is not saying too much to maintain that he understands the Hegelian Philosophy who is completely master of the sense of this Preface.' Now, while, on the one hand, it is impossible to overrate the value of the exposition involved, it is to be said, on the other, that this Preface may be very fairly understood, and yet he who understands it shall fail to understand —just anything of the Hegelian system proper—just anything, that is, of the *origin*, *principle*, (the *form*, in a certain sense, lies on the surface,) and *matter* of this system. Nevertheless, what Haym says here may be very allowably considered critical so far as he himself is concerned. The Preface to the Phaenomenology contains—*at least*—all that Haym knows of the principle of Hegel: the Preface to the Phaenomenology

* Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 215.

contains within it the germ of all that Haym says of the principle of Hegel. His book, to be sure, does not confine itself to the Preface to the Phaenomenology, nor to the Phaenomenology itself, but passes through hands, as if under formal judicial inspection, the whole series of the works of Hegel. It never gets higher than this Preface, however, and from its height it is that what is said of the rest is seen. What is now so familiar to us as the Substance-subject, or just in general the *Spirit* (Geist) of Hegel: this, in fact, constitutes the entire *Key* which Haym offers us, and, as everybody knows, the Preface to the Phaenomenology is the easiest quarry for that.

This, then, is all that Haym knows of Hegel, or, at least, all that for his book he need know. But again to him the movement alluded to, the *schema* implied in this key, is all too plainly *factitious*—a thing got up, a pattern cut out. This to him—who is very much of a Politician—is but too clearly only Hegel's ideal resource against the horrors of the German political reality. Göthe and Schiller, he tells us, hied them to Greece, and brought thence the veil of poesy wherewith to shut out from themselves the painful hideousness of this same political reality. So to Greece Hegel too betook himself in order to be able to cover over the Real of Modern German ugliness with an Ideal of beautiful classical Totality, the instrument of which is this same wonderfully artificial Spirit with its wonderfully artificial movement. The Philosophy of Hegel is but a side-piece to the poetry of Göthe and Schiller, and of both poetry and philosophy the inspiration is—as against our ugly German Political Real—an Ideal of Hellenic Cosmos!

This is really no exaggeration: I know nothing else

in Haym: and from Haym of Hegel nothing else will anybody else ever come to know.

The following quotations will probably more than suffice, not only to confirm our sentence, but to illustrate as well the literary abundance of Haym—the extraordinary rhetorical tenacity with which he accomplishes the extension and expansion of a single scanty formula over hundreds of pages:—

The Universe, according to this system, is a Cosmos, or beautiful Totality; but it is at the same time Spirit, and describes, consequently, in whole and in part, the reflexive process which is the Essence of Spirit. The Universe is a living Whole: all parts of the universe must, therefore, in constant mutual self-reference, be conceived as, dialectically fluent, rounding themselves into the Whole (p. 221).

Unable to transmute his Ideal into the Actual, he transforms the Actual into his Ideal (p. 86).

It (the system) is not so much a great, unconscious creation of time—not so much a jet, an invention of genius, as rather a product of talent—something, with reflexion and design, essentially *factitious* (p. 10).

He found that the Göthes and Schillers had opened to the German people the treasure of its own inner and therewith the genuine treasure of spiritual life in general, that they for this people had brought to view its Ideals and Sentiments in a like manner as Sophocles and Aristophanes had brought for the Athenians theirs. He resolved in the same path to climb higher; he resolved to do the same thing in reference to the general notions and categories of the German nation—*to put into its hand, as it were, a Lexicon and a Grammatic of its pure thought* (p. 310).

True; the poetry of Göthe and Schiller sets before us a world of Beauty and the Ideal, which brings into repose and reconciliation the disunion of German Spiritual life. But this reconciliation comes not into existence on the basis of a beautiful and self-satisfied actuality; these works take not nutriment from the marrow of the historical and actual life

of the nation. That reconciliation comes into existence in contrast to, and in defiance of, an unbeautiful actuality; only by flight out of the present into the past of Hellenic life does it succeed with our two great poets to realise perfected beauty. Theirs, therefore, is an artificial poetry which terminates at last in an overcharged Idealistic and Typic. The end, then, again, is, with Göthe, resignation; with Schiller, the unfulfilled and abstract Ideal. In the enjoyment of this fair picture-world, our nation must needs delude itself a moment with the dream of Greek felicity and Greek repose to awake directly poorer and more restless than before. To Poetry such a delusion was indeed natural, and who would dispute it with her after she had offered to our enjoyment what was sweetest and most perfect? But we see now all at once Metaphysic seized with the same illusion. Turning aside from the strait path of sober inquiry and from the labour of deliverance through the most conscientious criticism, Hegel begins to expand over our spiritual world his Ideal that was found in Hellas, that was strengthened by exhaustive penetration into the ultimate grounds of all religion. A dreamed-of and yearned-for future is treated as present. A system tricked out with the entire dignity of the science of truth raises itself beside our Poetry, and with diamond net spins us into an Idea with which the want, the incompleteness, and the unbeauty of our political and historical actuality is at every point in contradiction. With the Hellenising picture of nature and of fate through poets, we receive a Hellenising Metaphysic which, in spite of our necessity, lures us to believe that all the limitations and contradictions of our knowledge, of our faith, of our life, reconcile themselves in the continuity of a beautiful whole (pp. 91, 92).

Halt we a moment; for we have put hand on the *second* decisive word for the composite enigma of the Hegelian Philosophy, the second *key* to the understanding of its inner texture. The *first* word [or *key*] was: the beautiful Cosmos is in whole the reflexive process of the Spirit: *the Absolute is Spirit*. The *second* more important word [or *key*] is: the beautiful Cosmos is just on this account in each particular

part the same perpetually self-renewing process, a transition, a compulsion forward from moment to moment, a Dialectic that returns into itself and gradually completes itself up to the whole: *the Absolute is infinitely dialectic.* And with this last word I signalise the strangely peculiar character and at the same time the pervading reason of the deep and enduring influence of this Philosophy. An æstheticising and vivifying of Logic that concealed itself under an abstract schema, that procured itself authority and systematised itself under premiss of a metaphysical formula for the universe, that pushed itself into everything—: on this mostly is that influence based. This philosophy is an out-and-out revolution of the treatment of the notion. It proclaims that 'the Determinate as such has no other essential nature than this absolute unrest, not to be that which it is,' that 'all that is is a Be-mediate'* (a result). It brings through its Dialectic into flux and movement the elements which were previously held for fixed and immovable. It tears up thus the whole floor of thought, and brings forth thereby, beside the noble fruit of a marvellous mastery of intellect that breathes life into cognition and the objects of cognition, *the poisonous product as well of an unscrupulous and indefensible Sophistic'* (pp. 106–7).

And greater still than the difficulty of the outer, is that of the inner form. I mean that *finishedness-from-the-first*, that *at-once-into-existence* of the whole of this world of thought. Here there is not a word of any gradual introduction into an investigation, of any joining on to ordinary views, of any previous setting-up of the question whereby one might know where one was, of any critical statement of the case where one might of himself be able to take his stand. With the first step we find ourselves as through stroke of magic in a peculiar new world. Like the prince in Andersen's tale, we seem in sleep to have fallen on the back of the winged spirit who carries us off through the air in order to let us see deep

* *Be-mediate* is an ugly mongrel for ein Vermitteltes; but it seems to me to convey the peculiar Hegelian sense somehow.

beneath us the world from which we have been snatched. In other words, the System, as it is there, appears to bid defiance to every analysis, to all research. It shows there like a smooth ball more ready to roll than easy to catch. Broken down is the scaffolding over which the arch was built. Filled up are all the inlets and outlets to this edifice of thought. *One and only one possibility is there to penetrate here. We* possess the *key* to this edifice only by *this*, that we have followed the Philosopher in the course of his studies and the progress of his training, that we have stolen behind him into the innermost of his still resorts of thought and feeling. What is not in actuality—[this is the *key* as before] —shall exist in the ether of the Idea. The unreal notions of the Germans, divorced from the truth of things, shall through the native energy and force of thought shape themselves into *real* notions, and, through this their realisation, into *a world* of notions. Reflexion shall bring into reality the Ideal which the praxis of German life denies. A deed of reflexion shall be set on whereby the gulf which by the political action of the German state is perpetually created and preserved between the universal and the particular, between formality and reality, shall be filled up. Through thought shall the fair concord between inner and outer, between the parts and the whole, be restored to that reality which it possessed in the poetry and art, in the State and customs of antiquity. Through thought shall that contradiction-annihilating Life, shall that truth of Love, and that truth of Religion, be set into existence. The same sharpsighted and matter-of-fact, penetrating and history-sifting thought which discovered in Antiquity and the tenets of Christianity the Ideal, but in the German Present the negation of this Ideal—the same thought moves now from the hem of the Hegelian spirit to the centre of the same; it throws itself once for all on this Ideal itself in order to raise its burthen into an absolute form for every interest, for the collective world of Being and of Consciousness. Leagued with the spirit of a better future, in silent agreement with the genius of German poesy, borne on the wave of a new world-epoch, it soars beyond the

immediate level of the actual life at its feet—nay, beyond the self-acknowledged limits of all reflection in order to construct a world which is a reality only under the heaven of Hellas, a truth only in the deeps of the God-adoring soul. Only the boldness and the breadth of the conception can conceal the inner contradiction and the impossibility of the enterprise. Only the intensest exertion of the thinking faculty will enable the unwilling medium of reflection to allow to rise from it an æsthetic product of cognition. Only the universe, on the other hand, will be wide enough to render inappreciable the dimensions within which every particular existence may be able to show as correlative part of a fair and living Cosmos. *This is the history and this the character of the Hegelian system.* I name it an *æsthetic work of cognition.* It will not, as it were, critically decompose the world of Being and of Consciousness, but construct it into the unity of a beautiful Whole. It will not expose the *aporias* of cognition—not make clear to itself the limits, the contradictions, and antinomies in the world of spirit, but, on the contrary, it will strike down these difficulties and level out these contradictions. It is, I say, *the Exposition of the Universe as of a beautiful, living Cosmos.* After the manner of the old Greek Philosophy, it will show how in the world as in a Whole all the parts conjoin to service of one harmonious order. It will make present to us the universal All as a vast Organism in which each particular ceases to be dead and receives the significance of a living organ. It will show that the Whole is an infinite All of life; to this end it will in everything finite expose its finiteness, and just with this and on account of this demonstrate its necessary completion into an infinite life. . . . . Such main idea on which lies the conception of the whole system, will require now in the first place *to be suppleted by the imagination of the Systematiser.* (Pp. 94–97.)

This theory of Haym, so enormous in word if so scanty in thought, must be allowed to possess its own correctness so far. The system of Hegel certainly

aims at Totality—(as for æsthetic Beauty, Hellenic Cosmos, Greek Ideals, German Reals, Göthe and Schiller, and Poetry and all that, it may be viewed for the moment as simply *literary* importation)—and the Self-reflexion of Spirit is as certainly somehow present in it. An attempt at Totality, and an attempt at dialectic articulation, no one can deny in Hegel. But did we want Haym's five hundred brilliant pages to make us aware of this? Which of us did not see this for himself the very first moment he looked into Hegel? A whole, and, in dialectic symmetry, what else lies on the surface, on the very outside of the system? Is not this just what the table of contents at once makes plain to us? Is not this just the whole of the information we all of us get—and we get it at once—when we look at Hegel the first day, and perhaps the thousandth? And is not this the single grievance we would have removed? Is not this the single difficulty we long to have explained? Yes, it is a whole, 'finished-from-the-first,' 'at-once-in-existence'—*Why*? Yes, it is dialectically articulate—but *How*? 'Beautiful Totality!' 'Self-reflexion of Spirit!'—with such hollow assumption you but mock us by an exclamatory echo in return for an interrogatory call. Nay, nay! hide it not in rhetoric, cover it not with flowers and flourishes of literature—Hellenic Cosmos and what not: we see it perfectly clearly all the time—you see Totality, you see Self-reflexion; but as for anything else, you see it no more than we ourselves. *How* it is Totality, and *what* is the Totality, *how* it is dialectically articulate, and *what* it is that is dialectically articulate—just in general what is all this about—what are the thoughts here—till *you* can tell *us* something about that, till *we* can tell *you* something about

that, both of us had better hold our tongues, however *literary* we be.

Haym's rhetoric and literature we blow into space, then, rhetoric and literature being no substitutes for ideas, no substitutes for information, and we see the so-called key which was supposed to lie in their midst to be no key—no key, but a juggle practised on us, as it were, by means of our own admissions. The probability, then, is that Haym knows not the literal historical derivation from Kant—the probability, then, is that Haym knows not the literal Hegelian Begriff? Just so; this is the truth, and in the above extracts there are proofs to this effect; but before commenting upon these, we shall add others.

It (the Hegelian Philosophy) is the history of philosophy itself projected on a plane (p. 1).

As it is the history of philosophy *in nuce*, so it is philosophy *in nuce* (p. 2).

The Logic, to say it briefly, has a course like history; and this, because history as such has been made the material and guide, the concrete agent of the Dialectic (p. 320).

Critique and refutation of Kantianism pervade the 'science of Logic' from one end to the other. This ('science of Logic') relates itself to Kant as Kant's first great work related itself to Wolff and Hume. In Kant, Hegel sees his predecessor, as Kant his in Hume. . . . . And further. As the science of Logic has its explanation with *Criticismus* (Kant's) behind it, so it has its explanation with the Philosophy of the Romantic (Schelling's) behind it. Rather, it is nothing but the systematising of this latter explanation (p. 298).

However strange the articulation of this system may seem, however forced the development of moment from moment, we should be extremely blind, did we not see the clue by means of which the pretended necessity of the dialectic progress receives an authorisation of fact. It receives such authorisa-

tion *by means of the history of the Pre-Hegelian Philosophy.* Our dialectician expressly turns himself in special polemical Excursus now against Kant and Hume, now against Fichte and Schelling. Even this express polemic, however, always leans quite closely on his positive developments, and almost blends with the dialectic of the categories. Nay, more. Just in the last-stated parts does this logical dialectic directly take nutriment from the factual dialectic of the historical course and matter of the latest philosophy. It is self-evident—not the less self-evident because it is not spoken out—that it is the matter and context of the Leibnitz-Wolffian Philosophy which is criticised in the 'System of Grundsätze' (axioms, principles) and in the 'Metaphysic of Objectivity.' It is the Fichtian Wissenschaftslehre, that, as in its Theoretical and Practical parts, we recognise under the title of the 'Metaphysic of Subjectivity.' Kant, as is well known, had no Metaphysic of his own: he re-coined the Wolffian Metaphysic into a Metaphysic of Renunciations and Problems.* He had, on the other hand, a Logic of his own, and different from the usual one, a so-called transcendental Logic. In this transcendental Logic he deduced the categories of Quantity and Quality, the relational notions of Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity; the modal ones of Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity. In the Critique of Pure Reason, too, a 'system of Grundsätze' followed the deduction of the Categories; and the dialectic critique of the previous Metaphysic followed the system of Grundsätze. Here we have the outlines, much modified, it is true, of the Hegelian Logic and Metaphysic. . . . . In his system Hegel realised the notions in truth *in the most varied manner.* He realised them neither least nor least successfully in this way, that he modified their colourless abstract nature by the dye of their *historical value.* In the most varied way, also, he made them fluent and capable of movement. One of these ways, and not the least successful, consisted in immersing them in the stream of the *historical evolution.* Notions, he might in this reference have said, *are* in truth just as in a particular time they were

* Perhaps *Aufgaben* means only *Duties* here?

understood, and they *develope* in truth into what, in the historical transition from System to System, they *developed into*. Much more certainly than this historical background of the notion-'realising' dialectic, behind the formalism of the same, *do the various other ways*, as just so many other concrete supports of the progress of the Reflexion from moment to moment, conceal themselves.' (Pp. 113-115.)

These are the strongest expressions we can find anywhere in Haym in regard to *his* sense of the connexion of the Hegelian system with Kant and with history in general. And one is apt to exclaim at first, And what would you have more? Are they not strong enough? Is it not clear from them that Haym knows all about Hegel and Kant, and Hegel and History? We say, No: if the literal connexion with Kant and History on the part of Hegel which has been developed in these volumes is to be interpolated by the reader into these words of Haym as uttered by Haym, we have again an instance of those fallacious *ex post facto* significations of which we have already spoken.

Hegel tells us himself that his Logic is the History of Philosophy itself, not 'projected on a plane' indeed, but freed from the concrete contingency of the historical form. In this way, the Logic may be very well spoken of as the 'History of Philosophy *in nuce*;' but how can we ever call the Hegelian System itself—whether with reference to the score of volumes of the 'Works,' or to the one of the 'Encyclopaedia'—Philosophy *in nuce*? Hegel's Philosophy is Philosophy *in nuce*: how shall we obtain any sense for this phrase, unless by simply explaining again that Hegel's Philosophy is the *History of* Philosophy *in nuce*? There is something here of seductive literary jingle merely.

Then, Haym says that Hegel's Logic has a course like History, not of its own pulse, not of any internal

principle in itself, but because of the simple and intelligible *outside* reason that Hegel has constructed his Logic out of History. But this is not to understand the Hegelian connexion of Logic and History. To Hegel, thought—Logic—is all; it has developed itself—it is a progressive alternating Gesetztseyn, according to its own laws, its own necessity, its own life; and the History of Logic in concrete natural actuality is but the same process, the same life, *in the mode of externality*. In Logic, Substance by its own notional dialectic becomes Causality, which in turn and similarly becomes Reciprocity, and then *the Notion*. In the History of Logic (or of Philosophy, if you will), this series is externally represented or realised by the actual thinkings of the men—Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke; then Hume, then Kant, and then Hegel himself. It is this *literal* connexion which neither Haym, nor, if we are right, anybody else as yet has understood; and it is a veritable inversion of the truth to assert the Logic of Hegel to have been formed from without by a consideration of actual history. In this assertion, even, it is not for a moment contemplated that the transition of Reciprocity into the Notion is the abstract expression of the concrete history of thought from Kant to Hegel; and the last-named (Hegel), instead of being enabled by History to construe Logic, was, on the contrary, enabled by Logic to construe History. We do not mean to say that Logic was throughout the first; but we do mean to say that a generalisation of Logic on hint of Kant was *the first*; that the concrete connexion between Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity, &c., and actual modern history, was a discovery that constituted *the second*; and that, after these, by means of a variety of labours and investigations now of history and now of philosophy, there arose as result—

the Hegelian System. Now it is this literal statement which we claim for ourselves and deny for others—as regards the connexion between the Hegelian Logic and actual History. Haym plainly has not even attained to the tinge of a dream of it. That there was some connexion, it was not difficult for Haym to know, for Hegel tells us again and again the fact; and a very simple comparing of their respective tables of contents sufficed to show that if Quantity, Quality, Substance, Cause, Reciprocity, &c. had been discussed by Kant, they had also been discussed by Hegel. Haym's knowledge amounts to no more than this; he simply points to this community of contents: he knows nothing and says nothing of the inner articulations: what we name the unknown and hidden Heuristic life of Hegel when constructing his system, to this he has attained no access, with whatever closeness he has followed the *outer* history and appearances of Hegel. He sees some relation between the Logic and Kant, but immediately thereafter he sees some relation also between the Logic and Schelling, and this latter relation he decides to be the dominant one. 'Rather,' says he, 'it (i.e., the Logic) is *nothing but* the systematising of this latter explanation' (that come to with the Romantic of Schelling, namely). Haym, in fact, has *to say* a great many things, and this is one of them. The Preface to the Phaenomenology had very plainly a great deal to do with Schelling and his *intellectual perception*; it is to gain breadth to say the Logic is occupied with the same business, and we need not fear to blunder, for beyond doubt there is question of Schelling in the Logic as well. In fact, never getting the clue into his hand, Haym cannot simply and satisfactorily just *wind*; he

is obliged to grasp at a thousand scattered expedients as they float by. So it is that the Logic is this instant from end to end a refutation of Kant, and the next nothing but an explanation come to with Schelling: the simple original *unit* is never caught, and then developed into its necessary *many*. In default of this unit with its necessary many, he is compelled to see and to say that Hegel realises his notions, that is, constructs his system, '*in the most varied manner*;' and just after the stress which he lays on the 'historical background,' as the main genetic source from which Hegel drew his materials, he speaks of 'the various other ways' which are the 'other concrete supports' of the dialectic evolution, and which 'conceal themselves certainly much more behind the formalism' of the dialectic than even this historical background.

But let us see what Haym himself says of what Hegel himself says about the Historical supports of the Logic,—perhaps we shall gain thus more light:—

> Hegel maintained—if, as regards the main notions of the successive historical systems of philosophy, we strip off that which belongs to their external circumstances of origin, their particular applications, &c., we obtain the various stages of the determination of the Idea itself in its logical notion; conversely, we have in the logical progress, the progress of historical phenomena in its main moments. This, so far as I see, is more than a mere hint; it is a naïve admission of the source from which the Logic drew partly its matter, and more than partly the form of its movement. What in the Frankfort sketch of the Logic and Metaphysic became visible only in individual passages, that becomes evident now with reference to the entire Logic. The Categories obtain their universal dialectic flux by the reality of nature and the mind being filled into them through the fine channel of abstraction. (P. 322.)

Here Haym quotes from Hegel himself an assertion of the existence of a much closer connexion between Logic and History than even he (Haym) seemed to seek to exhibit. Hegel says, History is Logic *in concreto*, and, conversely, Logic is History *in abstracto*. Haym's allusions to the Pre-Hegelian Philosophy, to explanations come to with Kant, Schelling, &c., are thus by no means revelations, and not by any means discoveries: Hegel speaks much more plainly, much more unexceptively than Haym. Nay, Hegel, as we have seen, has not been taken at his own word; it is here in these pages that what is the real significance (when concretely translated into history) of the transition of Reciprocity into *the* Notion, has been for the first time pointed out; and Haym, for his part, still believes himself to throw a light of detection on Hegel, when he makes prominent *some* relation *or other* (he cannot say particularly what relation) to history in the Logic. Nay, more; Haym flatly refuses to take Hegel's own word, and insists on calling it 'a naïve admission'! An *admission*, above all, a *naïve* admission, and on the part of a Hegel! Did the Sphinx, then, naïvely babble her own secret, and was it so that Œdipus overthrew her? Hegel says, in such and such wise, History is Logic and Logic is History: Haym says, Don't believe him—that just means, he took outside facts and reduced them to *his* Logic by the fine channel of abstraction,—that just means, his Logic is but an artificial distillation, by means of a concealed process, of the concrete facts of nature, history, and consciousness, which are open, which are common to all of us. Haym will not take the hint that what is, is Thought; and that every particular of what is, must be but a particular of Thought. An outer world that comes one knows not

whence, *that* is the *Prius* of Haym, and Hegel's work is to him but a cunning and external metamorphosing of it. Hegel gets thence, he says, partly his matter and more than partly his form. This seems an inversion; surely Haym means to say that all the matter came from without! Whence else, in Haym's way of looking, could it come? Perhaps Haym has it in mind, however, that Hegel's matter is partly pure invention, pure fiction. But then, that the form is more than partly derived from the realms of fact! We thought the form was the dialectic, that it was an artificial and mechanical process got up somehow in imitation of the movement of Spirit, that it was a poisonous Sophistic, &c. &c.: but no; the form comes '*more than partly*' from the realms of fact! To account for this Hegel, then, it is quite enough to be always brilliantly in speech? But, to Haym, with these realistic tendencies in him as we see, ought anything in this world to be more valuable than the categories, if, as he says, 'the reality of nature and the mind' has been 'filled into them'?

Haym's observations in regard to History and the Hegelian Logic are very far, then, from possessing that weight and appositeness which they may at first seem to possess. We may say, he names *a* historical connexion, but sees not *the* historical connexion. In fact, to him the whole truth here is, that certain historical materials have been taken up by Hegel—æsthetically—for completeness' sake—into his beautiful Totality. The following extracts will extend evidence in this reference of a directer nature:—

> How does this apocrypha, this system which has grown in concealment, relate itself to the philosophy of the day; how first of all, and before all, does it relate itself to the *then* hilosophy of Schelling? (P. 143.)

Both had exchanged Kant's critical tendency in philosophy for a dogmatical one. Both had burst the thread with which Fichte had bound the whole of truth to the infinite self-certainty of the Ego. Both had ceased to regard human Freedom (Free-will) as the highest form and the highest law under which cognition had to subordinate the entire universe. . . . In contrast to the Fichtian method of Reflexion and Deduction, both had come to develope the matter of their theory of the universe in a representative and descriptive manner. . . . Both saw in the sensuous universe no longer the mere reflex of 'the light immanent in the Ego,' but the realisation and manifestation of a Third (party), of a metaphysical Absolute that grasped up both Subjective and Objective. The philosophy of both was, again, what neither the Kantian nor the Fichtian had been, a System. Both systems finally—and this one point is far and away the most important, to this one point all the rest may be reduced, from it all the rest may be explained—both systems rested ultimately on the same common principle, were dominated by the one, now more and now less distinctly enunciated thought: the whole of being is like a work of art, the whole—thought as action, nature as history—stands under the æsthetic schema and bears the type of absolute harmony. (P. 144.)

But nothing of such a struggle, of such a groping, of such a vacillating irresolution, shows itself in the genesis of the Hegelian convictions. From the moment he enters philosophy independently there hangs before him an Ideal of a view of the world and of life that only late indeed realised itself in the form of a philosophical system, the physiognomy of which, however, was already visible in firm traits in those early paraphrases of the evangelical history and the theological dogmas. Heart and soul immovably directed to this Ideal, he advances with firm step to his system; neither the Reason-Kritik nor the Wissenschaftslehre can impose upon him, perplex him, divert him, shake him. Unsteady, irregular, and eccentric, advancing by zig-zag, is the line which Schelling describes before he throws himself into the point of Identity: continuous, uninterrupted, straightly, surely

drawn the path along which the convictions of Hegel proceed till they establish themselves in the system. (P. 145.)

What Schelling had got at second-hand, that Hegel had got at first. The æsthetic world-theory of the former had the modern, that of the latter Hellenic, classicism and humanism as its foundation. . . . Hegel's Philosophy in its original form, on the contrary, is an independent fruit of philological studies; it is a side-piece to the poetry of Göthe and Schiller, and grown on the same soil—a philosophical attempt to restore the Antique, as this poetry was a poetical attempt. . . . He has, as it were, unconsciously converted into moments of his system both Kantianism and Fichtianism, and in the construction of this system these modes of thought have themselves received the colour of his Ideal. . . . Schelling, because he has passed so directly from the school of the preceding systems to his new position, has the advantage over Hegel of being able more sharply and fundamentally to *point* this position. His system has a name, and we know distinctly what it wants. In its genesis from the preceding systems, and in its own principle, it is perfectly transparent. (Pp. 146, 147, 148, 149.)

The more we consider the 'System of Ethics,' the more do we miss specific Hegelian features, *the more do we discover in it Schellingian features* (p. 171). The Schellingian mannerism of construction extends itself on the surface. (P. 174.) The metal was Hegel's, the stamp was Schelling's. It completes—I repeat it—the proof that the former, not only accommodated himself to the latter, but that, up to a certain degree, he was dominated and carried away by the peculiarity of the other. (P. 179.)

When he describes Speculation as 'Synthesis of Reflexion with the Absolute Perception,' the true method as 'Self-destruction of Reflexion;' when he says that 'the Self-sublating Contradiction is the highest formal expression of knowledge and truth;' or when he characterises the 'absolute Notion' as the 'absolute direct contrary of itself:' when he demands that every part of philosophy be presented in the shape of an independent, complete formation, and this forma-

tion be 'united with the Logical element,'—all this amounts to expressions which do not indeed cancel his Schellingianism, but, &c. . . . The Dialectic is his peculiar difference from Schelling (p. 212). He adapted himself in the first three and a half years of his Jena residence to the *Identitäts-philosophie*: the consequence was, that he threw himself with greater stress on the æsthetic side of his world-picture (p. 221). Much deeper than the modern had the ancient spirit acted on him. Despite all acquaintance with later literary and philosophical endeavours, he was still a special Intimate only with the genius of Hellenic Antiquity. The pith and marrow of his system had just for this reason—of this we have convinced ourselves—grown up out of antique root; almost perfectly foreign and isolated it stood beside those creations of the German Spirit which were even then in bloom, and had arrested the interest of contemporaries (p. 126).

The origin and character of this system were totally different from those of the systems of Kant and Fichte. The object of Kant was, first of all, before a single step was taken in philosophy, with the most self-denying and impartial accuracy to buoy out the terrain of possible cognition. It was his object to discover a fixed and immovable point of truth to which to attach with infallible certainty the whole of knowledge, and he discovered this point—grasping deep down into the undermost grounds of human nature—in the conscience. Quite otherwise lay the matter with Hegel. It is not in first rank the necessity of scientific conscientiousness and truth that impels him to philosophy, but it is the necessity to represent to himself the whole of the world and of life in a form fully ordered and arranged. It is not a fixed, marked-off point out from which he prosecutes the discovery of truth, but it is an Ideal grown out of history and the mind itself—a concrete image, a broad and full Idea, an Idea of the authority of which beforehand he gives himself no abstract critical account, but which out of the full energy of his being he has appropriated to himself and lived for himself, which, he knows not himself how, has filled and pene-

trated him to the full, and into which he now longs to carry over the entire wealth of the being of nature and of man. The Hegelian philosophy, accordingly, arises, as it were, from a poetic impulse—from the impulse to project a figure of the world according to an ideal type lying ready in the mind of the Systematiser. He is beyond Kant and Fichte, without having and before he has expressly exercised any inquest into their leading principles. In Frankfort, indeed, he studied the Kantian moral and political theories which had just appeared; but even in the detailed study of these writings, as he plies it for himself pen in hand, he enters not properly into any critical analysis of the Kantian principles, but he opposes to the rigorous consequences which Kant had developed from his ground-notions, quite simply his own notions which had grown up from the soil of religious sentiment and historical Idea. . . . The question is the authorisation of Hegel to translate that Ideal into the form of Reflexion and Thought. . . . Be it as it may with the truth of the Kantian and Fichtian Philosophy, this is certain: they were pure and natural products of the factual situation of our nation (pp. 88–89).

It is an Ideal grown up in a foreign soil and in an alien time by which Hegel is out and out actuated (p. 91).

This labour stood visibly, quite independently of its being only a Torso, all too isolated and special, all too apart from the consequent, connected, manifest course which philosophy had taken in the hands of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling (p. 122).

All here is and happens quite otherwise than in what has been elsewhere and ever called Logic and Metaphysic. We have here partly other notions than those we know from Aristotle, from Kant, or from the Metaphysic of Wolff. Quite otherwise is the *nature* of these notions, quite otherwise are their *cognition* and mutual relations conceived. The Hegelian restoration of Logic and Metaphysic is a *total revolution* of them (p. 313). The Apriorism of Hegel, because it did not, like the Kantian, derive from the concrete inner, was what broke the point off all the apparent liberality of the political

views of Hegel. . . . These were furthest from true freedom where they spoke biggest of Reason and the Notion (p. 355). Since Kant we have had again an ethical, but no longer any speculative Metaphysic: now (after Hegel) we have again a speculative but no ethical Metaphysic (p. 367). The defect with which morality remains affected in Hegel arises from his inability to appreciate the Kantian conception of it (p. 376). The word Free-will is a coin whose currency finds itself in constant oscillation. The inner intention alone determines the sense of this word. The construction which Hegel puts upon it, is the means of betraying the fundamental defects of his philosophy. What falls at once into the eye, is the preponderance of the Theoretic over the Practical, or, to say it more correctly, the absorption of the *willing* into the *thinking* Spirit. *Will and Free-will evaporate by Hegel into thinking and knowing.* The will, so runs the psychological definition which forms the basis of his whole system of Free-will, is 'a particular form of Thought.' . . . The will, he says, 'is only as thinking intelligence true Free-will;' free-will in that way is identical with Reason. . . . Sharply to say it, this is a Will, then, which *wills not* (p. 370).

If we saw from previous quotations that Haym ascribed the development of the Hegelian Logic to the actual use of the historical materials of Kant, &c., and from others that he would not, at the same time, accept Hegel's own admission of this historical connexion as on internal principles, but would insist on a mere external, though covered, mechanism being the only agent at work, we see from these last quotations that Haym has not attained to the slightest conception of the veritable historical connexion which affiliates Hegel to his predecessors. The truth of the matter is, that Hegel, by means of the most laborious, continuous, and frequently-repeated analyses, especially of Kant, but very certainly and very particularly of Fichte and

Schelling also, arrived at an accurate perception of the true nature and real reach of the principles that constituted the foci in the meditations of Kant, and of the respective influences of the further operations of Fichte and Schelling thereupon. Not till this was accomplished, did he discern the remarkable light which the new results reflected on the Philosophy of the Greeks and the History of Philosophy in general. The new interpretations thus obtained as regards these latter interests were more adapted, in the first place, to conceal than reveal his relations to Kant; but in this last he rooted, and the stiff, wooden, insecure enthusiasm for Sophocles which Hölderlin had awakened in him had no influence on his philosophy as such. We have it again and again under the hand of Hegel, though he was certainly not at all loud about it to his contemporaries, that he knew perfectly well that he worked only on a thing called the Kantian Philosophy, which was a genuine product of human history and human consciousness, and which he himself, as genuinely, endeavoured to advance to the place and function it promised to fill and fulfil as the *Science* of Philosophy at length. To Hegel it was perfectly evident that, do what he might, and let Fichte and Schelling have done whatever they may, this thing would be known in time as, and would be named only, the Kantian Philosophy. Nor one whit less evident was it, that it was a true interest and carried in its womb all the germs of the future. So runs the story with us and in truth; but the reader need only glance superficially back on the extracts we have made, to become at once aware that with Haym the whole matter runs in precisely the contrary direction.

To Haym, despite certain borrowed articles he sees

in it, the house of Hegel is absolutely peculiar and absolutely isolated. It has no connexion whatever with the houses over-the-way. In origin, motive, plan, structure, it is wholly different from these. The very articles borrowed are but to *fill* his house; nay, they are just such household articles as all such houses cannot be without. Hegel tells him, indeed, that in raising his house, he laid others under contribution: but Haym will not believe him—not at all in his own way of it. The principle was modern and genuine, and its treatment was through thought, thought the sincerest and the truest; but Haym would have it that the principle was ancient, and its treatment through art, imagination, invention. To fill up this principle, accordingly, Haym has no natural clue of its own to wind into it: he is compelled to stop and to stuff it with a thousand miscellaneous expedients which his own great native ingenuity enables him to intercept on every side—but not, however, without falling on the face ever and anon over his own contradictions.

These matters are so plain that it is not worth while spending time on them, and we shall offer to guide the reader in interpreting the above extracts by only a a word or two.

In the quotations (pages 439–450), which were made for another purpose, we shall find several expressions which militate against the truth of the case (the 'Secret of Hegel') as it has yielded itself in the present work, and absolutely demonstrate the blindness of Haym to the real origin of the System from Kant. From these it is clear that to Haym the work of Hegel is but a *factitious* and *illusory* attempt to transform, not his Ideal into the Actual, but 'the Actual into his Ideal.' For the accomplishment of this work,

Hegel, in his opinion, 'turns aside from the strait path of sober inquiry, from the labour of deliverance through conscientious criticism' (such as Kant's), to set up a 'composite Enigma,' 'tricked out with the appearance of a Science of truth,' that merely seeks to be in relation with 'a dreamed-of and yearned-for future.' It stands in absolute isolation, absolutely without any connexion that might be a bridge to it. It is realised in 'the most varied manner' by a variety of expedients, and in general by a transcendence of 'the self-acknowledged limits of all reflection.' It is no result of criticism and analysis; it has no examination of the nature and limits of concrete thought behind it; it does not thinkingly decompose, but æsthetically construct. It will not have things as they are: it will have things as it would, &c. Though the description of the isolation of the System is exceedingly happy and exhaustively representative of the feelings of every man who approaches it for the first time, it is out of place in one who pretends to have attained to initiation, and gives not a hint of the true state of the case —the close and literal derivation from Kant. The whole conception which the words show Haym to entertain—the very phrase 'composite Enigma' points to a conclusion the very opposite of that which has been here maintained.

In relation to the extracts which occur specially in this particular reference, we cannot speak differently. What concerns Schelling, for example, is an enunciation in many of its constituents completely wide of the truth. It is to follow quite a wrong scent to seek, 'first of all and before all,' to track Hegel in this reference. Haym himself acknowledges the incommunicable disjunctions which, as regards Schelling, the

Frankfort sketch of the Hegelian System displays—it was 'a quite other world'—and that 'it (the system) never receded from these its fundamental articulations' as contained in this sketch. And this is the truth: in that sketch Hegel had reached to the Secret of Kant; he had attained to the Begriff, and stood but in small need of Schelling—unless for the lift which the shoulders of the Schellingian fame were able to extend to the then Hegelian obscurity. The whole affiliation, then, of Hegel to Schelling is full of items quite at variance with the veritable origin, with the veritable conditions. The Frankfort sketch is evidently 'a Torso,' and beyond a doubt it required a licking into shape; but how absurd to say it stood in need 'of an understanding being come to with the general course of German Philosophy,' inasmuch as it was nothing but this 'explanation,' nothing but the result of this 'course,' and how infinitely more absurd it is to opine as follows: 'that this in both respects (the 'licking' and the 'explanation') really took place, we have to thank the removal of Hegel from Frankfort to Jena'! Why, after such success as the Frankfort sketch demonstrates Hegel to have obtained, the System would have been eventually licked into shape though its author had been consigned to Timbuctoo,—had he been but left the necessary means otherwise. The well-balanced *affinities* of Hegel and Schelling, then, and their equally well-counterbalanced *differences*, are, for the most part, but words, words, words. Hegel had *not* exchanged 'criticism' for mere 'dogmatism;' he had *not* abandoned 'the infinite self-certainty of the Ego;' he had *not* 'ceased to regard human Free-will as the highest form and the highest law, &c.;' he had *not* adopted, 'in contrast to the Fitchtian,' 'a repre-

sentative method' (at least, this is no correct account of the matter); lastly, he had *not*—with a great many other things—viewed all as under an 'æsthetic schema.' Again, it is speaking very wide to talk of the 'physiognomy' of the system being 'already visible in firm traits' in his early Theological studies. 'Neither the Reason-Kritik nor the Wissenschaftslehre can impose upon him, perplex him, divert him, shake him!' Hegel had taken good care of that, he knew better than that: he knew that out of these works only was it that he could build, and he took good care to appropriate all he could for that purpose out of both. We may almost say, indeed, that in these two works, when they are rightly understood, will be seen the beginning, the middle, and the end of Hegel. Then all that about 'first hand,' 'second hand,' 'modern,' 'ancient,' &c., is but mere literary verbiage, so far as the special issue is concerned. The Hegelian System is *not* 'an independent fruit of *Philological* studies.' He has not '*unconsciously*' taken up into it 'both Kantianism and Fichtianism.' The position of Hegel, *when it is understood*, *is* as 'sharply pointed' as that of Schelling, and his derivation from predecessors, not *less*, but even *more* close, literal, and, in the end, 'transparent.' Hegel could *not* get his Ethics from Schelling, but only from Kant. Hegel *did* 'accommodate' himself to Schelling, but he was *not* 'carried away' by him; he did *not* allow himself to be affected by his 'manier;' and *both* 'metal' and 'stamp' are in Hegel's works Hegel's own, all conditions of genesis being duly allowed for. When Hegel talks of 'the self-sublating contradiction being the highest formal expression of knowledge and truth,' &c., these expressions not only *do* cancel his Schellingianism, but exhibit

him—as in possession of *the* Begriff—infinitely beyond Schelling. 'The pith and marrow of his system'—we may have convinced ourselves of whatever we please—was *not* ancient but modern, and this system did *not* stand 'almost perfectly foreign and isolated' beside its predecessors 'which were even then in bloom,' but rose bodily a literal birth out of them. 'The origin and character of this system' were *not* 'totally different from those of Kant and Fichte.' Hegel, as much as Kant, and more open-eyed, sought the 'terrain of possible cognition;' Hegel, as much as Kant, strove to a 'fixed point (or principle) of truth;' Hegel, as much as Kant, is distinguished by 'the most self-denying and impartial accuracy.' 'The necessity of scientific conscientiousness' *is* primal with Hegel; and he was not one whit keener in his longing towards Totality and a System than Kant himself. It *is* a 'fixed point' (*the* Notion) from which he proceeds, and *not* 'an Ideal' which possesses him 'he knows not how,' of which he can give 'no critical account beforehand'! No man that ever lived was ever less so possessed; no man that ever lived was ever abler just to give such an account. The system of Hegel does *not* arise from 'a poetic impulse.' He is *not* 'beyond Kant and Fichte before he has exercised any inquest into their leading principles.' He *did* enter—and vastly, infinitely, incalculably more thoroughly than ever student into any matter yet—'into a critical analysis of the Kantian principles.' Haym does not know Hegel's 'authorisation,' certainly; but not the less on that account is this authorisation good,—though, of course, the whole thing still wants confirmation. The Hegelian, quite as certainly as 'the Kantian and Fichtian Philosophy,' was a 'pure product' of the 'factual

situation' in Germany. Hegel is *not* 'out-and-out actuated' by an 'Ideal' merely, and that by which he is actuated is neither of 'alien soil' nor of 'an alien time.' 'The Apriorism of Hegel' *did*, 'like the Kantian, derive from the concrete inner.' The 'isolation' of the system and the 'difference' of the Logic from any other have had comment enough; but it is necessary to say a word as regards the relation of Hegel to morality and free-will. It must suffice at present, however, just to assert, without statement of proof, that Hegel, while he is nowhere greater in himself, is nowhere truer to Kant, than in all that appertains to Ethics. I know not that there is any lesson in any mere human book that can at all approach in value the lesson that comes to us from the words Subjective and Objective (Form and Inhalt) as used by Hegel in a Practical or Ethical connexion. It is quite plain, then, from a thousand tracks, that Haym knows nothing of the true and literal derivation of Hegel from Kant.

His deliverances in regard to the 'Frankfort Sketch' are to the same effect. This sketch is named of Frankfort because it seems to have been written there; it dates thus not later than 1800; and it is still in manuscript—a manuscript 'consisting of 102 sheets in 4to, of which, however, the three first and the seventh are wanting.' As a specimen of the contents of this remarkable paper, I translate a passage contained in the notes to Haym's book:

> What is united in a judgment, the Subject and Predicate, the former the Particular, the latter the Universal, contradict themselves through their antithesis in themselves and through the opposed subsumption which they mutually exercise; each is for itself, and each refers itself in its For-self-ity (Fürsichseyn, Being-for-self) to the other, and *sets*

(assumes, infers, implies, or eximplies) reciprocally the same as a Sublated(-ity). The one as much as the other must exhibit itself as *setting* this Ideality in the other. In the way in which they refer themselves to one another in the notion of a judgment, the contradictory Fürsichseyn (self-completeness) of each of them is set: each, however, is only for itself in that the other is not for itself; as they are in the judgment each is for itself; the For-self-ness of the one must therefore make the other something other than it is immediately set in the judgment: this self-preservation through subjection of the other under itself is therefore immediately an othering of this other; but the nature of Judgment must at the same time equally assert itself in this alteration and sublate at the same time this otherwiseness. The way, therefore, is reflexion of this other into itself. The Realising of the Terms of the judgment is thus a double one, and both together complete the Realising of the judgment which in this its Totality has itself become another; in that the peculiarity of the Terms—which peculiarity is essential to the judgment—has through its reflexions sublated itself for itself, and rather fulfilled for itself the empty nexus (co-reference).

What Hegel is employed on here is the act of Perception as it has demonstrated itself to Kant, that is, as implying a judgment, the subsumption of a Particular under a Universal into a Singular. The matter of this act is carried over in ultimate or pure abstraction, and put in relation with Kant's notion of an *à priori synthetic judgment.* The whole thing transforms itself into *the* Notion, the Concrete Notion; the result of which is a concrete *One*, an apparent *Simple*, whose *breadth*, however—whose *recognisable breadth*, however, is a web of two opposites, which, singly or apart, are the two constituent abstract moments. It is thus he gets into the marrow of the Notion, and by close attention now to this side, now to that, and now to the

uniting *be-reference*, the whole doctrine of the Notion, and of the Judgment, and of the Syllogism realises itself before him. The subject and predicate, the particular and the universal, being both seen to be the same in the absolute Subject, leads to many deep and peculiar considerations too; and all this is here present to Hegel.

The quotations of Haym, in truth, surprise one with the light they throw on the true nature of the genesis and operations of Hegel. Indeed, the perfection to which this latter has already brought the inquiry is alone fitted to surprise, and in the highest degree. The triplicity is full-formed, and the various divisions and subdivisions, if with differences and different names, are well advanced towards the form they were afterwards to assume. In short, reciprocity, the disjunctive syllogism, the generalisation of the generalisation of Kant into its ultimate principle, the realisation of the tri-une logical nisus, named in its separate or abstract moments Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason —this realisation carried into everything,—these are the creative motives apparently throughout the whole sketch.

Haym, for his part, knows nothing of all this; these peculiarities are to him unmeaning blocks, stumps, over which he is constantly stumbling; and the sincerest striving after the inner dialectic of the Notion can only show to him as a barefaced and external *escamoterie*. Had Haym truly seen what was at work, had he truly seen the exhaustive study of Kant and the carrying forward of the principles so found;—had he known the veritable nature of what Hegel carried in his pocket at the moment that he—in appearance—gave in his adhesion to Schelling,—we should have had

some very different remarks from him on all these points. But to all this Haym is blind, and of all this he speaks blindly, for to all this he is simply external. Of the transition of the notions, the einfache Beziehung, *our* reflexion, and that of the thing itself,—of such things, he remarks (p. 109):—'It is clear, however, that it would be a false subtlety, would we see here more than one of the *many* formalistic turns and expedients of the system at present in its commencement.' Haym can only see sophistic here; he does not know 'from what point as first our dialectician took his departure, and how he conditioned this departure,' but supposes so and so; he speaks of 'the designations in themselves quite unintelligible of Reference, Relation, and Proportion, &c.' This last graduated triplet ought not to have been so unintelligible, for it exhibits very clearly its relation to the Notion,—it exhibits very clearly the struggles of Hegel towards his System. Failing to perceive his departure from Kant, it is no wonder that the differences of Hegel from Schelling prove so puzzling to Haym. But turn we now to his mode of using the term Begriff, and let us see if it ever stood up to him—*the* Begriff.

This Philosophy is an out-and-out revolution of the treatment of the Notion (p. 107). He forgets, in the necessity to see his Ideal in representation before him, *the impotence of the mere Notion*, of which he himself had spoken (p. 86). With both there unites itself the necessity to represent the inner, to find what were represented, as an actual. The organ of such representation is to him, such is the nature of his spirit, the understanding, the sole medium in which said actualisation can go on, the Notion. It is not enough to him to have *begriffen* Religion; he will at the same time possess it, represent it, realise it in the Begriff (p. 87). When he characterises 'the absolute Notion' as the absolute imme-

diate contrary of itself . . . this is a declaration which does not remove his Schellingianism, &c. (p. 212).

It were endless to pursue everywhere—especially where only an ingenious association of ideas is at work—the trail of this Dialectic. Take, by way of example, nevertheless, the transition from the 'Relation of Being' to the 'Relation of Thinking.' The relation of Reciprocity is presented as the most highly developed form of the one, the definite notion as the most original form of the other. Transition is to be accomplished from the former to the latter. This transition is to be conceived as a transition of the one peculiarity into the other as its 'Reality.' This Realising is to be considered to occur according to the form of the process of the absolute Spirit; according to the form, that is, of 'the othering and of the return from the othering.' How runs the deduction? In the relation of Reciprocity opposites are beënt together. Each of the opposed substances now is in relation to the other at once active and passive. The double activity of both is only the expression of this, that in the same way each of the two is sublated, that both are set into the quiescence of equipoise. With the subtlest reality is this process described by Hegel and demonstrated in the machinery of nature. We see depicted, how here the line of Origin and Cessation goes on forwards and backwards *in infinitum*, how here many points of departure and issue are equally infinite; how through this infinite intricacy and intercrossing of origin and cessation, the Actuality becomes the originating and at the same time the ceasing *Being* of the Substances. Directly, however, the limning of this living fact becomes compressed into an abstract sum. Only so namely can, by means of the catching sight of an ingenious analogy, the reciprocal interaction and interpassion of the opposed substances be converted into its 'Truth,' into the notion of the Notion, that is to say, into the relation of Universal and Particular. The truth of the relation of Reciprocity, it is to be taken now then, is 'a fulfilled oneness of the opposed peculiarities, and in this Sublatedness at the same time a Positedness (an implication, eximplication) of the same as Sublateds. There has thus

become, however, the contrary of itself: for in its original notion the Opposites were beënt.' It is thus, negatively, the dropping of the characteristic peculiarity of Reciprocity that it is a commerce of Beënts, and, positively, attention to the *oneness of Opposites*, it is the one-sided reflecting on the abstractest trait of similarity between this relation and that in which Universal and Particular stand to each other in the notion proper,—it is by this that Dialectic here turns to nought the upright meaning of Kant, that the notion penetrates indeed into Being, but never exhausts it. The notion, then, is the 'self-equal oneness of Opposites,' the coming into light of what is concealed in the action of Reciprocity:—on this thin thread hangs the transition from the ontological to the logical forms! (Pp. 116–17.)

It is not our purpose, in regard to these extracts, to show that Haym does not know *the* Notion;—this has been shown already;—our purpose at present is only to show that when Haym says the notion and the notion and the notion, he does not mean *the* Notion. We are not called upon at present even to take note of what Haym says of Reciprocity. In this reference we shall say this, however, that in his own view Hegel has nothing whatever to do with Being or Beënts as regards the Reciprocity he contemplates. It may be true that, according to Kant, the Notion 'strikes itself into Being (Seyn), but does not exhaust it:' with this, Hegel here has no concern. But, if we withdraw from Seyn itself, or any Seyn, all the moments of the Notion, it will very much puzzle Haym himself to tell us what then remains. (In a very simple sense, indeed, that of which there can be and is no Notion, must be nothing.) To Hegel the *Notion* (not any thing, not any Being or Beënt) of Causality, which is but *a* form of *the* Notion, has by its own dialectic movement passed into Reciprocity. What *was* Cause *is* now Effect as well, and

what *was* Effect *is* now no less Cause. They were tautological before, and they are now only *differently* tautological; and this *difference* is the product of the thing itself. To Hegel the notion of Reciprocity is a necessary result of the native movement of the element Thought itself. But Haym may illustrate the thing to himself otherwise. Haym, we may certainly say, for example, has now a crude or figurate conception, a Vorstellung, of Reciprocity. Well, if he will but take the trouble narrowly to watch his Vorstellung, whether as in Imagination or as in actual Perception—if he will but take the trouble to throw out all foreign admixtures, if he will but take the trouble to purify and reduce his conception into its absolutely abstract notion, — he will obtain a result — something still appertinent to existence—so peculiar that even he will have some difficulty to prevent it passing into— the notion of the Notion. What we have before us, then, are notions as notions, or the forms of *the* notion as such, and any sneer about Being and Beënts is quite irrelevant and beside the point.

Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and just any German writer since the first of these, have been in the habit of speaking of the notion just as they would speak of the perception. This is simply a German method of expressing what Englishmen express by Notions in general, Notions as such, Perceptions in general, Perceptions as such. The Notion and the Perception of such usage are just the universals of Notions and Perceptions. But the notion, as notion universally, as universal notion (though the meanings will in the end be found to come together), does not at all mean in this usage *the* notion, the notion singularly, the singular Notion, which, though coming to him by natural

genesis from Kant, is peculiar to Hegel. Now 'the notion,' and 'the mere notion,' &c., of Haym is the former notion, and not the latter. *The* Perception is at this moment intelligible as Perception taken universally; but if '*the* Perception' were used as Hegel uses '*the* Notion,' then *the* Perception would be one special, particular and peculiar—would be a certain single or singular Perception. This has just to be pointed out, and now the Reader, every time he opens his Hegel, will be astonished again and again in every page that he did not see before that Hegel meant by *the* notion, *a* notion, a certain particular and peculiar notion.

It requires no minute inspection of the quotations from Haym to discern that all this has escaped him. He identifies the understanding, for example, with the medium of the notion, or just with the notion. To him to have begriffen something and to realise this something in the Begriff are two different things; but to Hegel they are the same thing, for to him to begreifen and to have the Begriff have both the peculiar and the same peculiar Hegelian meaning—(a meaning in the end, however, that coalesces with the ordinary one, though to the development of a higher and entirely new stage of thought). The mode in which Haym talks of the 'absolute Notion' is quite unconscious, quite blind, quite unwitting. Then the notion of the notion is not to Haym the notion of *the* Notion: it is but the relation of Universal and Particular (which, of course, is true too in the new and higher, but to Haym unknown Hegelian sense). In fact, both the way in which he uses the term, and his perfectly unconscious commentary on the transition of Reciprocity into the Notion—the

actual genesis of the latter—demonstrate Haym never to have even dreamed of regarding the notion as *the* Notion—that single and singular entity which Hegel means, and which we here and elsewhere attempt to express and convey.

What Haym sees is but the attempt at an organically articulated Whole, which attempt everybody else sees. What he would do now is, account for this attempt; and the means he uses are an Ideal of Hellenic Cosmos which he holds Hegel to realise, and which he himself would in explanation realise, by 'various ways,' by '*many* turns and expedients.' Haym accordingly follows Hegel step by step through his life and the series of his publications. He is thus with Hegel and near Hegel, and can always allude to some fact of Hegel. But the boastful exclamation, every now and then, 'Ha! you see I am on his traces; I take you with me into the very den of the unknown and inexplicable monster at last,' is about the hollowest attempt to bawl oneself and others into a baseless conviction of success which, perhaps, anyone has ever witnessed. In fact, it needs not directly to demonstrate the failure of Haym by reference to the historical connexion, the Frankfort Sketch, the Begriff, &c.: Haym's whole edifice cannot support itself on its own incessant self-contradictions, but tumbles through these into an untenable chaos; and, for a conclusive and satisfactory refutation, it suffices to show this. Nor is this an operation of any difficulty, unless, indeed, the extreme abundance of the materials shall be thought such.

The single Begriff is the genetic One of the Many and of the All of Hegel. Knowing this, Haym would have given us simplicity and consistency; not knowing this, he has given us, instead, only multitude and

incongruity. Not knowing this, he has exclaimed, That symmetrical Totality is but an Ideal, a Greek Ideal, and Hegel has necessarily given it body through a variety of miscellaneous expedients. Haym accordingly sets up this Ideal as his own principle of explanation; this is his *facing*, and behind it, to fill it out into a show of substance, he stuffs all manner of rags and rubbish. These, however, as only disconnectedly together, easily fall piecemeal. Aesthetic fiction enunciated of a work in pure Philosophy, of a work in Logic,—that we feel at once is not likely. Involuntarily we expect the theory to prove insufficient, self-contradictory, and compelled to eke itself out ever and anon from elsewhere. A dream of beauty is to construct a Logic! That vast Hegel, whom we so long to know just something of,—that vast Hegel is but a dream, and as the smoke of a dream he shall be shut together into the shining, little, literary casket of Haym!—No; these things cohere not! Statement is easy, and especially to so accomplished a rhetorician as Haym; but how—just to say it at once—how are we to make intelligible a warp of Reflexion and a woof of Imagination weaving into a Logic?

Even in the extracts which have been given already, many contradictions, on examination, show. *Literature*, in fact, occupied with the satisfaction, with the applause of the moment, is, perhaps, in its own nature prone to contradiction. Consider this point alone: In the extract that occurs above at page 439, we are told that Göthe and Schiller 'had opened to the Germans their own inner,' 'had brought for this people its Ideals and Sentiments to view'—'even as Sophocles and Aristophanes (Thucydides and Plato are added elsewhere—p. 146 of Haym's book) had brought to the

Greeks theirs;' and that Hegel, following in the same track, wanted to do the same thing by the categories and notions of the Germans—wanted to put into their hands 'a Lexicon,' 'a pure Grammatic' of such. Now, all the world is agreed that Sophocles, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Plato did well in this matter, that they did in this a genuine work which is to reap the gratitude of the latest posterity. We are to suppose, then, that as these were to the Greeks, Göthe, Schiller, and Hegel are to the Germans, and similarly deserve well at the hands of posterity for an honest and glorious work done. But, in our very next extract, all this is strangely changed. It was not *German* Ideals and Sentiments, it seems, after all, that Göthe and Schiller and Hegel brought,—it was *Greek* ones, and accordingly the Hellenising poetry of the former is only 'artificial,' 'an overcharged Idealistic and Typic,' as the Hellenising philosophy of the last is but deception, delusion, and sophistic! This, as one sees, is but a kind of literary speaking in the air—for speaking's sake!

But there are other contradictions, and bearing more directly on the matter in hand. We see, for example, to begin with the earlier extracts, that the motive of Hegel is an Ideal of Beauty, 'a poetic impulse,' derived 'he knows not how,' and we feel that the result is not such as we should have expected, when we are told that it is 'no unconscious creation,' 'no jet,' 'not an invention of genius,' but 'a Gemachtes (an artifact) of talent.' Then analysis is demonstrated to be the forte of Hegel; but towards his Logic it is not analysis of the aporias of thought, &c., which he has employed —no, his Logic, on the contrary, shall be a synthesis, an æsthetic, an artificial synthesis! It is from Schelling that Hegel shall derive too, at the same time, that his

work is quite unlike that of Schelling, 'another world from the first!' One moment Hegel is to Haym in historical connexion with Kant, Fichte, and the rest; and, the next, he is wholly isolated, disconnected, cut off,—in short, totally unlike all other philosophers in origin, character, &c. History (and the same thing is said of Perception) is the 'concrete agent of the dialectic,' 'natural and mental life its principle,' yet, 'because his Apriorism (= his dialectic), unlike the Kantian, did *not* derive from the concrete inner, &c. &c.'

A multitude of extracts which are now in place, and which were translated directly for the purpose of demonstrating the numberless contradictions into which Haym's impossible theory leads him, must, out of considerations of space (which are now not unnatural), be passed over with but an occasional touch. We find, from page 229, that the Greek Ideal stands in need of—among other supplementary expedients—a Protestant Real! We are told, too, that in the Frankfort Sketch (p. 121) 'never has the Hegelian system receded from these its fundamental articulations;' yet, 'when Hegel undertook the elaboration of a Logic,' we learn (p. 293) that 'he did this from quite other points of view, with multiplied other objects!' We are led to suppose, then, that Haym is quite prepared for a difference here. But no: having said this—which would account for any difference—he seems immediately to forget what he has said, and suddenly to awake to the necessity of demonstrating—as in agreement with his theory—that we have still the old identity everywhere. This, indeed, is not effected without something of confusion. Though the crabbed opacity of the Frankfort Sketch has been made obvious to us by the most telling words, and though the grate-

ful change of the Logic to perspicuity and symmetry, to aids and assistances of all kinds, has been by the same means made equally plain, we find that it is expected of us to believe, that there is no real difference between these works, but only the appearance of such, in consequence of 'the freshness, fullness, and colour of youth' in the *former* having naturally contracted 'the wrinkles, ossifications, and callosities' of age in the *latter*! It does not surprise us that Haym should intimate here that it will tax 'all our powers of memory and discernment' to see this—this, and any moderately satisfactory measure of human consistency and sense! These metaphors, indeed, about 'wrinkles,' 'hulls,' 'kernels,' 'cores,' &c., only betray the contradiction they are intended to hide (see p. 302).

At pages 173, 318, 323, are opportunities of inspecting the materials, 'the most multifarious sensuously realistic and spiritually realistic, as well as historical motives,' out of which the beautiful Cosmos (!) is 'woven together;' and at pages 103–5, we have a detailed statement of how Haym believes Hegel to have gone to work in rearing his system generally. Positively the resultant edifice is not one whit stronger, not one whit less miscellaneous than any school-girl shall build you of a holiday. To Haym it all depends on this, 'that the same combining imagination which suppleted the schema of the whole, should perpetually conjoin and bring into play at once both of the faculties from the co-operation of which the problem as problem sprang.' The two faculties which imagination is here expected to unite, are Understanding and Perception. Now the word for Perception here (Anschauung) is very frequently used—by Haym himself among others—in a way that confounds it very much with Imagi-

nation itself. It commonly indicates the apprehension of images whether outwardly by sense or inwardly by phantasy. It is not really, then, hair-splitting, to say that Haym here calls on imagination to conjoin two faculties one of which is itself. But no sooner has Haym made this call on imagination, than he makes the same call as strongly, and more strongly, on understanding :—

The special strength of this intellect (he says) lies in the tenacity of its faculty of abstraction, in the indefatigableness of its reflection: the whole burthen and honour will fall, consequently, on the function of the understanding [what is imagination to be about now, then?]: in fact, and in truth, it will be the totality of the mind [Haym has got it at last] which acts in the execution of the world-picture; in pretension and appearance, it will be a work of pure thought, or of abstract understanding.

Haym, then, asks as regards the getting actually to work,—and, in view of such processes and tools, the question seems very natural,—

How otherwise will this be possible but by a series of compromises? The logical element plainly (he continues) must be everywhere blunted and bent; the living element, again, must everywhere up to a certain degree accommodate itself to the logical one: only with broken limbs, indeed, will the beautiful life of the all appear in the form of reflection; but this reflection, on its part, will become [*will become* is not difficult to *say*] as much alive as possible, it will become elastic and dialectic reflection!

A perusal of the whole passage will bring out every mark that is set here, in infinitely stronger relief, in infinitely more glaring colours, and the reader will feel no surprise that all this should suggest itself to Haym as 'not unlike the quadrature of the circle!' He will probably raise his eyebrows, however, when

he finds that to the same Haym, 'all these operations' shall 'express the special secret of Hegel's treatment of the notion'—*only*—'they must conceal themselves under abstract forms!'

The confusion, the inconsistency, the inconceivableness, the constant necessity of plausible shadings and additaments—all this is too clear here to require exposition. How imagination and understanding might cooperate to a fiction, one can see well enough; but that this fiction should be also a Logic and a Grammatic of pure German thought, and a Sophistic of Greek Ideals, and a beautiful Totality, and a broken-limbed beautiful Totality!—'compromises" we do see, but they are compromises into which Haym himself flounders, in the bewildered defence of an altogether impossible theory!

Such is the wonderful double faculty, the sinniger * Verstand, with which Haym, for his own purposes, compliments Hegel. In this reference the following passage is worth quoting for additional illustration:—

> It is easy to see that this vacillation between the preference which is given now to the pure Spiritual and now to the Real has its foundation in the ambiguity of the Hegelian mood of mind generally. It is the same vacillation that makes him declare at one time the reality of the state, at another the ideality of art, religion, and science, as the most consummate truth of the absolute spirit. It is the same vacillation that sends him to seek the greatest satisfaction now in the practical establishment of a vigorous and capable German State, and now in the philosophical construction of a harmonious Ideal State rounded into itself. It is the same vacillation that

* It is difficult to translate the sinniger of Haym. The dictionary senses are: sensible, judicious, thoughtful, circumspect, ingenious, well-devised, &c. Haym has probably both its etymological and ordinary senses in his mind. It seems to convey to him a sense at once of subtle (even crafty) and realistic.

leads him to work the concrete into his Logic and Metaphysic, and then again in his Real philosophy to rarify the concrete into abstractions. It is the same vacillation that on every point of the system causes the tongue of the dialectic balance to swing now over to the actual, and now—though in the ever-identical tendency of the 'Realising' of the moments—to swing back to the notional. On this ambiguity the whole system rests. From this ambiguity the whole dialectic feeds itself. It is the bottom and the root, the life and the movement—it constitutes the worth and the worthlessness, the strength as well as the weakness of this philosophy. The philosopher is quite the same as the pedagogue (Hegel is now at Nürnberg). The inconsequence of the latter is the inconsequence of the former. Here as there, in fine, the preponderance inclines periodically now to the one and again to the other of the two sides. It inclines at the present period to the side of the abstract and logical. At the same time at which the philosophy of the Spirit is, in the Encyclopaedia, enriched by a new section in being carried up beyond the System of Ethics into the consideration of Art, Religion, and Science, at that same time it is declared that a philosophical education in public schools must apply itself to the abstract form—that the abstract is not merely in itself the earlier and the truer, but also the easier and to the pupil the more intelligible! . . . The most essential result of his scholastic activity (at Nürnberg namely), the special memorial of this epoch of Hegel's life lies before us in the three volumes of the 'Science of Logic' (pp. 289–91).

The vacillation, the ambiguity dwelt on here is but misintelligence. The reason seems to lie in this, that the oscillation of the dialectic is altogether misunderstood and mis-named. Vacillation is in very truth the absolutely last word that it should occur to anyone to attribute to Hegel, who, as much as any man that ever lived, is always consistent with himself. The reality of the state, of nature, &c., and the ideality of art, of logic, &c., have all of them their prescribed places—

they interfere not with each other, and Hegel looks through all and over all from the beginning. How differently Haym would speak did he know the Begriff, did he truly know the origin, principle, and matter of Hegel! It is the very essence of the science itself that there should be ever and everywhere a factor or moment of ideality and a factor or moment of reality, and that the latter in the end should always be subordinated to the former. We have seen already Hegel enunciate the advantage of abstract instruction at the commencement of study, and we feel that it really requires no very special knowledge of the man and his work to understand that the theoretic writing in the Encyclopaedia and the practical prescripts of the Nürnberg Gymnasium nowise clash, and that it is only externality of view that could possibly be tempted to make them clash. Haym himself, with acceptance, points out elsewhere that Hegel demonstrates 'the abstract' to be at present the nearest and most current to us. In fact, the extract is a very excellent specimen of the worth of mere literature. These words, in literary reference, are perfect: no general member of the public, hearing them, but must yield to the delight and the seeming instruction they convey. No trick, no air, no antithesis of such balanced characterisation fails. The very *breadth* is in keeping with the *edge*, the *fullness* with the *point*. It seems decisive; yet is it but words. Go and see Hegel handle a Kant, and know the difference between a *thinker* and a *littérateur*—between the solid aliment that fills and feeds, and the brilliant gas that but inflates and makes windily to reel.—Hegel's logic the most essential result of his scholastic activity! This is in one apex, the type of the entire business. Does anyone believe

that Hegel's Logic is the result of his temporary employment as schoolmaster at Nürnberg, when forced by Napoleon's Prussian campaign to *degrade* from his Professorship at Jena? Does anyone believe that we should not have had the Logic, and essentially the same Logic—its roots lying in quite another soil—though Hegel had never seen Nürnberg? Why fill up paper with these emptinesses, then—this mere *playing at* causative relations, at connective articulations? Is this aught else than a sort of customary Tarantula-dance of what is called Literature? Will the slowest to believe this any longer doubt when he is told that Haym cannot restrain himself from deriving the *Bau* of the Logic from the *Bau* of the Nürnberg street-gables?

Haym accentuates elsewhere also, and at great length, the incongruity that seems to lie between the pretensions of the Logic as the pure truth, and those of the Philosophies of Nature and the Spirit as also the pure truth, and asks where is the special seat of Hegel's Philosophy. This is from the outside and beside the point. The incongruity, however, is held up to reprobation by the same method of dexterous literature. Haym, however, would never have seen incongruity, had he been able through Hegel to see Reciprocity, the animating reciprocity of the undeniable actual.

To Haym, then, ambiguity is the product, and sinniger Verstand the instrument. It but suits the case that this instrument should, as we have seen, be itself an ambiguity—should be itself, even like the rest of the business, an ambiguity and a blur,—confusion which every new shift but worse confounds. Had Haym been but able to look from the *in*side instead of

the *out*, from the centre instead of the circumference, —had he been but able to see the one shuttle and the one thread of the Begriff,—the incoherent and untenable Many of a dead chaos would have collapsed before him into the One of a living organism: . . . in other words, sinniger Verstand would have become anschauender Verstand! And now we have touched the thing with a needle: it is impossible more glaringly to put the mistake of Haym; it is impossible more glaringly to put the self-refutation of Haym.

> This even-handed justice
> Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
> To our own lips.

Shall this suffice, or shall we spread—after the method of *Literature*—the burthen of these two simple adjectives over a score of pages? Shall we form antitheses: the one is confusion, the other order, the one falsehood, the other truth, the one darkness, the other light, the one death, the other life, &c. &c.?—Well, it is impossible altogether to resist remark here, but we shall endeavour to be short.

Haym speaks (108) of the sinniger Verstand which is one of his compulsory shifts to explain Hegel, as an understanding that is 'at once accompanied and led by an instinct for the concrete, and for the concrete that lurks in the abstract: just so,' he says, 'is Hegel enabled to disentangle those threads from the notions through which it is possible to spin them into other and further notions.' Look now not from the outside, like Haym who sees only the rising up of an artificial aggregate, but from the inside to which the opposed adjectives have given entrance, and observe the wonderful, new, living, and coherent sense which these words of Haym have at once assumed! 'An instinct for the concrete!'

—Yes!—but not such as Haym contemplated. 'So he was enabled to disentangle the threads of the notions!'—Yes!—but not by artifice, not by pretence, not by a sinniger Verstand that was merely glued together,—no!—but by a living anschauender Verstand, an Understanding which had come into possession of the Concrete Notion, and was filled and quickened by its life. That broad-painted ambiguity, then, of which Haym, ambiguously to thought if antithetically to literature, speaks as 'the worth and the worthlessness, the strength as well as the weakness' of the Hegelian philosophy, is an involuntary testimony to the success of this last. That Haym should think of a sinniger Verstand with reference to Hegel tends to point out that Hegel has succeeded in realising that anschauender Verstand of which Schelling made so much with reference to Kant. The presumption is thus extended to us, that Hegel has found the single unity of the All, and from it and through it been enabled to develope the All. The *lusus naturæ* of an impossible faculty, so far as Haym is concerned, is seen to indicate the very inmost secret of the very latest philosophy!

It is true that Hegel would conduct the universe into Totality, into a single life, and Haym's error is in assuming the process to be only ambiguity. Hegel simply believes in God, believes that the universe is God's; believes that in God, therefore, all rounds itself to Totality. Totality, then, is the one fundamental truth, and Hegel has only sought the clue to it. When Haym talks of Spirit as this clue, he is nearer the truth than when he forgets it for his sinniger Verstand. God is a Spirit, and Man, made in the image of God, is a Spirit, and the life of a Spirit is Thought. The early notes, however, in what is called the

Struggle to Hegel, show that knowledge to this extent comes from the surface and from the first; and Haym cannot really name the *whence*, the *how*, the *what* of this Spirit. He can only talk of its analogy; he cannot realise, he cannot effect its fusion into the diversified material. Haym says of this movement: 'This dialectic, to believe Hegel, is nothing else than the principle of all natural and mental life: the reverse is the truth,—natural and mental life is the principle of that dialectic' (p. 320). To reverse, is to misunderstand, Hegel: but what, after all, does the reversal amount to? Would it be wrong in Hegel to make natural and mental life the principle of his dialectic? Where else would Haym have Hegel look for the principle of his dialectic? Again, if natural and mental life thus identify itself with the dialectic, shall we not prefer to regard the latter, or abstract element, as the principle, and the former, or concrete element, as the realisation of the principle? But, take it either way, let it be said with Hegel that the dialectic is the principle of reality, or let it be said with Haym that reality is the principle of the dialectic, we have in both ways the same result—*an identification of Logic and the Actual*!

Are they, then, not to be identified? Are Logic and the Actual for ever to confront each other divided by the impassable chasm of an irreconcilable difference? What were Logic thus separated, thus inapplicable? What were the good of Logic, if it is not to be conceived as the thought, the principle, of the Actual? But this is just Hegel's attempt: he would realise and systematise the identification of Logic with the Actual. Why, then, should Haym stigmatise this attempt as 'self-contradictory in itself,' as 'a confusion and cor-

ruption of the understanding and its conscience?' Idealism would result, but that need not scare us. That we are here to think, involves the virtual identity of thinking with that which it thinks; for to think is to assimilate. Reality and Ideality must be set equal; the breadth of the universe is the reciprocity of Reality and Ideality; but the single pivot of rotation is Ideality itself. Nevertheless, though, in this way, Thought and Perception are *virtually* identical; there is no necessity to *confound* opposing spheres.

Can it be else, then, here, than that Haym has just missed the matter in hand, and all the while been but beating the air? It is the problem of problems that Hegel would solve, and not the contradiction of contradictions that he would only cloak: his crime to Haym is his virtue to the Absolute. Nay, Haym himself means nothing else, though he does not see it, when he accentuates the Real and would have us seek wisdom in the Concrete. When the whole Concrete had disappeared, resolved into the Wisdom which Haym contemplates, what were this Wisdom but the *Thought* of the Concrete — *Logic*? The æsthetic element and the logical element must, in the end, coincide; and of the two ways of putting this,— dialectic is principle of life, life is principle of dialectic, — is not the alternative of Hegel the more legitimate and correct? Haym, thus, would seem unable to bring his own thoughts together. Like a true *littérateur*, he riots in the infinite *out of one another* of Perception; Ideas, Thoughts, Notions, are as casual and diverse organisms that delight him there; but he is unable to bring the *different* of Perception into the *unity* of the Understanding. This purblindness seems strange in a spirit so vivid, but — (witness

the German Ideals that were yet Greek Ideals)—it is a true trait and constant.

Haym, in truth, is perhaps very nearly exclusively concerned with the perfecting of his merely literary picture; and that is largely accomplished by the liberal use of that peculiarly literary expedient, the supposititious *es soll*. That is, Haym gets within Hegel, and reports to us how Hegel sketches out his work before him by a 'this shall be done,' and 'that shall be done;' but Haym all the time is lapped only in his own dream. This soll and sollen (v. p. 316 and the volume *passim*), this ascription of plausible genetic motive, grows into a very happy literary structure, which, however, just builds the philosophy it would enclose—out.

There are deliverances of Haym in reference to Being and Nothing, Finite and Infinite, Qualitative and Quantitative, &c., which might be used towards the same general conclusion here of contradiction and defective information; but enough probably has in that respect been now said, and we may remind only of the wonderful and true metaphysic which we have seen these points really to contain. It throws light just to know that Haym (291) is surprised Hegel should speak of 'Philosophy being as *docible* as Geometry;' and there is a little mistake, on Haym's part, about Reason, which it is perhaps worth the trouble to cite. One aspect of the duplicity which Haym sees in Hegel concerns the contrast which this latter exhibits of the remotest unreality in the extravagance of his speculation, and of the nearest reality in the sobriety of his understanding. Now the 'Reason' of the following sentence (269) is supposed by Haym to stand for this said sobriety of understanding. 'That "Reason" which

a reader of Hegel's philosophical writings,' says Haym, 'might easily mistake for an element wholly apart, is curtly defined as the capability of "being awake, of seeing in all, and of saying to all, what it is."' Reason here, however, is not simply vigilant common sense; it is more than that,—it is transcendental reason, dialectic reason, speculative reason, Hegel's reason, Reason Proper, which, when employed on *one* moment of a concrete, will not allow its own abstraction to blind it to the *other*: it will keep 'awake,' it will see 'all,' and it will say to all, '*what* it *is*.'

In the obliquity of Haym towards Hegel there mingles, as we would now point out, a certain political bias. Political bias, indeed, what we may call a sort of Fichtian flame of Liberalism, is a chief characteristic of Haym; and he cannot view with patience the conservatism of Hegel, whom he seems almost to suspect of simple *ratting*. This comes forward in what he says of Hegel's inaugural address at Berlin. The address itself, we may remark, is very short and very plain, but in its matter peculiarly rich. Hegel begins in it by expressing pleasure at the wider sphere of usefulness extended to him by his new position, *now* and *here*: *now* that peace promises scope for philosophy; and *here* in a centre of civilisation that has so distinguished itself. Now this last topic receives but a word—a word, too, perhaps tamer than is usual and conventional in all such circumstances—yet to Haym 'the sum of this address consists in the demonstration of the mutual affinity and necessity of the Prussian Government and the Hegelian Theory!' (P. 357.)

Something of the same spirit sharpens the chuckle: 'thus runs the naïve self-confession of the Absolute

Idealism that it is not absolute' (p. 387). Hegel, in his works, stands so perfectly self-consistent as regards what is absolute and what is not absolute in his mode of looking, that both 'self-confession' and 'naïve,' as words quite alien, simply surprise. We have but to read the Begriff der Natur with which the Naturphilosophie opens to obtain the necessary conviction here.

There is an allusion to Jacobi which is not discrepant. 'This is the first instance,' says Haym, referring to a certain identification of himself, on the part of Hegel, with the philosopher just named, 'of that Geneigtheit des Concordirens und Paciscirens, that trick of making union and peace which, later in the philosophy of Religion, as in reference to the Dogmatic of the Church, reached its acme' (p. 346). Now this is *not* the first example of the tendency in question, nor were it very easy to point out where that first example is contained, unless we just say that the first sentence written by Hegel, after he reached years of discretion, constitutes such example. From first to last Hegel has no object whatever but this *Concordiren* and *Paciscirен*. The Aufklärung, or Illumination, by the light of Private Judgment, has gutted humanity of its whole concrete *substance*: Hegel would restore this substance but—in this light. This is the whole—there is nothing but this in Hegel—and this is a compromise. It is this compromise, however, which Haym does not understand—certainly not in its grounds—and which, therefore, he jeeringly names a 'Concordiren and Paciscirен.' Now what else was the action of Jacobi than to take stand by this very substance, the *enlightened* gutting-out of which it was the precise object of Hegel to undo? What wonder, then, if Hegel pointed out that what Jacobi sought to realise

by the method of Sentiment, and in a consequently *rhapsodic** form, he himself had realised by the method of knowledge, and in a consequently exact and necessary form?

Haym's dissatisfaction with certain of the Hegelian religious tenets is on the same platform. 'Only the long predominance,' he says, 'first of the Kantian and then of the Hegelian philosophy, has availed to obscure the simple truth, that Religion, quite as much as Speech or as Art, is a specific mode of expression of the human spirit' (p. 399); and, again, 'an offensive coquetting at once with orthodoxy and philosophy became the order of the day, perplexed the head and the conscience, and ate like a cancer into the sound reason of our nation as into its character for straightforwardness' (p. 431). If conclusions are to be drawn from these allegations as regards the tendency of the religious teaching of either Kant or Hegel, and as regards the nature of the religious belief especially of the latter, great injustice will be done both. While there is nothing in the teaching of Kant that could avail to obscure the 'simple truth' spoken of, that 'simple truth' is the special belief of Hegel. Again, the compromise sought by Hegel between Religion and Philosophy is frank, open, unconcealed; and it is only the jaundiced or clouded eye of a Haym that, in a bearing so simple, could see the base and disreputable coquetting which he at least lays at the door of the system.

But, as already hinted, it is Hegel's political teaching

* *Rhapsodic* is here used in the Kantian sense which has reference to a process of contingent and disconnected *snatch*. This is an inversion or perversion of the original Greek use of the word: scholars think that ῥάπτειν ἀοιδήν refers to a *continuous* recitation.

that Haym regards the most obliquely. He attacks, for example, with the greatest keenness the celebrated dictum, 'what is rational that is real, and what is real that is rational.' We are spared, however, the trouble of any defence here; for Hegel's own, in the beginning of the Encyclopaedia, is ample—such, indeed, that it is rather surprising to find Haym repeating what Hegel himself had already met. In fact, he who knows the Hegelian Philosophy at all, knows that 'the logical forms are *the living spirit of the actual*, and *that* only of the actual is true which, *by virtue of these forms, is through them and in them true.*' *

As belonging to the liberalism of Germany, to know the better and to will the better are two of Haym's presuppositions. We may fancy with what feelings, therefore, he watches the grim contempt with which Hegel casts an utterly extinguishing thunderbolt or two at the shallowly conceited Besserwissen as at the shallowly sentimental Besserwollen of the modern—let us say revolutionist. Haym's astonishment is indescribable. So many things are all wrong,—it seems so natural to him that it should be thought right to know better and to will better. Especially to will better—why is not that virtue itself? It is not wonderful, then, that Haym terms this portion of the system—though, surely, it is not difficult to see that Hegel founds his contempt on the mere empty subjectivity of the bulk of those who raise the cries—immoral, sophistical, and a tribute only to the *quietism* of the conservative *re-action*. He accuses it of neglecting the concrete inner of man, of degrading willing into knowing, and of ignoring individual subjectivity before a mere universal. Hegel's political system

* Hegel's Encyclopaedia, § 162. The translation is exact.

coheres with his theory of morals; and, as not blind to this connexion, Haym dislikes the latter also, and for reasons that relate to this same subordination of the individual to the universal and of will to thought. Fortlage, in a work already cited, speaks of Hegel having 'rolled forward the foundation-stone of a more intelligent conception of the historical development of States, of positive law and political justice;' and this is the truth. Hegel is nowhere greater than in the Practical sphere—in that sphere, namely, which relates to morality, politics, and what in general concerns action. Whatever may be imperfect in Hegel, not so is his theory of morals, which, as only behoved the following out of the Ethical principles of Kant, has placed the whole subject in such solidity, breadth, and consummation of development as will yet, if we mistake not, lead to many most important changes in the social arrangements of Europe.

Yes, it is true that subjectivity *qua* subjectivity is not the true practical principle, and that it must give way to a universal. In the practical field, subjectivity that would be subjectivity is simply *Evil, the Bad*, and all that can be called such; whereas subjectivity that would be the universal is really all that we possess as *the Good*. In the interests of the universal the individual must harness himself. In general, the probability is that—through Hegel—we are on the point of receiving political principles at last, and of attaining to the possibility at length of a nation governed. Is it, then, government—and this is not only what is practically done, but with much pomp even theoretically laid down nowadays—to wait for the voices of the governed, and then to move only with such calculated slowness as shall just anticipate any outbreak of

impatience on the part of the same governed? If Hegel is correct, there are objective principles which, by teaching us the right, render us independent of the shallow *conceit* and shallow *sentimentality* of the bulk of those vain subjectivities that so commonly *know* better and *would* better than their neighbours. But these objective principles require quite another *knowledge* and quite another *will* than these same subjectivities can extend to them. It were easy to dilate here; but enough has been said to suggest probably that the utterances of Haym in this reference have been singularly rash and inconsiderate, and countenance the assertion of his erroneous and external position to the Hegelian system generally.

It cannot be denied, nevertheless, that Hegel, in his actual connexion with the Prussian State, *seemed* to play—at least *weakly*—into the hands of the aristocratic re-action. This was a grave error; this was, on the part of Hegel, to do vast injustice to himself. If the place of the Philosopher was very certainly not at the side of insensate revolution, neither was it—and quite as certainly—at the back of selfish, brutal, and merely aristocratic obstruction. Hegel the staunch bull-dog of Prussian pigheadedness and pride that honoured his inferior blood when it employed his talent—this is a position of all possible the most preposterous and pitiable! It is not impossible, however, something to extenuate the blame of Hegel. Hegel's life had not been one of prosperity, of uninterrupted advance. For six years an humble house-tutor, for an equal period Schelling's unknown second, and at the same time an unintelligible and almost unattended sub-professor (though holding any actual professorship only for a few months), for

two years, being 'in want of all other means of subsistence,' editor of an inconsiderable journal, for eight years a mere schoolmaster in Nürnberg, and reaching his true place at length in Berlin only at the ripe age of 48,—pain, disappointment, difficulty, mortification—in a word, humble-pie had been his only nourishment from the moment he stepped out of sanguine student-life into the chilling world. At Berlin he was at last in full sunshine; no wonder that he opened to the heat, that he chirruped to it, that in thought he truckled to the givers of it. In thought to truckle to such benefactors is natural to universal mankind. But how is such truckling in thought to be translated into action by an awkward, inexperienced, unacquainted recluse of books? It is only the accomplished world-man who knows *what is his own*, and, with that, when to speak and how to speak, when to act and how to act, when to take offence and how to take offence. Most book-men are in such matters—*babies*; apt, perhaps, to fall into convulsions if obliged to ask change for a shilling; now pocketing with an insensate smile, what men of the world would throw off with a glance of the eyes, or receive on the edge of a still keener joke; and now with hysterical eloquence, or maniacal violence, furibund in demeaning positions, which these same men of the world never would, or never could, have entered, or which—if by some evil star they had been once for all flung into them—they would have been but too happy to be allowed to quit, in submissive silence and with their heads down. The natural truckling in thought to exalted benefactors is but too apt by such bookish innocents to be translated into a truckling in fact,—and they cannot help it. Hegel was a vigorous piece of mother-spun Suabian

manhood undoubtedly; but he was a recluse of books, he had tasted the bitters of adversity, he had had to creep for his bread: place him now at once in the position and with the associates that, however far off, he had always by presentiment known as his own! Would he not be innocently pleased to find that his book-theories were able to lend an even welcome aid to the great state-policies of those high and mighty names which had been familiar to him from the distance, and whose bearers were now in personal contact with him? He was now one of them himself! He was a power in the State!

It is in the same way we would reduce to ordinary human motives the action of Hegel with reference to Schelling. There was a certain cunning, a certain calculation in the approaches of Hegel to Schelling at Jena, and in the relative position he assumed there. He undoubtedly stood as Schelling's adherent, as Schelling's second, and he undoubtedly knew that he had voluntarily given himself something of this air in order to obtain the benefit of Schelling's introduction and support. Nevertheless to Hegel, in the unclear consciousness to all such matters of a mere book-man—shall we say of a mere pedant?—the whole thing was very differently named. He longed keenly for a certain advantage, he knew that he could identify Schelling's philosophical platform *so far* with his own. *So far*, then, said innocent book-cunning to him, propitiate Schelling, and obtain this thing you so long for. This cunning, equally with the Berlin truckling, we believe to be a feature of the innocence and babiness incidental to a life of mere books, and the impressible, egoistic, inwardly-living men who usually adopt such. Cunning, too, it undoubtedly was, for, when Hegel appeared in

Jena, he had brought with him the Frankfort Sketch of his System; and that sketch proves him to have then penetrated to the ultimate generalisation of Kant —to *the* Begriff. The hysterical vehemence with which he called some one 'in so many words a liar,' who had given his relation to Schelling its coarsest name, throws light on Hegel's own feelings and on the theory of his general action now propounded. In the same way, the defence he sends up to the Prussian Government in reference to the Roman Catholic Priest who had taken umbrage at his language as regards the mouse that nibbled the *host*, illustrates his frame of mind as man of books that knew himself a functionary of the State and—on the right side.

It is always to be seen, however, that what Hegel did say as regards Schelling at Jena, did not compromise him as said, but as interpreted,—though, at the same time, it must be confessed that the unnecessary and cruel bitterness with which he afterwards threw off Schelling contrasts unfavourably with the calculated language of suppression and accommodation with which in the first instance he had taken him on. Similarly, the conservatism of his writings is a genuine result of his researches and convictions; as there it is without motive from considerations of the State; and he erred only in the too prominent pleasure with which he observed that it was capable of application to the interests of the day. Hegel manifests the same bookish simplicity of obsequiousness, together with a congruously innocent irrepressibleness of delight, in his relations with Göthe. When Göthe quotes him, he cannot help appending to the passage quoted a notice of the honour done it. In every correspondence that takes place between them, too,—seeing that

there is on one side a—certainly not larger—sort of German Voltaire, and on the other the deeper Aristotle of a modern Europe,—the superiority of Göthe both as given and taken, is surely of a veritably bookish innocence on the part of both. *Usage* of the world seems requisite to make a book-man know where his own honour lies; and certainly *roughing* of the world were not amiss where this same world's success may have stiffened a book-man into so much ridiculous starch.

It is in this manner we would attempt to scratch off some appearance of ambiguity from the action of Hegel; but, be all this as it may, we hold with perfect conviction, as against Haym, that not only is he honest in his moral, political, and religious position, but that that position is the ripest outcome of his reflexion and the special sphere of promise to us.

In the state of his belief, however, we cannot feel surprise at the sentence which Haym in the end has pronounced on Hegel. A few extracts will explain:—

> An intelligent contemporary of Hegel, a man of action, who, indeed, knew not how to speculate, but only so much the better how to judge, has compared the Hegelian Logic to the gardens of Semiramis; for in it abstract notions are artfully twisted into Arabesques: these notions are only, alas! without life and without root. With the practical philosophy of Hegel, it is not otherwise than with his metaphysic. Where he persuades himself that he is most and deepest in reality, he penetrates only superficially into its outside. His practical notions have also the withered look of plants that root only in the flat surface. In the entire depth of individual life, in the concrete inner, lies the mighty motive and matter of reality. Into this richest mine of living actuality the absolute idealism disdains to descend. It esteems subjectivity only so far as it has ceased to be subjectivity and clarified itself into the universal. Hence the superficialising of willing

into knowing; hence, moreover, the *disregard manifested for what is subjectively spiritual in general*, and with it for what is individual. (Pp. 374-5.) The Logic, briefly to sum it, is the sustained attempt to *intensify and concrete abstract thought as such by means of the fullness of the totality of the human spirit, and by means of the fullness of actuality.* Contradictory in itself as is this attempt, it must be designated from the stand-point of living spirituality, from the stand-point of religious and aesthetic conception, as a crude and tasteless barbarism; while from the stand-point of pure rationality, it must be designated as a confusion and corruption of the understanding, and of its conscience. . . . In a dogmatic and uncritical, in a confused and barbarous form, the Hegelian Logic has been the first fraudulent attempt at such a Gnosology and Philosophy. . . . That was, I repeat it, a rude and coarse manœuvre, resting on a palpable confusion and confounding of what is of the understanding, and of what is of the concrete spirit. (Pp. 324–27.)

This is plain. Whatever of external *form* may have been seen by Haym, it is evident that he has missed the *origin*, the *principle*, and the *matter*. Of these he has even said what must be held to be the exact reverse of the truth. It is impossible, indeed, to mistake the nature of this conclusion; it is impossible to fail to see that in Haym's opinion the Hegelian Logic is an utter and—what is worse—a fraudulent failure. Nevertheless, as usual, contradictions perpetually turn up in Haym, as regards both failure and fraudulence; and perhaps it is not impossible to adduce himself in confutation of himself. Some such, indeed, we have already seen; and, I dare say, the reader has been already puzzled to reconcile, on the one hand, that marvellous faculty of sober understanding, of which he has heard so much, with failure, and, on the other hand, that marvellous labour of research (for

what, if not to see the thing, the truth?) with fraudulence. The sort of double faculty into which this sober understanding converted itself by an alliance with a so-called aesthetic faculty, was so much of a contradiction, that we could only name it a *lusus naturæ*; but these contrasts seem even worse—seem capable of being considered only irreconcilable contradictories. When we hear, for example (p. 328–9), that 'the allmächtige (almighty) understanding which Hegel lets operate, saw, in most cases, into the actual foundation and genuine sense of the notions, and behind this understanding there stood a solid knowledge, pure feeling on the whole, a sober sense, and a modest phantasy,' we feel that we have just received an express receipt against all possibility of failure—and quite as much an express receipt against all possibility of fraudulence. Failure and fraudulence, it must be said, are entirely unintelligible side by side with such endowments. But Haym is consistent with himself throughout—consistent, that is, in his inconsistency; he does not content himself with this antithesis in general or in reference to Logic only,—he carries it with him throughout the whole of his Critique.

We have seen, for example, the unmitigated reprobation which he has heaped on the Rechtsphilosophie, yet we hear presently that even the Rechtsphilosophie 'posesses an imperishable *Kern* (core).' This too, he says, after having spoken thus: 'Only one step, indeed, but that a great one to this self-destruction, is the Hegelian Rechtsphilosophie: it essentially has the blame of the fate, that the highest science has sunk into contempt, and stands opposite the powers of the actual almost impotent!' It is in a similarly dubious mood that Haym finds himself in presence of the Re-

ligionsphilosophie; but as regards the Aesthetic and the Philosophy of History his satisfaction seems simple and unmixed. 'The German people,' he assures us, 'possesses in the former an aesthetic such as no other nation possesses;' and, as this aesthetic 'constitutes an atoning side-piece and a correction for the Religionsphilosophie, the Philosophy of History constitutes a no less important complement to the Rechtsphilosophie.' As regards the Philosophy of History, indeed, Haym expresses himself at great length, and always almost rapturously:—

> An energy of concrete vision (he says) accompanied here the energy of abstraction, which must have surprised him to whom it was unknown that even the Logic and Metaphysic had sprung from the same combination of faculties. The capacity of thinking himself into a peculiar spiritual life, and of bringing it, out from the firmly-seized centre, into an expanded panorama, was in youth scarcely so special to him as now when in age he made a second voyage of discovery into the wide realm of the life of peoples. With this talent for generalisation stood that of contraction into a single significant word, the talent of categorising and of bringing to a point, in the most admirable equipoise. Not but even the philosophy of history has a logical impress—[but]—these are thoughts of a metalline clang which cause us to forget the thin and soundless thoughts of metaphysic. (P. 451.)

It is impossible, we say, to believe in such a mangled operation of so supreme a faculty: it is difficult to believe in failure; it is impossible to believe in fraudulence. Compare thoughts of failure and fraudulence with the following:

After talk of 'the bitter and unsparing thoroughness of Hegel's criticism,' his 'hard and stinging words, &c.,' Haym goes on:—

> Here again comes to the surface that power of an all-gene-

ralising characterisation which had contracted the entire compass of German thought into a system of sharply-limited, surely-signalised categories; here again is manifest that talent of incisive critique—incisive into the flesh and life of the opponent—that skill to operate with knife and club at once. (P. 350.) Here, before all, Hegel appears in the entire mastery of his insight. Just as experienced age discourses of the worth of life, so discourses the philosopher of the worth of the intellectual and imaginative forms of his time. Completely in it, he stands at the same time triumphant over it; with every turn of opinion he is familiar; he sees through every stand-point, and against all of them he makes good, with a superior air of quietude and urbanity, a definitive conclusion of the deepest and most matured conviction. (P. 393.) And, what is peculiar, the Hegelian delivery was most helpless there where the ordinary talent of declamation is just most at home. In narrative he foundered in an almost comical fashion. Just in what was easiest he became dull and tiresome. Just in what was deepest, on the contrary, did he move with a grandly self-assured complacency and ease. Then, at last, 'the voice rose, the eye glanced sharp over the auditory, and the tide of speech forced its way with never-failing words to every height and depth of the soul.' And that, too, not merely when the question was of fleshless abstractions, but no less when he descended into the deeps of the material outward. Even to paint epochs, nations, events, individuals, succeeded with him perfectly. Even the most special singularities and depths of the character withdrew themselves not from this gift of statement. (P. 396.)

In quotation from Haym we are certainly peculiarly diffuse, but there is an irresistible pleasure in dwelling on his vivid and perfectly successful words at all times that he praises. Of this the reader may rest assured: however wide he may be when he censures, Haym is always absolutely home when he applauds. We may seem here to perpetrate the very contradiction on which it is our present business to animadvert; we

may seem here to expose ourselves to the retort: Are not the cases parallel?—if Haym is so very right when he commends, is it not a contradiction that he should be so very wrong when he blames?—in what respect is the contradiction greater to speak well of Hegel here, but to denounce him as a fraud and a failure there? To this it is easy to answer: It is no contradiction to say, that though Haym has hit the *form*, he has missed the *matter*; though he sees, that is, the *subjective power*, he is blind to the *objective product*, of Hegel. But it is a very great contradiction to allow a man all the attributes of success, and yet predicate failure of the very work special to these attributes; and it is a vastly greater contradiction to portray a man, as in the last extract, who shall display every sign and token by which the *true*, by which the *genuine* shall be known and discriminated, and yet this man shall produce, nevertheless, only what is artificial, only what is fraudulent. Here in a final extract surely this contradiction, as a general attribute of Haym, is palpable:—

Quite undeniably, Hegel is excelled in purity and acribie of thought by one of his fellow-labourers for the philosophic palm—Herbart. That the understanding and the actual, that pure thought and the other faculties cannot be alternately set equal in the manner of a *Quiproquo*, that between this setting equal the want of *a transcendental critique of the living spirit of man* remains to be filled up—this hint the disciples of Hegel may borrow from the doctrine of Herbart. Hegel, compared with Herbart, is an inexcusable confusionary. To the position of the former, that contradiction is the soul of things, Herbart—with his philosophy that is wholly of the understanding—opposes the principle, that only the method of the elimination of the contradiction leads to truth and the inner soul. But not only that in power of

abstraction, in penetration and tenacity of thought, Hegel may very well measure himself with his rival—his greatness just lies in his courage to bend and to break the law of the understanding. That means: he alone has had the great instinct to bring to a halt the spiritual powers which awoke in our nation through our classical poetry, to train them into the service of philosophy, and in this manner to let them sink into the scientific mind of the age for further purification. He was, perhaps, not altogether the greater thinker: he was certainly the greater philosopher. 'Give up all hope,' one must call to those who even yet endeavour to avenge the fate of the neglected Herbart: the Hegelian Logic is a living term in the history of the development of the German Spirit, and will continue to exercise its powerful influence even then when the name of a Hegelian shall have as completely ceased to be heard of as those of a Cartesian or a Wolffian. (Pp. 330-31.)

Here is what Hegel would name, after Kant, a complete nest of contradictions. Herbart undeniably excels Hegel 'in purity and acribie of thought;' yet, 'as regards power of abstraction, as well as penetration and tenacity of thought,' Hegel may 'very well measure himself with Herbart:' Hegel of the two is 'the greater philosopher,' if not quite 'the greater thinker.' Of any difference that may exist between a *thinker* and a *philosopher*, as in reference to two such men and so placed as Herbart and Hegel, we may give Haym the benefit; but what is 'power of abstraction,' if not 'purity of thought?'—and what is 'acribie,' if not 'penetration and tenacity of thought?' That is to say, in the same purity and acribie of thought in which Herbart 'quite undeniably' excels Hegel, Hegel, nevertheless, may very well measure himself with Herbart! It may be pleasant to ring changes on literary phrases, and no doubt it is agreeable to have the credit

of incisive antithesis; but really some consistency of *thought* were, with all that, much to be wished. We are given to understand that Haym's preference of Herbart to Hegel turns on this—that while, on one side, the work of the latter, his *Quiproquo* of faculties, is an untenable contradiction, the want so indicated has, on the other side, been filled up by the work of the former. Herbart shall be the express antidote, the exact counter-poison to Hegel. Or, the principle of Herbart shall be the honourable and true one of the elimination of contradiction, while that of Hegel shall be the sophistical and confusionary one of Contradiction itself. Yet—despite this, and despite all that superior purity and acribie of thought—it is the true and genuine Herbart that is to succumb, that is, like the damned of Dante's hell, to abandon all hope; and it is the sophistical and confusionary Hegel that shall be held the greater philosopher—it is this false man's influence that shall endure when, &c. &c. &c.! In presence of such things, one recurs involuntarily to the problem of a Providence. But, while we are lost in wonder at this extraordinary reversal of what is just and right—while we are engaged speculating on the possible secret reason of it,—we are suddenly quite dumbfounded to find that the precise source of the inferior virtue of Hegel is the precise source as well of his superior success, or that just for his righteousness' sake is it that Herbart has been condemned and consigned to the place without hope! The confounding of the understanding and the other faculties—*the Quiproquo*,—this it was that seemed to found the inferiority of Hegel to Herbart: but, if this were so, we find now that Hegel's greatness—his 'grandeur'—justs rests on the very 'courage with which he bent and broke the

law of the understanding!' To bend and to break the law of the understanding, it appears, is synonymous with bringing 'into harness to philosophy the spiritual powers which German classical poetry awoke, and so sinking these powers into the mind of the century for further purification!' Why, then, because of this bending and breaking, because of this *Quiproquo*, was Hegel denounced as a fraud and a failure; and why is a fraud and a failure to continue, all the same, to exercise on the German Spirit such a wonderful influence, when Cartesians, and Wolffians, and even Hegelians themselves, have so completely gone to the dogs, that their very names are lost?

It is quite possible—it is pretty certain, that Haym has here an idea in his head—an idea which we have already attempted to reduce to its true specification; this, namely—that we have to look for wisdom in the concrete, and not in abstractions. But surely the realisation of this idea does not necessitate a bending and breaking of the law of the understanding! Surely Haym—to whom, we have been led to suppose, understanding is the highest faculty—by whom, just because of his supreme understanding, now Herbart and now Hegel (did this latter bend and break, then, just what he was best in? or is it possible to exhaust the contradictions here?) was praised—must stand appalled before a bending and breaking of the law of the understanding! Surely he does not mean to say now that the Hegelian *Quiproquo* is the means of the realisation of his idea! Have we not been just given to understand that 'a transcendental critique of the living spirit of man' is what is wanted for this realisation; and has not this critique, as the work of Herbart, been opposed to the denounced antagonistic work of Hegel? How,

then, after all, is it Hegel's work that gets the credit of the realisation which Haym specially desires, and which, we were led to believe, he had actually found accomplished in Herbart—and in Herbart as exultingly opposed to Hegel? But, after all, did the German Poets do what Haym says here they did do? Has he not told us himself, that it was to shut out German Reals, that they brought Greek Ideals, and that so, consequently, their poetry was an 'artificial Idealistic and Typic?' Has he not told us also, that just such was the industry of Hegel; that he, too, with similar objects, and for similar purposes, addressed himself to Greece? What, then, are these specially German Powers that are, nevertheless, awakened, and that are to do so much? Here truly we have but confusion worse confounded! Here we have but a rankness of literary phrase that usurps the appearance of philosophical thought! That is it! Haym demonstrates to the quick what difference there is between the careless abundance of the *Littérateur*, and the anxious parsimony of the Philosopher. Had Haym been but as familiar with philosophical distinctions as he is with literary images! Images and again images, let them be brilliant—let them but dazzle, let them but interest, and be it as it may with the unity of thought! 'This,' says Lord Macaulay, 'may serve to show in how slovenly a way most people are content to think;' and it is certainly strange, 'the slovenly way' in which so brilliant a writer as Haym 'is content to think!'

Hellenic Cosmos, this is the conclusion to which we have been brought on Hegel; a Cosmos, of which we do not very well know what to think,—a Cosmos, of which we do not very well know what to think Haym himself thinks. To this conclusion we have been borne along on

an abounding and triumphant stream of the most brilliant and vivid rhetoric. Not but that we have become aware, from time to time, of how this stream has been indebted for its volume to contributions from without; for we have seen gliding into it the spirit of the Protestant present, facts of aesthetic perception, experiences of Hegel's own life, as Nürnberg and his vocation of teacher, influences of Fichte, of Schelling, criticisms of Kant, and just, in general, as Haym says himself, 'the plunder of historical and natural actuality.' So it is that we have been borne in triumph to this conclusion of a Hellenic *Cosmos* which has been—artificially manufactured and put together, violently, coarsely, crudely, barbarously, sophistically, fraudulently, by aid of an unheard-of confusion and contradiction of facts or faculties, or both! . . . . But in what condition are we when we arrive? With much complacency we had remarked in the preface the singularly satisfactory previous advantages and preliminary preparations possessed and made by Haym for the important task he undertook. We heard, well pleased, that 'he had repeatedly lectured at the University on the life, writings, and tenets of Hegel;' that 'he had attained to the possession of a material that compelled him to enter into the details of the tenets and individual development of Hegel;' that he had procured for study 'the whole abundant treasure of the manuscripts left by Hegel,' as well as other 'most desirable communications.' All this we heard with delight; and it was even with the intensest interest that we listened to the magnificent scheme he propounded—a scheme by which very plainly the Hegelian secret would be at length secured. How otherwise were it possible to feel when experiencing the promise of such words as these?—

I shall not supplant and subdue metaphysic by metaphysic, dialectic by dialectic—not system by system. Not this; but I shall give, at first at least and before all, an *objective history of this philosophy*. Very certainly I propose to expound it, very certainly to criticise it: – but the ground to both, I shall win in the *method of history* by *an analysis of its origin and development*. . . . Our purpose is to conduct the current of history into a well-enclosed and fast-shut edifice of thought. . . . In the place of reason there steps up the entire man, in the place of the universal the historically determined human being. It was by an abstract critique that Kant, it is by a concrete historical critique that we, with the resolution of a metaphysic abandoned by the belief of the world, seek to furnish a contribution to the purification of the science of philosophy. . . . Our business is the historical cognition of this system. Our business is to resolve it into its special genesis and into its historical value, to follow into its very structure the power which history has exercised over it, and to discover the threads to which the progressing time could attach itself, through which this time could get power over it. Our endeavour shall it be to restore it to the departed or half-departed life in which it had its foundation. Something analogous it shall be ours to effect in its regard to what for his part Hegel effected as regards the systems of his predecessors. He set them altogether in his own system. He threw over their dead bodies the mighty pyramid of his absolute idealism. It is fit that to this idealism no less an honour fall. In a wider, more imperishable tomb we shall set it—in the huge structure of eternal history we shall preserve it; a place and veritably a place of honour we shall assign it in the history of the development of the German Spirit. Unfiguratively to speak: we shall see this philosophy take birth and develope itself, we shall cooperate in its production. Step by step we shall follow the growth of its originator—shall bodily transport ourselves into the spiritual environment, into the historical relations out of which his mode of thought and his entire intellectual fabric rose—shall conceive to ourselves that the influences of deve-

lopment, the intellectual and the moral instigations which worked on Hegel, work also upon us, and shall then inquire whether we should have allowed ourselves to be determined by them, should have employed and formalised them, should have decided in their regard in the same manner as he. (Pp. 2, 11, 14, 8.)

Penetrated by the wonderful promise of these and other such words, we had listened breathlessly from the first, and never for a moment flagged. As for that, indeed, we were never allowed to flag: perpetual incitement, rather, even goaded us into a preternatural intensity of attention. 'Hold we a moment in!' 'Let us take it more objectively!' 'Turn we now the leaf, sharpen we our memory, strengthen we our attention!' 'We have reached the point to understand the *universal articulation* of the Hegelian system!' 'Learn we it at last in its entire peculiarity!' Goaded by such prickles, how otherwise can we arrive than breathless, haggard, worn, and—at such a finale—after such promises, through such torments of disappointment and contradiction, with the echoes of such cries of excitation still in our ears—at such a finale—Hellenic Cosmos, still Hellenic Cosmos, nothing but Hellenic Cosmos; how can we but stare and stagger, how can we but wanly, wildly smile and ask, as we choke, Hah! is that it?

Ah! we remember the pride with which we joined in the exclamation of Haym: 'No longer shall either the logical abstractness or the linguistic barbarism prove a hindrance to our intelligence!' But we are ashamed now. We heard, with a smile, Haym declare of Hegelian formulæ: 'No doubt that he who were so instructed, would find himself quite in the position of the student to whom Mephistopheles, disguised as Faust, holds the first prelection on the method of

academic study; no doubt that he would understand nothing of the whole of it, that these formulæ would appear to him very strange, and their identification very confused.' With a smile of superiority and pity we heard this, for we believed what Haym assured us in regard to our own knowledge—we believed him when he said: 'They (these formulæ) can no longer appear to us as a witch's rhyme; they will appear to us only as an abbreviation for a view of things which is now perfectly intelligible to us, not only in its meaning, but in its historical genesis and real value.' We smiled with pride, pity, and superiority *then*; but when we look back to the very occasion on which Haym made these declarations (p. 220), we find that, despite his protestations, he had given us no keys whatever, unless those very formulæ at which he pretended to smile—Substance is Subject, the Absolute is Spirit, the True is System;—we find this, and by as much as we were proud then, by so much are we dejected now. It can seem, indeed, as if Haym had been but chaffing us. Where is the 'view of things' which is to be 'perfectly intelligible to us?' Where is the Hegelian 'genesis' which we are supposed to be so much at home in? What is, then, that 'real value,' of which the knowledge is so coolly attributed to us? We know nothing of these things—with all the phrases we have learned.

The article on Hegel in the ninth edition (1844) of the Conversations-Lexicon contains the following:—

> The Hegelian System—through its connexion with the Identitätsphilosophie, through the original and (at cost of those logical laws on which all the sciences directly repose) dearly-bought novelty and seeming depth of its method, through the semblance of a universal knowledge that

equally embraced God and the World, through the imposing confidence with which it presented itself as the sole possessor of 'rational' thought, through the captivating symmetry of its arrangement, through the unremitting labour with which its originator, supported on a wealth of knowledge, continually applied himself to the following out of the fundamental thought of his system even into the most concrete phenomena, —finally, through the favour of external influences, which is not by any means to be considered of small account—had acquired a great and extensive influence. . . . He saw the necessity of a thinking development of what 'the intellectual intuition' meant. This necessity, taken together with—what is common to every Identitätssystem — the proposition of Spinoza, that the order and connexion of our thoughts is the same as the order and connexion of things,—may be regarded as the natural germ of the peculiar method which gives to the Hegelian system its specific character.

There is nothing here that can be considered widely different from the *external* view of Hegel, which is common and current everywhere. Now, while it is quite certain that Haym adds nothing *to* this, it is not quite certain that he either says all this, or says as well this. In particular, we may instance the proposition attributed to Spinoza, which is the same thing but in an infinitely more penetrating form than the 'Spirit' of Haym.

To what end, then, has Haym written?—to what end are his whole five hundred brilliant pages? Are these aught else than the glittering bubbles of mere literature, that, after the manner of bubbles, presently die out, as with a murmur at their own inanity? Is it that Haym, known to have been engaged on Hegel, felt himself obliged, for his own credit, to say something of Hegel? Is it that all this—all this brilliant rhetoric and all this perfect literature, all these adroit turns and all these expert antitheses, all that is unhesi-

tatingly arrogated, and all that is unhesitatingly denied, —is it that all this—and we have taken every care, at least, to examine and inquire,—is it that all this is but Haym's way of saying, the grapes are sour?

Of the three writers we have passed under review, Rosenkranz is the most at home with Hegel. He has evidently read him faithfully—most faithfully. Nor could he so read without attaining to a very satisfactory insight into the general spirit of his author. We have convinced ourselves, however, that he has remained outside—that he has missed the focus and centre of *the single secret.* Indeed, the failure of a spirit so vivid as Haym—coming *after* Rosenkranz—testifies to the failure of the latter as well. If these three have failed, then, we may rest assured that no other has succeeded; for—so far as general evidence of books can be depended on—these three, of all who have approached the subject, are the latest and the best, and ought to be amply representative of whatever has preceded them. The general failure of Germany and of Europe in this matter must seem extraordinary; but when we think of the failure of a man so peculiarly endowed and so peculiarly placed as Schelling, we are left but small room for wonder at the failure of the rest. Schelling opined that the system was but 'Wolffianism,' and that Hegel himself was but the 'purest exemplar of inner and outer *Prosa.*' We take leave to think differently. Only a *maker*, only a faculty of the intensest poesy could move as Hegel moved. It is possible that what the imagination of a Homer or of a Shakspeare saw—compared with what the imagination of Hegel saw—will yet show but as a school-

boy's pictures on a schoolboy's books. Everything in existence—were it but a dry wall or a morsel of soap, a grain of sand, a drop of water, or the twig of a plant—is valid and valuable only by the amount of thought it contains; and the imagination of Hegel holds in solution the deepest, the purest, the heaviest thought of any imagination that ever lived.

Yet to Haym this very thought has been 'more than refuted: it has been judged!' At the same time, it is declared—not quite without the usual contradiction—that 'this one great house has *only* failed *because* this whole branch of business lies on the ground;' 'we find ourselves at this moment in a great and almost universal shipwreck of the spirit, and of faith in spirit at all.' 'Of pretenders to the empty throne, it is true, there is no want; we hear now this one and now that one wagered on as the philosopher of the future: now at last, timidly hope the disciples of Herbart, is the time come when posterity will do their master a tardy justice; now many for the first time hear of the Schopenhauerian philosophy, &c. &c. The truth is—just this crowding up, this obtruding and intruding of the *Dii minorum gentium* is the proof of what we say—the truth is, that the realm of philosophy is in a state of *complete masterlessness*, in a state of break-up and demise.' Haym then tells us that the most rigid Hegelians themselves admit this; that, with a timidity unlike their ancient assurance, they only plead now, 'Hegel was "still not unfruitful" for the development of philosophy;' and that they do 'not trust themselves to decide whether the Hegelian system has yet found "its Reinhold and Beck" or not.' Haym also asks, as if with the hope of cure for these things, 'what if science now should have only to seek a broader and surer

basis—for what Kant did?'* Now, we do not dispute what is so vividly described here—only we should prefer to say that, instead of Hegel having failed because philosophy is in ruins, it is philosophy that is in ruins because Hegel (*who just sought said basis*) has failed —*to be understood*! Hence the want of successors—hence the shipwreck of philosophy—hence the judgment on Hegel himself—hence the necessity of a return to Kant—hence the inquiry after a Beck and a Reinhold, who were still to seek, perhaps, not only for Hegel, but *even* for Kant!†

* Haym, pp. 6, 5, 3, 4, 5, 13.

† This is said, however, if with direct and sufficient knowledge of Reinhold, only with indirect and insufficient knowledge of Beck.

VII.

CONCLUSION: LAST WORD ON "THE SECRET," ETC.

In the course of his inquest, it probably occurred ('a light went up') to Hegel, that the one common object of the search of all of them—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—was *the concrete notion*. Kant named what he wanted, an *à priori synthetic judgment*, which amounts to a principle the *sameness* of which was already *multiple*, and this as determined independently of all experience by pure reason, or, what is the same thing, as self-determined. Fichte aimed at precisely the same thing in his synthesis, which was to be the *one* of thesis and antithesis, the last, too, being a process as spontaneous, *à priori*, and necessary, as the second. Schelling, again, gave direct name to the operations of both Kant and Fichte, when he spoke of the identity of identity and non-identity. Lastly, Hegel, while he felt that what he himself had been striving after was no less and no other, perceived that this very principle was the principle as well of the concrete and the actual. There *was* this actual world; consequently, *the First* had been no bare identity, no abstract identity: it must have at once and from the beginning contained difference,—it must have been from the very outset a concrete, i.e. a *one* at once of identity and difference. Nay, such was the actual constitution and nature of every single entity in this

universe. How did I know that door, this window, or that shutter? The *difference* of each was simply the *identity* of each: what each was for-other, that *it* was as reflected into self, or each was only and nothing but its for-other reflected into its in-itself, its difference reflected into its identity, or (as even ancient logic holds, in its way, of *definition*—Bestimmung) its *Differentia* reflected into its *Genus*. This was the common character of the whole world, and of every denizen in the world. Again, and, as it were, on another side, to *perceive* was to *think*, and to think was to *identify difference*.

There is a vast amount of material which can be all brought under this one point of view. A *summum genus*, for example, is a necessity of thought; but the true name and nature of a *summum genus* were only identity. That *summum genus*, too, if it were the *summum genus* of this actually varied universe, must have been not more the primitive and original identity than the primitive and original difference: in other words, that *summum genus* must have already held within it also the *summa differentia*. A union of opposites, then, was thus the one concrete fact; and it was no wonder that—as principle of explanation—it had been the one abstract quest of Kant and the rest. It was thus seen that what we ought to look for was not, as in common thought, abstract identity, but pure negativity; for a one that is through opposites, or an identity that is supported on *differents*, that lives, that *is* through these, can be named no otherwise. What is pointed at, in fact, is but the *concrete reciprocity of a disjunctive sphere*, where each is no less itself than it is the other. Nay, the reciprocity is such, that you cannot *signalise* the one without *implicating* the other:

the current forward is equally the current backward. You look before to attraction; but could you look behind, you would equally see repulsion: if the *one moment* of the *antithesis* is *explicit*, the *other of the two* is always also at the same time correspondingly *implicit*. Reciprocity has been the bottom consideration of all modern philosophy, and it is remarkable that in just such reciprocity it began. Hume closed his inquiry by concluding Causality not to be necessary because it was matter of fact; and Kant, with a sort of reciprocating reversal, opened his by inferring Causality not to be matter of fact because it was necessary.

This perception on the part of Kant led to the important conclusion, that there must be *inferences* in us quite *à priori* and independent of any reference whatever to sensible facts. This single thought of Kant it was that Hegel gazed into its ultimate abstraction, or into its ultimate life,—*the concrete notion*, the primitive and original radical, the Roc's egg of the whole huge universe. Study of Kant, too, enabled Hegel to see that the intent or ingest of this notion was not confined to the intellect proper, but repeated itself in perception as well; for an act of perception was to Kant this, that only by the universal is the particular converted into the singular. This singular, further, a phenomenon to Kant as σύνολον of variety of unknown thing from without and of unity of known categorical universal from within (*affection* brought by *function* into focus), became a noumenon to Hegel, the actually existent concrete, the only reality and truth—this, by abstracting from any and every subject, as well as by regarding the universal and particular as only the abstract moments of the single singular. To find the primordial form of this singular, then, and let it by means of the

nisus of its own life develope, through the fullness of all and every, into the one spirit that alone is—this was to find also the system of Hegel.

The ultimate of Hegel, then, is the notion as notion. Let us suppose a spore, a germ, and call it the notion. Now, this spore has its own life; there are three glances in it, each of which is the spore itself and the whole spore. Such is the nature of notional universality, particularity, and singularity. They are necessary mutual complements, and cannot be disunited —unless by the fiction of abstraction. They are the constituent reciprocals of a disjunctive sphere: they are *the* constituent reciprocals of *the* disjunctive sphere; *it* is the unity, the all, the absolute; *they* are *its*—(its own proper inalienable, inherent)—manifold, plurality, variety, or phenomenal show of attributes. *It* is the one Identity; *they* are the one Difference: and identity and difference are the moments of the single concrete, or they are universality and particularity in the single singular. The secret of the universe is thought, the spirit of thought, whose own life is the play of what is, and that which is, is thought in its own freedom, which at the same time also is its own necessity. The absolute is the vibration of a mathematical point, the tinted tremble of a single eye, infinitesimally infinite, punctually one, whose own tremble is its own object, and its own life, and its own self.

This is what it is to be serious with idealism. If God is a Spirit and thinks, if God created the universe *on* thought—: in other words, if thought is what is, then all is reducible to thought, and logic is the name of the whole. If the word 'logic' offend, let us say λόγος; but let us admire *then* our own resultant satisfaction! The three—absolute reciprocals, that is,—

may be named Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason: with these we can shadow out the whole history of man, and the whole life of the individual.—Idealism is this: the Inhalt of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason is identical with these its Forms; Perception is identical with Intellect; Affection is identical with Function; Object with Subject. What is, is the '*intuitus originarius*,' the anschauender Verstand, the one absolute Spirit—God.

How very little is required to convert the Vorstellung of Kant into the Vorstellung of Hegel, we may see from these words of the former :—

> The transcendental hypothesis, that all life is properly only *intelligible*, nowise subject to the vicissitudes of time, and that neither is there a beginning through birth nor an end through death: that this life is nothing but a mere phænomenal show, i.e., a sensuous Vorstellung of the pure spiritual life, and the entire world of sense a mere picture which hangs before our present mode of cognition, and, like a dream, has no objective reality in itself: that, did we see things and ourselves as they are, we should find ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, with which world our only true union had begun neither through birth nor would cease with the death of the body (as mere phænomenal appearances), &c. (Krit. of P. R., Discipline of P. R., third section, last paragraph but two.)

That we should be able to say the same thing in such a variety of ways, is itself a proof of the truth of the principle. The reflexion of difference into identity it was, however, that Hegel probably kept in his eye when he described his dialectic in those words about each whole passing into its own opposite, which have been so often repeated without intelligence, and with the conviction at bottom that they concerned only an idle receipt, a something factitious that merely

would be. Collation with the various other points of view which have been just indicated will supply a correction to this conviction, however. Hegel, in short, perceiving that the reflexion of difference into identity was the one concrete principle in the world of sense as in the world of thought, must have at once seen that he had caught the principle of truth—the principle which would be at once beginning, middle, and end. There was progress in the very thing itself: if difference could be reflected into identity, difference might also be separated from identity; and was not that the very definition of progress? The following out of such considerations could only lead to the development of Hegel's necessary chain of units, which were, at the same time, an all. A beginning would not be difficult to find; for a beginning would require simply to be as a beginning is in thought, thought being all. We have no admissions of Hegel's actual procedure; we have this latter expressed in abstract results only. We have seen for ourselves, however, that a beginning is impossible to any outward principle. Any outward principle would at once presuppose and leave unexplained both space and time. A *single* outward principle changing itself into thought, changing itself into new kinds, changing itself even into new dimensions—changing itself at all—is inconceivable. A single outward unit that had so changed itself into this universe, would demonstrate itself to have held even at the first this universe potentially or virtually within it. This is idealism, but an imperfect idealism, time and space being left on the outside, absolutely unyielding to every attempt to pack them in. A beginning externally is absolutely impossible. The materialist, it is true, may admit this; but probably he will admit that

a beginning must be thought. If he admit this, he will now admit also, that that beginning must be thought in an internal principle. Should he deny, however, that a beginning *must* be thought, he will admit that it certainly very often *is* thought, and always, at all events, that it *may* be thought. But if a beginning *may* be thought, it *must* be thought only so and so. That is, as Hegel shows, the beginning must be both absolutely *First* and absolutely *Incompound*. Now, only pure Being corresponds to that description, and this is all that Hegel requires: from this, by process of simple watching, the whole universe ascends; into this, too, it rounds, taking up into itself the inconceivable *Firstness* and *Incompoundness*; for if a Beginning *must* be absolutely First and absolutely Incompound, just as much it *can* be neither. That what is, is the concrete notion, explains this. We have seen, also, many other considerations, as Identity, the Genus Summum, the Universal, &c. &c., which could only lead to the same result.

Being passes into its opposite, Non-being; and Non-being returning to Being passes into its higher opposite, Becoming. We have already seen this process at some length. By external reflexion of the moments into each other (as of Nichts into Seyn to the development of Werden), it has already appeared to us so easy to bring about the whole Hegelian series, that a danger manifested itself, on the one hand, of the whole business being considered phantasy and delusion, and, on the other, of our being exposed to an inundation of similar attempts, with endless modifications on the part of others. It must be said, however, that Hegel, for his part, has done his best to obtain only solid results. To this end, he has carried into each element the move-

ment of the notion *internally*, and has not contented himself with the mere external reflexion of Nichts into Seyn, &c., or of Seyn into Nichts, &c. (for the process has always evidently the two directions to the evolution of the two new moments),—but has endeavoured, on this principle, to develope and demonstrate the whole concrete matter of logic, metaphysic, &c. Nor is this a light labour. There is probably nothing in this world more oppressively difficult than to attempt to follow Hegel into the inner of his transitions; as, for example, in Measure, or Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity, &c. In these Hegel shows to us, like a man with an enormous load on his head, who endeavours laboriously, with many an ineffectual effort, many a sway, now to, now from, to turn into such a direction (that of the notion) as would immediately lighten his burthen into a new form. Nor can we enter with him into the same element without feeling the same weight imposed on us—to the utter crushing generally of our weaker powers. Hegel has not been crushed, however, but has veritably demonstrated the matter of metaphysic, logic, &c., in such perfection as far surpasses the very happiest attempts of all his predecessors. Nor is this a weak tribute to the notion: for to the notion Hegel seeks ever to be true.

Another aspect besides those of transition into opposites, reflexion of moments mutually, successive functions of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, &c., on which the principle of the method may be regarded, is this: Whenever there has been coalescence to a new element, the last moments may be re-extricated from this element, *but in the form of this element*, that is, as the new moments to a new and further coalescence. The moments, in short, always proceed in

pairs, and in pairs that gradually ascend. Consider such sequences as these: Being, Nothing; Reality, Negation; Something, Other; One, Many; Attraction, Repulsion; Continuity, Discretion; Extension, Intension; Identity, Difference; Positive, Negative; Matter, Form; Whole, Parts; Force, Manifestation; Inner, Outer; Substance, Accident; Cause, Effect; Action, Reaction, &c. Does not one see an extraordinary tautology here? To limit ourselves to the three last pairs, does it not give to think that Substance and Accident are the same matter as Cause and Effect, and that, in Reciprocity, what was previously Cause and Effect is now alternately both Cause and Effect? Are we not made to see an ascending tautology here? Nor is it very different in other spheres. These pairs will be readily seen also always to constitute what Hegel calls *the Antithesis*: the successive *ones* of their union also will be as readily seen to prove a gradually ascending series till final eclipse in the Absolute Spirit.

It is not to be pretended that Hegel has always been successful, or that what he has done, like everything else that holds of time, is not to be—partly by rejection, partly by absorption—eventually superseded. The work was too prodigious for that, the fever of the zymosis of the day much too ardent. Indeed, the instrument he has in hand brings with it its own temptations to merely arbitrary products, and the bare show of a consistent and continuous rationale: that is to say, there is a duplicity in the notion itself which steads you easily whether you would distinguish into antithesis or unite to harmony. This is a dangerous power for the architect of a system to possess: whether an impassable chasm yawn in the Object, or an exhausted faculty frustrate the Subject, the fascination of the

ready expedient is equally irresistible. We must lay our account, then, with finding inequalities in Hegel—even crudities, it may be, and things that revolt. Where such side of Hegel comes most prominently to the surface is, as the nature of the element would alone lead us to expect, in the Philosophy of Nature. Here the object of Hegel is to lead the notion into the reports of nature which the concrete sciences extend; and the *inner* principle finds, as Hegel takes care to make us see, the *outer* element *only naturally* stiff and refractory. Nevertheless, we have in appearance one unbroken chain from the abstractest natural object—space, through time, motion, matter, the laws of matter, light, heat, electricity, chemistry, geology, &c., up to the concretest natural object, the animal, and the last manifestation of the animal, death; and, no doubt, glances of the most penetrating character have been here thrown by Hegel on many of the hardest and most important matters. Still at times the notion *shows through* these matters; it is as a frame, a lay-figure, externally in their midst; they fall off from it like clothes that are not its own and will not fit. It is dangerous to read here, if one would preserve one's respect for Hegel. Rejection is at times so unexceptive, and in an element of such *feeling*, that all the essential greatness of the man has disappeared for the time, as it were, behind a dwarf. It is to be said, however, that the newer and lighter the look at these points, the more instantaneous and unhesitating is our sentence. Consideration dulls our disapproval, and we retire at last, perhaps, all but won over to that in regard to which we had laughed our scornfullest. At all events, one glance to the 'Science of Logic' or the 'Philosophy of Spirit,' and our balance is restored;—one glance to these—one

glance (say) to that discussion of what are called the fundamental laws of thought under Identity, Difference, Ground, &c., for which Hegel has in this country been so ignorantly decried, and this same Hegel is once again to us the absolute master of thought. It is but fair, however, that the reader should have a sample of Hegel on this side also, and be able here as well to judge for himself. In § 369 of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel thus delivers himself in regard to the relation of sex :—

> The first sundering of the Genus into Species, and the further determination of these into the immediate exclusive Being-for-self of the Singular, is only a negative and hostile relation as regards others. But the Genus is just as essentially affirmative reference of the Singular to itself in it; so that it (the Singular), in that it is exclusive, an Individual as against other such, continues itself into this *other*, and has the sentiment of itself in this *other*. This relation is *process* —a process which begins with a *want*, inasmuch as the Individual is as *Singular* not adequate to the immanent Genus, and is at the same time in one unity the identical reference of the Genus to itself: the individual has thus the the *co-sentiment* of this want. The Genus is in it, therefore, as hostility to the inadequacy of its actuality in the Singular, the impulse to obtain in the other of its Genus its feeling of self, to integrate itself through this union (one-ing) with it, and through this interposition of means to shut together the Genus with itself and bring it into Existence—Generation.

There are those who will burst into a horse-laugh here, and the jeering exclamation, 'And so Hegel has made the woman!' and the whole thing will probably appear, indeed, to most readers arbitrary and a fancy merely. Remarking only on a word or two, we shall just leave it, however, as it is, for consideration. Genus and Generation convey, perhaps, tolerably the assonance

of Gattung and Begattung, which the reader is not to neglect. Similarly, the inner connexions of etymological meaning in the words Process, Bedürfniss, Einzelnes, are to be observed: the singular is but one, a want, and so process follows. Gefühl, *co-sentiment* or *consent* (or say, on the model of *conscience*, *consentience*), deserves particular remark, too. Hegel considers the Ge, which has the force of together. There is a communion, a together of two, and so the possibility of Spannung, *divarication*, *resistance*, here translated *hostility*. This disunion in the communion is the Trieb, the spring, the motive, the *drive* to regain *self-consent*, *self-communion*; and so on,—Hegel's special inner thoughts being guessed from the very particles he uses.

The sentences in Hegel immediately preceding the above will, perhaps, bring us a satisfaction just in proportion to our dissatisfaction with this latter. Somewhat eliminating the technicality of the notion, they run thus:—

Life is subjected to the complicated conditions and circumstances of external nature, and may exhibit itself in the poorest forms. The *fruitfulness* of the earth lets life *for every sake* and in all ways strike out everywhere. The animal world can, almost even less than the other spheres of nature, exhibit a rational system of organisation independent within itself, hold fast ideal *forms*, and preserve these from the imperfection and intermixture of conditions, in consequence of transitions, interferences, and confusions. Thus not only is the development of individuals subjected to external contingencies, not only is the perfected animal (and man the most) exposed to monstrosities, but even the genera are wholly a prize to the changes of the external universal life of nature, the vicissitude of which the life of the animal undergoes also, and is consequently only an alternation of

health and disease. The *entourage* of external contingency contains almost only what is alien; it exercises a perpetual violence and threat of dangers on the animal's feeling, which is an *insecure*, *anxious*, and *unhappy* one.

This *seems* much more in the way of the materialist than of the idealist. Allenthalben has been translated *for every sake*, as the italics seemed to demand, but *everywhere* has been added. Of disease Hegel speaks thus :—

The organism finds itself in a state of *disease*, so far as one of its systems or organs in conflict with an inorganic potence becomes *excited* (irritated), sets itself apart by itself, and persists in its special action against the action of the whole, whose fluency and all-pervading process is thus obstructed. The peculiar phænomenon of disease therefore is, that the identity of the entire organic process presents itself as *successive* passage of the vital movement through its several moments, Sensibility, Irritability, and Reproduction—i.e., as *fever*, which, however, as process of the *whole* against the *individualised* action is just as much the effort and the commencement of *cure*. The curative agent rouses the organism to eliminate the *special* irritation, in which the formal activity of the *whole* is fixed, and replace *in* the whole the fluency of the particular organ or system. The curative agent produces this effect by being itself an irritative, but one difficult to assimilate and overcome, so that an external somewhat is offered to the organism against which it is necessitated to exert its force. Directing itself against what is external, it steps out of the limitation in which it was imprisoned, and with which it had become identical, but against which it could not react so far as it was not as object to it. (Encyc. §§ 371–3.)

Now, such speculation as this, in connexion with the pretensions of *the Notion*, gives pause. We feel disposed to ask, what is meant by 'conflict,' 'potence,' 'external irritative,' &c., and, in fine, has not Hegel

here just committed himself to the carriage of that very Vorstellung which he would not hesitate sarcastically to blow to pieces from beneath the sitting of everybody else? The organism is a *transparent* breadth composed of myriads of ants in regular connexion and in regularly consecutive movement. An individual ant is suddenly thrown *across* to the production of an *opaque* spot, the opacity of which rapidly spreads and thickens under the misfortunes of the succeeding ants who stumble over the begun obstruction. The whole power of the general organism is now centred in that one spot. Present now a Spanish fly, or other hostile insect, at the periphery; instantly the ants flee asunder from the opaque spot, each to its post, to defend the common whole,—with restoration of transparency as the result! We have thus a picture; but have we more than that? Hegel, however, might conceivably say here, it is just the Vorstellung that is in place in Nature, the externalisation of the *Begriff* in the externalisation of the *Idee*. And it is to be admitted that the greatest philosophers, as Plato and Leibnitz, have made advances by just such expedients. Nay, the progress of those who are named scientific men *par excellence*, Bacon, Newton, Berzelius, &c. &c., is not differently conditioned. The most respected theories in all branches of science are at this very moment only such Vorstellungen: *irritatives*, *conflicts*, *potences*, are by no means confined to Hegel. It will reward the student's trouble, if he but consider the most current speculations in the most current text-books of the day. Should he regard them as pictures and question them as such, he will astonish himself with his own results. On the whole, then, perhaps we may conclude with Hegel himself here:—

However general, and therefore in comparison with the so multifarious phænomena of disease insufficient, the above determinations may be, nevertheless it is only the firm *fundamen* of the Notion which is capable as well of penetrating and pervading the particular details as of rendering perfectly intelligible that which, whether as regards the phænomena of disease or the principle of cure, appears to Custom sunk in the externalities of the Specific, as extravagant and bizarre.

It is but fair on our part to add also, that in Hegel himself there is neither the *ant* nor the *fly*.

Hegel, then, on the whole, must be considered quite as eligible for dispensation with respect to errors of detail as anybody else; and it is on his great principles that, in the end, his merits or demerits must rest. Now, for these surely much can be said. At *the* one great principle itself, the Notion, on the supposition of its being fanciful, we may shake our heads; we may be allowed to express ourselves equally doubtfully as regards the *method*, which may appear to us a mere mechanical process of the easiest and at the same time the most fallacious nature: for what difficulty, or what likelihood of soundness, can there be in the reflecting of Nothing into Being to the production of Becoming, of Negation into Reality to the production of Something, of Quantity into Quality to the production of Measure, &c. &c.? But how are we to account for the results? It may appear to us that we but alternately intricate and extricate Affirmation and Negation from the very Alpha to the very Omega of the System; but how is it that this gradual rise of categories takes place—categories* which strike down

* Hegel says (Logic, vol. ii. sect. 1, chap. ii. Remark), '*Category*, according to its etymology and the definition of Aristotle, is what is said, maintained, of the Beënt' (or of a Beënt — of that which *is*, or of anything that *is*).

into the very heart of the actual? Is not the very conception of the examination of the categories as such, apart and by themselves, a master-stroke? We go on arguing and reasoning with each other, we settle Politics, Religion, Philosophy, Science, House-affairs, and all through use of certain distinctions which pass current with us like pounds, shillings, pence,—Being, Becoming, Finite, Infinite, Essence, Appearance, Identity, Difference, Inner, Outer, Positive, Negative, Cause, Effect, Substance, Accident, &c. &c.,—but we have never turned upon these things themselves to ask the warrant and nature of their validity. To use them, nevertheless, without this inquest is not to be free, but bound—is to drive about an absolute log, and absolutely at their mercy. This, then, must be granted as a great merit in Hegel, that he has taken these things up, and subjected them to analysis in their abstract and veritable selves. But the categories are not the only Hegelian results; there are others, and quite as striking. On many concrete interests Hegel is supposed to have thrown some very extraordinary and yet very acceptable lights. His Philosophy of History, his Philosophy of Religion, his Philosophy of Politics (Recht), his Aesthetic, have given to think to the very deepest and severest thinkers. Take the Aesthetic alone (and Franz and Hillert give enough of it to judge by), it is a work absolutely unexampled, whether we consider the exhaustive completeness and captivating felicity of the divisions and classifications, or the unerring truth of the criticism in detail—as regards matter too,—Art, Poetry and General Literature—*in* which we have no reason to suppose that Hegel had ever particularly dwelt, and *for* which we have no reason to suppose that he was ever particularly called.

Now, how is this?—whence is this immense, extraordinary, and unexpected success? The longer we inquire and the deeper we look, the more shall we be inclined to answer—the Notion, all comes from the Notion, the Notion does all. Just in proportion to the reality of a man's piety, too, is his insight into the penetrating truth of Hegel's statement of the act of devotion, of inward religious experiences. Yet in the very centre of this statement—the spirit that produced the matter—*the* notion can with a scratch be demonstrated to lie at full length. This, then, is very striking, that Hegel should have produced such important results and in such peculiar spheres, and all in consequence of utter and unswerving fidelity to his one single principle—the Notion. There cannot be a doubt of it, the most momentous questions that have interested humanity since the first accents of recorded time, all lie in the pages of Hegel in ultimate discussion; and this ultimate discussion has been attained only through the Notion. Special proof as regards these results were out of place here; but the reader, who is now better prepared, might like to see some expressions of Hegel's own in regard to the Notion, which shall extend evidence in favour of what has been said of it in these pages. As remarked, now that *the* Notion has been held up to view, almost every page will offer illustrations in place (as shown, indeed, by these very last quotations in regard to sex, disease, &c.), but it may be worth while to adduce one or two of a more striking character.

Thought has its *Forms Proper*, the Universal of which Forms is the Notion. . . . From the *Notion* in the speculative sense, what has been usually named Notion is to be distinguished. (Encyc. § 9.)

In this field of Mutation and Contingency, not the *Notion*,

but only *Grounds* (or Reasons) can be made available. (Encyc. § 16.)

The One Notion is in all and everything the *Substantial*. (Encyc. § 114.)

The Forms of Logic are, as Forms of the Notion, the *living Spirit of the Actual*. (Encyc. § 162.)

As the Spirit is not only infinitely richer than Nature, but as moreover the *absolute unity of the Contrapositive* in the *Notion* constitutes its essential being, it shows in its Manifestation and Reference to Externality the Contradiction in its ultimate determinateness. (Logic, iii. p. 264.)

The Notion is the Eternal, the Beënt in and for itself, just because it is not the *abstract* but the *concrete* Unity—not determinedness abstractly referent of self to self, but the Unity *of itself and of its other*; into which other, therefore, it cannot pass over as if it altered itself in it, just because it itself is the other, the determinedness (specific peculiarity and characterisedness); and in this passing over, consequently, it only comes to its own self. (Lc. iii. p. 268.)

Das Lebendigste, Beweglichste, nur im *Beziehen Begriffene*—The Livingest, Movingest, what is *comprehended* only in the *be-referring* or *co-referring*. (Lc. i. p. 248.)

It is particularly the *relation of potence or power* which has been applied more recently to the *moments* of the Notion: the Notion in its immediacy was named the *First* potence; in its Otherwiseness or the Difference, the existential thereness (Daseyn) of its moments, the Second, and in its return into self, or as Totality, the Third potence. (Lc. i. p. 393.)

The Notion which Kant has set up in the *à priori synthetic judgments*,—the notion of an *Interceived* (a Dis-tinguished, a Dif-ferenced) that even so is *Inseparable* (incapable of disunion), an Identicality that is in itself (as such) *unseparated Dif-ference*—belongs to what is great and imperishable in his philosophy. This Notion, AS IT IS THE NOTION ITSELF AND EVERYTHING *IN ITSELF* IS THE NOTION, is indeed equally present in *Perception*. (Lc. i. p. 241–2.)

Although Kant made the deep observation that concerns à priori *synthetic* axioms, and recognised the unity of self-

consciousness as their root—recognised, that is, the Identity of the Notion with itself—he took, nevertheless, the *particularised* interdependence (the matter of detail), the relational notions and synthetic axioms themselves, *out of formal Logic* as *given;* the Deduction of these should of necessity have been the demonstration of the transition of said simple unity of self-consciousness into these its characterising forms and dif-ferences; but the exposition of this truly synthetic Progress, of the Notion engaged in production of its own self, Kant has omitted to supply. (Lc. iii. p. 282.)

Science Proper can organise itself only through the own life of the Notion; in such science the peculiar principle, which a schema merely sticks on outwardly, is the self-actuating soul of the full-filled *Intent.* (Phaenom. p. 40.)

After that the Kantian *Triplicity*—only re-discovered by instinct, yet dead, yet uncomprehended—has been raised to its absolute import, and so, consequently, the true Form has been set up in its true Matter as well, and there has arisen the Notion of Science, &c. (Phaenom. p. 37.)

These quotations will make the Hegelian Notion, and all that it imports, so obvious,—as it were, so self-evident,—that little merit will seem to be left for anyone who shall have signalised this. It is quite certain, however, that it was not from them that the 'light' of the Notion 'went up' to ourselves: before that light went up, they were all of them read repeatedly, but till that light went up they all of them remained unyieldingly dark. If we are right, too, though read repeatedly in all probability, they yet remain dark to the most competent Germans themselves. Again, it is to be considered that they lie here in one focus; whereas in Hegel they lie widely apart from each other, scattered over hundreds of pages. Nor is it to be less considered that, while here they are *direct* and *express*, they occur in Hegel only *indirectly*, *parenthetically*, *accidentally*.—We add a few more such passages which may illustrate special points in the one operation, nameable *expo-*

sition of the Notion; and we feel assured that a perusal (to which the reader who has followed us with a knowledge of German will now find himself—much to his delight, probably—perfectly competent) of 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen' at the beginning, and of 'Die absolute Idee' at the end of the third volume of the Logic, will complete conviction, and definitively clinch all that we have in this respect anywhere said.

To be held fast in *finite* categories, i.e., in the yet unresolved Antithesis. (Encyc. § 27.)

The Antithesis expressed in *immediacy* as Being and Nothing. (Encyc. § 87.)

The *second* forms constitute a sphere in its *Difference*. (Encyc. § 85.)

The Negative, the Peculiarised, the Relation, the Judgment, and all the other determinations which fall under the *second* moment. (Lc. iii. p. 342.)

That the Totality be *set*, to this there belongs the *double* transition, not only that of the one character into its other, but equally the transition of this other, its return, into the First . . . this Remark on the necessity of the *double* transition is of great importance for the whole of the scientific method. (Lc. i. p. 392.)

It is one of the most important facts to know and hold fast, this nature of the reflexional forms considered, that their truth consists only in their reference to one another, and that each, consequently, contains the other in its own very notion; without this knowledge there is properly possible no step in Philosophy. (Lc. ii. p. 66.)

The Difference (Unterschied) is the Whole and its own *moment*; as the Identity is equally its Whole and its moment. This is to be regarded as the essential nature of Reflexion, and as *determinate primitive Ground of all Activity and Self-movement*. Difference, like Identity, [these] make themselves Moment or *Setness* (Gesetztseyn, ostensive expression), because as Reflexion they are the negative reference to themselves. (Lc. ii. pp. 38–9.)

Kant has applied the infinitely important form of Triplicity, however much it has manifested itself with him only first of all as a *formell* spark of light, not to the Genera of his Categories (Quantity, Quality, &c.), as also this name only to their Species: he has, therefore, not been able to get at the Third to Quality and Quantity [Measure]. (Lc. i. p. 396.)

In general, every Real is in its beginning an only immediate Identity (and Identity = Ansichseyn, Being-in-self, Lc. ii. p. 202); for in its beginning it has not yet opposed and developed the moments, on one side not yet *inneral* itself (remembered itself) out of externality, on the other side through its activity not yet *uttered* (outered, *alien*ated) and produced itself out of internality; it is therefore only the Inner as *Determinateness* counter the Outer, and only the Outer as *Determinateness* counter the Inner. It is thus partly *only* an immediate Being; partly, so far as it is equally the Negativity which is to become the activity of the development, it is as much essentially *only* an Inner. In every natural, scientific, and spiritual development in general this presents itself, and this is essentially to be recognised, that the First, in that Something is only first of all *inwardly* or in its *notion*, is just for this reason only its own immediate, passive There-being (Daseyn, quasi existential *breadth*, existential Out-being). So the Relation here is only the Relation *an sich* (*in itself*), its notion, or only *inwardly*. But on this account again it is *only* the *external*, immediate Relation, &c. (Lc. ii. p. 181.)

Justification and support will be found in these extracts for many decisions in regard to the *moments* and their names with which the Reader must now be perfectly familiar. At page 94 of the first volume, and in reference to an extract of Kant which was spoken of as likely to have been suggestive to Hegel, it was remarked of the action on the world of a being that can think, that it would amount to a projection of this being out around him, so that the *other* would

come to be only the stand for this being's qualities thereon disposed: if the reader will consult 'die Idee des Wahren,' in the third volume of the Logic, he will be struck with the singular truth of the accidental conception; and he will also see reason to admire Hegel for realising this side of the Notion (for it is a side of the Notion) under Erkennen (Cognition).

At page 610 of Frantz and Hillert's Hegelian Extracts, we have the following from the Philosophy of Religion:—

> The *Third* is the elimination of this Antithesis, of this separation, this banishment of the Subject from God, the effecting that Man feel and know God within himself; as this Subject, raise himself to God, give himself the assurance, the satisfaction, the joy to have God in his heart, to be united with God. This is the Cultus: the Cultus is not merely relation, knowledge, but act; the action to give himself the certainty, that Man is accepted by God, received into Grace. The simple form of the Cultus, the inner Cultus, is Devotion, Worship—this Mystic thing, the *unio mystica*.

The most fervid believer that ever lived could give no better and no other account of his inner experiences: yet here we are in the third moment of the notion. The development of the notion through its ordinary moments has led us to this: it is fidelity to the notion and its own accurate language that has given birth to this fidelity to the vital feelings and expressions of Religion.

The last extract suggests the propriety of a word on the *Matter* of Hegel—and we may say again, in passing, that his *Origin* is directly from Kant, and more especially from Kant's Deduction of the Categories with peculiar reference to the Unity of Apperception and the fundamental Kantian query as regards the

possibility of *à priori* synthetic judgments, or, what is the same thing, mental inferences independent of any reference to the facts of experience; his *Principle* is the *Concrete Notion* so developed, and his *Form* or *Method* is his evolution of new Moments to the production of a new Whole by means of extrication, *or* reflexion, *or* opposition of these moments, *or* disposal of them according to the triple movement constituted by Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, or however else we may name the operation indicated.* As regards the *Matter*, we may say at once, that it consists of all the questions which have ever in any sphere been regarded as *Philosophical*. Probably no man that ever lived ever studied as deeply as Hegel the progress of humanity in regard to those questions which it puts for the procurement of explanation as respects its own existence, that of its world, and the constituent phenomena of both. A man so rich in knowledge of the Real, a man that had so trained himself in the actual, could not by any possibility come to us offering only what was formal or formell, and without concrete nutriment. In an age that exacts such scientific requirements as the present, it is impossible that such a man, in such a position, and with such pretensions, could have treated of such interests as Logic and Philosophy, History and Aesthetic, Morals, Politics, and Religion, with no result but that of an arbitrary, fanciful, idle, and all but unintelligible systematisation, and without any addition or improvement of a solid and substantial nature. This is wholly incredible: rather, it is to be expected that Hegel has said what will

* The extract from Kant (vol. i. p. 92), in what concerns *pure* Reason as *pure* Syllogism, may, if looked deeply at, manifest itself as Hegel's *pure* Form, and so his *pure* Principle, *pure* Method, *pure* Matter, and even *pure* Origin.

prove for centuries, perhaps, to come, the absolutely last word on all the great concrete interests for which alone Humanity lives, and to which alone it strives.

In Logic, to consider the Categories alone abstractly and in themselves, is a glance the deepest and the truest, as the leading of them all up into the Notion and the Idea is not only the most subtle and original feat, but probably the most important work which any philosopher has yet achieved. Consider Being alone! What is Being? Driven on the literary hot-bed which is given us at present, we are all geniuses nowadays, men of rapid ideation and symbolical speech (which, I suppose, is the definition of this wonderful thing genius —often the perquisite of the weakest),—and at the very first touch of the question, we soar away up on Vorstellung, on Imagination, away up, up to the Empyrean in search of the Unimaginable—big at heart—but to return presently drooping—with *Nothing*! This is Vorstellung. The Notion, however, is a cool old swordsman, takes time, moves not from the spot, and looks at *the thing*. What is Being? it says,—why Being is simply *presence* absolutely indefinite—equally *Nothing—but*, this time, a *seen* Nothing. Being is all in general, and no one thing in particular; and Nothing is no one thing in particular—and also all in general, for the Nothing that is no one thing in particular has not destroyed a single dust-point of the all, which just remains after as before. What is, has been, and ever will be: we are in presence of the Infinite. Nay, this Infinite as much is *not* as it *is*. The *is* to the *was* is another, the *was* is *not*. Unchanged identity exists not even in a dream. The *is*, to know itself—even to continue itself—must *other* itself, must become *not*. Not, Not, Not, are the links of the circle of

Identity: only by Not, Not, Not, is Identity preserved. Truly to think these thoughts, truly to think Identity and Difference, but—*sub specie æterni*—is, in ultimate result, to develope the System of Hegel. The Hegelian *Notions* are parallel to the Vorstellungen, the myths, of all concrete History: Chaos is Seyn, Creation is Daseyn, Christianity (Vision, Love, Submission,—Intelligence, Union with God, Immortality) is Fürsichseyn. And this series is but Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, the one, single, and sole-existent logical throb! But we must renounce any attempt to present more of the *Matter*, in the meantime, than has been already presented in the two sections from the Logic, and in the various extracts which have occurred to be inserted here and there. We must content ourselves for the present by simply saying again, that the *Matter* of Metaphysic, Logic, of the Philosophy of Nature, of Psychology, Morals, Politics, Religion, History, Criticism, Art, has all, or mostly all, been exhaustively considered by Hegel, and if presented in freedom from the peculiarity of the form, would speedily convince all men who cared to inquire, of his ultimate and absolute mastery of thought. Nay, if even the Hegelian Notion were proved (which would require such another industry as Haym's, *but on quite another platform of vision*) an artifice, a poem, and a dream, the state of the case would remain substantially the same. As to that, indeed, it is to be admitted, that the Hegelian Notion has yet to receive the guarantee of a competent jury who will decide as to whether or not it goes together in the end, as Hegel says, with *Notion* as ordinarily *used* (if not *seen*), and constitutes, at the same time, the principle of Perception.*

* At the end of Reciprocity in the Logic, Hegel attempts to enable his reader, not only to understand, but to see *the Notion*. We there see

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Be this as it may, there can be no doubt but that Hegel's object was *truth*. 'That to which,' he says, 'in my philosophical efforts, I have wholly striven and strive, is the scientific Cognition of Truth.' His works, he tells us, 'have been many years *thought through*, and with all earnestness of the object and of scientific requirements *worked-through*.' He would 'seek truth but with a consciousness of the nature and value of the Relations inherent in Thought itself, which are the uniting and determining element of every *Matter* (Inhalt).' A great motive of his action is 'the misunderstanding, that the inadequacy of the finite categories to truth brings with it the impossibility of objective knowledge, from which misunderstanding the right is inferred to speak and pronounce from feeling and subjective opinion, so that, in place of proof, there step forward asseverations and the recountments of what is found as facts in consciousness; and the more uncritical this is, it is considered the purer.' To Hegel Philosophy is 'the reconciliation which the Spirit solemnises of itself with itself;' and this is accomplished by 'the restoration of that absolute *Con*tent (Gehalt) beyond which Thought at first struggled and set itself out, but a reconciliation in the freest and most native element of the Spirit.' (Passages in commencement of Prefaces to

Universality and Singularity transparently to collapse, while Particularity is held in a transparent distinction betwixt them. Conceive a globe: its infinite discrete granularity is its *Part*icularity. Off from this granularity, conceive the one continuous case or hull to slip, as it were, on one side: this were the *Uni*versality of the globe. This conceived, it is not difficult to see granularity and case, discretion and continuity, *Part*icularity and *Uni*versality, reflect together into the one self-identical concrete *Sing*ular —the globe itself. Here are three things where each is the other, and where each, at the same time, somehow, is only through the other. The illustration properly concerns *the antithesis* only on the stadium of *Whole* and *Parts*: if not satisfactory to *thought*, it may prove auxiliary to *conception*.

second and third editions of the Encyclopaedia.) The theory, then, that would conceive Hegel's operations to root in fancy, and to consist of express efforts towards an intentional artifact, is exceedingly absurd and entirely opposed to the truth. Never did human being more reverentially receive the torch from his predecessor, or more conscientiously strive to pass it brighter to him that should succeed. To name Hegel's 'Philosophiren' 'Phantasiren' is the most monstrous injustice. Concretely viewed, his action is but the necessary historical reaction and complement to the Illumination. In his youth he had shared the ardour of that movement; he had as keenly felt as anyone the pang of Intelligence, indignant at the monstrous contradictions which an interested Superstition sought to impose on it; and in that sense he had for long, laborious years, though entirely by himself and for himself, worked and written. It presently became evident to him, however, that it would be his duty and his task, not—with the shallow enlightenment and frivolous gaiety of the thoughtless—to push that movement to its ultimate consummation in an identification of man with the monkey, and of both with the unintelligible, baseless, and fortuitous atoms of an unintelligible, baseless, and fortuitous universe,—but to find such correction and complement for the false and one-sided extreme of the Illumination as would restore the equilibrium of concrete fact. The danger became presently plain to him—the danger of the dissolution of society, of its complete retrocession into barbarism before the attacks of an absolutely *enlightened* but utterly irrational understanding. The light which the Illumination had turned upon our whole human heritage of time was become, he saw, a flame to devour. God was to be burned out of us,

the soul was to be burned out of us; we were to be left in presence only of the material elements, ourselves a material calx.

—Apart from the *theoretical* world, we can see for ourselves the same movement at work in the practical world. What is the *principle* of the Political Economy of the day? Self-will; and for the realisation of self-will the destruction of every realisation of universal will. Now, what is that but the dissolution of society—what is that but the reduction of all to an infinitely disconnected, inorganic atomism of irresponsible *Selfs*? Self-government is the word, not in the sense that the individual will, the false will, is to govern itself into the true will, into the universal will, into God's will, but in the sense that the individual will, listening only to its own self-will, its own subjective interest, is to govern and prescribe the universal will—a universal will, however, which were then chaos. Yet there are men of the most undeniable talent, and in occupation of very responsible places, who openly avow and with all their heart promote this principle. They look forward with exultation to that day of freedom, to that day of light at length, 'when we shall doctor and parson ourselves.' To doctor and parson ourselves is not to them a proposition of sheer *dementia*, but an axiom of enlightenment—enlightenment so advanced that it is only too advanced for its own generation! But why should we not also *lawyer* ourselves, *police* ourselves? A large section of the community would rejoice in the enlightenment and liberality that would relieve it of the incubus of a police. Strange how the gorges of some of these enlightened individuals indignantly rise at this as at a palpable absurdity foisted into the place of their own immaculate wisdom! We would parson ourselves,

they say, we would doctor ourselves, and we are not sure but that any prescription of the age at which a child shall be allowed to labour is an infringement of the liberty of trade; but we must not speak of attempting to police ourselves,—*that is going too far.* They say this, and with the most perfect conviction that they have still spoken as rational beings! If they adopt the principle of self-will, they adopt a principle absolutely *subjective*, there is no guarantee of agreement possible between any two whatever. What is going too far to A. is not going far enough to B., and there is no oracle (criterion) that shall ultimately and definitively decide. If they say, Oh, we do not mean to assert that self-will is to be absolutely trusted; they have opened the door to universal will—they have altered their formula from *the unit for itself*, to, *the unit for the Whole.* Instead of a subjective principle, they have now set up an objective principle; and with such there is the certainty of agreement, system, organisation in the end. Consistency of thought would teach them to see and understand this; but in their devotion to the principles they have inherited, they cannot bring their thoughts together. Point out, for example, that, in obedience to the maxim, Let the individual seek his own self-interest, this unit and that unit have injured the community, *with* punishment to themselves, it may be,—and, it also may be, *without* punishment to themselves,—it is not uncommon for Political Economists to answer: Oh, the unit will find in the end that the general interest is its own interest. Now, they who so answer, are quite unconscious that they have just reversed the very principle in which they so implicitly believe. The community is best served by the individual serving himself, is surely not the same proposition as, The individual is best

served by serving the community. But it is on the difference of these propositions that the whole case we seek to make out rests. The former is a subjective principle, and incapable of any one specific assignment or determinate appointment whatever; the latter is an objective principle, and contains within it the entire organisation of society. The one is the principle of Self-will—Slavery; the other, the principle of the Universal Will—Liberty.

On what thin abstractions Political Economy inflates itself! Demand and Supply, for example,—this phrase is used as if it possessed in itself power—as if it fulfilled functions, performed operations, achieved results. There never was a greater mistake. Demand and Supply—what is so named—is in itself utterly empty, utterly untrue. To be true,—it presupposes a concrete system and actually at work; it is this system alone which is its truth, and without this system it is an idle phrase: without this system, indeed, it is a phrase which would never occur to be used. Demand and Supply was the inexorable law to which the universe must submit; America was *par excellence* the land which recognised, honoured, and obeyed such principles: yet, because the negroes of Central Africa sell each other, this well-principled America tears herself loose from the law, and rushes into a war which, so far as all laws and principles are concerned, must be named contradiction itself. It is something else than Demand and Supply that has worked and works here then: not but that America is still true to the great principle of Self-will,—so true that she has here broken down and put an end to a concrete system in her own midst, through which, in a particular instance, the abstractions of Demand and Supply had a filling

of fact. Demand may now 'burst its wind' in Manchester, and Supply die of glut in Charleston; but there is no longer any concrete system to reunite the pair. In short, the *formal* generality that describes, is no *substantial* principle that animates and moves; and Demand and Supply, though the biggest note of a spurious wisdom, has but an abstract reference to temporary complexes which are a prey to thousandfold contingency.

Political Economy, nevertheless, enjoys at this moment the most triumphant of reputations. Illustrious Statesmen boast to have *imbibed* it, all Politicians swear by it, and most Newspaper Editors live by it. It is not difficult to explain this. The Illumination is an historical movement, there is much truth in it, we accept it on the whole,—*only*, we would see into it, we would know its limits and conditions, we would ascertain the higher truth into which it must be absorbed. Now, as it is with the Whole, the Illumination in general, so it is with a part, Political Economy in particular. This part brought *its* light also, and what it lit was not all found good. How could it? Was it at all likely that the arrangements which suited Feudalism, a state of war, would be found to suit Industrialism, a state of peace? The light once thrown, then, the discrepancy was visible, and of late we have done little else than throw off, much to the gain of Industrialism,—the obsolete provisions of Feudalism. It is this which constitutes the praise of Economical Science,—Mr. Buckle intimates as much,—Mr. Buckle himself acknowledges with satisfaction that all reform as yet is but an *undoing* of what an *ignorant* (!) past had *done*. Nor—so far as Feudalism is opposed to Industrialism—would we willingly be

understood to think otherwise here; we accept the relative demonstrations of Hume and Adam Smith; and we rejoice as sincerely as another in the advantages which have accrued to Industrialism from that part of the Illumination named Political Economy, and in special reference to the appointments of Feudalism. What we seek to make plain is only—besides the true nature of its abstract principle—the peculiarity of that concrete material in battle with which it has earned its fame.

As regards the principle, what we have said can be made good also from another point of view. As part and parcel of the Illumination, Political Economy can have at bottom no principle but the Right of Private Judgment. But in this element the considerations are not merely theoretical: they concern action; the right of private judgment is here brought into application with individual commodity. No wonder, then, that the word *private* becomes much more strongly concentrated in this, a sphere of action, than in others that bear only on theory and belief. That Political Economy should openly set up Self-will as its principle, was in such relations obviously irresistible. Nevertheless, that it was private *judgment* that was in question ought not to have escaped notice; and judgment applied to the interests of Political Economy,—that is, to the stewardship of the nation,—is competent to a System only, to an Organisation, the necessity of which shall be Reason. There is possible, then, a true Science of Political Economy, which shall boast not only to be *negative* of the past, but *positive* of the present, and, in its tendency, therefore, certiorative of the future. This science, then, shall cease to be destructive, and become constructive; nor will it set up the merely

subjective principle of self-will, but honestly and strenuously strive forward to the realisation of the objective principle of universal will. Then, perhaps, we shall have a stewardship of the nation, but *now* look at the chaos!

Political Economy is usually treated of under four divisions, the last of which (Consumption), however, has no prescripts that cannot be included under the first. The objects of this science, therefore, may be all included under Production, Exchange, and Distribution; a classification that falls out not very diverse from the triplicity of the Notion. *Distribution* as yet belongs very much to a region of doubt and difficulty —in every view, and may be passed over at present. But how does the principle of Self-will work as regards the two spheres of *Production* and *Exchange*? We can, of course, in this place, not expound, but only suggest. Well, in these days is there not a tendency for Self-will to penetrate and render rotten every article of *Production*, and have we not infinitely more difficulty to save ourselves from this enemy than even from our rats? Let us consider the colour of our clothes alone, or let us ask simply on what principles any farmer raises his potatoes. As regards *Exchange*, again, is there not at present a very large class who live by intercepting and laying their own toll on commodities,—who live, as it were, by taking rides on commodities—through their Capital? These men produce not, they merely put the consumer to the expense of their ride. The expense is the least part of the damage: the active centres of immorality that are thus generated, this is the great point. We hear the purest disciples of Political Economy as it is, speak themselves with positive terror of the threatened

'pestilential influence of these mushroom-moneyed men.' And, indeed, there seems good reason for the terror. There seems rapidly growing up among us a spurious middle class to which our Legislators themselves pay deference, asking their advice in crises of actual government, as if they—in Political Economy—were the depositaries of all wisdom. This class is not so much constituted by honourable and thrifty producers, as by bold and crafty commodity-riders, unscrupulous contractors, lucky colonists, &c. Now what is the life of such people? In one word, it consists of the coarse brutality and vulgar insolence of expenditure and display. Uneducated, unrefined, unpleasant persons they often are, who see the clothes you have on, and remark on the jewelry your wife wears; yet they push into Parliament and infect their neighbourhood with the emulation of expense. Now these are a class of Political Economy's own making, and they are poisonous and deranging in the highest degree. They presume on the breadth of platform their money extends to them. Merit—as it is called—merit, in comparison, is rebuked into the cold shade by such categories as, He lives at the Clarendon—he paid so-and-so for his brougham! True it is that evils are not without compensation, and that there is a reaction against this class on the part of *gentle*men, as there was a reaction against the barbarity of the time on the part of the gentle Knights of King Arthur, or of a later period. Many of our best writers reflect this at present, as Tennyson, the Kingsleys, &c.—but, perhaps, above all, the clear-minded Kinglake, whose chapter as against the *coup d'état* is but a manifesto of the principles of a brave English gentleman as he is now. We would suggest, then, that Production and

Exchange, as they work at present, exhibit nothing of system, or generalisation, union, arrangement, reason, but form together the wide-weltering chaos of a disintegrated and irresponsible Atomism. Will anyone pretend that the stewardship of a nation is best performed in such a miscellaneous and promiscuous fashion as this?

Political Economy, then, would it really be Political Economy, and prove adequate to the national stewardship, must reject this its principle of Self-will, and adopt instead the principle of Universal Will. Indeed, Political Economy itself shows a dim sense of this in that very answer which we have seen already as regards the unit finding out in the end that the interest of the community is its own also. This answer amounts to—The true universal will is the true individual will. What we would point out, however, is, that while Political Economy has never made this principle plain to itself, but, on the contrary, has held by the opposite, it offers—so holding—no field for its realisation. It would work out the universal will, we shall say, and it is sincere in believing that the true mean to that end is to leave the individual to his own interests, which he will find sooner or later to be identical with those of the community. We willingly grant also that this is perfectly true, and the means are perfectly adequate—could the individual but live long enough. But just here lies the rub: the individual cannot live long enough. It is quite certain that *a perfect experience* would make us all *gentlemen*, in the sense which has been already partly indicated, that is, *selfless; so* selfless, that the very self we should assert—if in any way obliged to assert self—would be the universal, and not the individual self, our *self*, the objective one—but not

our self, the subjective one. It is certainly best that a man should freely grow into manhood by the influences of his own natural life. But how if he have not time enough, or how if he should be individually so constituted as to be—of himself—incapable as regards such growth? Has Reason nothing to say, then? The ligaments of vows are not in general to be recommended, but they have saved many a man. Is there no system of Reason demonstrable that would train and discipline and school a man into his own true manhood? Is all organisation hopeless, must we be simply left each of us to his own self-will? We know that we are not in point of fact so left; we know that there is the Government, &c.; but we deny that it is competent to Political Economy to allude to this, for Political Economy would reduce Government to the Police—a Police, too, wholly subject to the will of its objects, and these objects being stimulated into activity by express injunctions to follow out their own self-interests. Nay, we might say that Political Economy has no right to speak of Government at all, for no Government could long exist side by side with the principle of Self-will.—Is there no means of expressly guiding forward Self-will into Universal Will by human reason, or for that consummation must it be simply left to itself and the path of natural instinct? We do not make the most of Nature anywhere else by leaving it to itself: our gains everywhere else are brought about by empaling natural contingency within rational necessity. Are we to despair of a similar method in application to the natural man? Compare the man that comes as it were direct from the furrow with him, the son of a good house, who is *bred*—who from the cradle upwards feeds and fills on Inhalt, the Inhalt of

experience inherited, of experience acquired, by his parents! The former enters on the world in mere natural immediacy, absolutely abstract; his action is a series of blunders, he has all to learn; he is a boy at forty, at fifty,—perhaps he drops into the grave 'an exasperated stripling of threescore years and ten.' Not so the other—(actual exceptions subvert not the ideal rule)—he is a man from his majority, and thenceforward does the work of a man. Here we see how the Family acts in converting mere *nature* into *reason*, and may be led by its example to anticipate the possibility of a like function on the part of Government as well. The method of the Family, however, is not to leave the individual to his own self-will and the casual experience of natural life, but, through the aliment of an objective reason, as it were, objectively deposited, to develope into full stature the true or universal will which is implicit in the natural will, the self-will of every human being. As is the method of the Family, so then must be that of the Government. Nay, the rudest Government that ever existed had no principle at bottom but the conversion of self-will into universal will. The first step, the first stir to Society, ties a knot on self-will, cuts a knot from universal will. Only in a state of nature, only among men anthropoid merely—call them Gorillas if you will—do we find the principle of Political Economy at home at last. It is perfectly natural, then, that there should have been so much stir of late about the Monkey. The Illumination with the light of the Right of *Private* Judgment was destined to reach no less a consummation. So it delights to humiliate, in the triumph of its own intelligence, the dullards who pretend still to find bread in tradition, consoling its own self when it sighs—for it will sigh—

by contemplation of the all of things, through dissipation of heat and mechanical energy, speedily at rest, a cold opaque idle bulk, in the centre of a cold opaque idle space—and so for ever—a useless, unlighted universe left to blank time and its own useless, unlighted self!—These are the latest results of the Illumination; and if these are to be accepted and held true, there is just no more to be said; there need not be talk any longer of self-will, or universal will, or government at all; there is but one conclusion: let those who can enjoy the senses continue to enjoy them; let those who cannot, take aconite and go to bed.

But suppose we determine not to accept these results, perhaps we had better determine also to be just done at last and altogether with the Illumination as the Illumination. The wide welter of lonely, isolated atoms produced by it—each miserable, all miserable, divorced from Substance—is painful to look at. Why, books themselves, which formerly were as our cells of sacred fire, are now bound on the same commercial voyage as all the rest; they are but counters, and take rank by the amount they stand for: we ask now, not how much of the *Ideal* do they contain, but how much of the *Real* will they bring? Perhaps, then, we had better declare completely off with the Illumination, and turn to see if there can be any help elsewhere.

Hegel demonstrates, by History and otherwise, the *end* of man to be Freedom. Now, it must be said that the first step to Freedom—and this has been said by Aristotle—is material possession. We owe Industrialism, then, however misguided, sincere thanks for the immense mass of material commodity it has of late realised: we possess there a most indispensable magazine for the future. That this magazine is for

the future, however, rather than for the present, is the proof that Industrialism is as yet misguided: who is there as yet that enjoys Freedom through it—is there a soul on this earth at present so situated as regards material possession that he is free from *apprehension*?

Und die Sorge, die mehr als selbst mir das Uebel verhasst ist!

By Freedom, however, Hegel means specially the realisation of the universal will; and his system must be regarded as the path of Philosophy to that end. Nor will it be found, on sufficient consideration, that we have reason to disapprove either of the meaning attached to the word, or of the method proposed for the realisation of the thing. If Philosophy have reached at length, as Hegel asserts, the position of a Science—if it be now Wisdom, and no longer simply the *love* of Wisdom—if, in fact, it be really the Science of Science, the knowledge of knowledge,—where else can we ever hope to find any better promise for the realisation in question? Hegel's books, however, are a hard road and a long: is there no short cut—is there no single practical principle competent to act at once as criterion, as test, as guide?—Ten years ago, in a little medical essay, we proposed for this very function—*Health*.

We live at present mostly for material enjoyment; material possession is held up as the only reward, the only success; and human effort, accordingly, hunts such game to the uttermost parts of the earth. Attainment, however, it is found on trial, rarely satisfies. Life is passed between two fevers—the first of inflammation and of struggle, the last of typhus and despair. Hence the rush to and fro of the ignoble at present, as of maddened animals stung by gadflies: hence the profound dejection, the cloud, that sits for ever on the

nobler. It is a false end we seek,—it is a false life we lead,—and we owe both to the Aufklärung. Atomistic Spannung, mutual atomistic repulsion,—abstract Self-will,—material Greed: what other fruits could a Political Economy, born of denial of the Universal, born of destruction, bear? We are all now absolutely disintegrated, absolutely separated, absolutely unsympathetic units. Each, absolutely excludent of others, absolutely includent of self, is simply desperate. We live for the senses, and die. Mere life is the whole; there is no end to work out, no noble purpose to fulfil, there is no *Beyond*! Formerly, the world had an object; it was a scheme of probation, of which all partook, in which all united, to which the Whole helped the Part. It is so no longer: it is a distracted ant-hill, in blind physical ferment. The Illumination could have no other end. But is there no cure? Will life again never come to have the meaning of probation? Will man again, indeed, never come just to live as in a meaning? Is it impossible to restore humanity, and 'let the ape and tiger die?' Now, in effect, Kant and Hegel have lived for no other end than this that is here indicated: both would complete the side of materialism, animalism, at which the Illumination is now nakedly arrived at length, by the other side of idealism, spiritualism, which is found to be equally authentic the moment we turn from Perception as Perception to Thought as Thought. And surely this is a very coarse conclusion,—Unless I touch, I will not believe; only what I hold in my hand *is*. Kant and Hegel, then, in one word, would restore Faith. The path to the new world is necessarily through them. Nevertheless, it is in the same interest that we would suggest here an application to the general problem of the principle of

Health. Having health, we should be happy; having health, we should know we were in the right. Then health is a something known, it is a tangible object; there are means to it, it can be worked to. Suppose Government were but as a Board of Health, with no object but the health of the Community—with no duty but to do for the individual in that direction what the individual could not do for himself! Health is the outward sign of Freedom; health is the realisation of the Universal Will. Health as a practical principle is adequate to bring into a focus, into a single point of action, all the great interests which Philosophy demonstrates in the constitution of humanity. Man is a triple thread of Cognition, Emotion, Volition; on that triplicity is his whole world disposed; and health may be set at once as sign and as goal of the harmonious operation of the whole system—as sign and as goal of a realisation of life.

Nor are we without good reason for supposing that the founders of Political Economy themselves would now agree with these views. The place of David Hume as regards this science, and the relations borne to him by Colbert, by Quesnay, and by Adam Smith, have been already suggested. In general, we may say, indeed, that in France the Illumination took on the form rather of a *mockery* of the contradictions of Tradition, and that it was Hume who really constituted the *thought* of that movement—who may be called the High Priest, then, not only of the Aufklärung as a whole, but of Political Economy specially. This is the veritable historical position. In David Hume, nevertheless, we find none of those one-sided, and consequently untrue, extremes to which his followers incline: the complete *Urtheil* which we see now into

mere self-identical abstractions, would have been an anachronism then. That Government, for example, should only be an affair of external and internal Police, and that, for the rest, everybody should be exhorted to follow his own self-interest,—of this we find nothing in Hume. The existent dialectic of concrete things was too obvious to such an intellect as his, to allow him to remain immovable in a single side.

We have with regard to taxes, he says (Essay, 'Of Taxes,' last paragraph), *an instance of what frequently happens in political institutions, that the consequences of things are diametrically opposite to what we should expect on the first appearance.* It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the Turkish Government, that the *Grand Signior*, though absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax; and every Ottoman prince who has made such an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the world against oppression; *yet it is certain, that its effect is quite contrary.*

The same open sense to the same natural dialectic is seen here (Essay, 'Of the Balance of Power'), where he is remarking on the irresistible tendency displayed, up to that time, by England, to interfere in the quarrels of other nations:

These excesses, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; *and may, perhaps, in time, become still more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally careless and supine with regard to the fate of Europe.* The Athenians, from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, finding their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no contest ever took party on either side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.

Doubtless, there are those who will find that these words have already come true, and that England has already entered on the second Athenian phase. Again, though no man ever saw clearer into the advantageous side of what he named *Luxury*, yet, when claiming, *firstly*, to that extent, he admits, '*secondly*, that wherever luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, though perhaps not the most pernicious, to political society.' (Essay, 'Of Luxury.')

There is dialectic here, too (Essay, 'Of Commerce'):

It may seem an odd position, that the poverty of the common people in France, Italy, and Spain, is, in some measure, owing to the superior riches of the soil and happiness of the climate; and yet there want not many reasons to justify this paradox.

Similarly illustrative is his admission, though attributing the power of modern states to Commerce, that

Sparta was certainly more powerful than any state now in the world, consisting of an equal number of people: *and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury.* . . . In short, no probable reason can be given for the great power of the more ancient States above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury. (Essay, 'Of Commerce.')

The extreme openness and candour of Hume's nature is seen in these examples: it is only his disciples who have become thin, shallow, stiff, pompous, and at the same time fierce, bigoted and fanatic. Think of Mr. Buckle's rationale of the difference between England and France, and compare it with the admission of Hume (Essay, 'Of Commerce'):

Lord Bacon, accounting for the great advantages obtained by the English in their wars with France, ascribes them chiefly

to the superior ease and plenty of the common people amongst the former; yet the governments of the two kingdoms were, at that time, pretty much alike.

Observe his attitude here:

The public becomes powerful in proportion to the riches and extensive commerce of private men.

This is now stereotyped into a fixed and immovable axiom of Economical Science, and this is really the character Hume would wish to demonstrate for it; but he is led by his full nature and unjaundiced eye immediately to add:

This maxim is true in general; though I cannot forbear thinking, that it may possibly admit of some exceptions, and that we often establish it with too little reserve and limitation. There may be some circumstances, where the commerce, and riches, and luxury of individuals, instead of adding strength to the public, will serve only to thin its armies, and diminish its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being, and susceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. *What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found false when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.*

Now this has become true in these very days as regards his own doctrines. Society suffered in his time from prohibition and protection, which

Deprived neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange, which the Author of the world has intended, by giving them soils, climates, and geniuses, so different from each other (Essay, 'Of the Balance of Trade').

That is, in ultimate abstraction, society suffered then from a certain assertion of Self-will against the Universal Will. It was to do good work, then, on the part of Hume to point out this; and the consequence is, that we live now in an entirely opposite system of

arrangements. But the opposition is too complete, and his own words become true of his own results. Non-interference is now 'false when we have embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.' Hume's object was, in essential meaning, to give scope to universal will, and frustrate self-will; but now, in an opposite state of things, we find that it is precisely self-will that is the inconvenience, and we shall be obliged to return to *interference*, though in a new and higher light.

It seems so desirable to demonstrate affinity with the thought of Hume, that a little further development in this connexion may prove not unwelcome.

As soon as men quit their savage state, where they live chiefly by hunting and fishing, they must fall into these two classes (husbandmen and manufacturers); though the arts of agriculture employ *at first* the most numerous part of the society. Time and experience improve so much these arts, that the land may easily maintain a much greater number of men than those who are immediately employed in its cultivation, or who furnish the more necessary manufactures to such as are so employed. If these superfluous hands apply themselves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of *luxury*, they add to the happiness of the State, since they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments with which they would otherwise have been unacquainted. But may not another scheme be proposed for the employment of these superfluous hands? May not the sovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increase the dominions of the State abroad, and spread its fame over distant nations? It is certain, that the fewer desires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ: and consequently the superfluities of the land, instead of maintaining tradesmen and manufacturers, may support fleets and armies to a much greater extent than where a great many arts are required to minister to the luxury of particular per-

sons. Here, therefore, seems to be a kind of opposition betwixt the greatness of the State and the happiness of the subjects. A State is never greater than when all its superfluous hands are employed in the service of the public. The ease and convenience of private persons require that these hands should be employed in their service. The one can never be satisfied but at the expense of the other. As the ambition of the sovereign must entrench on the luxury of individuals, so the luxury of individuals must diminish the force and check the ambition of the sovereign. (Essay, 'Of Commerce.')

In the first place, there suggests itself a lesson in method here. What we see at once in this passage is —after the loose manner or method common to the period and continued by Mr. Buckle, but which is so unlike the rigorous deduction of the Notion—Hume engaged beating up ground for inferences through conjectural picturings *of what would naturally be the case* in such and such circumstances. It is easy to understand that such a method must be at the mercy of subjective contingency, and can insure no necessary result. We as subjects have as much right as Hume as a subject to set on our own conjectures and insist on our own results. By way of example, let us dream over again what Hume has dreamed, let us see if the same *natural pictures* which came to him will come also to us, and let us compare the conclusions. Well—Men as hunters have killed all their game; they must live, they take to agriculture. Practising agriculture, they require certain manufactures (tools, clothes, &c.). At first they supply these themselves. By-and-by certain individuals are found experter, more productive at this sort of industry than others. The latter say then to the former, Do the same thing for us—make our tools, our clothes, &c., and we shall pay you out of our growths. But to both classes, their respective indus-

tries become by practice easier, and take less time, or produce more abundantly in the same time. A surplus is the result. Every individual in the community is well off, he can afford to give. Accordingly he exchanges his surplus freely—a variety of skills having developed itself, meanwhile, in the manufacturing class, with a consequent variety of products—for such articles as please him, and he gradually surrounds himself with wealth. The variety of skills thus encouraged, sunders into the full discretion of the difference, and a civilised community blooms before us in full activity. But now self-will enters. Indolence and incapacity have led to inequalities, which indolence and incapacity will not brook, however—which they will balance by *violence*. Those who are the objects of this violence seek defence. An executive, a government, a power that can control, rises as the means of this defence. Now, the varieties in the fortunes of this power, as it presents itself in the various peoples, constitute History. Suppose this power to arise late—suppose the workers to have enjoyed a long immunity from violence, and to have reached, each of them, a considerable amount of well-being—then, probably, the resultant state will be an England with the workers and the executive in a healthy equilibrium. Hume supposes Sparta, Rome, &c., to arise from this,—that the sovereign took the superfluous hands that resulted from the surplus, and made—to the prevention of commerce—soldiers of them. But suppose we go on our own way, and assume rather the controlling power to have arisen *early*, we think it more natural to see a France issue; and, in seeing this, perhaps, at the same time, more light bursts on us as regards the differences between England and France, which Hume cannot, and which Mr. Buckle

can, attribute to differences of government as such, than is contained, it may be, in the very pretentious but very unsatisfactory hither and thither of statements accorded us at so much length and with so much unction by the latter. As for Sparta, the Helots were a conquered tribe, and their conquerors took to themselves their surplus and lived as soldiers. It is not difficult to prefer the other application of this surplus, that, namely, to the encouragement of arts and peaceful activity, and it is plain as well that an *early* seizing of an agricultural surplus might issue in a splendid state with miserable inhabitants; but it is by no means certain that the Spartans would have been less powerful had they 'given employment to a great variety of trades and manufactures,' as is the averment of Hume. Sparta was certainly great without commerce, but not necessarily for that reason. Rather, it should be said, Sparta was without commerce, for, as yet, such organised intercourse between nation and nation hardly was: demand and supply was then a dead letter, for no concrete system on a sufficiently general scale was yet formed to make it a living spirit. Had such system existed, however, then one skilled Helot—only a single worker if in his own field—might have drawn the produce of two agricultural workers elsewhere, &c. Had such things taken place in Sparta, the Helots might have gradually grown into a power in the state, nor would this state have been, necessarily, less strong. It might have possessed so many skills, for the products of which—on the supposition of a general system of commerce existing—men would give, that it would have been difficult for an enemy to exhaust it. Of all this England is an example as opposed to France.

Consideration of this picture, and in comparison

with similar pictures both of Hume and Buckle, may suggest some profitable inferences as regards the particular method involved, and whole general industry indeed. But we, for our parts, take leave to use the illustration for the purpose of bringing home our general argument. We would point out that, as self-will invaded the community with *violence* in early times, and necessitated an organised defence—a defence often based on no higher motive than again self-will—the interests of class (feudalism, &c.),—so self-will attacks the community now with *fraud* (in adulterations and impositions of many kinds), and necessitates insight on our part and a new defence. Now, I think Hume, had he lived at present, would have conceded this. His great intellect would have seen that his own words had come true, that the Illumination had done its work, that the due middle was being overstepped ; that, as extremes meet, precisely that was making its appearance on the new extreme, which he had striven to crush on the old ;—that, in short, 'what was true while we adhered to one way of thinking, was proving itself false now that we had embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.' In a word, as it was only self-will that he combated then, he would have had no difficulty in deciding that it was now all the more his duty to combat self-will still.

Thought, in fact, has infinitely improved since Hume, through Kant and Hegel, and in consequence of Hume ; and, did this last live now, he would be able to think much more clearly, much more consecutively, than he did then. What had been then hazy to him would be now distinct, and all his opinions would be found to have undergone important modifications. If he saw then that there was a negative side to com-

merce, as in regard to the possibility of an excess of luxury and of a consequent diminution 'of strength to the public,' he would see the same thing now much more clearly. If he saw then, as in the case of Sparta, that ancient greatness was owing to the want of commerce, he would understand now better the reason of that, and would be more likely to admit that the fall of this greatness derived from luxury itself in one of its stages. That he would not allow then. Averring that

> No probable reason can be given for the great power of the more ancient states above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury,

He still asserts that—

> It would be easy to prove, that writers mistook the cause of the disorders in the Roman state, and ascribed to luxury and the arts, what really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conquests: luxury or refinement on pleasure has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption, nor can anything restrain or regulate the love of money but a sense of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of luxury and knowledge. ('Of Luxury.')

Still, we are disposed to believe that Hume would have understood all this much better now. He would have seen more clearly, perhaps, into the truth of his own words, that what is good *thus*, may be bad *so*. Luxury may not always remain 'innocent,' and certainly it was not 'innocent' when Rome fell. Let it be easy to Hume to prove what he may, still the truth is this, *that self-will had come into the state*. Rome as Rome was now what she wished to be, the mistress of the world; the passion for ascent in the breasts of her children could no longer expend itself on her; this passion still worked, nevertheless, and would have an

outlet; so it became a battle of self-wills, and the self-will of Cicero or Cato is no less visible than that of Catiline or Crassus. It became a battle of self-wills, till the realest of self-wills, the abstractest self-will, the self-will κατ' ἐξοχήν, Cæsar's self-will, that which would be rather first in a village than second in Rome, asserted and made itself good.* *Then there was a place instituted for the rest to strive to*; for to it—in ultimate analysis—even the most distant strove, though through an intervening interdependency of patron and client: and they were all slaves; the empire, the freedom for which they had battled, proved their own enslavement.

The same luxury that has made our welfare, may, in other circumstances, prove our bane, just as it is the same oxygen that both makes and wastes our fire, ourselves. Hume will have it that honour and virtue abound more in ages of luxury, but this depends on the *age* of the luxury. There doubtless have been—perhaps there yet are—materialists both virtuous and honourable; but still virtue and honour are, in ultimate instance, incompatible with materialism, for materialism *must end*—in a worship of the senses. Now, so it was in the latter end of Rome;—all religion had fled—sensuous gratification was alone left—and there was no longer any place for honour and virtue.

The truth is, that commerce is both a private and a public gain—like everything else, *when in measure*: it is neither the one nor the other when it is out of measure. *And it is out of measure now*: it knows no longer anything of the universal will, it has abandoned itself to self-will, and it now visibly corrupts in the

* Even to this day, and in various lands, unlimited self-will names itself still—Cæsar!

midst of a boundless fermentation. Interference, then, is now required, if we would not see the State destroyed. In very truth, the present cry of Political Economy—consummate wisdom though it seem to itself—of, Hold off, hold off, leave self-will to itself, is sheer *dementia*. For to allege that the self-will it means, is self-will controlled by virtue, is an imbecility of blindness to the state of the question and to the fact that that one word hands the whole matter over to Reason *qua* Reason—an imbecility of blindness to this, that, while materialism is incompatible with virtue, it is materialism which dominates now. Much reason, then, have we to set up the principle of Health, and say, surely you will all agree to that, surely you would all like to be at least healthy.

While, on the one hand, then, we have reason to believe that Hume would have at once accepted the distinction between universal will and self-will, even as against himself, we have auxiliary glimpses into the incompleteness of his own positions as they then stood. Imperfections of thought, contradictions of thought, we have seen as regards Sparta and as regards Rome, and the case is not much better with such an allegation as this, that 'a nation may lose most of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people.' ('Of Commerce.') The *may* is a category that certainly leaves open for itself a very wide door; but surely the view must, on the whole, have been but hazy that could give rise to such an expression. Suppose the foreign trade had introduced a large amount of the necessaries of life, as grain, for example? In fine, while, in all probability, Hume would have seen it right to fight the battle of universal will even against his own descendants, we see that it is

impossible to trust the loose method of miscellaneous reasonment on natural conjecture, as practised, with whatever captivating ingenuity, by himself, or, with whatever amusing breadth of make-believe, by Mr. Buckle: we certainly stand very much in need of *a method of the notion*, and it is to be hoped that the Hegelian, or some other, will, in the end, substantiate itself.

It will be plain, then, that it is not hostility to the founders of Political Economy that prompts the position here. On the contrary, Hume is to us one of the ablest intellects: if not preferable to Burns *bulk for bulk*, so to speak, he is still in a social aspect the most perfect of men, and probably the most important literary Scotchman that ever lived. His *comprehensiveness*, to use Mr. Buckle's favourite category (which with him meant pretty much only desultory miscellaneous reading, and, in the first instance, only his own), is superlative, and there is hardly an intellectual movement now in existence of which he was not the vital germ.* His most limited side is that of literary criticism; but that was the very weakest side of the Aufklärung generally (see Blair's Lectures, *passim*!), and it is pleasing to perceive Hume, if boundless in his estimation of Pope (not but that admiration in such a case is right, and very right too), not blinded by the same, like many other members of the Illumination, to the merits of Milton. It is a tic of the Aufklärung to say style, and style, and style, with very little regard to the matter if it be only of the ordinary, shallow, natural reasonment; but Hume must have meaning as well as style, he must have information from what he

* Hegel gives to Kant the glory of beginning the categories: this, too, is Hume's in his seven classes of philosophical relation in the Treatise of Human Nature, as his distinction between *matters of fact* and *relations of ideas* is just the *an sich*, the *in itself*, of German Philosophy in general.

reads. 'An author,' he says, 'is little to be valued who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-house conversation;' and this he would have said, we doubt not, independently of the style. There are those who say still of literary excellence, really so far as the thoughts are concerned, there is nothing new, or peculiar, or great in it—it all comes to the style, it is the style that gives the value. It may be well to intimate again that a thing is valuable—and consequently style itself—only in proportion to the amount of thought it contains.

Still we think the position made good, that the disciples of Hume and Smith have pushed the doctrines of their masters into unwarrantable abstractions, one-sided, false, dangerous,—and utterly irrational. Hume points out himself the advantage of equable distribution, and talks of the dangers of monopolies. Now the great tendency at present is to these latter. All must be on the great scale nowadays—Farms, Factories, Contracts,—Speculations of all kinds. People are no longer content to ply a modest and moderate industry with just sufficient surplus to insure the welfare of their children and the comfort of their own old age. That was possible formerly, when men—apart from their immediate occupation—still interested themselves in other objects of intellect, of morality, of religion. But now all is changed—what is now is but a longing and a rush—we have no time to wait—we must enjoy now—we must make a fortune at a stroke, or let us just *go under*. Self-will vies with self-will for material possession. Material possession, indeed, is, in sum, the single category now; and for result there is this boundless welter, where no individual is connected with another, where many *fall* every instant *out*, as through trap-doors of the bridge of Mirza, unheeded

and uncared for. Nor is there any cure for this but in the promulgation of true *principles*—intellectual, moral, and religious—which will, perhaps, lead in the end to a coalition of upper, middle, and under-class veritable manhood against the spurious middle-class which self-love has so swiftly generated in the material of commerce. *Destruction* ought to be seen now to be as absurd as *Obstruction*, and *Construction* the only duty. Did but true *Constructives* form themselves there in the centre, *possessed of principles*, *either* of the extremes, *Destructive* or *Obstructive*, were overmatched, while any coalition of *both* were but the result of a blunder. The veritable Destructives among us are the apostles of self-love, who worship the American constitution of no institution, and know no human ability to admire but that which by successful commodity-riding raises itself into the spurious middle-class, the miserable, never-satisfied, self-love-goaded members of which vie, painfully, vulgarly, with each other, 'in the fashion of a ring or the pattern of a shoe-buckle,' in the cost of their carriages or the prices of their wines.

But if we can bring Hume to our side, we think it not impossible similarly to withdraw from the ranks of the enemy even Bacon himself. No one will deny that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were employed on true interests, political, moral, scientific, &c. How about their descendants, the Schoolmen, however?—Yes, here it is plain that what is a rich and living concrete with masters, can become a dead and empty abstract with pupils. This it was that disgusted Bacon and turned him once again to *Fact*. Nor is this alone less than a sufficient guarantee for the originality, or, as we prefer to name it, for the *genuineness* of the faculty of Bacon; which *genuineness* it is, that in all cases makes the superior man. Bacon—for the rest,

perhaps, a somewhat weak and ostentatious personality, infected, on the whole, by force of classical example (see Sallust in his openings), with the specious mouthing of a thin moralisation—said here: all these logicalities are but idle abstractions,—they *do* nothing;—let us turn to Fact instead, and then we shall have something that *is*, for something that only *sounds*. But if Bacon turned on what had degenerated from a concrete into an abstract then, we have a right to claim his protest against a similar abuse now; for that it really is a similar abuse which in these days we suffer at the hands of Political Economy, we think certain. Such simple suggestion, however, as we have seen already, must on this head at present suffice. Men, indeed, who would have us regulate our conduct by such void abstractions as Demand and Supply, Capital will find its own outlet, Labour its own market, Wages their own level, &c., are really as idle as the seraphic doctors who discussed the number of angels that may stand on the point of a needle. Did any merchant ever make sixpence by any such prescripts? Apart from the cutting asunder of the ligatures of an obsolete system (Feudalism, &c.), and apart from the seeming convenience of hard, unrelenting self-interest (which will be found just its own dialectic in the end, however), what merchant, since the promulgation of Political Economy, can point to a gain which he owes not rather to his own individual sagacity—that sagacity, for example, that found cheap markets for purchase and dear ones for sale, and that lessened, as well, the number and commissions of the intervening hands? Will those interminable platitudes about the nature of Credit ever enable a merchant to know more than his first transaction of the kind teaches him, that a credit, namely, is but a loan *for a consideration*; or,

in fact, does any merchant ever trouble himself to read the same?

Demand and Supply, Capital, Wages, Labour, &c., all these are concerns of human Reason, and can be guided by human Reason only; they cannot be left to the mere allegation of a law that exists we know not where—in the air, perhaps? And would Political Economy leave them to aught else? It is really worth looking at the cheap triumph of immaculate wisdom which Political Economy procures itself in this reference, as well as at the self-devotion of its trust, the awe, the prostration, the superstition of its worship of mere abstractions, mere formalities that—substantially—are *not*. At present, for example, observe with what swelling self-complacency Political Economy watches the rise of the rate of discount at the Bank of England in steady reply to the increasing ferment of *reckless* speculation! It is in the presence, it thinks, of infallible law, it sees Commerce—the mighty commercial system—correct itself—and this without meddlesome interference! It remits its gas for a moment, indeed, when it suddenly sees *reckless* Banks spring to meet this *reckless* speculation, but presently recovers itself on renewed recognition of law. Even on the ultimate result of wide-spread ruin and misery, it still smiles, as on the legitimate fruit of law! Yet at this moment, Political Economists, if not Political Economy, are never done with cries to England *to interfere* for the Danes and against the Prussians! Will, then, the widows and orphans of the foreign sin be worse off than the robbed widows and orphans of the domestic sin; and is English Reason all-powerful for a trouble *without*, but impotent for a trouble *within*? If we are passively to leave all to law,—law we don't know

where—law in the air—law which is just as a law of nature,—why make an exception of the Danish difficulty? That too, in the end, will settle itself on law—the law of the strongest, as the other case (*reckless* speculation, &c.) on the law of the cunningest and richest—a law of *nature* very truly each!

But, indeed, this levity of recognition and acceptance of law is wonderful. Where, after all, *is* this law? Is it in the commodities themselves? Political Economy swells big as it thinks to itself of its laws of Production, its laws of Exchange, its laws of Distribution: but ought these abstract phrases to conceal from Political Economy this, that neither the Distribution, nor the Exchange, nor, in a true sense, even the Production, is in the commodities? Distribution, Exchange, even Production, lies only in Humanity; laws in this connexion can only be generalisations of Humanity's action; and the action of Humanity as Humanity is Reason. The true laws of Political Economy, then, are laws of Reason, and not of Nature. But it is to some fiction of a blind law of nature that Political Economy has in reality looked superstitiously reverent. It seems to itself hitherto to have been in presence of a vast power which was supposed to be quite beyond and above all assignments and prescripts of any mere man. Mr. Buckle very *naïvely* betrays an instinctive consciousness of the true state of the case, not only in acknowledging that all triumphs of Political Economy hitherto have been but destructions of an old (that is, that Political Economy wins for its idle abstractions the credit of the industrial progress due simply to the cutting of ligatures which were in place elsewhere and at another time), but in proposing to mediate between man and nature through the laws of

Political Economy, for in this he very plainly indicates what he *felt*, that, somehow or other, there was an effort on the part of Political Economy to reduce human interests to laws of Nature. Nor could it be otherwise, and the whole thing is a very simple matter: for Self-will is a law of Nature, a law of the flesh; it is universal will that is the law of Reason. The light here ought to be absolutely convincing, for to attempt to subject Reason to Nature—brute Nature with its brute Necessity and no less its brute Contingency—is simply the contradiction of contradictions, is simply preposterousness proper; for we are human just by this, that we supersede Nature, and that we conduct its Contingency into the Necessity of Reason.

Political Economy in this aspect, then, is but de-humanisation, and an abdication of Reason—the grossest delusion, perhaps, that this world has ever yet seen. Nor will it be possible for anyone to realise by-and-by the power possessed by be-frilled and be-ruffled Political Economy at present, of sneering its opponent into the cold shade of ignorance, to be there, indeed, absolutely ignored. But I confess I cannot well see how Political Economy can escape the correction that lies for it in the simple distinction between universal will and self-will: a concrete practicality, *action*, must correct its abstract impracticality, its mere pedantic *ignavia*. The only defence I can conceive for Political Economy here is, that it should say, self-will opposed to self-will neutralises self-will, and there is a universal human result obtained thus by the action of natural law without the dangerous and uncertain influence of legislative interference. But here, again, Political Economy simply deludes itself by the abstractness of its own phrase. Self-will opposing self-will is but a state of

nature: and Political Economy has but to look around to see that, in the atomism its own call to self-will has produced, it has already carried us far on the road thither. Nature—brute self-will—this is the beginning of history, and this Political Economy would make the end also. We are so far on our way, indeed, that we have actually reached the Gorilla and the Sensation Novel. Consider what important witnesses both are to the truth of the general position maintained here. What *can* be the nature of a population where the one is acceptable and the other necessary? '*Goats and Monkeys*!'

The truth, nevertheless, is, that we must live in system: the individual belongs not to himself, but to the community. No Richard Arkwright can jump into the air—into isolation—and say, I am my own, and what I have is my own. Neither he, nor what he has, are opaque independent units, quite indifferent there in the middle of the current: they really constitute portion of its transparency and flow with it. The Arkwrights of the day, however, are so far from seeing this, that they would absurdly isolate each the whole foison of the universal into the punctuality of his single Ego,—a feat which, were it accomplished, would only prove its own dialectic—absolute want.

We are to understand, then, that a national stewardship would create a garden of reason and reasonable work; whereas Political Economy, as it is plied now, can end in absolutely nothing else than a wilderness of self-will and animal rapine; that the one is concrete, whereas the other is abstract, and that it is for this reason we claim the countenance of Bacon. For Bacon's single constitutive virtue was to oppose the concrete to the abstract; from the mere formal self-

identity of thought, from merely formal Logic, he sought to divert the attention of mankind to interests actual, real, and substantial. True it is that Bacon is usually reckoned on the other side from that maintained here, and that to his authority is ascribed the present merely sensuous ransacking of Nature in the pursuit of a merely sensuous commodity. But this position is itself no concrete—this position is itself an abstract; if what Bacon opposed was the abstract Universal, this is but the abstract Particular, mere Sense. What Bacon pointed to was not exactly this, however, but, as union of nature and thinking inquest, rather the concrete Singular, though, it must be said, perhaps one-sidedly, as only *out*. We see here, then, that if the descendants of Hume have come to occupy an abstract and untenable extreme, it is not different with those of Bacon. If Sense alone and Thought alone oppose each other, the concrete Singular is lost to both, which are now but mutually the abstract Particular and the abstract Universal. Bacon's own *partial*-ness, however, led to this; for if we are to see only an external magazine to *exploiter*, there is no ascent over material commodity, and end there can be none but materialism and self-will. Hence the need of Hegel, who, to Bacon's *out*, adds his own necessary *in*. It was said, some time ago, that there was no such great difference, after all, between Hegel and Locke—that if the latter derived Notions from Sensations, the former derived those from these. This is not strictly true; this were to assign to Hegel the position of abstract or formal Idealism, while that which he plainly arrogates to himself is manifestly a concrete, of which both Realism and Idealism are indifferently predicable. Hegel's Notions, in fact, are not divorced

from Sensations, but are the skeleton of Necessity in the Contingency of the latter; and thus the addition of the third moment completes a concrete in this element. So, then, is Hegel's necessary *in* constituted; and there results, in place of Bacon's man *and* nature, the single Geist, the one Spirit, the true concrete Singular which alone is—which takes up Nature into unity and meaning—possible only through *both*. There *are* both. The Idea is the Prius. What it becomes it *is*. It already is a completion of its own necessity.—

Each of these points of view will have thrown its own light, then, on the general allegation, that what constitutes the *Matter* of Hegel, constitutes also the correction and the complement of the Aufklärung. Hegel would restore to us—and *in* the light of thought—the concrete Substance which the light of thought carried off. Hegel would procure for us a scientific answer at length to those our questions, which are strictly and properly ours, which are strictly and properly human: Is there Free Will, Immortality, God? For we must presume to differ from Lord Macaulay here. 'It is a mistake,' this distinguished Aufgeklärter avers, 'to imagine that subtle speculations touching the divine attributes, the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the foundation of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual culture: such speculations, on the contrary, are, in a peculiar manner, the delight of intelligent children and of half-civilised men.' We disagree with this, and would adduce against Lord Macaulay his own master, David Hume, who ('Of Luxury') affirms: 'We cannot reasonably expect that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of Astronomy, *or where Ethics are neglected*.' And this is the truth, and

demonstrates the immeasurable superiority of Hume to Macaulay so far as thought is concerned. You cannot withdraw one element of the concrete without deranging and disturbing all. The fineness of an ode, of an epigram, is an element in the delicacy of a tissue, even in the edge of a razor. The poet enters the drawing-room no less honoured a guest than the inventor or the warrior, for he is known—though not consciously perhaps—to contribute to the common stock as substantially as either. Nor is the philosopher behind the poet. The philosopher is, indeed, the central light and heat of humanity; and this—by his answers to those very questions which Macaulay, the too precipitate pupil of Hume, consigns to children and half-civilised men. All men hang together to constitute humanity, and the Whole would perish were a single link to fail, for each is as a centre of the relations of the all. The interests represented by these questions, then, can simply *not* be omitted. As well might you hope that man, disencumbered of his brain, would remain man, if living by his stomach alone. These interests, in fact, stand to the universe in no less a relation than the brain to man, and their suppression, like its suppression, would reduce the universe, as it were, to a sort of stomach. These interests constitute what is essential to humanity as humanity. To convince ourselves of this, we have but to recall the passage already quoted from the Judgment-Kritik, where Kant points out that the existence of the world would have no worth if it consisted, firstly, of inanimate beings; or, secondly, of animate beings without reason; or, thirdly, of animate beings with reason, but a reason adequate only to considerations of bodily expediency. Guided by this passage, we shall have no difficulty in discerning

that man, deprived of any interest in the questions concerned, would at once sink into no higher a place than that of a human beaver, who knew only and valued only what contributed to his merely animal commodity. Elsewhere Macaulay's words show that he places quite under the same category the question of the immortality, and almost of the main mystery of religion in general. 'The immortality of the soul,' he says, 'is as indemonstrable now as ever;' and, 'as regards natural religion, we are no better off now than Thales or Simonides.' It is not unfair, on the whole, then, to infer that Macaulay said generally to himself on these points, These are things which we never can settle, and of which it is useless to speak—allons!—and, as Voltaire concludes, and Candide concludes, 'cultivons notre jardin!' That is, turning the back on all else, let us cultivate our garden of material commodity; for with the suppression of these questions and these interests, all would come to material commodity.

What is peculiarly human is not to live in towns, with soldiers and police, &c., safely to masticate our victuals; what is peculiarly human is to perceive the Apparition of the Universe; what is peculiarly human is to interrogate this apparition—is to ask in its regard—what? — whence? — why? — whither? It may suit Macaulay and the Illumination to say, It is absolutely useless to put these questions, you never can get an answer; do not trouble yourself with them, turn your back on what you call the apparition and look to the earth—'an acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia'—all your Platos and your Socrates but 'fill the world with long words and long beards'—take to Bacon and be content with the 'fruit:' but,—apart from the valuelessness of such fruit, if *alone*, if

all,—had there been no such questions, there could never have been this fruit itself, 'not even woollen cloth,'—in a word, had there been no such questions, there could never have been this formed world, this system of civilised life, this deposit of an objective reason. On no less a stipulation than eternal life will a man consent to live at all: so it is that philosophy and morality and religion are his vital air, without which his own resultant madness would presently dissipate him into vacancy.

No perception was ever clearer to man than this was to Hegel: his one work, in whatever number of volumes, is but an answer to what we may call—*the questions*. After Kant, the freedom of the will had little difficulty; for that is free which is amenable only to itself, and this is Reason. Reason is its own necessity, and in its own necessity is its own freedom, for in obedience there it but obeys itself. The universal will is free, then, and in the universal will man is free; for his true will is the essential and universal will, while his self-will is but enslavement. Man, then, as was a perception of one's early student days, is free *because* he obeys motives; for what obeys motives obeys itself, and is not subject to the compulsion of another. Kant is particularly beautiful on this question—particularly beautiful in the illustrations he adduces in proof that men value a man, that a man values himself, just in proportion to the sacrifice he makes of self-will for universal Reason.

As for the Immortality of the Soul, that lies secure in the Notion. The notion is the vital heart of all, and for the notion self-consciousness is but another name. The subject and the concrete notion are identical, and they have not in them the character of the

finite, but of the infinite. The system of Hegel, from stage to stage, is full of utterances on this head, and he who can read there has no room to doubt. Abstract absorption into the universal is not Hegel's doctrine, and need be a fear to no one. 'The One is Many, and the Many One.' A system of horizons under one horizon, as Kant figures it—this is the true Monadology. God is no abstraction, but a Spirit in his own concrete differences, of which every finite spirit is one. That each is, is to each the guarantee of his own necessity both here and hereafter: that he should be *then*, is not more incredible or absurd than that he is *now*. At death, the external other of nature falls from us, we are born wholly into spirit—spirit concrete, for it has taken up into itself nature and its own natural life. Nature is to Hegel much as a late extract showed it was to Kant. It is but the phenomenon of the noumenon—it is but the action of *what is*, and passes, while the latter is and remains. Time and space and all questions that concern them reach only to the phenomenon, they have no place in the noumenon. There is but one life, and we live it *with*, as the Germans say. That life we live now, though in the veil of the phenomenon. There is but an eternal now, there are properly no two places and no two times in the life of the Spirit, whose we are, and which we are, in that *it* is all. So it is that Hegel is wholly sincere and without affectation, when he talks of it being in effect indifferent to him, *how* and *whether* he be in this finite life. He is anchored safe in thought, in the notion, and cares not for what vicissitude of the phenomenal may open on him. Hegel, then, not Fichte, is the rock, which Mr. Carlyle, in reference to the latter, feigns: rock in his spirit, that is, in his faith

and in his hope, which faith and which hope spring alike from knowledge, if, in his finite life, wraths, and indignations, even fears and apprehensions, were perhaps known to him, just as they are to us. Flesh is weak, and, while in the phenomenon, consciousness is but the mirror of its vicissitude, and never blank.

Then God—there is for Hegel nothing but God; and this God is a personal God, and no mere Pantheistic Substance that just passively undergoes a mutation of necessity. Hegel, however, looks on the ordinary *être suprême* of infidelity as but a name, an empty abstraction, and he has attempted to construe God out of his universe into the one absolute spirit which he is. We say *construe*, not *construct*—Hegel as little constructs God as he constructs God's universe. The system of Hegel is but the process of this construing, in which all finite categories show their untruth and their finitude, and pass into their truth and their infinitude, the Absolute Spirit. As abstractions, for example, there are both Seyn and Daseyn; but the true concrete singular is the Fürsichseyn into which they both collapse. Neither *Quality* is, nor *Quantity* is —truly, or as such; what truly and as such *is*, is *Measure*. Both *Ground* and *Appearance* are the formal abstract moments of the concrete singular, *the Actual*, which alone is. *Substance* and *Causality* collapse into *Reciprocity*; *Notion* and *Judgment* into the *Syllogism*; *Life* and *Cognition* into the *Absolute Idea*, &c. &c. *Being* and *Essence* are but correlative abstractions that find their truth in the *Notion*; nay, *Logic* and *Nature* are only the *abstract moments*, the abstract *universal* and the abstract *particular* of the *Absolute Spirit*, which is the final *concrete singular*, the ultimate unity, the living *One*, which alone is. Here all finite categories collapse

and disappear, while those which are infinite are but names of the *one* on lower stages. The pulse, nevertheless, the ultimate vital throb, is the *Notion*.

So little does this scheme seem to Hegel to contradict Christianity, that it is just on this scheme that he is able to perceive that Christianity is, must be, and can only be, the Revealed Religion. It is here that Hegel is, perhaps, at his greatest, at his truest, at the greatest and truest of thought itself. Christianity is, in his hands, rescued not less from the contingency and externality of mere History, than from the contradictions and discrepancies of the mere separating, and, so to speak, self-identifying understanding *—rescued from the vulgarity of material sensation, and restored to a spiritual reality which is, in very truth, one and identical with the absolute inner of the living soul. To him who understands the full force of the Hegelian terms, there is no profane reading whatever more ennobling, consoling, peace-giving, than that which Hegel offers us here. Crass facts, which were opacities and obstructions, melt and flow at his touch, and are taken up into us—sustenance, as it were, into the souls of men before whom there seems to open at length the kingdom of grace. It is not with the mere abstractions and distinctions of thought that Hegel deals here, but with the concrete element of religion itself, which is as truly human, which is as much ours and indispensable, as our very senses. If the instrument be thought, thought as clear and consecutive as that of the soberest Aristotle, the result is feeling—feeling as

* The *self-identifying* action, alluded to here, must be supposed to fall on the *objects* as well as the *subject*: Understanding proper separates not only itself, but whatever is submitted to it, into independent, self-identical *selves*: in a wide sense, its function is thus simply to *self-identify*.

substantial, palpable, real, as ever gave beatitude to the intensest of Saints.

It is the doctrine of the Trinity which constitutes to Hegel the central and vital principle of Christianity. Again and again he may be found animadverting on the gratuitous astonishment of Understanding at the identifying of such differences as *one* and *three*. We saw a very prominent instance of this in Remark 2 of the second chapter of *Quantity*. Similarly, towards the beginning of Maass in the complete Logic, Hegel will be found expressing interest in the trace of a trinity even in the 'enormous Phantastery' of Indian superstition,—'like a *mod*erating thread in what is im*mod*erate.' The passage continues:—

> Though this Indian Threeness has misled to a comparison with the Christian Trinity, and though indeed a common element of the movement of the notion is to be acknowledged in them, we must still, however, attain a preciser consciousness in regard to the essential difference between them which is not only infinite, *but the veritable infinite just is this difference.*

So much in earnest is Hegel with the doctrine of the Trinity, that he finds Christian writers of the most undoubted orthodoxy strangely lukewarm in its regard. Tholuk, for example, he censures most unsparingly, because he terms 'this doctrine a scholastic doctrine, and regards it merely on the external side of an assumed only historical origin from speculation on scriptural texts under the influence of the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle;' because he asserts also that 'the doctrine of the Trinity is not in any way a fundament on which faith can be founded.' Hegel complains also that 'he conducts his reader only to the Passion and Death of Christ, but not to his Resurrection and

Ascension to the right hand of the Father, nor yet to the Pouring out of the Holy Ghost; and intimates that, in this way, the doctrine of Redemption cannot have more than a moral, or even a heathen, that it cannot have a Christian, sense. Perceiving the taint of Illumination and mere morality in religionists represented by such men as Tholuk, Hegel avers further :—

Through such finite mode of viewing the Divine—that which is in and for itself, and through this finite thinking of the Absolute Intent, it has happened that the fundamental tenets of Christianity have in great part disappeared from the formulary. Not only is Philosophy—rather Philosophy signally is—now essentially orthodox; the tenets which have been always held to be the ground-verities of Christianity, are maintained and preserved by it. [To Hegel, indeed, it is not a care] to prove that the Dogma, this still mystery, is the eternal truth; *for this is what goes on in the entire of Philosophy.*

In truth, no one can doubt the depth and fervency of the religious sense of Hegel, who will take the trouble to read his pertinent deliverances. They have the breadth of feeling in them of a George Fox or a Bunyan, yet do they rigorously issue from the notion, and rigorously dispose themselves according to its moments,—and this is no unimportant testimony to the truth of the principle. The peculiarly deep, living, and meaning way in which all the great doctrines of our religion—Good and Evil, Original Sin, &c.—are realised in the new element, is especially striking. We shall dwell on a few extracts by way of illustration :—

The cultus is to give oneself this supreme, absolute satisfaction (Genuss)—there is feeling in it—I am there present

with my particular personality: it is thus the assurance of the absolute Spirit in his people, it is their knowledge of their essential being; this is substantial unity of the spirit with itself. It is a twofold act—God's grace, and man's sacrifice. The latter has reference essentially to the inner; it is the sacrifice of natural will, the will of the flesh, as comes more to the surface in Repentance, Purification, &c. God is the creator of the world; it belongs to his Being, his Essence, to be creator; so far as he is not this, he is imperfectly understood. But a secret, a mystery in the usual sense, is God's nature not, least of all in the Christian religion; there God gave himself to be known, showed what he is, there is he revealed; but it is a mystery for sensuous perception, conception, for the sensuous mode of view and for understanding as such. In the Idea, the Differences present themselves not as self-excludent, but so that they only are in this self-conclusion (shutting-together) of the one with the other: that is the true supernatural, not the usual supernatural, that is to be conceived as up there; for that is just so something sensuous and natural, that is to say, what is an asunder and indifferent. The self-identical substance is this Unity, which as such is *fundamen* and *principium*, but as subjectivity it is that which acts, which produces. Religion is divine wisdom, man's knowing of God and knowing of himself in God; this is the divine wisdom and the field of absolute truth. In general, religion and the basis of the state are one and the same; they are in and for themselves identical. The laws of the state are rational and divine things, in view of this presupposed original harmony; religion has not its own principles as opposed to those which obtain in the state. (Hegel no voluntary.) There is one notion in religion and state; this one notion is the highest thing that man has; it is realised by man: the nation that has a wrong notion of God, has also a wrong state, wrong government, wrong laws: this relation is seen in men's ordinary conceptions, and expresses itself in this way, that to them the laws, the authorities, the constitution, come from God, that thus these are authorised and by the highest authority which can

be given to them. But if the laws are from the will of God, it is important to know God's will; and this is not the business of one in particular, but belongs to all. When only the formal side is taken, room is given to caprice, tyranny, and oppression. This showed itself in a marked manner in England, under the Stuarts, when passive obedience was insisted on, the sovereign claiming to be accountable to God only. Through means of this same claim of a divine revelation, the *antithesis*, however, directly manifested itself. The distinction of priests and laymen, namely, is not held by protestants; the priests are not privileged to possess the divine revelation, and still less is this the case as regards the so-called lay. So there arose in England a sect of protestants who maintained it was given to them by inspiration to tell how they should be governed; in consequence of such inspiration of the Lord, they stirred up a rebellion in England, and beheaded the king.

This demonstration of the inevitable alternation of the antithesis—that in repelling the point you are struck by the but—Hegel accomplishes finely also with reference to the Roman Empire. The people so named worked only to a single end, universal dominion; but, this attained—'abstract dominion,' 'simple dominion'—'there manifested itself over *all*, a common present power, a power of self-will—the Emperor—which, without all moral restraint, could act, rage, give a loose to itself.' This same abstract dominion of the Roman people—'this universal unhappiness of the world'—was, in a religious point of view, the preparation for Christianity:—

> The gods of all nations were collected in the Roman Pantheon, and they mutually annihilated each other just by this, that they were to be united. Rome fulfils this unhappiness of the annihilation of beautiful life and consciousness . . . and produces a throe which was to be the labour-pain of the religion of Truth. 'When the time was fulfilled,

God sent his Son,' it is said; the time was fulfilled, when despair to find satisfaction in the temporal and finite had taken possession of the spirit of man.

Again, of Faith, Hegel declares that it is indispensable :—

The relation of the individual to this truth, is, that the individual just comes to this conscious unity, renders himself worthy of it, produces it within himself, becomes filled with the Spirit of God: this takes place through process within him, and this process is, that he has this Faith, for Faith is the truth, the presupposition, that in and for itself and assuredly redemption is accomplished: only through this faith that the redemption is in and for itself and assuredly accomplished, is the individual capable of setting himself into this unity.

Of Baptism we find it said, this rite

demonstrates that the child is born in the community of the Church, not in outer wretchedness, that it will not have to meet a world at enmity with it, but that its world is the Church.

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is characterised thus :—

In it there is given to man the consciousness of his reconciliation with God the entering and dwelling of the Spirit within him: the Lord's Supper is the focal centre of the Christian Church, and from it all differences in the Christian Church receive their colour and form. In regard to it there are three conceptions. 1. According to one of these, the Host, this external, this sensuous, unspiritual thing, becomes through consecration the present God—God as a thing, in the wise of an empirical thing, is just so empirically enjoyed by man. Inasmuch as God was thus known as an outward in the Lord's Supper, this centre and focus of the entire doctrine,—this externality is the fundamental basis of the whole

Catholic religion. There arises thus servility of thought and deed; this externality pervades all further forms of it, the True being represented as what is Fixed, External. As thus existent without the subject, it may come into the power of others; the Church is in possession of this, as of all other means of grace; in every respect, the subject is passive, receptive, knows not what is true, right, good, but has only to receive it from others. 2. The Lutheran conception is, that the movement begins with an External, that there is an ordinary, common thing, but that the Spirit, the self-feeling of the presence of God realises itself, insomuch and in so far as the externality is absorbed, not merely bodily, but in Spirit and Belief. In the Spirit and Belief now is the present God. What is sensuously present is of itself nothing, and even consecration makes not of the Host an object of veneration, but the object is in the Belief alone; and so in the consumption and destruction of the Sensuous element, there is the union with God, and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here has the grand consciousness arisen, that, apart from the Enjoyment and Belief, the Host is a common, sensuous thing: the process is only in the spirit of the subject truly—certainly a trans-substantiation, but such that by it the external element is eliminated, God's presence is directly a spiritual one, so that the Faith of the subject belongs to it. 3. The idea here is, that the present God is only so in conception, in remembrance, and thus has only an immediate, subjective presence. This is the reformed idea, an unspiritual, only lively remembrance of the past, no divine presence, no actual spirituality. Here the divine element, the Truth, is debased to the Prosa of the Aufklärung and mere Understanding, a merely moral relation.'

That, in general, it is the Notion which is the guide to these determinations, will, perhaps, now at last come home to the reader, in a perfectly undeniable and definitive manner, from the Division (Eintheilung), which runs thus :—

'The First is the Notion, as always; the Second, again, its Determinateness (specificity, *Particularity*), the notion in its determinate (specific, *Particular*) forms; these cohere necessarily with the notion itself: in the mode of consideration properly philosophical, it is not the case that the Universal, the Notion, is put first as it were for the sake of honour. Notion of Right, of Nature, as set first in ordinary usage, and as to which, as so set, we are still in uncertainty, are general determinations, on which properly the matter in hand does not depend, that depending, on the contrary, on the special *intent*, the single capital. In this usage, the so-called notion has, in the continuation, no influence on this further *intent*; it indicates in a way the ground on which we find ourselves with these materials, and that we are not to introduce *intent* (matter) from any other ground (sphere); the intent—for example, magnetism, electricity—passes for the thing itself, the notion (that is, in the usage alluded to) for the formal or formell element of it.

In philosophic consideration, the notion is also the beginning, but it is the Thing, the Substance, as the germ from which the whole tree developes itself. In it are all the determinative characters contained, the whole nature of the tree, the peculiarity of its saps, ramification, but not preformed in such wise that, if we take a microscope, we shall see the branches, leaves, in miniature—not so, but, on the contrary, in spiritual wise. So the notion contains the whole nature of the object, and knowledge here is nothing but the development of the notion, of that which is contained *implicite* in the notion, not yet come into existence, explicated, laid out (displayed). Thus it is we begin with the notion of Religion.

The second, then, is religion in its determinateness, the determinate notion. This we take not from without, but it is the free notion itself, that propels itself into its determinateness. It is not as if we empirically treated Right, for example: in which case, Right is, first of all, defined in general; but then the determinate (particular) Rights (the

Roman, German, &c.) are to be taken from elsewhere, from experience; here (that is, with us) the determinateness has to yield itself from the notion itself.

The determinate notion of Religion is finite religion, a one-sided something, thus and thus constituted as against other, one particular as against another particular; Religion in its finitude.

The third is the notion that comes to its own self out of its determinateness, finitude, that again restores itself out of this finitude, limitation; and this restored notion is the infinite, veritable notion, the absolute Idea, the true Religion.

The first religion in the notion is not yet the true religion. The notion is true certainly within itself, but it belongs to truth that the notion should also realise itself, as it belongs to the Soul that it should have given itself a body. This realisation is directly determination of the notion; the absolute realisation is that this determination is adequate to the notion: this adequate notion is the Idea, the veritable Notion. These, in an abstract way, are the three parts in general.

This division may be also characterised thus. We have to consider *the Notion* of Religion, first, *in general*, as *universal*, then in its *particularity* as self-differentiating notion, which is the side of the Urtheil (Judgment, &c.), of limitation, finitude; and thirdly, the notion which shuts itself together with itself, the Schluss (close, shut, or syllogism), or the *Return of the Notion* from its determinateness (particularity), in which it is unequal to itself, to its own self, in such wise that it comes into equality (adequacy) with its form. This is the Rhythmus, the pure eternal life of the Spirit itself; and had it not this movement, it were dead. The Spirit is, to have itself as object; it is its manifestation, relation of objectivity, to be a finite something. The third is, that it is object to itself, reconciles itself in the object, is by itself, is come to its freedom, for freedom is to be by oneself.

This division is thus the movement, nature, act of the Spirit itself, as regards which, we, so to speak, only look on. Through the notion it is necessary, but the necessity of

the further progress has, first of all, in the development itself, to demonstrate, explicate, prove itself.*

* The quotations that refer to Tholuk occur in the prefaces to second and third editions of the Encyclopaedia; those that bear on Religion, in the pertinent extracts from Frantz and Hillert (Hegel's Philosophie in wörtlichen Auszügen).

From the latter extracts I derive also the three following equations, which will interest *the student*: Beziehung=das, worin sie identisch sind;—Verhältniss = Auseinandertreten dieser Einheit; and Setzen =dass diess durch mich sey. *Reference* is thus reserved, as has been the general practice of this work, for the identity of the sphere of Simple Apprehension, *Relation* for the dif-ference of the sphere of Judgment, and Setzen is seen to apply to what is established in consciousness through process of and from— *another*, which indeed is the life of thought itself *qua* thought. The internal process *sets* the external forms. That is gesetzt, into which another has formally become. A succession of intellectual results that appear from implication, and disappear from explication, but into new explication — this is Gesetztseyn—ostensive expression of an implicit mutuation. There is the fruit of a womb *in aperto*, which is presently withdrawn again, as into eclipse for a new issue. If the ice is *explicit*, the water is *implicit*, but still there is substantial union. Ex-implication, Gesetztseyn, is all that goes on—it is the one onward. To know the Hegelian *Notion*, and to know that the verb setzen is retained for the determination of the life of the notion, is, as regards Hegel, pretty nearly to have arrived. I should say, indeed, that if the reader, who has studied his way this length, will now take the trouble to peruse the first two chapters of the second volume of Hegel's complete Logic, he will find this author—really—at length in his power.

Hegel's fidelity to the notion—which, indeed, is wholly unswerving—is seen, not only in the above equations, but in all the extracts in the text. As, in fact, we have seen, even in the single terms, he is true to the triplicity of the notion: each of them is a syllogism; the ordinary sense coquets with the virtual sense into a third, the Hegelian or speculative sense; and thus the whole notion, even in a word, has come full circle. Urtheil, for instance, is, first, judgment, then dif-ference, and, thirdly, re-duction of the dif-ference into the first identity. Begriff, similarly, is, as Universal—a notion indefinitely; as Particular—a notion definitely, as *the* notion of some particular concrete; as Singular — *the Notion*, Kant's Notion, Hegel's Notion, the concrete Notion.

Hegel is reported to have said, 'that only one man understood him, and he did not.' This man, I am inclined to believe, was Göschel. Hegel accepted Göschel's exposition of his own religious views; but, no doubt, saw clearly that Göschel knew nothing, after all, of *the Notion*.—Sir William Hamilton opined Gabler to have been this man!

The depth and truth of these glances of Hegel into the inner significance of Christianity will be denied by no one; but there is now an external side on which it will be well to say a word. It relates as well to what is called *plenary inspiration*, as to the counterpart of the same,—the *grubbing* into what is supposed the region of *historical fact* by such men as Strauss and Renan. On the first head, we may say, that Hegel is perfectly sincere in his adhesion to the doctrine of plenary inspiration in its true sense—in that sense, namely, in which it relates to the inner: the Bible is to him perfectly instinct with the inspiration of the Spirit. Hegel, however, is unable, from the whole nature and principle of his philosophy, to believe in the inspiration of an outer *as outer*. The outer element, as in the sacrament, is to him but the medium, and disappears in the inner realisation of the spirit. Plenary inspiration, most assuredly, he would say, but not inspiration of the *letter*. The letter as letter is an outer; and the sphere of externality as such is a prey to boundless mutability and contingency. It is the decree of God that it should be so. The notion in external manifestation, is nothing but, and can only be, this spectacle of change and accident. Let anyone look at his own copy of the Bible. He got it at a certain time, he carried it to certain places, he has used it on such and such occasions, and others have so used it: there are accidental dog's-ears in it, tears, burns, stains, thumb-marks (of Prussian officials or others). Then the binding,—it is in such and such materials, form, colour, &c. The paper is of such and such quality, and is at such and such stage of decay. There are such and such a number of pages. The printing is of such and such a date, and in such and such a type. The chapters,

verses, &c., are appointments of certain human beings. Then the *matter*: it is in prose and in poetry; there are histories, legislative enactments, narratives, biographies, letters, proverbs, prayers, sermons, parables, revelations, prophecies, &c. Then there are a variety of authors actually assigned. These authors, too, are completely in the yoke to the categories of their respective countries, ages, languages, &c. Nay, externality goes deeper still,—there are discrepancies in this *matter*: Of the vision that appeared to Saul as he went to Damascus, we hear, for example, in the seventh verse of the ninth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, that 'the men which journeyed with him stood speechless, *hearing a voice*, but seeing no man;' whereas, in the ninth verse of the twenty-second chapter of the same Acts, we are told, 'And they that were with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid; but they heard *not* the voice of him that spake to me.' Now, this is a contradiction in terms—a deeply-marked discrepancy, then: doubtless, reconciliatory explanation is possible, is easy; doubtless, it is an *external* discrepancy which, instead of weakening, adds force to the inner truth of the particular narrative, and of the Bible generally: still it is a discrepancy—a proof that whatever is external must yield itself a prey to the *contingency* of the external. We stop here; into discrepancies at all it is no joy to enter; we have had enough of them at the hands of the general Aufklärung; we would not protract the agony; what is wanted now is something quite else—an end to the misery, a renewal of Faith.

This, however, will probably sufficiently illustrate what we hold to be the relative position of Hegel, as justified by such passages as the following, also from the extracts of Frantz and Hillert:—

The Christian is *positive* religion in the sense that it has come, been given, to man from without . . . it will be interesting to see what *is* the *Positive*. . . . The laws, municipal ones, laws of the state, are in the same way *positive*: they come to us, are for us, have authority; they are not so that we can let them stand, that we can pass them by, but that even in this their externality they are to be for us what is subjectively essential, subjectively binding. When we apprehend, recognise, find reasonable, the law that crime be punished, it is then essential for us, has power over us, not because it is *positive*, because it is *so*, but it is of validity inwardly also, to our reason, as what is essential, because it is inward, rational. As regards revealed religion, there is necessarily this side also: inasmuch as we have there what is historical, externally *apparent*, we have also there what is positive, contingent, that may be in this manner, and also in that. Even in religion we have this. Because of the externality, sensuous manifestation, which is implied to accompany it, there is always present what is positive. But this is to be distinguished: the Positive as such, the abstractly Positive, and the law, the law of Reason. The law of Free-will is not to be allowed to act, because it is, but because it is the determination of our Reason itself; when it is so known, it is nothing positive, nothing blindly operant. Religion also appears positive in the entire tenor of its doctrines; but it ought not to remain so, it ought not to be an affair of mere apprehension, of mere memory. . . . The attestation is spiritual, lies not in the sensuous, cannot be brought about in immediate sensuous fashion: against the sensuous facts, therefore, there may always be something objected.

This will suffice for the first head; as regards the second, the point of view may be seen to open in the following extract:—

As regards the empirical world, the Church does so far right in this, not to undertake such investigations as those concerning how it was with the appearance of Christ after his

death: for such investigations proceed from the point of view, as if the thing depended on the sensuous element of manifestation, on this mere historical element; as if in such narratives of one as historically perceived, in historical manner, there lay the attestation of the spirit and its truth. This truth stands firm in itself, although it has such point of origin.

There is an edge here that tells most unmistakeably against those that grub into historical fact, as if they could so discredit the sacred history, let them find out what they may. Hegel has no sympathy whatever with this industry; and it is rather singular that it is one which—in appearance at least—has emanated from his school. The mantle of the prophet is not always of direct descent, however. To Hegel it is no attestation of anything in a spiritual sense, or simply in meaning, that it should have such and such sensuous documents in its support. Apart his ordinary curiosity as man and interest as antiquary, Hegel would toss into the fire—if offered to attest, if offered for worship just so—never so authentic a piece of the true cross with as little compunction as John Knox flung into the water the *painted board* named Virgin. Really, what can sensuous facts attest? What were the value of a tooth of the wolf that suckled Romulus? Should we be really better off, had we even a letter to the fact under the hand of Lupa herself? Hegel's dislike to critical history (which really springs from his general principle), so lively in expression is it, is quite amusing: it is to him nothing but an exhibition of personal vanity. What can any man now hope to make of the death of Remus—what good would he do, did he even demonstrate it to have actually happened so and so—what really is the *value* of such an industry? To

Hegel the beginning is always the continuous identity of apprehension; it appears to him everywhere, as he actually names it in the geographical element, 'gediegenes Hochland,' hard, solid, unbroken *steppe*: it lies there under vapour; it recedes as you approach; it can never be got at to come under the knife or to lie in the scales; it is but a cast of the eye, and is always there before you; it is the necessary presupposition of the notion itself: it is, in short, a sphere of apprehension, and in *externality*—why would you vainly seek to split it into the self-identities of the present Urtheil? So always is the germ; Hegel knows it such, and mocks the idle curious that would thrust fingers into it. And Hegel here is, no doubt, scientifically right, while Strauss and Renan (Hegelians that reverse their master!) are only inept. Hegel, in point of fact, recommends us, 'In considering this religion, not to go historically to work after the fashion of him who begins from the outward, but to take start from the notion.' He tells him also who begins in the external manner, that he only *seems* to himself 'receptive,' that he is in fact 'active;' that is, that the resultant work of his efforts is not a work which he has only *found*, but which he has also *made*. In short, the grubbers into the historical facts of such commencements are but mistaken men, who, as it were, with one foot on the centre, stubbornly endeavour to set the other on the horizon. Notion is the word, not the Datum of Fact; to which latter would you stretch 'the ladder of Jacob,' it instantly 'goes further off and becomes astronomical.' There is no ultimate solution of any element but the notion, which being in effect ourselves, any nearer nearness were a strange desideratum.

> Hence, pageant History! hence, gilded cheat!
> . . . . What care, though owl did fly
> About the great Athenian admiral's mast?
> . . . . . Juliet leaning
> Amid her window-flowers, ...
> Doth more avail than these!

So Keats exclaims, and Keats is right. Would we know truly how the spirit of man lived, and moved, and was in the old Greek world, it is to Homer we must turn, and not to Thucydides. In the Iliad and the Odyssey, in the soul of Homer—whom, despite the testimony of centuries and the voices of the demi-gods themselves, a prurient modern vanity would deny—in the Iliad and Odyssey, in the soul of Homer, veritably a one—there lies in crystal reflexion the whole Greek world, organically together; in the soul of Homer, there lies in crystal reflexion, organically together, the spirit of man himself gone asunder into his own necessary and native differences. Preserve the Real, Thucydides—destroy the Ideal, Homer: we have lost both Greece, and the deepest insight into man and the world of man. Reverse the action,—and of what account is the loss, when compared with the gain? As then, so now: the prologue of Chaucer, the plays of Shakspeare, the poems of Burns, will readily outweigh any professed history. We will agree with Hegel, then, that, possessed of the notion, we feel ourselves lifted high above the *historical*, the *external*, the *contingent*, and we shall only smile at the necessarily futile efforts of a Strauss and a Renan to paw the horizon.

'The spiritual is higher than the external; the spiritual cannot be *externally* authenticated:' it is this position also which gives Hegel his peculiar place as regards miracles. He does not oppose them, admits

the belief they would bring to sensuous men, but still he subordinates them. They are to him in a sensuous, external element, and consequently lower than what is spiritual as such. To support his view, he points out that the Egyptian Sorcerers performed miracles as well as Moses; but

> The main point is, Christ himself says: There will come many who do miracles in my name; I have not known them. Here he himself rejects miracles as veritable criterium of truth. This is the main point of view, and what is to be held fast: attestation through miracles, as the impugning of the same, is a sphere which does not concern us; the testimony of the spirit is the true one.

Hegel has, however, probably missed here an aspect of the miraculous element which, even in obedience to his own principles, should procure it a vastly higher place. The reader of Hegel is very apt to be haunted with this difficulty: what we have here for God is a sort of universal that has no expression of his own, that has an expression only through us; there is *a* life—the individual disappears, the one, the universal alone is; but he is only through the individual, if the individual, in turn, is only through him; and even if the contingency of Nature be but an externalisation of the Idea, it is independently there, and all-powerful on its own side. There can be no quiet heart on such a stage as this. Now, it appears to us that the miraculous element contains the necessary resolution. God must be conceived as Lord of Nature: prayer must be believed to stay the arm which sways the universe. This is absolutely necessary; unless this be so, *men* have no business here. Now, the miraculous element in the New Testament is a guarantee of this. Indeed, is not this element in every way an essential one? Can the New

Testament be believed without its miracles? We do not say, then, that Hegel impugns the Christian miracles —this he forbids; but we say that he subordinates them: whereas, not only the historical position, but the necessity of the absolute, the principles of Hegel himself, compel us to believe that Christ had power over nature. Only so is there guarantee for a Personal God; and without a Personal God there can be no *Cultus*. But Hegel is perfectly sincere in his expressions as regards the Cultus, *therefore*, &c.

If such be the attitude of Hegel in regard to religious relations, his bearing is quite of a piece in reference to politics, in reference to the State. The State is the rational substance of the universe, and depends not on the wise opinion and good knowledge of either you or me. The Aufklärung, to be sure, suddenly turned its lantern upon it, among others, and declared all there-appertinent rotten. Since then we have been stripping our walls bare, and Mr. Buckle has been able, with much comfort—opening a waistcoat button—to perorate on Superstition. The value of Descartes, it appears, is that he saw into the imposition of priests and princes, and our forefathers were plunged in a hopeless limbo of ignorance and darkness! O Superstition! Superstition O! The category of superstition is not enough for Hegel, however; he is not unjust to the Aufklärung, but he will not deny all tapers but its own. On the contrary, Reason to him did not begin with the Aufklärung, but had been, for thousands of years, building itself into the outward crassitude. Hegel, then, examines Reason as regards the State, and assigns, through the Notion, the essential determinations that constitute its organisation and life. To say this much must here suffice, however; and, per-

haps, for the present, the hint alone is sufficient, that political wisdom cannot possibly consist in undoing alone, else its own activity were speedily its own end. There are *principles* here, as there are in all human interests, and, through Hegel, we may yet get to see and realise them.

In simple truth, the last chance is offered us in thought as thought: in matter as matter, we have nothing but despair. In Germany, they already ask, how would life constitute itself—*seposita animorum immortalitate*? But we in England should ask simply, how would it be were matter all? This supposed, we shall presently see everything that has been formed out of the reason of man, during untold generations, break up and disappear. Thought is but a function of matter, and must be studied in the laws of matter. There is, consequently, no God, no spirit, no immortality: Religion, Metaphysic, Morals, Politics, vanish. Even science remains not; for we are left with the registration of phenomena alone; and phenomena being but appearances, and not things in themselves, inquest is at once endless and hopeless. And is Poetry, Literature, one whit more possible? Will anyone any longer take interest in sea or star, in mountain or in flower, or in the loves and hates of men? All must perish: there is nothing left us but material commodity; each is for himself—each would realise that. And would that—would material commodity continue to be realised? Does not the high priest, Hume, tell us himself, that a piece of woollen cloth cannot be expected to be realised in a nation 'where Ethics are neglected?' What can be expected but a realisation of the ideal of political economy at length,—self-will the only principle—barbarism—a state of Nature? And

could men now bear a state of nature?—The misery of the present is infinite, and it is because the Illumination has stripped us naked—to matter. Schopenhauer, who has fairly arrived at this stage, talks (Parerga and Paralipomena, Bd. II., § 156) thus:—

> If we reckon up, so far as is approximately possible, the sum of want, pain, and misery of every kind which the sun illuminates in his course, we shall admit that it would have been much better, had he been as little able to evoke the phenomenon of life on the earth as on the moon, and did the surface in the former, as in the latter, still find itself in a crystalline condition. We may conceive our life, indeed, as a uselessly interrupting episode in the blissful repose of Nothing, . . . as only a gross mystification—not to say, Prellerei, cheat!

This is the voice of Atheism, and to this voice only is Materialism adequate. This is the 'unglückliche Bewusstseyn,' the unhappy consciousness; and there is hardly a great literary man in England at present who smoulders not slowly into a grey ash under it. This is the infinite misery! What wonder, if the wretch who realises it to himself should creep to bed with a dose of aconite in his stomach! The sick like himself will say, it is all one; but there are those who see the pain of the simple souls that stand in relation—and more! Even as they lift the hat that honours, not him, but death in his place—their lips shall involuntarily wear the shadow of a sneer—a sneer that means: Oh, no; it will not do to take the pet; you should have strutted your part out—you should have played out the Idea! This is it—there *is* an Idea. It is ours to realise it—and in contentment so—but we are wretches if we refuse.

This materialistic ruin is illustrated also by the Illumination in its latest scientific phase. This phase, or

this misnamed science, says simply, that all that we see and know are but material phenomena, that vary to contingent material conditions. The contingency of the variation may be understood from this, that such disturbances of the earth's interior as depend on volcanic agency, — which itself is due to accidents of the central conflagration, or to fortuitous complexions, gaseous or other, — may give rise to very various interchanges of land and sea, of heat and cold, &c., and, consequently, to very various worlds, and very variously inhabited. Nevertheless, there is, at the same time, everywhere present in this variety such common analogy as can point only to a common origin; and it seems reasonable to conclude that all that we see is but the result of the successive transmutations of a single primitive species, or, indeed, of a single primitive atom. From such antecedents, there conceivably emerges, under favourable circumstances, the first rude cell, which propagates itself, which improves itself. Improvement, in particular, becomes very intelligible so soon as a stage of animality has been attained: for what will exist then will be a battle of life; all action will be a trial of strength. Men select their breeders, and so modify species that they cease almost to be specifically the same. So Nature: through the struggle for existence and the victory of the strongest, she also selects her breeders. Thus it is that we have the Flora and Fauna which presently exist; and these together constitute but a single chain of organisation from the lowest forms of life, up, through the monkey, to the man. If any links in this chain still fail, if intermediate steps are still required in order to complete the proof of actual transmutation, appeal need only be made to the element of time. All human

records are but as a day, an hour: but infinite time extends a field, adequate, as we look backwards, to the possibility of the fact,—adequate, as we look forwards, to the actual demonstration of the same. Infinitude in the latter direction has probably its term, however, so far as man (and, indeed, the present sidereal system) is concerned. Conditions being presupposed to remain as they are at present, there is evidently going on such gradual loss of heat, mechanical force, energy of all kinds, as will reduce all, *in the end*, to a single cold, dark, meaningless mass, in the centre of a cold, dark, meaningless space. Whether there be what is called a God to change that or not? . . .

This is what the Aufklärung, that began by seeing the corruptions of the mediæval church, has ended in. It is not to be supposed, however, that all the members of the movement are absolutely of the same mind in regard to the various articles of the general creed: rather, it is curious to watch the differences—to watch the particular predilections. One, the Philopitheque par excellence, bravely goes the whole ape—waves, as he advances to battle, the picture of a procession of monkeys, man at top, and triumphantly thrusts his fist of enlightenment into the blind pride and wretched superstition of men! Oilily another,—buoying himself blandly up on a well-balanced series of smooth plausibilities,—talks, subrisively-deprecatingly, of this 'picture of the ever-increasing dominion of mind over matter,' and ascends—the gratification of a triumph of *enlightenment* being enough for him—in Jovine serenity to his elevated Olympus of—shall we say—'philosophical Atheism'? The figure of Mr. Buckle is quite comic here, Garrick-like: with tears in his eyes he speaks of the consolations of deism and immortality; but, sud-

denly recollecting his duty to himself as an advanced thinker, he struggles forward beyond—oh, if it were only possible!—beyond Comte himself, 'whose great merits it were unjust to deny!' Another figure I know, more comic still, the pattern Illuminatus of a generation back: with Mr. Buckle, he too does not like the reproach of having been left behind; but old leavens are still strong within him, and he ventures to suggest that is not quite certain yet, not quite agreed yet, that the belief in a God and in Immortality is to be given up. The specially comic element lies in his shoulders, however. Above these shoulders there rises a clear, experienced head, and beneath them beats a sound warm heart, by virtue of both of which he can speak in the fullest and most conclusive manner of books, and men, and crises of life, at the same time that he is the most social and agreeable of human beings. By these excellences he sets no store, however; all that he values himself on lies in his shoulders. His right shoulder he names to himself Political Economy; his left he cherishes more quietly as Pang at the Biblical humbug. Talk to him of the first, of the right shoulder, and he raises it high, proudly advancing to the front in all the fullness of a crop well ruffled, in all the spreading dignity of Philosophy in bloom. Talk to him now of the second, and, ah! it is no less dear to him; but, see, it has instantly sunk, while over it suddenly shows, crouchingly, as if for a spring, a red, blue, green, yellow face, that spits out,—with a maniacal eye, and a rabidity that appals—And what of *that*?

As regards the theory itself, perhaps, it would be fair to point out, in the first place, a certain vacillation as to what position it is to assume on the question of

progress. For a long time,—generally, indeed, such is the case still, *for the first three-fourths of the volume*, —improvement in series, 'a chain,' from lowest to highest, was a fixed and undoubted tenet: it was always understood, for example, and it is still said, that 'the earliest known fossil mammalia are of low grade.' Now, however,—and especially towards the end of the volume,—a change has set in; progress seems no longer necessary, and we are told that 'the earliest cryptogams are the highest.' It would be fair, we say, to point to this, and to call for consistency and decision; but we shall assume—to give materialism its strongest side at once—that progression as progression is out of place in any such element. Progression as progression involves an antecedent idea, involves design—a principle not by any means welcome to the materialist, who would know no moulding hand but that of external conditions. Accordingly, the progression that results from Natural Selection is rather apparent than real. In certain seasons of scarcity, for example, the long-necked Herbivora might live, while the short-necked should die; but the former need not necessarily be an improvement on the latter. This, then, were not properly *progression*; this rather were but *succession* —contingent succession, on contingent variations of contingent conditions. We shall not object that, perhaps, succession is inadequate to the facts; we shall adhere to such influences only as might lead to a natural selection of the Giraffe, on the one hand, and to an equally natural rejection of the Ox, on the other. But let us remark for a moment on what in the theory concerns this Giraffe. How came the Giraffe by such a length of neck? Oh, it was not always so, poor thing; it used, indeed, to be much like other creatures;

only, you must know, there was once a season of scarcity, and out of a mass of herbivorous quadrupeds, none survived but those that got at the leaves of trees, by having the advantage of the others in length of neck. But was one season enough? Oh, as for that, the same thing happened more or less every season. And why is the process terminated—why does the Giraffe's neck not lengthen still? How do you know the process *is* terminated? Perhaps, it is going on still; from the short records of human existence, we cannot hope, you know, &c. &c.: besides, it is only fair to say that things cannot be expected to stretch for ever! Are not these just such *propos* as schoolboys might indulge in, all concerned, the while, being already much too dark in the beak to believe a word of them? This theory is supposed to be superior to that of Lamarck, who feigns the neck of the Giraffe to have simply stretched to the effort of desire; but is not this latter much the more likely of the two? Compare the hut of the first Barisius with the palace of the Tuileries, and see between, the long series of cabins, cots, cottages, and houses, which must have been built the while, before the skill adequate to the first was transformed into the skill adequate to the last. Figure this transformation now, not as in series, but as in an individual: behold the hut of the Barisius grow into the Tuileries. In this way, man's hut has so grown in process of time only in obedience to his own desire: why, then, should not the neck of the Giraffe have similarly grown, through long generations, in obedience to a similar principle? If we can figure a single hut and a single man to represent the one respective series, we may figure also similarly, respectively, a single Giraffe and a single neck. There, then, at the foot of

its single tree, is the single Giraffe, with its single neck It but reaches the lowest leaves as yet, and has no further desire. But now a breeze blows into its teeth a branch from the tier above: how tender, juicy, and delicious! Desire awakes, and by dint of effort it attains to the tier above. An accidental branch from the third tier similarly incites to new effort, which, ever similarly stimulated, continues ever stretching from tier to tier, till at length, in the end, the Giraffe—or, what is the same thing, its descendant after millions of generations—finds itself browsing on the very top!

One must admit, at all events, the intrepidity of men who can commit themselves to such giraffe-stories.

But we do not wish to concern ourselves at present with the puerilities of the execution in detail, nor with the inadequacy of *succession* to *progression*, nor with the comic uncertainty of hand that cannot let go and yet will not hold *progression*: what concerns us here is the materialistic theory in itself, of which *succession* is, perhaps, the most characteristic feature. Now, *succession* does not by any means necessitate a beginning; and it is a proof of the *haziness* of the theorists that, through the principle of *analogy*, they nevertheless postulate such. Of this *postulatum*, haziness, indeed, is the very element; for though the conception of a primitive atom floats somewhere or other as nucleus in it, this nucleus, however primitive *it is to be*, has already around it an entire world of more primitive *conditions*, to which *it*, indeed, is but the medium through which *they* variously pronounce themselves. A beginning must be something First, and something absolutely One; but a primitive atom already *in* conditions is neither the one nor the other. The thought, then, is evidently very defective that would conceive

an atom *primitive*, and yet would see it in time and in space, and surrounded by conditions. If all these elements were to be granted as a beginning, creation—at least to theory—were not so difficult. But, though a material atom be evidently thus wholly inadequate to Time, Space, and Conditions, and, consequently, quite impossibly a beginning, let us conceive it such; let us name it a First and One, and let us look at it on other sides. Now, in the first place, of what size shall it be? This question is adapted to give long reflection, perhaps, to the majority of minds; but we hasten to interrupt this by asking again: Nay, all size being but relative, why think of size at all? Any size is surely quite indifferent to infinite space—one size quite as good as another; a needle-point were in this connexion quite as effective as a pin-head, and that as a whole solar system! A whole solar system of a single substance dwindles down in opposition to infinite space into a needle-point; and, *è contra*, a needle-point is thus tantamount—quantitatively—to a solar system. In a word, Quantity is indifferent; it must have been hazard that assigned the first quantity; or, in our way of it, we do not see any reason for quantity at all—we cannot tell why there should have been any quantity, or just such a thing as quantity. That is true; these questions have been only concerns of Hegel as yet.* There seems no reason, then, why we should not

* There is that in the above which will give a firm hold at last on the Quantitative Infinite, which consists simply in the fact of the absolute relativity of Quantity; any positivity of Quantity seems absolutely and infinitely to flee. This is just the *infinite divisibility* on another side, but brought back, as it were, into unity of notion. The reader will do well to refer to the relative places under Quantity, and will probably be delighted to find himself in complete light at last. We may point out now too, that, though the *rationale*, formerly as-

at once go back to nothing, so far as quantity is concerned: but, not to distress ourselves with this, we

signed for the apparent difficulties that presented themselves on occasion of the 'Nullities' of Thomas Taylor, is the technically correct one, what lies at bottom is this, that any quantity is quite as good as another, *so far as a capability of discretion is concerned.*

What is involved in all that, is simply the *antithesis,* the *Notion,* the fact that the seen *explication* implies, is through an unseen *implication.* This is the *Species.* What is, is but the middle of the growing antithesis, which was at first Being and Nothing. There is no advance to identity that is not *implicitly* accompanied by an advance to difference: so it is you repel the point only to be struck by the but. Energy, you will grant to be positive, and very positive too; still it implies a *negative, another, on* which it acts, *through* which indeed it is. Nay, of the two, either is indifferently the other, just as it is often manifestly indifferent which of the moments you name universal, which particular. Energy is much talked of, nowadays, by philosophers, who will only stultify themselves till they understand this necessary mutuation. Meantime they think energy a *one*! Hegel, with his pairs of inner and outer, force and energy, &c., is there the while to save them, if they wish, from whole lifetimes of mere futility. It is necessary to know that any identity, or whole, may be viewed as an absolute, which is absolute, however, only through its relativity, and identical only through its difference. The extrication and opposition of the relativity, the difference, from and to, the absoluteness, the identity, is the *Method,* the collapse or eclipse of the one into the other to a new. God is, what he is, through himself; God is, at the same time, not what he is, through himself; otherwise he were not what he is through himself. This again is *the Notion,* an Affirmative, an explicit 2nd that involves a Negative, an implicit 1st, a 1st and 2nd that are identical in a 3rd: the Trinity! The whole secret nature of the case will yield itself to due meditation here.

The reader will, perhaps, perceive that there has been contemplated something of an arrangement to produce a *graduated* conviction; and the following statement will, it may be, complete the metaphysical side:—

The Notion, or Thought as Thought, which as such has always an object on which it is engaged, is, according to Hegel, this, that it (you or I if you will) cannot *explicate* without, accurately and exactly to the same extent, *implicating*— cannot set into *position* without, at the same time, quite correspondently, setting into negation. Of this Notion, all Antitheses are modes; or all possible antitheses are, in ultimate analysis, identical with each other in their essential Form and in their essential Matter. Thus, *explicate* Being as completely as you may, you are, all the time, just as completely, *implicating* Nothing; and of this absolutely abstract antithesis, all other antitheses are but repetitions — on higher

shall just assume a quantitative atom in the middle of Time and Space. Now, again, how shall this atom distinguish itself? It must be something—something positive—not nothing; it must affirmatively distinguish and assert itself. But it is impossible for anything to make itself distinguishable, to assert itself, unless as in contrast to another—and the atom is by supposition *alone*. The qualitative is quite as much an indifferent limit, as the quantitative one: the *that* is not less a one of two than the *there*,—each is through its other. The redound, the *contrecoup*, is inevitable. You cannot make a vacuum without at the same time filling the identically same vacuum: difference is identity, identity difference. Eliminate A—its place is filled; and you have the labour of the Danaïds, not to the end of the chapter, but to the creation of the world. Setzung and Aufhebung, *Ponency* and *Tollency*, (we may coin also *ponated* and *tollated*, *ponation* and *tollation*,) are the moments of the single mutuation that is. This *explication* of nature, in which you are now, will

stages, and in graduated series, however. All possible antitheses of thought will be found to constitute a System—the Logical Idea. Of this Idea, Nature is but—and accurately so—the externalisation. Spirit, again—or say actual Humanity—is but a return of the idea from externality to internality. These three spheres, however,—Logical Idea, Nature, Spirit,—are not to be understood as each self-dependent and self-subsistent: they are together *one*—one in trinity. The total result is a System, by which Hegel conceives himself to answer all philosophical questions which have ever yet been put. By this system also he conceives himself to complete as well, not only—its beginning and germ—the Kantian philosophy, but philosophy as such, and this finally and definitively, by raising it to a *scientific* basis and informing it with a *scientific* principle. In short, we may say that Hegel has shown the Metaphysical world to be not less under the control of *Action* and *Reaction* than the Physical; and that, while it is Action that, as explicit and overt, is, in the first instance, believed the whole, Reaction, though implicit and occult, is no less real, essential, and necessary.

disappear into its *implication*, but in the new explication you will abide. Remain in the disappearing explication, and you remain in the eternal sorrow. The explication as the explication is the abstract side, and this you have chosen,—forgetting that you are the concrete, and will still be the other that emerges.

A primitive atom is an untenable position, then, for it were absolutely indistinguishable without another. Such atom, in fact, were no more than abstract Quality, that and no more. But, abstracting from the fact that, with a primitive atom, we are but in presence of abstract Quantity and abstract Quality, let us hold a first and one space-filling atom to be still conceivable: Space is around it, Time is over it; it is there, one and single, the absolutely First. Why *it* was the first, and not another, we shall not ask. It is there, and in such manner there: but how will anything else ever come there? It is absolutely single, how can it possibly change?—how can it possibly grow?—how can it possibly move?—and where are your necessary *conditions*?—Pshaw! kick *thought* into limbo: it is easy to see that condensation takes place, motion results, heat, light, and electricity are generated, and so we have the whole!—Certainly the kick has made Cosmogony easy!

The theorists, in fact, feign all back into a single identity, but quite forget to ask themselves, How, then, can we extricate *difference* from *identity*? This is really the problem in ultimate generalisation, and these theorists know not—who does?—that this was the problem Kant set up when he asked, 'How are *à priori* synthetic judgments possible?' This, however, is the first step towards a true way of stating the problem, and into this it is perfectly clear that Hegel saw.

What it all comes to, then, is simply things as they are; a primitive atom is nought, we have only material structure under material conditions. Indeed, the theorists in question may declare, We never intended it otherwise, of primitive atoms we never spoke. It may be said in reply, that to go back to a primitive atom was, in fact, to put their own problem into its true place. A *primordial form* seems really to demand a primitive atom; and to bridge the gulf from this first atom to an oyster, were not more difficult than to bridge the gulf from an oyster to a man: agencies adequate to the latter may be readily assumed adequate to the former also. But, indeed, the search for a *primordial form*, to which they say they are driven by the universal *analogy*, is, in ultimate analysis, nothing but the search—for *identity without difference*; quite the same problem as that of the primitive atom. The one great error of these theorists, in truth, is their one-sided resolution to look only for identity: I am *like* the monkey; so I am to abstract from the *differences*, and speculate on how and when I derived thence! But, similarly, I am like the rat; slit each of us from chin to pubis, and how analogous are the organs! I am, in fact, an animal, and as such analogous to all animals—nay, I stand as summary of the entire round of the principles of nature: but what then? Am I not also more?—have I not an inner as well?—and on which side is the testimony, if that whole outer be but one analogy of this inner, and on principles of this inner? It is a mistake, then, to abstract from *difference* and signalise *identity* alone, just as it is a mistake to signalise difference and abstract from identity.* This

* *Enlightenment*, on the general question of Man, would have done well to have remembered these words of one of its own foremost

mistake coheres with the general mistake that these theorists propose to approach the problem and manipulate the problem with all their categories ready-formed: it has never occurred to them to say, we determine all by difference and identity, by conditions, by cause and effect, &c.: it will, therefore, be necessary to examine first of all what these things mean, and whether what they involve be in itself true or not. Now, this it was that occurred to Hegel; and so it was that he was enabled to discern an entire internal system, of which nature was but the externalisation, and thus complete on both sides the single analogy, the concrete reciprocity.

Had the theorists in question but perceived the necessity of verifying those internal standards by which they proposed to appreciate and appraise all, they would have consulted Metaphysic, and would have been surprised to find that the whole industry they contemplated had received its rationale, and, in its extreme form, its *coup-de-grâce*, more than fourscore years ago at the hands of Kant. Or—as we may say it otherwise—they would have been surprised to find that what they contemplated was at once absolutely certain and utterly impossible.

In what he calls the *Anhang*, or Appendix, to the *Transcendental Dialectic*, Kant proves the existence of three laws in human nature imposed by it on the objects of sense, and received by it from and with these objects, as if they (these laws) were part

priests, Bayle:—'L'homme est le morceau le plus difficile à digérer qui se présente à tous les systèmes. Il est l'écueil du vrai et du faux; il embarrasse les naturalistes, il embarrasse les orthodoxes. . . . . Je ne sais si la nature peut présenter un object plus étrange et plus difficile à pénétrer à la raison toute seule, que ce que nous appelons un animal raisonnable.'

and parcel of these objects themselves, and not a reflexion, a colour fallen on them from the very faculties to which they (these objects) presented themselves. This peculiarity is summed up in the single word *transcendental*: that is transcendental which is really a contribution to objects from us, but which, at the same time, appears to us actually in the objects themselves. Further, the three laws in question enter not into objects as *Constitutive* of them, but only influence them, so to speak, from without, as *Regulative* of them into unity and system. Now, it is such laws that become *transcendent* when wrongly applied—when, on the supposition that they belong to the objects themselves, conclusions are attempted to be made in regard to these objects which transcend the limits of all possible experience. Here, then, we have a perfect indication of the entire nature of the Darwinian industry: a law, not in objects, but falling from us on them, has been erroneously supposed by the reasoners alluded to to be still, nevertheless, in them, and to be capable of supplying results quite impossible to any experience. In other words, these gentlemen have supposed *objective* what was only *transcendental*, attempting, moreover, to force the same into such use that it became *transcendent*.

The three laws in question Kant speaks of thus:—'Reason, therefore, prepares for Understanding its field, 1. by a principle of the Homogeneity of the Variety of individuals under higher *genera*; 2. through a principle of the Variety of the Homogeneity of individuals under lower *species*; and, in order to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3. a law of the Affinity of all notions, which law dictates a continuous transition from every single species to every other through

gradual increase of Diversity: we may name them the Principles of the Homogeneity, of the Specification, and of the Continuity of Forms.' The first law Kant further expresses by the proposition, '*Entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda*;' the second by, '*Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas*;' and the third by, '*Non datur vacuum formarum*,' or, '*Datur continuum formarum*,' or, '*Est lex continui in natura*.' Each of these laws aims only at a '*Focus Imaginarius*,' for the use of our understanding, which, therefore, as a focus imaginarius, can only be asymptotically approached, nor ever reached, for it is underived from experience, and is indeed wholly beyond the limits of any possible experience. Into the proofs of Kant we have no room to enter, but it will probably be found, in the end, that they are irrefutable. Variety, Affinity, and Unity are three necessities of Reason, and they fall on Nature from Reason, but are not in Nature as such: they are only the source of three *maxims* of Reason, which Reason only *seeks* to realise.

When, then, the supporters of the modern argument in question would refer all to a common genus, and would account for all variety by 'transmutation of species' (accomplished by whatever expedients they may like), they are only repeating the schoolboy's chase after the rainbow; they are pursuing only what is in themselves, and will move as they move. There is no single genus in Nature, nor any infinitude of mutually-affined species: these are but spectra of the reasoner's own projection, illusions merely when their real quality is undetected. They have their indispensable use, they connect and give meaning to experience, but they are only snares and pitfalls when applied beyond the possibility of experience. One grand system, unity of

type, all this must be postulated from the very constitution of human reason; but from the very constitution of experience as well, it can never be realised in experience. It is ours to assume that there is such articulate chain in fact: we but stultify ourselves, however, would we attempt to see this chain *in growth*. This, nevertheless, is just what Darwinists *would* see; and just so it is that Darwinianism is at once absolutely certain and utterly impossible. We would catch Nature in the fact, would we—actually come upon her with an individual half *in* and half *out*! We would see *identity* end, and *difference* begin; but so still that the one were the other!

But we may support Kant by Hegel, who (Encyclo. § 249, and Remark) pronounces as follows:

> Nature is to be regarded as a *System of Grades*, of which the one necessarily rises out of the other, and is the proximate truth of the one from which it results—but not so that the one were *naturally* generated out of the other, but only in the inner Idea which constitutes the Ground of Nature. *Metamorphosis* accrues only to the Notion as such, as only its alteration is development. The Notion, however, is in Nature partly only inner, partly existent only as living individual: to this individual alone, then, is *existent* metamorphosis confined.
>
> It has been an inept conception of earlier and later 'Naturphilosophie' to regard the progression and transition of one natural form and sphere into a higher as an outwardly actual production which, however, to be made *clearer*, is relegated into the *obscurity* of the past. To Nature externality is precisely proper—to let the differences fall asunder and present themselves as neutral Existences: the dialectic Notion which guides forward the *stages*, is the inner of the same. Thinking consideration must deny itself such nebulous, at bottom sensuous, conceptions, as is in especial the

so-called *origin*, for example, of plants and animals from water, and then the *origin* of the more highly developed animal organisations from the lower, &c.

This, written many years before the appearance of Mr. Darwin's book, reads like a critique on nothing else. This, in fact, is the truth of the case and ends the business. Nature is the externality of the Notion, and, as such, a prey to boundless contingency: the metamorphosis, the development, the articulation, is due to the Notion alone. Name it in the language of Kant, or name it in the language of Hegel, it is the same thing that is indicated. Kant himself says, 'the principle of genera postulates identity,' that of species 'diversity.' In ultimate abstraction, indeed, the whole problem just concerns the metaphysic of *identity and difference; neither of which is without the other.**

The error, then, of the reasoners in question is patent. We may say, in general, too, that they have been precipitate and rash, that they have attempted to execute the realisation of their problem without having first thought this problem *out*. Not only is it utterly impossible for any material principle to be an adequate Beginning, an adequate First and One, but the whole problem they set themselves concerns at bottom abstract Quality, abstract Quantity, abstract Identity, abstract Difference, abstract Condition, and, in general, the whole body of Metaphysic with which—though they knew it not themselves—unexamined, simply presupposed, they set to manipulate their atom or their species, as if *so* any legitimate result *could* be possible.

* It is interesting to find Kant coming so often directly on *the Notion*. At the end of this Appendix, he will be found saying, 'Thus, then, all human knowledge begins with Perceptions, proceeds to Notions, and ends with Ideas'—the triplicity of the Notion almost in its very logical name.

Consider their zoological infinite alone! What is it but a blind presupposition that Difference, through its own infinitude, *identifies* itself at last? So it is that the infinitude of Discretion eliminates itself and restores Continuity; and thus, too, it is that we arrive at length at truth—the Kantian, the Hegelian, the Concrete Notion. Cuvier shall pursue Difference, and St. Hilaire Identity: but we shall take part exclusively with neither. There is a genus which holds under it all species, and all individuals; there is a horizon which holds under it infinite horizons, as they others: but this genus, this horizon is not a material atom; it is the Notion, it is Self-Consciousness, it is God.

In passing, let us just point out again the one-sidedness of the Infinite of Natural Philosophy at present, the progress of which is to bring all material atoms into a cold mass, or a hot mass, in the centre! Were there nothing in existence but the material forces of this Natural Philosophy, the *past* Infinite ought long ago to have achieved the result contemplated. That it has not done so depends on the duplicity of the Notion, to which Attraction were impossible, did it not possess, at the same time, just as much Repulsion. Did said Natural Philosophy consider this, it would wisely withdraw in time from a Metaphysic in reference to *Energy*, which is, at bottom, as crude as the ludicrous incoherences of the Medical Philosophers, or Philosophic Medicists, who, at present, wall-blind themselves, afflict with their own malady every mortal—who attempts to read them! *

We were badly enough off, then, with the mere

* In coherence with the Infinites already mentioned, there is a Geological Infinite in general which, however, ought to be seen to be no Geological Infinite, but a Geological Skeleton.

brute law of Mr. Buckle, but we are worse off still with the contingent lawlessness of varying conditions; for *so*, there were nothing left us but the atoms of Democritus, in the void of Democritus, under the τύχη of Democritus. But even suppose it so—even suppose all the views of materialism accepted, one after the other, up to complete Darwinianism (necessarily, of course, Identity as Identity, but in material form—that is, as a Primitive Atom)—why, we have but to turn the back, and the world is as it was, the problem as it was. We shall admit all, we shall see the primitive atom, we shall see its gradual evolution into the formed universe. So admitting, so seeing, we shall lose ourselves in the despair of materialism; we shall lament to ourselves that material agency is all, that there is no hope. But just let us turn our backs on the atom a moment, just let us turn round to the formed universe, came it from whence it may,—Ah! it is all still there the Apparition, in its wonder, in its beauty, with its innumerable ideas! The majestic shape has been there all the while, in unmoved serenity, as if smiling on the tetchy infant, Man! How came she there, that majestic shape, jewelled in ideas—jewelled in ideas, were they but shells of the shore, or simple heath-bells of the most savage moor?—That is it, all has been duly developed from an atom, but whence are the ideas—the ideas of the vast resultant organisation?

Meantime—how easy soever, how varied soever the refutation—men have given themselves up a prey to this materialism: they go down everywhere desperate at present in a wide welter of atheistic atomism. The end of the Aufklärung is material self-will. But is it well *so*? Is it really good to end as Schopen-

hauer? Are we prepared to bear such misery? Is there no consciousness but 'the unhappy consciousness'—das Unglückliche Bewusstseyn? Must we believe ourselves but isolated atoms—unconnected with each other, unconnected with the universe—disjuncts —foam-bells, haply murmuring ourselves *out*, on some plashy pebble of a forlorn shore?

No: the triumph of *superior enlightenment* will not support the materialist himself long. It is in vain that the soul is burned out of us, that God is burned out of us; even when reduced to a material calx, these, which might have been within us to our comfort and support, return to haunt us from without, as ghosts of vengeance. God is *what is*, and he will pain his creatures till they confess him.

We live in the *diastole* of the universe, and our souls long for the season of *systole*. All is in the *disjunct*—cold, lonely, unsupported: fain would we have company once again, warmth, support, in the *conjunct*. Let us not be too miserable, neither; judgment is now the moment at work, we *must* accept the element — we *may* enjoy the variety. There is a *comique* to amuse at present, even in the shallow, even in the triumphant worthless. We must not give all to tears; there is matter still for laughter. Grisildis is, but not far off as well the wanton she of Bath. If there be the 'Cotter's Saturday Night,' there are likewise the 'Jolly Beggars;' if we have Milton's 'Cathedral Music,' we have also an ode of Catullus—(to Furius if you will). So let us make the best of what is given us—*Only*, let us know rightly what that is, and of what whole it is but a part. We are shaken asunder from each other certainly, and the traditional substance

in which we lived—a common cement*—has fallen out; but it is ours to see this, and it is ours to repair this. Systole must succeed diastole: it is now the time to fill the bucket.

It is but another side of the same fact, that all weight, for some time back, has been put upon the conscience: not in our works, it has been said, is merit, but in the spirit which produced them. An eloquent utterance to this effect will be found in Carlyle's Hero-worship (Hero-worship itself, by-the-by, is but a part of the same whole). This, however, is not all true; this, indeed, is now largely false. This is but the empty bucket, and the bucket has value only in its filling. I, you, he,—we are not to be left, each to his own opinion of conscience, of spirit; there must be a guarantee that the conscience, the spirit, is the right one. No one can be trusted in that respect to his own self-will. What is concerned is a rational *object*, which can be realised by the universal will alone. The conscience of the individual is amenable to the prescriptions of the rational object, nor possesses authority but in assent and consent to the universal. It is not in the power of a single female individual even to refuse a *crinoline* at present without a creak in the machinery of society—a creak that falls with most pain on the ear of the recusant. This is an extreme case, and a temporary, unjustifiable too, certainly, to universal reason: but, in absolute fact, Use and Wont is the true Morality. That is the meaning of the

* This may bring pictures of mites in a cheese: no matter! tradition is to humanity just such an element; and it is this element which the Aufklärung (and Political Economy is but a subordinate part of it) has discharged for the time, leaving us all isolated units, unsupported and unhappy.

Hegelian distinction between *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität*. *Moralität* is the conscience of the Aufklärung: it demands the right of private judgment—place for its own subjective feeling. *Sittlichkeit* is the deposit of objective reason realised by time in the practical ways of a people. *Moralität*—despite the tolerance, the enlightened liberality it asserts for itself at present—is a sour and thin fanatic that burns its enemy alive. *Sittlichkeit* is a jolly Burgher that lives *in Substance*, with his family, with his neighbours, with his administrators, with his God. It ought to be ours then, as it were, to fatten our *Moralität* with a filling of *Sittlichkeit*—to pasture, as it were, the one on the other. But—in direct antagonism to this—your thorough *Illuminatus* of the day shall laugh at the mass for wearing absurd round hats and absurd-tailed coats: he, for his part, shall be above the folly of the herd; his wedding shall be surreptitious, and he shall skulk about it with the air of a thief in the sulks; he shall not christen his children, neither, nor attend church; he shall not ceremoniously exchange cards, and never for the life of him drop one with a P.P.C. on it. He shall write no letters of sympathy, none of congratulation, not any of condolence. He shall never send any kind messages to inquire, and never be seen at a funeral. He shall exist in *Pure Reason*!—But what is this Pure Reason? It is only his own reason; it is uncorrected by the reason of others; it tyrannises over himself, it tyrannises over everyone unfortunately submitted to him. Reason here, in fact, is simply tantamount to abstract self-will; and the rule of self-will is the only tyranny, the rule of self-will is despotism proper.

This self-will feels itself, indeed, *abstract*—divorced

from Substance. But the whole bent of all theoretic teaching for a long time back—in Political Economy and the Aufklärung generally (compare Shelley on that 'Anarch,' 'Custom')—has been to foster nothing but this self-will; and so it is that we are all, more or less, infected—Society, more or less, disintegrated by it. To seek a cure, then, is not now an affair of a few individual Illuminati, but that of the community at large, and it is to be accomplished by a return to Substance.

But what is Substance? Substance is the traditional observances prescribed by objective Reason, in the elements of State, Town, Church, Family, &c. And would you have this Substance in the authority and articulation of the Notion, it is there for everyone in the pages of Hegel. On such a wrong course are we all nowadays, that—to take a homely example—people still entertain indeed, but there is no longer any hospitality. Rather entertainments at present are periodical mortifications: I mortify you by a display of my splendour in April and June; you mortify me by exhibiting yours in May and July. And in the midst whether of mortification or triumph, we each sigh for the days when things were otherwise: we eat the *dîner à la Russe*, but what is present to thought—what is actually fragrant in the nostril—is some plainer meal years since. We are disposed to prophesy, then, that the first symptom of a return to Substance will be a return to meals actually intended for enjoyment—and next, perhaps, the recall of the children from the Boarding-school!

In short, what we all long for, is the Christian simplicity, the Christian happiness of our forefathers. We have seen already in picture the subject of this

simplicity, the subject of this happiness; but it will do us good to see him once again, 'the simple pious soul, on the green earth, in the bright fresh air,—patiently industrious, patiently loving,—piously penitent, piously hopeful,—sure of a new world and a new life, a better world and a better life, united to his loved ones, there for ever in the realms of God, through the merits of his Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ.' This is happiness —the thinnest Aufgeklärter, if he deny it with his lips, will confess it by his sighs! This is happiness, and this is what must be restored to us, else History indeed draws nigh its term: a universe recognised to be material only were but Humanity's grave. But this happiness *will* be restored to us, and in this restoration the very most powerful instrument will, perhaps, be the identical Hegel as in contrast to whom—so contradictorily opposed the error was—the picture of this happiness first suggested itself. Hegel, indeed, has no object but—reconciling and neutralising atomism,—once again to restore to us—and in the new light of the new thought—Immortality and Free-will, Christianity and God.

With the quotation from Bacon with which Kant begins his Kritik, it seems fit that we should now, after Hegel, and the glimpse obtained into him, end. It runs thus:—

De nobis ipsis silemus: de re autem, quæ agitur, petimus: ut homines eam non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo habeant, non Sectæ nos alicujus, aut Placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis æqui . . . in commune consulant . . . et ipsi in partem veniant. Præterea ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et animo concipiant; quum re vera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.

Now, probably, it will appear not presumptuous that Kant should have sought to prefigure his work so. Now, too, it may be, we are able to see not too dimly that the Kantian Philosophy concerns an *opus;* and not an *opinio*; the foundations of human advantage and advancement, and not the interests of any dogma or sect; and that it may, indeed, be the end and legitimate term of infinite error. And now, perhaps, we shall be willing to consult together, and, for our own profit, participate in the work—not without hope; —at the same time that we shall assuredly not bind ourselves to the mere human letter whether of Kant or Hegel, as either infinite or more than mortal. Finally, if we may be allowed *de nobis ipsis* non *silere*, it will be only to say that we hope the imperfections of these volumes may prove but as the irregularity of a ladder—but as the interruptedness of a series of stepping-stones which yet reach at least *to* the *terra firma* of a general desire—HEGEL.

THE END.

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